Chattisgarh High Court
High Court Of Chhattisgarh vs Miss Akanksha Bhardwaj on 20 September, 2024
Author: Parth Prateem Sahu
Bench: Parth Prateem Sahu
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2024:CGHC:36870-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Order reserved on 2.8.2024
Order delivered on 20/09/2024
WA No. 362 of 2024
• Miss. Akanksha Bhardwaj D/o Shri Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj
Aged About 34 Years R/o Rajkishore Nagar, Bilaspur (CG)
---- Petitioner
versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary, Law And
Legislative Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. High Court Of Chhattisgarh Through The Registrar General,
High Court Building, Bodri, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
3. The Registrar (Vigilance) High Court of Chhattisgarh, and The
Chairman, Internal Complaints Committee, High Court of
Chhattisgarh, High Court Building, Bodri, Bilaspur (CG).
---- Respondents
WA No. 363 of 2024
1. High Court Of Chhattisgarh Through The Registrar General,
High Court Building, Bodri, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
2. The Registrar (Vigilance) High Court Of Chhattisgarh, And The
Chairman, Internal Complaints Committee, High Court of
Chhattisgarh, High Court Building, Bodri, Bilaspur (CG)
----Petitioners
Versus
1. Miss Akanksha Bhardwaj D/o Shri Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj
Aged About 33 Years R/o Rajkishore Nagar, Bilaspur (CG).
2. State of Chhattisgarh Through Principal Secretary, Law And
Legislative Affairs, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya
2 / 22
Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
---- Respondents
WA NO.362/2024
For Appellant : Appellant in Person.
For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Praveen Das, Dy. Advocate General
For Respondent No.2 & 3 : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate
WA NO.363/2024
For Appellants : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate
For Respondent No.1 : Respondent No.1 in person.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Praveen Das, Dy. Advocate General
DB: Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Mr. Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
CAV Order
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, J
1. As the order under challenge in both these writ appeals is one and the same, both were heard together and are being disposed of by this common order.
2. Subject matter of challenge in both these writ appeals is the order dated 01.05.2024 passed in WPS No.2206/2017 whereby writ petition filed by petitioner/appellant in WA No.362/2024 was allowed in part and she was reinstated in service without back wages.
3. Facts relevant for disposal of these writ appeals are that respondent No.1 in WA No.363/2017 was appointed as Civil Judge Entry Level vide order dated 12.12.2013 on probation for a period of two years. Her probation period was extended vide order dated 18.3.2016 along with nine others. While 3 / 22 posted as 1st Civil Judge Class-II, Ambikapur, respondent No.1 made a complaint against her senior colleague upon which appellant No.1 High Court constituted the Internal Complaints Committee, which inquired into the complaint, submitted its report that allegation made in complaint were not found to be correct. The Standing Committee constituted under the Chhattisgarh High Court Rules, 2007 (henceforth 'the Rules of 2007') upon considering the candidature of respondent No.1 for confirmation, recommended to terminate her from service. Consequently, respondent No.2 vide order dated 9.2.2017 terminated respondent No.1 from service. The order of termination was put to challenge by respondent No.1 by filing writ petition on multiple grounds. It appears that during course of arguments, it was also urged that the Standing Committee has no power/jurisdiction to dismiss/remove any member of Chhattisgarh Lower Judicial Services as the jurisdiction to recommend for termination of services lies with High Court.
4. Learned Single Judge upon appreciation of submissions raised by both sides, while turning down other grounds raised by respondent No.1 in her writ petition, had allowed writ petition on the ground that recommendation made by the Standing Committee on 31.1.2017 for termination of respondent No.1 from service was without competency and accordingly, set aside/quashed the order dated 9.2.2017 4 / 22 issued by respondent No.2 terminating service of respondent No.1 and directed for her reinstatement in service with notional seniority but without back wages.
5. Learned counsel for appellant High Court submits that the Standing Committee is a statutory body constituted under Rule 4-A of the Rules of 2007. The Standing Committee is composed of the Chief Justice, two Judges nominated by the Chief Justice, generally the senior-most Judges to be designated as Judge, Administrative Department, as also two Judges nominated by the Chief Justice by rotation for a period of two years where one of the Judges shall be a Judge appointed from Higher Judicial Services. The High Court in exercise of Rule 4-A of the Rules of 2007 has constituted the Committee for speedy and effective dispensation of administrative works. The Standing Committee vested with the powers to recommend on matters of promotion, appointment, posting, transfer, initiation of departmental proceedings as also for making recommendation for compulsory retirement of any judicial officer. It is contended that the Standing Committee is also vested with the power to decide all matters relating to service conditions of the Judges of the Courts etc. which clearly shows that the Standing Committee is a body which is vested with absolute administrative powers over subordinate judicial officers. Learned Single Judge failed to 5 / 22 appreciate that a judicial officer on probation does not have an indefeasible right to be confirmed on regular service. It is for the High Court while exercising control over the subordinate judiciary and judicial officers in matters of appointment to consider who is fit or unfit for confirmation in service considering judicial discipline, probity and impeccable standard. Once the Standing Committee constituted under Rule 4-A of the Rules of 2007 took decision with regard to continuity in service of respondent No.1, said decision ought not to have been interfered on hyper technicalities. He also pointed out that Rule 4C of the Rules of 2007 was amended vide Notification dated 28.11.2023 whereby clause (xvii) is inserted empowering the Standing Committee to dispose of any matter which is not covered under Rule 4C excluding matters covered under Rule 4-O and therefore, by application of de-facto doctrine, the decision of the Standing Committee and its recommendation does not call for any interference. Any action of the Standing Committee of recommending is valid and decision taken by the Standing Committee cannot be challenged on the ground of lac of jurisdictional competence. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Gokaraju Rangaraju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1981) 3 SCC 132 and M/s Beopar 6 / 22 Sahayak (P) Ltd. and others Vs. Vishwa Nath and others, (1987) 3 SCC 693.
6. Respondent No.1, who appeared in person, vehemently opposed the submissions of learned counsel for appellant High Court and would submit that learned Single Judge has considered the facts and law on the issue in its entirety and rightly held that the Standing Committee recommending termination of her services was not having jurisdiction or competence to make such a recommendation because no such jurisdiction was vested with the Standing Committee on the date of recommendation in exercise of powers under Rule 4C of the Rules of 2007. She submits that the impugned order with respect to quashing of the order of termination is within four corners of law and it does not call for any interference. She further submits that with respect to denial of claim of back wages by learned Single Judge, she has preferred writ appeal bearing WA No.362/2024. Learned Single Judge erred in observing that "petitioner has nowhere pleaded in writ petition that from the date of termination, she remained unemployed' and only on this ground rejected her claim of back-wages, which is not sustainable. She submits that because of adverse remarks made in her annual confidential reports on 10.4.2013, she was unable to work anywhere and remain unemployed from the date of her termination from service. She contended 7 / 22 that learned Single Judge reinstated her in service finding the order of termination to be without jurisdiction and in cases of wrong termination of service, reinstatement is normally ordered with continuity of service and back wages. Learned Single Judge though granted relief of continuity of service, however, erred in rejecting claim of back wages. In support of her contention, she placed reliance upon the decision in case of Deepali Gundu Surwse v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidhyalaya (D.Ed.) and others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 and Pradeep v. Manganese Ores (India) Ltd. And others, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 683.
7. Learned State Counsel submits that based on recommendation made by the Standing Committee of terminating service of respondent No.1, order impugned in writ petition terminating service of respondent No.1 herein was passed.
8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with utmost circumspection.
9. Respondent No.1 in her writ appeal has only challenged rejection of her claim for back-wages. Other findings recorded by learned Singe Judge have not been challenged. Appellant High Court has challenged finding of learned Single Judge that recommendation made by Standing Committee for 8 / 22 terminating service of respondent No.1 to be without jurisdiction and competence.
10. To appreciate submissions of learned counsel for appellant High Court, we have perused Rule 4 of the Rules of 2007 existing on the date when recommendation was made by the Standing Committee and relevant rules are extrcted herein below for ready reference:-
"4A. There shall be a Standing Committee composed of-
[i] the Chief Justice.
[ii] two Judges nominated by the Chief Justice, who shall have executive charge of the Administrative Department. They shall be generally the senior-most Judges to be designated as Judge, Administrative Department I, and Judge, Administrative Department II. In case any Judge is unwilling to work as an Administrative Judge, the Judge next in the order of seniority will be appointed in his place. [iii] two Judges nominated by the Chief Justice by rotation for a period of two years. One of them shall be a Judge appointed from Higher Judicial Service. 4-C. The Standing Committee shall have power, without reference to the Judges generally -
(i) to dispose of all correspondence within its own Department urgent in its nature and not of general importance;
(ii) to make recommendations for promotion of Subordinate Judges to the rank of Additional District & Sessions Judges and of the Additional District & Sessions Judges to the rank of District & Sessions 9 / 22 Judges, and their initial posting on promotion or appointment;
(iii) to exercise the power exercisable by the Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973;
(iv) to make recommendations to the Government for the vesting of special powers under any special Act;
(v) to pass orders of transfer of District & Sessions Judges and Additional District & Sessions Judges;
(vi) to pass orders of the transfer and posting of subordinate Judges with or without the powers of an Additional Sessions Judges and Civil Judges;
(vii) to make recommendations for the deputation of Lower Judicial Service or Higher Judicial Service to posts under the Government of India, Government of Chhattisgarh or other State Government or to Foreign Service;
(viii) to issue orders regarding the promotion of Civil Judges;
(ix) to pass orders of suspension, initiation of departmental proceedings against members of the Higher Judicial Service and Subordinate Judicial Service, and consequential orders in the said proceedings other than that of dismissal from service;
(x) to issue Circular Orders and General letters to the Subordinate Courts;
(xi) to dispose of any matter which might have been dealt with by the Judge in charge of the Administrative Department, but which he has referred to the Committee for their opinion;
(xii) to make recommendation to the State Government for compulsory retirement of any Judicial Officer of any rank:10 / 22
Provided that notice of the decision of the Standing Committee shall be circulated to the Full Court within ten days from the date of the decision and if any member of Full Court desires, within three weeks of the decision, the matter to be discussed at a meeting of the Full Court then no action will be taken till the decision at such a meeting; and
(xiii) to dispose of any matter referred to it by the Full Court which might have been dealt with by the Full Court.
(xiv) to consider the representation of Judicial Officers with regard to expunging the adverse remarks / up-
gradation of grades in Annual Confidential Reports or to refer to a committee for the said purpose.
(xv) Matters relating to the service conditions, facilities and amenities of the judges of the Courts.
(xvi) Rules which when published will have the force of law.
(xvii) To dispose of any other matter (s) which are not covered under Rules 4-C excluding matters covered under Rule 4-O."
"4 (O). (i) On the following matter decision shall be taken by the Judges at a meeting of the Full Court:-
(a) All appointments which by law are to be made by the High Court and which are not otherwise expressly provided for by these rules in this Chapter.
(b) All recommendations for the dismissal from office of Judicial Officer.
(c)Proposals for designating Advocates as Senior Advocates under section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961.11 / 22
(d) Matters relating to the service conditions, facilities and amenities of the Judges of the Courts.
(e) Constitution of Rule Committee under section 123 of the new Civil Procedure Code nominating Judges for the Rule Committee.
(f) Consideration of matters relating to the Chief Justices' Conference.
(g) High Court Calendar.
(ii) The following matters on which Judges have to be consulted, may be disposed of by circulation of files, except in a case where a meeting is called in accordance with Rule 4-N:-
(a) Proposed changes in the law where the proposition emanates from the Government or, in other cases, where a committee or any Judge of the Court considers that action is called for.
(b) The Administration Report yearly submitted to Government when passed by the Judges of the Standing Committee.
(c) Rules which when published will have the force of law.
(d) Subjects connected with the relation between the Supreme Court and the High Court."
11. Apart from other powers under Rule 4C, the Standing Committee under sub-rule (ix) of Rule 4C is empowered to pass orders of suspension, initiation of departmental proceedings against members of the Higher Judicial Service and Subordinate Judicial Service, and consequential orders in 12 / 22 the said proceedings other than that of dismissal from service. In the aforementioned Rule 4-C (ix) the Standing Committee on the date of recommendation was not having jurisdiction to pass orders of dismissal of service as dismissal of a judicial officer from service has been consciously excluded in the provision itself. Rule 4C came to be amended vide Notification dated 28.11.2023 and Rule 4 (xvii) was inducted, as quoted above.
12. Learned counsel representing the High Court of Chhattisgarh pressing upon the amendment made under Rule 4C incorporating sub-rule (xiii), made an attempt to submit that though the power to the Standing Committee granted to dispose of any other matters not covered under Rule 4C excluding matters covered under Rule 4-O which includes the power of competence of the Committee also to make recommendation and therefore, applying the doctrine of de facto, the decision of the Standing Committee of making recommendation is valid.
13. In case of Gokaraju (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court relying upon the decision in case of Pulin Behari v King Emperor, (1912) 15 Cal LJ 517, wherein the Court noticed that in England the de facto doctrine was recognized from the earliest times. Doctrine of de facto gives validity to acts of officer de facto whatever defects there may be in the legality 13 / 22 of their appointment or election is founded upon consideration of policy and necessity. Some paragraphs of Gokaraju's case (supra) wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court considered doctrine of de facto relying upon its earlier decisions, are extracted below for ready reference:-
"8. Some interesting observations were made by the Court of Appeal in England in re James (An Insolvent). Though the learned Judges constituting the Court of Appeal differed on the principal question that arose before them namely whether "the High Court of Rhodesia" was a British Court, there did not appear to be any difference of opinion on the question of the effect of the invalidity of the appointment of a judge on the judgments pronounced by him. Lord Denning M. R., characteristically, said:
"He sits in the seat of a judge. He wears the robes of a judge. He holds the office of a judge. May be he was not validly appointed. But, still, he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent ....... so long as the man holds the office and exercises it duly and in accordance with law, his orders are not a nullity. If they are erroneous they may be upset on appeal. But if not erroneous they should be upheld".
Lord Denning then proceeded to refer to the State of Connecticut v. Carroll decided by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, Re Aldridge decided by the Court of Appeal in New Zealand and Norton v. Shelby County decided by the United States Supreme Court. Observations made in the last case were extracted and they were:
14 / 22
"Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions.. The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid on grounds of public policy, and for the protection of those having official business to transact."
9. Scarman LJ who differed from Lord Denning on the question whether the High Court of Rhodesia was a British Court appeared to approve the view of Lord Denning M. R. in regard to the de facto doctrine. He said:
"He (Lord Denning) invokes the doctrine of recognition of the de facto judge, and the doctrine of implied mandate or necessity. I agree with much of the thinking that lies behind his judgment. I do think that in an appropriate case our courts will recognise the validity of judicial acts, even though they be the acts of a judge not lawfully appointed or derive their authority from an unlawful government. But it is a fallacy to conclude that, because in certain circumstances our Courts would recognise as valid the judicial acts of an unlawful court or a de facto judge, therefore, the Court thus recognised is a British Court".
12.In Cooley's 'Constitutional Limitations', Eighth Edition, Volume II p. 1 355, it is said, "An officer de facto is one who by some colour or right is in possession of an office and for the time being performs its duties with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact. His colour of right may come from an election or appointment made by some officer or body having colourable but no actual right to make it; or made in such disregard of legal requirements as to be ineffectual in law; or made to fill the place of an officer illegally re-moved or made in 15 / 22 favour of a party not having the legal qualifications;....."
17. A judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure.
Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceeding to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the judge except as a judge......"
14. From the above observation made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Gokaraju (supra) relying upon decision as mentioned above, what is culled out is that de facto doctrine would apply only for the acts of a Judge who by some colour of right is in a position to a office and for the time being performed the duty with public acquiescence, though having no right in fact. Doctrine gives validity to the acts of the officer de facto whatever defects there may be in the legality of their appointment or election is founded upon consideration of policy and necessity, for the protection of the public and individuals whose interests may be affected thereby. Doctrine of de facto would apply only where the authority or a Judge 16 / 22 who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment may later be found to be defective.
15. In case at hand, the Standing Committee was not clothed with the power of making recommendation against a member of district judiciary of dismissal from service. Hence, submission of learned counsel for appellant High Court that recommendation made by the Standing Committee by application of doctrine of de facto is valid, in the opinion of this Court, is not sustainable. In case of Gokaraju (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "an intruder is one who attempts to perform the duties of an office without authority of law, and without the support of public acquiescence".
16. The decision in case of Gokaraju (supra), which is relied upon by learned counsel representing the High Court is of no help to appellant because in said case appointment of the Additional Sessions Judge who had pronounced the judgments after their appointment by the authority, has been subsequently held by the High Court to be invalid and the point for consideration was that what will be effect of decisions and judgments pronounced by such Additional Sessions Judges prior to such declaration of their appointment to be invalid.
17. In case of M/s Beopar Sahayak (supra), the question/issue which was under consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court 17 / 22 was whether the order of release passed by the Prescribed Authority under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 was null and void, because the Prescribed Authority had no jurisdiction to pass the order as he did not possess requisite qualification for being appointed as such authority. In that case, the prescribed authority who passed the order, which was subject matter of consideration before Hon'ble Supreme Court, was initially appointed as Tahsildar, he was promoted to the post of Sub-Divisional Officer and thereafter to the post of Deputy Collector and then Additional City Magistrate. During this period of his posting as City Additional Magistrate-2, he has passed the order of release. While said officer working as Tahsildar, the Government in exercise of its power under Section 12 and 39 (1) of CrPC 1898 issued a general notification dated 6.2.1968 conferring on all Tahsildars the powers of the 1st Class Magistrate and on all Naib Tahsildars the power of 2nd Class Magistrate. Notification of the Government was duly published in the gazetted on 17.2.1968. By means of Notification dated 9.9.1974, the Government had designated the Additional City Magistrate-2 to be the Prescribed Authority under the Act for certain areas including the limits of Collectorganj Police Station where the lis property was situated. Objection on the jurisdiction/authority of the 18 / 22 officer who acted as Prescribed Authority was that said officer had a communication under Section 39 (2) of the Code, the conferment of powers was only for ensuring the maintenance of law and order and not for the trial of cases and therefore, said officer cannot be treated as Tahsildar on whom the power of 1st Class Magistrate has been conferred upon for trial of cases. Accordingly, in the aforementioned facts of the case, considering submissions thereto and the decision relied upon, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed thus:-
"13.In view of our conclusion that Shri Senger's experience as an Executive Magistrate satisfied the requirements of Section 3 (e) of the Act and as such he was not incompetent to act as a Prescribed Authority and pass the impugned order of release, that secondly even if he was not fully qualified to act as a Prescribed Authority and pass the order of release the validity of the order cannot be impugned because of the 'de-facto doctrine' and thirdly, the appellant is not entitled to question the competence of Shri Senger to act as a Prescribed Authority in a collateral proceeding, it is really not necessary for us to examine the correctness of the view taken by the High Court that by reason of the merger of the order of Shri Senger with the order of the Appellate Authority, there is no room for the appellant to contend that the release order is a nullity because Shri Senger did not have jurisdiction to pass the order."19 / 22
18. Thus, both the decisions relied upon by learned counsel appearing for High Court are on different facts, therefore, no benefit of aforementioned decisions can be extended to appellant High Court.
19. For the foregoing, we do not find any merit in WA No.363/2024 and accordingly, it is dismissed.
20. So far as Writ Appeal No.362/2024 filed by the judicial officer claiming back-wages is concerned, in writ appeal it is only pleaded that due to adverse remarks made in her annual confidential report, she could not get job elsewhere. In case of Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed) and others, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324, which is relied upon by appellant-judicial officer, Hon'ble Supreme court in Para 38.2 has observed thus:-
"38.2. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/ workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee / workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors."
21. Learned Single Judge taking note of Para-12 of the judgment rendered in case of Pradeep vs. Manganese Ore (India) Limited and ors, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 683, has denied 20 / 22 relief of back-wages to appellant. Para-12 of said decision is reproduced below for ready reference:-
"12. It is, undoubtedly, true when the question arises as to whether the back wages is to be given and as to what is to be the extent of back wages, these are matters which will depend on the facts of the case as noted in Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra). In a case where it is found that the employee was not at all at fault and yet, he was visited with illegal termination or termination which is actually activised by malice, it may be unfair to deny him the fruits of the employment which he would have enjoyed but for the illegal / malafide termination. The effort of the Court must be to then to restore the status quo in the manner which is appropriate in the facts of each case. The nature of the charges, the exact reason for the termination as evaluated and, of course, the question as to whether the employee was gainfully employed would be matters which will enter into the consideration by the Court."
22. In case of Pradeep (supra) considering the decision in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that in case where it is found that the employee was not at all at fault and yet, he was visited with illegal termination or termination which is actually activised by malice, it may be unfair to deny him the fruits of the employment. In case at hand, learned Single Judge upholding the proceeding recorded by the Standing Committee has set aside the order of termination on technical 21 / 22 ground that the Standing Committee was not having competence to recommend for termination of service of a judicial officer. This order of reinstatement in favour of appellant herein is not on the ground that her termination was wrongful on facts. Learned Single Judge in order impugned while rejecting other grounds raised by appellant judicial officer, has observed as under:-
"30. The record of the case would demonstrate that the information regarding petitioner was made available to the Standing Committee which clearly reflects that the ACR of the petitioner for the year 2013-14 was not recorded, ACR for the year 2014-15 was 'D' and though ACR for the year 2015-16 was also graded 'D' but it was yet to be communicated and the Standing Committee has considered the overall performance of the petitioner for the year 2014-15 which was found average. Thus, performance of the petitioner was not satisfactory, therefore, the Standing Committee has not found fit for confirmation and accordingly, it has recommended for termination from service. From the records, it is quite vivid that the Standing Committee has not taken into consideration the complaints made against the petitioner by the then District & Sessions Judge and other persons as already detailed by this Court. Thus, the non-extension of probation period though amounting to termination but it is not by way of punishment, thus the contention raised by the petitioner that on the basis of the report submitted by the then District Judge, her services have been terminated and she has become confirmed member of Lower Judicial 22 / 22 Services, therefore, she should be granted protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India, deserves to be rejected..."
33. Thus, it is quite vivid that the petitioner was probationer and she remained on probation till 31.01.2017 when probation period was not extended by the High Court. It is also quite vivid that the High Court has also not taken into consideration the complaints or report of the learned District Judge, Ambikapur but has taken into consideration the overall performance of the petitioner which was found unsatisfactory, therefore, the contentions raised by the petitioner that in the biased proceeding initiated against her by the then District Judge and report of ICC and other complaints, her termination was passed, deserves to be rejected accordingly, it is rejected."
23. In view of above findings recorded by learned Single Judge, petitioner except relief of back-wages, has not challenged other findings recorded in impugned order, and further considering that writ petition was allowed on technical ground, this Court is of the considered opinion that there is no substance in WA No.362/2024, the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed.
24. In the result, WA No.362/2024 and 363/2024 both stand Digitally dismissed. No order as to costs.
signed by SYED SYED ROSHAN ROSHAN ZAMIR ALI ZAMIR Date:
ALI 2024.09.20
18:55:22
Sd/- Sd/-
+0530 (Parth Prateem Sahu) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
roshan/-