National Green Tribunal
Surti Mohammed Irfan vs State Of Gujarat on 12 December, 2025
(Pune Bench)
BEFORE THE NATIONAL GREEN TRIBUNAL
WESTERN ZONE BENCH, PUNE
[THROUGH PHYSICAL HEARING (WITH HYBRID OPTION)]
APPEAL NO.217 OF 2025 (WZ)
Surti Mohammed Irfan,
R/o 4051, Behind Old Anjuman School,
Gollimda, Astodia Road,
Ahmedabad - 380 001 ..Appellant
Versus
1. State of Gujarat,
Through its Principal Secretary,
Forest and Environment Department,
8th Floor, Block 14, New Sachivalaya,
Gandhinagar - 382 010
2. Gujarat Pollution Control Board,
Through its Member Secretary,
Paryavaran Bhavan, Sector-10A,
Gandhinagar - 382 010
3. Appellate Authority constituted under the
Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution)
Act, 1074, through its Chairperson
Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Principal Secretary,
Forest and Environment Department,
14th Block, 8th Floor, Sachivalaya,
Gandhinagar ....Respondents
APPEARANCE :
Appellant : Mr. Maitreya Ghorpade, Advocate
Respondent : Mr. Maulik Nanavati, Advocate for R-1/State of Gujarat
and R-3/Appellate Authority
Mr. Neelkanth Mehta, Advocate for R-2/GPCB
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH KUMAR SINGH, JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE DR. SUJIT KUMAR BAJPAYEE, EXPERT MEMBER
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Reserved on : 19.11.2025
Pronounced on : 12.12.2025
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JUDGMENT
1. This appeal has been filed under Section 18 sub-section (1) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 read with Section 16 sub-section (a) of the NGT Act, challenging the legality and correctness of the order dated 06.06.2025 passed by the Appellate Authority - respondent No.3 constituted under the provisions of Section 28 sub-section (1) of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short, "the Water Act") by the State of Gujarat whereby the appellant's appeal has been dismissed, holding the same to be not maintainable. It is held therein that as per Section 28 sub- section (1) of the Water Act, M/s N.H.H. Textiles Processors (not a party to the present proceeding) can be considered as "DIRECTLY COMMUNICATED PARTY" and hence, the appeal was held to be not maintainable.
2. The impugned order dated 06.06.2025 was passed in Appeal (F) No.218740 of 2024 filed on 19.12.2024 passed by respondent No.2 - GPCB, granting Consolidated Consent and Authorization (CCA) to M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors - Project Proponent under the provisions of the Water Act, Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 and Hazardous and Other Wastes (Management and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2016 for operating a Textile Processing Unit located at Behrampura, Ahmedabad.
3. It is urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that respondent No.3 - Appellate Authority has committed an error in interpreting Section 28 sub-section (1) of the Water Act, which provides right to appeal to "any person aggrieved" by an order issued by the State Pollution Control Board under the provisions of Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Water Act and such right to appeal is not limited to a "directly communicated party".
4. Further it is mentioned that the appellant preferred an appeal due to significant violations of the Water Act being effected by M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors in operation of the impugned textile processing unit. These Page 2 of 22 violations were evident from the inspection reports, show-cause notices, CCA renewal rejection order and closure orders issued by the GPCB against M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors. The appellant had also raised the contentions establishing the failure on the part of the Project Proponent to ensure Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD), which was likely to result in environmental pollution. The Project Proponent - M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors was also extracting groundwater without valid permissions from the relevant Statutory Authorities, which would certainly lead to depletion of the local groundwater resource. All such grounds were detailed in the said appeal. The said appeal was filed in a format as provided under Rules 7 and 8 of the Gujarat Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Appeal Rules, 1982 (for short, "Gujarat Appeal Rules"), wherewith Form-I was also annexed, in which the appeal was to be moved. The appeal was placed for hearing before the Appellate Authority on 29.05.2025, where-after impugned order dated 06.06.2025 was passed. Thereafter, being aggrieved by that order, the appellant seeks a direction for that appeal to be remanded to the Appellate Authority - respondent No.3 for reconsideration for deciding on merits in time-bound manner.
5. It is further urged that Section 28 of the Water Act clearly reveals the legislative intent that it allows the right of appeal to "any aggrieved person". Therefore, the rationale adopted by the Appellate Authority while dismissing the appeal that only M/s N.H.H. Textile Processor/Project Proponent had right to prefer an appeal against the CCA dated 16.11.2024 issued by the GPCB is legally untenable. In this regard, reliance is placed by the appellant on the judgment dated 05.05.2000 of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in S.C.A. No.11 of 1989 (Gujarat Pollution Control Board V. Parmar Devusinh Shersinh; 2000:GUJHC:6459, wherein identical issue was deliberated upon. In the said case, the GPCB was aggrieved by the fact that the Appellate Authority, constituted under Section 28 sub-section (1) of the Page 3 of 22 Water Act, had held that the appeal filed by a third party against the order issued by the GPCB was in fact maintainable in an appeal filed under Section 28(1) of the Water Act. Aggrieved by the said decision of the Appellate Authority, GPCB had approached the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in aforesaid S.C.A. No.11 of 1989. The Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat dismissed the said S.C.A. by passing the following order dated 05.05.2000, copy of which is annexed as Annexure-A6:
.
6. It is further stated that it is quite evident from the above judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat that any person, who finds himself to be aggrieved by the order of GPCB, could approach in appeal before the Appellate Authority for quashing of the same and not only the industry Page 4 of 22 concerned, which had been granted/rejected CCA, because any person may feel aggrieved by the grant of CCA, if the same would have effect of leading to pollution. Further it was held that in absence of delivery of copy of the order to the appellant, it would not disallow the appellant from filing the appeal before the Appellate Authority. These observations contradict and effectively negate the operative directions as contained in the impugned order dated 06.06.2025, wherein it is held that only the Project Proponent - M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors could be considered as "directly communicated party", which would have right to file an appeal.
7. The appellant being aggrieved by the environmental pollution being created by the Project Proponent - Industry by not achieving Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) and is still operating, had demonstrated that he had an interest in ensuring a pollution-free environment because of which he had challenged the CCA dated 16.11.2024. Therefore, he had locus standi to approach the Appellate Authority.
6. The appellant has also relied upon the judgment of this Tribunal dated 11.01.2013 delivered in Appeal No.56 of 2012 (SZ) (Janajagriti Samithi and Ors. Vs. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Ors.), wherein also, identical issue was raised pertaining to dismissal of an appeal filed under Section 28 sub-section (1) of the Water Act by the Appellate Authority on the ground that the appellants were not aggrieved persons and therefore, could not have challenged the legality of the consent order issued by the Karnataka State Pollution Control Board (KSPCB). Rejecting the said plea of the Appellate Authority, this Tribunal held as follows: Page 5 of 22
7. After having cited aforesaid two citations, learned counsel for the appellant urges that both the forums have provided liberal interpretation of the words "any person aggrieved" mentioned in Section 28 sub-section (1) of the Water Act.
8. Reliance is placed by the appellant once again on the judgment of this Tribunal in the matter of Janajagriti Samithi and Ors. (supra), wherein with regard to issue of communication of order to the appellant, following is observed:
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9. Having drawn our attention to the above, it is further urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that a consent order cannot but be communicated only to the applicant seeking such order. However, such does not disentitle a person interested in ensuring environment protection in challenging such consent order.
10. Besides that, it is further stated that the appellant had challenged the CCA dated 16.11.2024 before the Appellate Authority when the same was communicated to the appellant vide an affidavit-in-reply dated 21.11.2024 filed by GPCB in a parallel lis pending before this Tribunal in Original Application No.138 of 2024 (WZ).
11. It is further urged that assistance would be taken by the appellant of the law laid down in the order dated 14.03.2025 of this Tribunal in M.A. No.104 of 2012 in Appeal No.39 of 2012 in the case of Save Mon Region Federation and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors., wherein this Tribunal observed that communication in rem of any order is deemed to be complete upon placing the same in public domain. Therefore, in the case in hand, the impugned CCA was put in public domain by the GPCB upon filing of the affidavit-in-reply dated 27.11.2024.
12. Having stated above facts and cited the position of law, it is urged that the appellant cannot be disentitled from preferring an appeal before the Appellate Authority.
13. Further, the appellant has dealt with the observations made by the Appellate Authority, which were as below:
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14. With regard to above observations of the Appellate Authority, it is submitted by the appellant that they are not legally tenable, because under Section 31 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 also, there is a provision of appeal against the consent order granted under the Air Act. However, the appeal filed being Appeal (F) No.218740 of 2024 under Section 28 (1) of the Water Act, due to the violations of the Water Act being effectuated by M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors in operation of the impugned textile processing unit. Additionally, although the Consolidated Consent and Authorization (CC & A) are issued by the GPCB under three separate legislations viz., Water Act, Air Act and the Hazardous and Other (Management and Transboundary Movement) Waste Rules, 2016, no such provision contained in such legislations or any other Act in force, provides for an option of instituting a Consolidated Appeal. Hence, the appellant preferred an appeal as per Section 28 (1) of the Water Act. Page 8 of 22
15. As per the provisions of Section 28 (4) of the Water Act, it was evident that the Appellate Authority shall provide an opportunity of hearing only to the "appellant and the State Board". Accordingly, the appellant had complied with the statutory provisions and impleaded the GPCB as party respondent. It is further mentioned that pending parallel lis does not disentitle the appellant from preferring an appeal under Section 28(1) of the Water Act, rather the existence of such pending lis further highlights the appellant's sustained interest in ensuring redressal of the issue of persistent environmental pollution being caused by M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors -
Project Proponent.
16. As regards the non-impleadment of the Project Proponent, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that an opportunity ought to have been given to the appellant by the Appellate Authority for impleadment of necessary party i.e. the Project Proponent, if the appeal was to be dismissed on that count. In support of this submission, he has drawn our attention to Rules 7 and 8 of the Gujarat Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Appeal Rules, 1982 (for short, "the Gujarat Appeal Rules"), annexed at pages 128 to 130 of the paper-book, which read thus: Page 9 of 22 Page 10 of 22
17. A close reading of the above provision would indicate that upon receipt of the memorandum of appeal by the Appellate Authority, if any defect is found to be there, the same shall be intimated to the appellant to correct the same and resubmit the same within fifteen days thereafter. If the appeal is not remedied within the period allowed under sub-rule (vii) by the party or his authorized agent, the chairman shall call him in person and record the facts.
18. Having drawn our attention to above, it is urged by the learned counsel that if the Appellate Authority was of the view that the Project Proponent was necessary party to be impleaded, he ought to have been called by the Appellate Authority and had to be directed that the Project Proponent is a necessary party and it should be impleaded, but instead of giving any such opportunity to remove all lacunae, the learned Appellate Authority chose to proceed thereby dismissing the appeal, which is improper.
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19. From the side of respondent No.1 - State of Gujarat and respondent No. 3 - Appellate Authority, learned counsel Mr. Maulik Nanavati has appeared and states that the Appellate Authority is a Quasi Judicial Authority . Therefore, it restricted its submission only to assist this Tribunal on pure question of law, which has been raised during the oral argument. The Project Proponent was granted Consolidated Consent and Authorization (CCA) on 19.10.2022, validity of which expired on 25.11.2023. An application for its renewal was moved on 22.02.2024. It was initially rejected on 21.05.2024, but thereafter, an application was made on 27.05.2024. Finally, the State Pollution Control Board granted CCA on 20.11.2024. The subject unit i.e. the Project Proponent did not hold valid permission for post 25.11.2023 period till the permission was granted on 20.11.2024 and yet, it continued processing activity during the interregnum period.
20. The appellant filed application under Section 14 of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 before this Tribunal, complaining about the Project Proponent operating without valid CTO and causing pollution. It was registered as Original Application No.138 of 2024, whereon notice was issued on 23.07.2024. During pendency of this application, CCA dated 20.11.2024 was granted by the answering respondent. The appellant did not challenge the CCA dated 20.11.2024 by seeking amendment in the pending application and instead, led to challenge the same by filing an appeal before the Appellate Authority under Section 28 of the Water Act, filed on 19.12.2024. This Tribunal, after taking note of the CCA dated 20.11.2024, disposed of Original Application No.138 of 2024 vide order dated 05.08.2025.
21. When the appeal was preferred before the Appellate Authority, on that date, the Appellate Authority heard the parties, on which date, the Appellate Authority noticed that Original Application No.138 of 2024 was pending Page 12 of 22 before this Tribunal. This Tribunal in hierarchy is superior to the Appellate Authority. An appeal against the order passed by the Appellate Authority would lie before this Tribunal under Section 33-B of the Water Act. It is an established law that no litigant can be allowed to pursue parallel proceedings simultaneously for the same or similar or even overlapping cause of action. This principle is aimed at avoiding multiplicity of proceedings, abuse of the process of law and the possibility of rendering of conflicting decisions by the different forums. The Appellate Authority, therefore, did not entertain the appeal on the ground of judicial comity and propriety by recording that Original Application No.138 of 2024filed by the same party was pending before this Tribunal.
22. The appeal was filed challenging the CCA dated 20.11.2024 granted to the Project Proponent, but the Project Proponent was not impleaded in the appeal proceedings. It is one of the basic principles of law that the order passed in favour of any person cannot be challenged in any proceeding without making such person a party to the said proceeding. This burden is cast solely and exclusively upon the party bringing the challenge to the Appellate Authority. But the appellant, for the reasons best known to him, chose not to implead the Project Proponent as one of the parties before the Appellate Authority. Even no application was made post filing of the appeal seeking leave to amend the memo of parties and join the Project Proponent as a respondent in the array of parties. Therefore, the appeal suffered from a manifest and obvious vice of non-jointer of necessary party. Hence the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
23. Further it is mentioned that the Appellate Authority is a creature of the Statute and enjoys only such powers as are expressly conferred upon it by the enacting statute. Under the Water Act, the Appellate Authority has been granted limited jurisdiction of examining the legality and correctness of orders made by the State Pollution Control Board under Sections 25, 26 and Page 13 of 22 27 of the Water Act. It does not possess any inherent or plenary powers and cannot exercise jurisdiction over subject matter beyond the description of its appellate power contained in section 28 of the Water Act, much less over matters under different statute. The CCA dated 20.11.2024 granted to the Project Proponent is a composite permission granted under different Acts. The compound and fused permission was challenged before the Appellate Authority only to the extent it violated the provisions of the Water Act. It is not open for the Appellate Authority to split the consolidated consent, bifurcate the consent pertaining to the provisions of the Water Act and quash the same.
24. Reliance is placed by respondent No.1 on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T.N. Pollution Control Board vs. Sterlite Industries (I) Ltd; (2019)19 SCC 479, wherein it had an occasion to consider the maintainability of an appeal before the National Green Tribunal challenging composite order made by the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board under Section 33A of the Water Act and Section 31A of the Air Act directing that the unit of the project proponent in the said case to not resume production without obtaining prior approval/renewal or consent from the State Pollution Control Board. After consideration, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 32 of the said judgment, has held as below:
"32. From the above authorities, it is clear that an appeal is a creature of statute and an appellate tribunal has to act strictly within the domain prescribed by statute. It is obvious that an appeal would lie from an order or decision of the appellate authority under Section 28 of the Water Act to the NGT only under Section 33B(a) of the Water Act read with Section 16(a) of the NGT Act. Similarly, an appeal would lie from an order or decision of the appellate authority under Section 31 of the Air Act to the NGT only under Section 31B of the Air Act read with Section 16(f) of the NGT Act. Obviously, since no order or decision had been made by the appellate authority under either the Water Act Page 14 of 22 or the Air Act, any direct appeal against an original order to the NGT would be incompetent. NGT's jurisdiction being strictly circumscribed by Section 33B of the Water Act, read with Section 31B of the Air Act, read with Section 16(a) and (f) of the NGT Act, would make it clear that it is only orders or decisions of the appellate authority that are appealable, and not original orders. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that an appeal was pending before the appellate authority when the NGT set aside the original order dated 09.04.2018. This being the case, the NGT's order being clearly outside its statutory powers conferred by the Water Act, the Air Act, and the NGT Act, would be an order passed without jurisdiction."
25. On going through the above citation, on which reliance has been placed upon by the learned counsel for respondent No.1, it is quite clear that the facts of the said case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court are totally different because in the case in hand, it is the Appellate Authority which has passed an order against which the Tribunal has been moved and that the appellant could not come in appeal against the order of State Pollution Control Board to this Tribunal. Hence, the judgment in the case of T.N. Pollution Control Board (supra) would not be applicable here.
26. Further it is mentioned by the learned counsel for respondent No.1 is that the legal submission made by the appellant during hearing held on 03.09.2025 that the Appellate Authority under the Water Act and the Air Act have been constituted under a common notification issued by the State Government and therefore, the Appellate Authority under the Water Act is the same as under the Air Act. The said submission is thoroughly misconceived as it suffers tom improper understanding of law. Only the constitution of the Appellate Authority under respective enactments is jointly notified; however, the Appellate Authority under each enactment remains distinct and enjoys only such jurisdictional power as is conferred upon such Appellate Authority under the respective parent statute. Reliance in support of this submission is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in the case of Evergreen Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Page 15 of 22 Ltd. v. Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Deptt., Gujarat State; 1990 SCC OnLine Guj 99, wherein in para 12 it is held as follows: Page 16 of 22
27. Having cited the above judgment, it is submitted that the Appellate Authority does not deal with the larger issue as to whether the appeal before it can be preferred only by a person who has been communicated a copy of the order made by the State Pollution Control Board under Sections 25, 26 or 27 of the Water Act or any other person in the light of the observations made by the Constitutional Court and the Coordinate Bench of this Tribunal, except to state that both these judgments do not consider the words "communicated to him" as appearing in the section as also the effect of extinguishment of legal right to lay a challenge under the statute and impermissibility of revival of such right even by way of filing of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before a Constitutional Court.
28. It is further submitted that the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 ("NGT Act", for short) provides six months' limitation period for an aggrieved party by grant of CCA to the project, to challenge the same, extendable for further 60 days under Section 14 of the NGT Act. If the term "any person", appearing in Section 28 is read expansively, as has been done in the judgments cited by and relied upon by the appellant, the words "communicated to him" are interpreted to mean acquisition of knowledge by such person, it would bring about an incongruous situation and in fact lead to defeating the period of limitation prescribed in Section 14 of the NGT Act.
The orders passed by the State Pollution Control Board under Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Water Act are not put in public domain. They are only communicated to the concerned party. A third party can claim acquisition of knowledge of any order passed by the State Pollution Control Board under Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Water Act as per his sweet will and approach Page 17 of 22 the Appellate Authority well beyond expiration of period of 240 days (180 days plus 60 days), maintain the appeal and then challenge the order of the Appellate Authority within the statutorily prescribed timeline under Section 33-B of the NGT Act. Such interpretation, if accepted, would give an impetus to unscrupulous litigants to circumvent the period of limitation prescribed under Section 14 of the NGT Act.
29. Additional submission filed by respondent No.1 is dated 17.11.2025, wherein it is recorded that pending hearing of the present appeal, the Project Proponent - M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors applied for extension of the period of validity of CCA on 01.10.2025, which had expired on 25.11.2025 and after consideration of the same, the validity is extended upto 25.11.2026 on 14.11.2025. Since the appeal before the Appellate Authority was confined to the correctness of the CCA dated 20.11.2024, which was valid for only one year, the same has lived its life. There is no challenge to the extension of the validity period of the CCA dated 20.11.2024. Therefore, dispute raised in the present case has lost its relevance due to passage of time because of subsequent events.
30. From the side of respondent No.2 - GPCB, written submissions dated 19.11.2025 has been filed, wherein it is submitted that the appeal under Section submitted, wherein it is recorded that the word "appellant" under Section 28(4) of the Water Act, when interpreted in its holistic statutory context, legislative intent and constitutional framework, must mean and be restricted to the person to whom the order is communicated and against whom the regulatory consequence operates, namely, the project proponent. Any other interpretation would render the mandatory hearing requirement under Section 28(4) unworkable and contrary to the express statutory command. Next it is submitted that the non-impleadment of a necessary and affected party goes to the root of maintainability and is not a mere procedural irregularity capable of subsequent curing and in this case, the Page 18 of 22 Project Proponent was a necessary party, which was not impleaded by the appellant. Hence, the impugned order was rightly passed. Further it is mentioned that the appeal has become infructuous because it is devoid of any surviving cause of action, in view of the subsequent renewal and supersession of the original CCA issued by the State Pollution Control Board.
31. From the side of respondent No.3 - Appellate Authority, the legal submissions dated 17.11.2025 have been filed by respondent No.3, in which the same facts/averments have been reiterated, which we have already cited above.
32. We have gone through the pleadings and heard the arguments of the learned counsel for respective parties.
33. The admitted facts are that the Appellate Authority - respondent No.3 has passed the impugned order dated 06.06.2025, rejecting the appeal filed by the appellant on the ground that the order was not directly communicated to him and hence, he was not competent to file this appeal. In other words, by that order, it was meant that it would be the Project Proponent, who would be competent to assail the impugned order, had he been adversely impacted by the said order. This reasoning is found in the operative portion of the impugned order, wherein several facts have also been recorded, such as that the appeal could not have been heard without impleadment of M/s N.H.H. Textile Processors, which was a necessary party. Further it is recorded in that order that if the appellant had any grievance by the activities of the Project Proponent, causing pollution, he should have first approached the GPCB. Further it is recorded that Original Application No.138 of 2024 (WZ) was pending before the National Green Tribunal. Therefore, he could not approach the Appellate Authority.
34. During argument, the main emphasis was laid by the learned counsel for respondent No.3 - Appellate Authority that the appellant was a third Page 19 of 22 person, who was not quite competent to file an appeal as he cannot be said to be "any person aggrieved" under Section 28 of the Water Act. We have quoted hereinabove the relevant portion from the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in the case of Evergreen Apartment Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (supra), wherein it is made very much clear that even third person would be competent to file an appeal before the Appellate Authority in case he finds some grievance by the permission granted by the State Pollution Control Board. It is the right of an aggrieved person, who is likely to suffer effect of pollution to be spread/being spread by an industry to approach the State Pollution Control Board for seeking quashing of permission granted. Therefore, there being direct ruling of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat on this point, we cannot defy the same in view of said position of law. We find that the appellant would be covered under the expression "any person aggrieved" and find him to be competent to file an appeal. Hence, the appeal could not be dismissed on that ground.
35. As regards the second objection that the Project Proponent was not impleaded in the appeal before the Appellate Authority as a necessary party and hence, the appeal has been rightly dismissed by the Appellate Authority, we are of the view that the procedure, which ought to have been followed by the Appellate Authority as per Rules 7 and 8 of the Gujarat Appeal Rules, cited by us, has not been followed, because as per those Rules, if the appeal was found to be defective, an opportunity ought to have been granted to the appellant by the Appellate Authority to remove those defects, meaning thereby that it was considered by the appellant that the Project Proponent was a necessary party to be impleaded in the appeal proceeding and hence an opportunity could have been given to the appellant to implead the Project Proponent and thereafter, after giving fresh hearing to the parties concerned, final order ought to have been passed by the Appellate Authority. In this Page 20 of 22 case, the same has not been done and hence, the impugned order deserves to be set aside.
36. Another point, which is raised about the parallel proceeding going on before the First Appellate Authority, we are of the view that there is mandatory provision that the First Appellate Authority ought to be approached by the person aggrieved and it is only against the Appellate Authority's order that an appeal would lie before this Tribunal in view of the provisions cited above. Therefore, on account of this, the appeal should not have been dismissed by the Appellate Authority.
37. As regards the complaint to be made first to the GPCB by the appellant, we find that already several complaints were made to the GPCB and thereafter also, no action was taken, hence the Appellate Authority was approached by the appellant.
38. It is also argued by the learned counsel for respondent Nos.2 and 3 that in view of the extension of the CCA, which was assailed in the appeal, now cause of action does not survive because earlier CC&A, which was assailed before the Appellate Authority was valid for just one year, which has already lapsed. This argument does not appeal to us because extension of CCA does not mean that the earlier granted permission for CCA can not be challenged if it was erroneous. If the original CCA is found to be defective and worthy to be set aside, then its extension would automatically not survive. Hence, the cause of action is held to be there.
39. In view of the analysis made by us above, we are of the view that the impugned order deserves to be set aside with a direction that the Appellate Authority shall grant liberty to the appellant to implead the Project Proponent as necessary party and thereafter, after giving a fresh hearing to the parties concerned, fresh order shall be passed on merit in accordance with law in this matter within two months.
40. In the result, we pass the following order:
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(A) The Appeal is allowed.
(B) The impugned order dated 06.06.2025 passed by the Appellate Authority - respondent No.3 in Appeal (F) No.218740 of 2024 is set aside.
(C) The matter is remanded to respondent No.3 - Appellate Authority with a direction that it shall grant liberty to the appellant to implead the Project Proponent as necessary party in the appeal before it and thereafter, after giving fresh hearing to the parties concerned, fresh order shall be passed on merit in accordance with law within two months
41. No order as to costs.
Dinesh Kumar Singh, JM Dr. Sujit Kumar Bajpayee, EM December 12, 2025 APPEAL NO.217 OF 2025 (WZ) npj Page 22 of 22