Allahabad High Court
Ramdulare vs State Of U.P. And 3 Others on 22 May, 2026
Author: Raj Beer Singh
Bench: Raj Beer Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2026:AHC:119096
Reserved
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL No. - 12769 of 2023
Ramdulare
.....Appellant(s)
Versus
State Of U.P. And 3 Others
.....Respondent(s)
Counsel for Appellant(s)
:
Amit Krishna, Jitendra Pal Singh Chauhan, M.N. Singh, Mahesh Narain Singh, Pranvesh, Pratik Kumar, Vineet Pandey
Counsel for Respondent(s)
:
G.A., Praveen Kumar Dhuriya, Vivekanand
Court No. - 90
HON'BLE RAJ BEER SINGH, J.
Order on Criminal Misc. Application under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C.
1. This application has been filed under Section 389 Cr.PC. with following prayer:- "It is therefore, most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to allow this application and to suspend and stay the execution of sentence and conviction order dated 15.12.2023, passed by Sri Ahsanullah Khan, H.J.S. Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 1, Sonbhadra, convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offences under Sections 376, 506 I.P.C. and Sections 5 (?)/ 6 of POCSO Act in Special Session Trial No. 35 of 2015 (State Vs. Ramdulare). It is further prayed that this Hon'ble Court may further be pleased to release the appellant on bail and stay the realization of fine, during the pendency of the instant appeal. And/ or pass such other and further order, which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the fact and circumstances of the case, otherwise the appellant shall suffer irreparable loss and hardship."
2. Heard learned counsel for appellant, learned counsel for informant and learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.
3. The appellant has been convicted under Section 5Tha/ 6 POCSO Act and Section 376, 506 IPC and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with fine of Rs. 10,00,000/- under Section 5Tha/ 6 POCSO Act and two years imprisonment with fine of Rs.5000/- under Section 506 IPC.
4. Learned counsel for appellant submitted that appellant is innocent and he has been falsely implicated in this case. There is long and undue delay in lodging of the first information report. The trial Court has misread the evidence and failed to appreciate the same in accordance with law. The conviction of appellant suffers from material illegality and perversity and that the allegations of rape levelled by the victim are quite improbable. It is further submitted that as per prosecution version the date of birth of victim was shown as 15.12.1988 and thereby at the time of incident, she was aged about 16 years but said date of birth is not based on any satisfactory documentary evidence. Victim has stated in her cross-examination that she has studied in Birla Vidya Mandir in class 7th but the certificate of Primary School, Raspahri, was relied stating that victim was admitted in class Ist in that school, whereas as per statement of DW-3 Harishchandra, Headmaster of Tulsi Bal Pradhmik Vidalaya, Rajkhar, victim was admitted in the said school on 10.07.2000 in class Ist and her date of birth was shown as 25.08.1994. Similar age has been mentioned by DW 2 Akhilesh Kumar Dubey, who has proved pariwar register. It was submitted that statement of PW-8 Nitika Sharma is not consistent with the statement of victim and her father. PW-8 has inter-alia stated that in academic year 2006-07, 2007-08, 2008-09 victim has not taken any education from that school nor she has taken any examination, which is not consistent with statement of victim. The trial Court has arbitrarily disbelieved the testimony of DW-2 Akhilesh Kumar Dubey and DW-3 Harishchandra. As per medical examination report, victim was aged more than 18 years. DW 2 Akhilesh Kumar Dubey, Village Panchayat Officer has proved pariwar register, wherein date of birth of victim was shown 25.08.1994. Similarly as per Admission register of Primary school, Rajkhar the date of birth of victim was 25.08.1994 and thus victim was a major girl. Referring to the statement of victim/ PW-2, it was pointed out that she has stated that she was admitted in class 1st in government school Raspahri and she has studied there upto class 5th and that in class 6th & 7th she has studied in Uchchtar Madhyamik Vidyalaya and in class 8th she has studied in Birla Vidya Mandir, Myorpor. It was stated that alleged school certificate relied by the prosecution regarding age of victim age is wholly doubtful and the reliance of trial Court on statement of PW-8 Nitika Sharma is wholly erroneous as she is neither the author of register nor she has recorded date of birth in school register. It was submitted that in fact as per medical examination as well as scholar register of Primary school Rajkhar, the age of victim must have been considered more than 18 years.
5. It was further submitted that it is wholly unsustainable story that victim was found pregnant in as much as during investigation no such fact was stated by the victim or any other witness. The victim has made improvement at every stage, be it statement under Sections 161, 164 Cr.P.C. or before the trial Court. In medical examination report prepared by PW-5 Dr. Geeta Jaiswar, it has been mentioned that LMP (last menstrual period) of victim was on 12.11.2014 and she has categorically stated that no characteristics of pregnancy were there in the examination of the victim. For the first time the victim has raised issue of pregnancy in her statement recorded on 06.03.2020 before the trial Court, whereas at the time of her medical examination there were no signs of any pregnancy. The alleged ultrasound report (Paper no.49 Kha/ 3) filed before the trial court during trial is a wholly doubtful document and it was neither exhibited nor proved. The trial Court has placed reliance upon document paper No.49 kha/ 3 but the same is wholly misplaced and in fact this document does not even bear the name of person, who has examined the victim. The said document has not been proved or exhibited during trial. During trial, victim has produced certain documents before the trial Court i.e paper No.49 Kha/ 1 to 49Kha/ 6 and tried to show that her ultrasound was done on 12.01.2015 and on that basis for the first time in her statement dated 06.03.2020, victim has stated that she is having pregnancy. It was submitted that said ultrasound report, Paper no.49 Kha/ 3 does not contain even name of the victim. As per said ultrasound report, EDD (estimated date of delivery) is 07.07.2015 and said ultrasound report is dated 12.01.2015 and going by the said report, it would indicate that victim got pregnancy in the month of October or early November 2014, whereas as per statement of victim recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. as well as statement dated 07.11.2014 recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. and also her statement dated 06.08.2022, recorded before the trial Court, it has been categorically stated that on 04.11.2014 the appellant has only harassed the victim and did not commit any rape and thus it can be deduced that in order to trap the appellant, victim has made a false statement and produced a forged document before the trial Court. In her statement, PW-5 Dr. Geeta Jaiswar has stated that when she examined the victim, the LMP was on 12.11.2014 and she has no signs of pregnancy, whereas as per ultrasound report 49 Kha/ 3 victim was shown having pregnancy of three months on 12.01.2015. In a supplementary medical legal report dated 06.11.2014, it has been mentioned that no definite opinion can be given about rape. All the attending facts clearly show that victim has produced a forged and false document. Referring to statement of PW-5 and documents 49Kha / 2, 49Kha/ 3 and 49 kha/ 6, it was submitted the story developed by victim regarding pregnancy is not consistent with sequence of events and the same is not corroborated by any credible evidence and even otherwise these documents were filed during trial and the same have not been proved.
6. It is further submitted that statement of victim is not supported by medical evidence in as much as the concerned doctor has stated that no definite opinion can be given about rape. It was submitted that in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., appellant has categorically stated that on 29.10.2014 a quarrel has taken place and in that regard a panchayat was held to settle the dispute between one Sobhanath and father of victim and appellant being husband of village Pradhan was involved in the panchayat and being aggrieved by the same the appellant has been falsely implicated in this case.
7. It is further submitted that at the time of conviction the appellant was a sitting Member of Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh and if his conviction was not stayed by this Court he would lose his membership from the Assembly. Learned counsel has referred statement of witnesses and submitted that there are material contradiction and discrepancies. The appellant has been falsely implicated in this case due to enmity and there is no credible evidence against appellant. The conviction of appellant is not based on evidence. The trial Court has failed to consider the material contradictions and discrepancies in the prosecution case. Appellant is in jail since 12.12.2023 and he has also remained in custody for some period during investigation/ trial. Lastly, it was submitted that in view of huge pendency of the cases, there is least possibility of early hearing in the appeal and thus, in view of aforesaid facts and circumstances, the sentence awarded by the trial Court as well as the conviction of the appellant may be suspended / stayed during pendency of this appeal.
8. Per contra, learned Additional Government Advocate as well as learned counsel for informant have opposed the prayer of suspension of sentence and conviction and submitted that conviction of appellant is based on evidence and there is no material illegality or perversity in the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court. At the time of incident, victim was a minor girl and in her statement during investigation as well as during trial, she has made allegations of rape against appellant. During trial, witnesses were cross-examined at length but no such material fact could emerge, which may create any doubt about authenticity of the version of victim. Appellant has criminal history of four cases. Learned counsel for informant submitted that in her cross-examination, the victim has stated that appellant committed rape upon her and after 8-9 days of said initial incident of rape, he has again committed rape upon her and similarly he has repeated same act for several times and in fact appellant has committed rape upon victim for six times. Victim could not report the matter to the police as appellant has threatened her. The evidence of victim is sufficient to sustain conviction of the appellant.
9. It was submitted that due to the incident of rape, the victim has become pregnant and the same is supported by the ultrasound report 49kha/3, wherein she was shown having pregnancy. Learned counsel has referred pregnancy test of victim conducted at Duddhi Pathology Centre and ultrasound report dated 12.01.2015, showing EDD as 07.07.2015. It was stated that later victim has given birth to a child at CHC Duddhi Sonbhadra on 27.06.2015 and the birth certificate of child was filed along with additional counter affidavit.
10. It was submitted that the date of birth of victim was 15.12.1998 and thus at the time of incident, she was aged about 15 years 10 months and 19 days and thus, she was a minor girl. Said date of birth of victim has been duly proved by PW-8 Nitika Sharma. Victim has also stated her age as 16 years. A false affidavit has been submitted from the side of appellant stating that for the session year 2013-14, victim has studied in Uchh Prathmik Vidyalaya, Raspahri and in fact she has never studied there. Victim was an unmarried girl and she has suffered pregnancy due to rape committed by appellant. The appellant has concealed material facts and he has not approached the court with clean hands. No corroboration of the statement of victim is required to convict the appellant. There are no reasons to disbelieve the testimony of victim. Referring to facts of the matter, it was submitted that conviction of appellant is based on evidence and that no case for suspension of sentence or of conviction is made out.
11. I have considered rival submissions and perused the record.
12. Section 389 of the CrPC empowers the Court to suspend the sentence pending the appeal and for release of the appellant on bail. Section 389 CrPC so far relevant reads as follows:-
"389. Suspension of sentence pending the appeal; release of appellant on bail - (1) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that he execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail, or on his own bond.
Provided that the Appellate Court shall, before releasing on bail or on his own bond a convicted person who is convicted of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years, shall give opportunity to the Public Prosecutor for showing cause in writing against such release:
Provided further that in cases where a convicted person is released on bail it shall be open to the Public Prosecutor to file an application for the cancellation of the bail.?
13. In the case of Preet Pal Singh (2020)8SCC645 the Apex Court held that as the discretion under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is to be exercised judicially, the appellate Court is obliged to consider whether any cogent ground has been disclosed, giving rise to substantial doubts about the validity of the conviction and whether there is likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of the appeal.
14. In case of Kishori Lal (2004) 7 SCC 638, the Court held:-
?Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.
The appellate Court is duty bound to objectively assess the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the accused-respondents were on bail. The mere fact that during the trial, they were granted bail and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is really not of much significance. The effect of bail granted during trial looses significance when on completion of trial, the accused persons have been found guilty. The mere fact that during the period when the accused persons were on bail during trial there was no misuse of liberties, does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the correct principle in view.?
15. In case of Hasmat (2004) 6 SCC 175, the Apex Court observed that Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the applicant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.
16. From aforesaid, it apparent that provisions of section 389(1) CrPC empower the Appellate Court to order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended pending the appeal. What can be suspended under this provision is the execution of the sentence or the execution of the order, which is capable of execution. The discretion under section 389(1) CrPC is to be exercised judicially. The appellate Court has to consider whether any cogent ground has been disclosed giving rise to substantial doubts about the validity of conviction. Likelihood of unreasonable delay in disposal of appeal is also a relevant factor, as referred in case of Preet Pal Singh (supra). In certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense, it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case. In such a case the power under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. could be invoked but in such situations the attention of the Appellate Court must be specifically invited to the consequence that is likely to fall, to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. it is under an obligation to support its order 'for reasons to be recorded by it in writing'. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed against. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine. The mere fact that during the trial, he was granted bail and there was no allegation of misuse of liberty, is not of much significance. The effect of bail granted during trial looses significance when on completion of trial, the accused persons have been found guilty. The main consideration is whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail.
17. In the instant matter, as per prosecution version on 04.11.2014 at about 7:00 PM, while informant was present at his home, his sister (victim) came running and weeping and told that husband of village Pradhan, namely, Ram Dulare (appellant) had been establishing physical relations with her by threatening and enticing her and on that day also he has misbehaved with her. The informant reported the matter to the police by submitting a written complaint, on the basis of which the case was registered on 04.11.2014 at 22:10 hours, under Sections 376, 506 IPC and 5tha / 6 POCSO Act. Victim was medically examined. In her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., victim has alleged that appellant has been committing rape upon her since last one year by threatening her and on 04.11.2014 he misbehaved with her and thereafter, she told these facts to her brother. During trial victim has been examined as PW-2. At the time of her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., victim has stated her age as 16 years. During trial, she has made a statement that appellant has been committing rape since last one year by threatening her and that on 04.11.2014 appellant has again misbehaved and thereafter victim has told the incident to her brother. In her statement, victim has told her date of birth as 15.12.1998 and she has stated that appellant has committed rape upon her for 4-5 times. She has also stated that one Ram Kali used to take her from home and thereafter appellant used to commit rape upon her. Victim has further alleged that due to incident of rape, she has become pregnant.
18. So far the prayer of suspension of sentence during appeal is concerned, it may be stated that as per prosecution version the appellant was physically exploiting the victim since one year and thus, there is long delay in lodging of the first information report. As per alleged school admission register of Primary School, Raspahri, the date of birth of victim was shown 15.12.1998, whereas case of the appellant is that victim was admitted in class Ist in Tulsi Bal Pradhmik Vidalaya, Rajkhar on 10.07.2000 and as per admission register her date of birth was 25.08.1994. In that connection DW-3 Harishchandra Headmaster Tulsi Bal Pradhmik Vidalaya, Rajkhar has proved the admission register. As per ossification test report age of victim was shown more than 18 years. It may be pointed out here that regarding study in Primary School, Raspahri, there are contradictions between statement of victim and PW 8 Nitika Sharma, who has proved the admission register of Primary school Raspahri. Thus, the alleged date of birth of victim (15.12.1998) is seriously being disputed from the side of appellant. It was shown that in medical examination report, no injury has been shown on body of victim. PW-5 Dr. Geeta Jaiswar, who has examined the victim, has stated that there were no characteristics of having any pregnancy to the victim and in fact her last LMP (last menstrual period) of victim was of 12.11.2014. During investigation, it was not the case of prosecution that due to alleged rape the victim has got any pregnancy. It appears that during trial for the first time the victim has alleged that she got pregnancy. During trial the victim has produced a copy of ultrasound report (paper no.49Kha/ 3) dated 12.01.2015, wherein she was shown pregnant and probable birth of the child in womb was shown as 07.07.2015. It may be stated that the alleged ultrasound report 49Kha/ 3 does not bear the name of victim. Even the name of person, who conducted ultrasound, has also not been mentioned. This document was produced during trial and it has not been proved. In view of aforesaid facts, particularly statement of PW-5 Dr. Geeta Jaiswar, the alleged version of prosecution regarding pregnancy of victim appears quite contradictory and doubtful. During hearing of application of suspension of sentence, the counsel of informant was asked as to what happened about the pregnancy of victim and consequently a copy of birth certificate was filed, wherein date of birth of child was shown as 27.06.2015 but there is nothing to show that when this certificate was issued, as it does not bear any date. In the said certificate name of appellant has been shown as husband of victim. This document also appears quite doubtful. It was also stated on behalf of appellant that for the sake of arguments even if the theory of victim regarding alleged pregnancy is believed, the time of alleged birth of child is not consistent with the version of victim as she has categorically stated that on 04.11.2014 no rape was committed upon her. Criminal history of some minor cases was shown against appellant, which has been explained. Appellant has already undergone custody of about three years. The case was registered in the year 2014 and impugned judgment was passed on 15.12.2023. It would be pertinent to mention that in view of huge pendency of cases there is little possibility that appeal could be heard soon and thus, the refusal of suspension of sentence may render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal.
19. Considering the submissions of learned counsel for the parties, nature of evidence, period of custody, least possibility of early hearing in appeal and all attending facts and circumstances of the case, without expressing any opinion on the merits, a case for suspension of further sentence / grant of bail during pendency of appeal is made out.
20. However, so far the question of staying the effect and operation of impugned judgment and order is concerned, the parameters and legal position on that issue are on different footing. It is well-settled that stay of conviction is not a rule but an exception to be resorted to in rare cases. No doubt in certain situations the order of conviction can be executable, in the sense it may incur a disqualification as in the instant case and in such a case the power under Section 389(1) CrPC could be invoked but in such situations the attention of the appellate court must be specifically invited to the consequences which are likely to fall, to enable it to apply its mind to the issue since under Section 389(1) CrPC it is under an obligation to support its order for reasons to be recorded by it in writing. The appellate court in an exceptional case may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power has to be exercised with great circumspection and caution. The appellant must satisfy the court as regards the consequences that are likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The court has to consider all the facts and examine whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The power to stay of conviction has to be resorted in a rare case only.
21. In State of Maharashtra V. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar (2012) 12 SCC 384, it has been held that the appellate court in an exceptional case, may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence, but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution, for the purpose of which, the applicant must satisfy the court as regards the evil that is likely to befall him, if the said conviction is not suspended. The court has to consider all the facts as are pleaded by the applicant, in a judicious manner and examine whether the facts and circumstances involved in the case are such, that they warrant such a course of action by it. The court additionally, must record in writing, its reasons for granting such relief. Relief of staying the order of conviction cannot be granted only on the ground that an employee may lose his job, if the same is not done. In State of Maharashtra v. Gajanan (2003) 12 SCC 432, the Apex Court had to deal with specific situation of loss of job and it has been held that it is not one of exceptional cases for staying the conviction.
22. In the case of Ravikant S. Patil (2007) 1 SCC 673, it was held that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases. It was observed as under:-
''15. It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant 7 would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction.''
23. Same view was reiterated in the case of Navjot Singh Sidhu (2007) 2 SCC 574 and it was held that grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases. In Para 6 it has been held has follows:
?The legal position is, therefore, clear that an appellate court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction. But the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case.?
24. The Apex Court in the case of Shyam Narain Pandey (2014) 8 SCC 909, held that unless there are exceptional circumstances, the appellate court shall not stay the conviction, though the sentence may be suspended. There is no hard and fast rule or guidelines as to what are those exceptional circumstances. However, there are certain indications in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 itself as to which are those situations and a few indications are available in the judgments of this Court as to what are those circumstances. In the case of Lok Prahari (supra), Hon'ble Apex Court has again reiterated that the power to stay a conviction is by way of an exception. Thus, it is well-settled principle of law that stay of conviction is not a rule but an exception to be resorted to in rare cases.
25. In case of K.C. Sareen (2001) 6 SCC 584, Hon'ble Apex Court summarized the legal position and held:
?The legal position, therefore, is this: Though the power to suspend an order of conviction, apart from the order of sentence, is not alien to Section 389(1) of the Code, its exercise should be limited to very exceptional cases. Merely because the convicted person files an appeal in challenge of the conviction the court should not suspend the operation of the order of conviction. The court has a duty to look at all aspects including the ramifications of keeping such conviction in abeyance. It is in the light of the above legal position that we have to examine the question as to what should be the position when a public servant is convicted of an offence under the PC Act. No doubt when the appellate court admits the appeal filed in challenge of the conviction and sentence for the offence under the PC Act, the superior court should normally suspend the sentence of imprisonment until disposal of the appeal, because refusal thereof would render the very appeal otiose unless such appeal could be heard soon after the filing of the appeal. But suspension of conviction of the offence under the PC Act, de hors the sentence of imprisonment as a sequel thereto, is a different matter.?
26. Thus, it is apparent that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. The appellate court can suspend or grant stay of order of conviction, but the person seeking stay of conviction should specifically draw the attention of the appellate court to the consequences that may arise if the conviction is not stayed. Unless the attention of the court is drawn to the specific consequences that would follow on account of the conviction, the person convicted cannot obtain an order of stay of conviction. Further, grant of stay of conviction can be resorted to in rare cases depending upon the special facts of the case but such power must be exercised with great circumspection and caution. Only in an exceptional case, the appellate court may put the conviction in abeyance along with the sentence.
27. In so far as the present case is concerned, it was stated that the appellant was a sitting member of Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh but now after the judgment of Trial Court, he has been stripped of the membership of Legislature. The only contention raised in this connection is that if the effect and operation of impugned judgment and order is not stayed, the appellant will remain disqualified under the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951. Except that no other specific consequence which is likely to fall upon conviction, has been shown. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, there is absolutely nothing that what consequences are likely to fall upon conviction. It would be relevant to mention that the appellant has been convicted for the offence under section 5Tha/ 6 POCSO Act and Section 376, 506 IPC and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with fine of Rs..10,00,000/- under Section 5Tha/ 6 POCSO Act and two years imprisonment with fine of Rs.5000/-, under Section 506 IPC. Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 stipulates the disqualification on conviction for certain offences. After giving thoughtful consideration to all attending facts of the case, nature of offence of which the appellant has been convicted and the aforesaid position of law, this Court is of considered view that the instant case does not fall within the ambit of such rare case so as to warrant suspension of conviction of appellant and thus, no case for suspension or stay of conviction of appellant is made out. It is correct that this Court is allowing the prayer of suspension of sentence / bail during pendency of appeal but, as stated above, the legal position and parameters for stay of conviction are quite different.
28. In view of aforesaid, the prayer for stay of conviction of appellant is refused and hereby rejected, however prayer for suspension of sentence / bail is allowed.
29. Let the appellant Ramdulare convicted and sentenced in S.S.T. No. 35 of 2015 (State Vs. Ramdulare), arising out of Case Crime No.483 of 2014, under Sections 376, 506 I.P.C. and Sections 5 (?)/ 6 of POCSO Act, Police Station - Myorpur, District Sonbhadra, be released on bail on his furnishing a personal bond with two sureties (one should be of his family member) in the like amount to the satisfaction of the court concerned.
30. On acceptance of bail bonds and personal bond, the court concerned shall transmit photostat copies thereof to this Court for being kept on the record.
31. The realization of 50% amount of fine imposed by the Trial Court shall remained stayed during pendency of appeal.
32. The application under Section 389(1) Cr.P.C. is disposed of in above terms.
33. It is clarified that observations made in this order are only for the purpose of deciding this application under section 389 CrPC and the same would have no bearing at all on the merits of the appeal.
Order on memo of Appeal:-
Appeal be listed in month of August, 2026.
Meanwhile paper book be prepared.
(Raj Beer Singh,J.) May 22, 2026 'SP'/-