Jharkhand High Court
Nirmal Kumar Agrawal vs The State Of Jharkhand on 5 April, 2023
Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 1016 of 2013
Nirmal Kumar Agrawal, son of late Mahadeo Prasad Agarwal working for
gain as Occupier, M/s Adhunik Power and Natural Resources, Ltd.,
Padampur, Behind P.G.C.I., Adityapur-Kandra Road, P.O. Kandra, Police
Station Kandra, District-Seraikella-Kharsawan ... Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Shri Tej Pratap Singh, Labour Superintendent & Inspector, Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, /2001, Department of Labour
Employment & Training, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. and P.S.
Seraikella Kharsawan, District-Seraikella-Kharsawan
... Opposite Parties
with
Cr.M.P. No. 1079 of 2013
1. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
having its registered office at BHEL House Siri Fort, P.O. and P.S. Hauj
Khas, Town and District New Delhi-110049
2. D. Saha @ D. Shah, son of late Shri Susanta Kumar Saha, working as
General Manager having its registered office at BHEL House Siri Fort,
P.O. and P.S. Hauj Khas, Town and District New Delhi-110049 (N.C.T. of
Delhi) and having its site office at M/s Adhunik Power & Natural
Resources Ltd., Padampur, Behind P.G.C.I., Adityapur-Kandra Road, P.O.
and P.S. Seraikella, District-Seraikella Kharsawan ...
Petitioners
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. Shri Tej Pratap Singh, Labour Superintendent & Inspector, Contract
Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, /2001, Department of Labour
Employment & Training, Government of Jharkhand, P.O. and P.S.
Seraikella Kharsawan, District-Seraikella-Kharsawan
... Opposite Parties
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Rishav Kumar, Advocate For the State : Mr. Vijoy Kr. Sinha, A.P.P. (In Cr.M.P. No.1016/2013) Mrs. Ruby Pandey, A.P.P. (In Cr.M.P. No.1079/2013)
-----
04/05.04.2023. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha assisted by Mr. Rishav Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Vijoy Kr. Sinha and Mrs. Ruby Pandey, appearing for the State.
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2. In both the petitions, common question of facts and laws are involved and that is why all these petitions have been heard together with the consent of the parties.
3. In both the petitions, the prayer is made for quashing the entire criminal prosecution arising out of G.O. 18 of 2013 including the order dated 18.01.2013, whereby, cognizance of an offence under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (herein after to be referred to as the Act) against the petitioners, pending in the Court of learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella-Kharsawan.
4. The opposite party no.2 lodged complaint dated 16.01.2013 alleging therein the complainant under the capacity of Inspector under the Contract Labour (regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 along with Shri Arun Kumar Mishra, Factory Inspector, Circle-2, District Seraikella-Kharsawan and Shri Satyendra Kumar Singh, Labour Enforcement Officer, Gamharia, District Seraikella Kharsawan conducted an inspection with regard to contractor M/s Bharat Heavy Engineering Ltd. working under M/s Adhunik Power & Natural Resources Ltd. at Padampur, Behind P.G.C.I., Adityapur-Kandra Road, Distric, District Seraikella -Kharsawan. At the time of inspecton, it is alleged that Shri D. Shah, General Manger was present and in course of the inspection the following violations have been stated to have been found:-
(i).Prior Contract Licence in terms of Section 12 of the Act has not been obtained.
(ii). Facilities in terms of Rule 51, Rule 57 and Rule 58 required to be provided to the labourers were not provided.
(iii). Register of the engaged labourers in terms of Rule 75 was not kept.
(iv) Engagement Memo in Form XIV within 30 days from the date of commencement of the work in terms of Rule 76 was not given.3
(v). Service Certificate to the labourers/staff upon completion of work in Form xv in terms of Rule 77 has not been given.
(vi). Muster Role in Form XVI, Wages Register in Form XVII, overtime Register in Form XXIII as required in terms of Rule 78 were not found at the workplace.
Wage slip to the labourers in Form XIX was not given.
It was alleged that regarding the aforesaid violations, a show cause notice vide letter no. 445 dated 05.12.2012 was issued requiring the contractor to submit his reply on 18.12.2012 at 11.00 A.M. and it has been alleged that the reply given by the contractor on the requisite date was not satisfactory.
Thus, it was prayed that by taking cognizance of the offence in terms of Section 26 the accused persons named in Column 2 in respect of the violations mentioned in Column 5, appropriate punishment be awarded to the accused persons in terms of section 24(A) of the Act.
Subsequently, the opposite Party no. 2 moved a petition, praying therein that due to typographical mistake section 24(A) has been typed in Column 5 of the prosecution report instead of Section 24 and, therefore, it was prayed that Section 24(A) in the prosecution report be read as Section
24. The aforesaid prosecution report was numbered as G.O. 18 of 2013 in the Court of learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella-Kharsawan.
5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the learned court has taken cognizance under sections 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. He submits that the petitioner- Nirmal Kumar Agrawal has been implicated in this case in the capacity of being occupier of M/s Adhunik Power & Natural Resources Ltd. He further submits that M/s Bharat Heavy Engineering Ltd. had replied to 4 the show cause notice dated 05.12.2012 by a reply dated 18.12.2012 wherein it has been categorically stated that BHEL is a Government of India undertaking and has not employed any contract labour for carrying out any activities. He further submits that so far as the work is concerned in the establishment of Adhunik and Natural Resources Limited, sub contractors have been engaged for the work of Adhunik Power and Natural Resources Limited and they have directly employed contract labour and have deployed the same in the establishment of Adhunik Power and Natural Resources Limited. He submits that if any violation is there it was responsibility of the sub-contractors and vicarious liability cannot be fastened upon the petitioners who are directors of the company. He draws the attention of the Court to section 25 of the said Act and submits that in view of this it has not been alleged that the petitioners are only looking day to day affairs of the company and in that view of the matter, entire criminal proceeding may be quashed.
6. Mr. Vijoy Kr. Sinha and Mrs. Ruby Pandey, learned counsels for the State jointly submit that there are violation of statutory provision of the said Act and that is why the competent authority has lodged the complaint and after that the learned court has taken cognizance. They further submit that in absence of licence, the work was being done, that is why case has been lodged. They submit that at this stage this Court may not interfere with the matter.
7. In view of above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on records. Section 2(1)(g)(iii) of the Act speaks of principal employer and relates to the owner, or agent of the mine . In the case in hand Nirmal Kumar Agarwal has been shown to be occupier of M/s Adhunik Power & Natural Resources, Ltd . There 5 is no provision of occupier in the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. This is not a case under the Factories Act and in the Factories Act concept of occupier is there. However in the light of section 25 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 the person who is looking day to day affairs of the company are only liable to be prosecuted and directors are not liable to be prosecuted. There is no such averment in the complain that these petitioners were looking day to day affairs of the company. Reference may be made to the case of Swapan Ganguly v. Union of India, reported in 2006 3 JLJR 1. Paragraphs 13 and 15 of the said judgment are quoted herein below:
"13. From bare reading of the above provision of the Act, it is clear that liability is fastened on a person was held to be in charge of the office when the offence was detected and for others the burden is caused upon the prosecution to show that it was with their consent, or connivance, or that the commission of the offence was attributable on account of their negligent and such negligent, connivance or consent must be shown in respect of any director, manager, managing agent or any other officer of the company, who were not in charge of the office alleged to the place of occurrence at the time when the offence was detected and was holding office at distant places from the place of occurrence.
15. There is substance in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners that in spite of direction made by the Ranchi Bench of Patna High Court in Cr. Misc. No. 736 of 1991(R) on March 15, 1999 (sic) while setting aside the earlier cognizance order in the present case on July 9, 1990 to take cognizance of the offence afresh after perusal of the necessary documents and upon being satisfied that a prima facie case existed under Section 24 of the Act against the petitioners. Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has made reference to a letter in the order impugned dated March 19, 2004, under challenge that his attention was drawn towards the letter dated August 8, 1986 issued by the District Manager for registration of Food Corporation of India as principal employer under the Act wherein District Manager had sought guidelines. Pursuant to that, the guidelines dated August 26, 1986 was sent to the District Manager, i.e. petitioner No. 2. He further relied upon the letter produced on behalf of the prosecution which was furnished in Form-I by the District Manager, i.e. petitioner No. 2 herein with reference to Column III that he presented himself as principal employer but certainly for the name and location of the establishment as Food Corporation of India, district office Ranchi with the mailing address of the. establishment at district office, 12, Purulia Road, Ranchi and no address of Tatisilwai 6 Depot, Ranchi was mentioned therein claiming as the principal employer for the said establishment. On perusal of the letter dated August 8, 1986, reference of which has been made by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi the order impugned, certainly is a communication from the District Manager, i.e. petitioner No. 2 herein to the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) under the subject "Registration of Food Corporation of India on principal employer under C.L. (R & A) Act regarding"
in which the guidelines was sought for the registration of Chakradharpur Depot of the Food Corporation of India as to whether it comes within the jurisdiction of Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Chaibasa or the registration as was already made under the jurisdiction of Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central) Ranchi would serve the purpose for Chakradharpur also. It is nowhere mentioned that the District Manager, Ranchi- opposite party No. 2 herein claimed as principal employer for the Chakradharpur Depot, rather guideline was sought with regard to jurisdiction of the registration of the said Depot under the Act. From perusal of both the documents upon which reliance was placed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate for taking cognizance of the offence against the petitioners does not indicate that either the petitioner No. 1 or the petitioner No. 2 was in any manner responsible for day to day work of the Tatisilwai Depot of the Food Corporation of India or that either of the two was the principal Mar 07 2022 Page 4 of 5 employer at the alleged time of the detection by the prosecution party. This Court further finds that no prima facie case is made out against the petitioners for the offence alleged under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 being the principal employer in any manner in the background that there was no material before the Chief Judicial Magistrate to connect the petitioners as the principal employer of the Tatisilwai Depot of the Food Corporation of India and hence there was no prima facie case against them for taking cognizance of the offence under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. 16. Under the circumstances, the order impugned dated March 19, 2004 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ranchi taking cognizance of the offence in Complaint Case No. C-III-306 of 1990 under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 against the petitioners is illegal and hence it is set aside. This petition is allowed."
8. The same ratio was held in the case of A.K. Sahay v. The State of Jharkhand & another, reported in 2011 2 JCR 558. Paragraphs 12 and 13 of the said judgment are quoted herein below:
"12. Penal provision has to be strictly construed. A person cannot be criminally prosecuted on vague and unspecific allegations. The Managing Director of the B.C.C.L cannot be held directly responsible for the alleged contravention of Act/Rule etc of a particular colliery if there is no clear allegation of the role of Managing Director of the B.C.C.L constituting 7 penal offence. Even if certain words bring some persons within the fold of the person responsible for the overall superintendence and control, they cannot be prosecuted as the "Principle Employer", if there is no direct allegation making out a case of contravention of any provision of the Act, Rule or condition of license in the capacity of owner, agent or Manager named for the particular mine.
13. Learned Magistrate without taking into consideration the said legal aspect and the canon of the criminal jurisprudence has taken cognizance of the said offences against the petitioner against whom there is no such allegation of Mar 07 2022 Page 2 of 3 contravention of any of the provisions of the said Act and the rules framed thereunder in the capacity of owner, agent or Manager of the mine. I, therefore, find no cogent material constituting the offences under Sections 23 and 24 of the said Act and sufficient ground for prosecuting the petitioner and supporting the impugned order."
9. What role is played by these petitioners are required to be disclosed in the complaint case as has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ravindranatha Bajpe v. Mangalore Special Economic Zone Ltd. and Others, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 806. Paragraph 27 of the said judgment is quoted herein below:
"27. As held by this Court in the case of India Infoline Limited (supra), in the order issuing summons, the learned Magistrate has to record his satisfaction about a prima facie case against the accused who are Managing Director, the Company Secretary and the Directors of the Company and the role played by them in their respective capacities which is sine qua non for initiating criminal proceedings against them. Looking to the averments and the allegations in the complaint, there are no specific allegations and/or averments with respect to role played by them in their capacity as Chairman, Managing Director, Executive Director, Deputy General Manager and Planner & Executor. Merely because they are Chairman, Managing Director/Executive Director and/or Deputy General Manager and/or Planner/Supervisor of A1 & A6, without any specific role attributed and the role played by them in their capacity, they cannot be arrayed as an accused, more particularly they cannot be held vicariously liable for the offences committed by A1 & A6."
10. The Court has perused the cognizance order dated 18.01.2013 in which it has not been disclosed what are the prima facie materials against these petitioners for taking cognizance under alleged sections of the Act. For taking cognizance application of judicial mind is necessary. A reference may 8 be made to the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal v. C.B.I, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 609. Paragraph no.48 of the said judgment is quoted as under:
"48. Sine qua non for taking cognizance of the offence is the application of mind by the Magistrate and his satisfaction that the allegations, if proved, would constitute an offence. It is, therefore, imperative that on a complaint or on a police report, the Magistrate is bound to consider the question as to whether the same discloses commission of an offence and is required to form such an opinion in this respect. When he does so and decides to issue process, he shall be said to have taken cognizance. At the stage of taking cognizance, the only consideration before the court remains to consider judiciously whether the material on which the prosecution proposes to prosecute the accused brings out a prima facie case or not."
11. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the case arising out of Minimum Wages Act in the case of Dayle De'souza v. Government Of India, through Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (c) And Another reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 1012. Paragraph nos.24, 25, 28, 29, 30 and 32 of the said judgment are quoted herein below:
"24. There is yet another difficulty for the prosecution in the present case as the Company has not been made an accused or even summoned to be tried for the offence. The position of law as propounded in State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh and Another: (1970) 3 SCC 491., reads:
"3. Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, sought conviction of the two respondents on the basis of Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act under which, if the person contravening an order made under Section 3 (which covers an order under the Iron and Steel Control Order, 1956), is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. It was urged that the two respondents were in charge of, and were responsible to, the Company for the conduct of the business of the Company and, consequently, they must be held responsible for the sale and for thus contravening the provisions of clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order. This argument cannot be accepted, because it ignores the first condition for the applicability of Section 10 to the effect that the person contravening the order must be a company itself. In the present case, there is no finding either by the Magistrate or by the High Court that the sale in contravention of clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order was made by the Company. In fact, the Company was not charged 9 with the offence at all. The liability of the persons in charge of the Company only arises when the contravention is by the Company itself. Since, in this case, there is no evidence and no finding that the Company contravened clause (5) of the Iron and Steel Control Order, the two respondents could not be held responsible. The actual contravention was by Kamdar and Vallabhdas Thacker and any contravention by them would not fasten responsibility on the respondents. The acquittal of the respondents is, therefore, fully justified. The appeal fails and is dismissed."
25. However, subsequent decisions of this Court have emphasised that the provision imposes vicarious liability by way of deeming fiction which presupposes and requires the commission of the offence by the company itself as it is a separate juristic entity. Therefore, unless the company as a principal accused has committed the offence, the persons mentioned in sub-section (1) would not be liable and cannot be prosecuted. Section 141(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, extends vicarious criminal liability to the officers of a company by deeming fiction, which arises only when the offence is committed by the company itself and not otherwise. Overruling Sheoratan Agarwal and Anil Hada, in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited, (2012) 5 SCC 661. A 3-judge bench of this court expounding on the vicarious liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, has held:
"51. We have already opined that the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal runs counter to the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is by a larger Bench and hence, is a binding precedent. On the aforesaid ratiocination, the decision in Anil Hada has to be treated as not laying down the correct law as far as it states that the Director or any other officer can be prosecuted without impleadment of the company. Needless to emphasise, the matter would stand on a different footing where there is some legal impediment and the doctrine of lex non cogit ad impossibilia gets attracted.
59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag- net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil Hada is overruled with the qualifier as stated in para 51. The decision in Modi Distillery has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove."
28. The proposition of law laid down in Aneeta Hada (supra) was relied upon by this Court in Anil Gupta v. Star India Private Limited and Another (2014) 10 SCC 373.
"13. In the present case, the High Court by the impugned judgment dated 13-8-2007 [Visionaries Media Network v.10
Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No. 2380 of 2004, decided on 13-8-2007 (Del)] held that the complaint against Respondent 2 Company was not maintainable and quashed the summons issued by the trial court against Respondent 2 Company. Thereby, the Company being not a party to the proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the Act and in view of the fact that part of the judgment referred to by the High Court in Anil Hada has been overruled by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada, we have no other option but to set aside the rest part of the impugned judgment [Visionaries Media Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No. 2380 of 2004, decided on 13- 8-2007 (Del)] whereby the High Court held that the proceedings against the appellant can be continued even in absence of the Company. We, accordingly, set aside that part of the impugned judgment dated 13-8- 2007 [Visionaries Media Network v. Star India (P) Ltd., Criminal Misc. Case No. 2380 of 2004, decided on 13- 8-2007 (Del)] passed by the High Court so far as it relates to the appellant and quash the summons and proceeding pursuant to Complaint Case No. 698 of 2001 qua the appellant."
29. In Sharad Kumar Sanghi v. Sangita Rane (2015) 12 SCC 781, this Court observed that:
"11. In the case at hand as the complainant's initial statement would reflect, the allegations are against the Company, the Company has not been made a party and, therefore, the allegations are restricted to the Managing Director. As we have noted earlier, allegations are vague and in fact, principally the allegations are against the Company. There is no specific allegation against the Managing Director. When a company has not been arrayed as a party, no proceeding can be initiated against it even where vicarious liability is fastened under certain statutes. It has been so held by a three-Judge Bench in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours (P) Ltd. in the context of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. xx xx xx
13. When the company has not been arraigned as an accused, such an order could not have been passed. We have said so for the sake of completeness. In the ultimate analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court should have been well advised to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellant and that having not been done, the order is sensitively vulnerable and accordingly we set aside the same and quash the criminal proceedings initiated by the respondent against the appellant."
30. This position was again clarified and reiterated by this Court in Himanshu v. B. Shivamurthy and Another. (2019) 3 SCC 797 The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:
"6. The judgment of the High Court has been questioned on two grounds. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that firstly, the appellant could not be prosecuted without the company being named as an accused. The cheque was issued by the company and was signed by the appellant as its Director.11
Secondly, it was urged that the observation of the High Court that the company can now be proceeded against in the complaint is misconceived. The learned counsel submitted that the offence under Section 138 is complete only upon the issuance of a notice of demand and the failure of payment within the prescribed period. In absence of compliance with the requirements of Section 138, it is asserted, the direction of the High Court that the company could be impleaded/arraigned at this stage is erroneous.
7. The first submission on behalf of the appellant is no longer res integra. A decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels & Tours (P) Ltd. governs the area of dispute. The issue which fell for consideration was whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without the company being arraigned as an accused. The three-
Judge Bench held thus: (SCC p. 688, para 58) "58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the considered opinion that commission of offence by the company is an express condition precedent to attract the vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words "as well as the company"
appearing in the section make it absolutely unmistakably clear that when the company can be prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected when a Director is indicted."
In similar terms, the Court further held: (SCC p. 688, para 59) "59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the drag-net on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself."
xx xx xx
12. The provisions of Section 141 postulate that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished.
13. In the absence of the company being arraigned as an accused, a complaint against the appellant was 12 therefore not maintainable. The appellant had signed the cheque as a Director of the company and for and on its behalf. Moreover, in the absence of a notice of demand being served on the company and without compliance with the proviso to Section 138, the High Court was in error in holding that the company could now be arraigned as an accused."
32. In terms of the ratio above, a company being a juristic person cannot be imprisoned, but it can be subjected to a fine, which in itself is a punishment. Every punishment has adverse consequences, and therefore, prosecution of the company is mandatory. The exception would possibly be when the company itself has ceased to exist or cannot be prosecuted due to a statutory bar. However, such exceptions are of no relevance in the present case. Thus, the present prosecution must fail for this reason as well."
12. In view of the above facts and reasons, these petitions succeed. The entire criminal prosecution arising out of G.O. 18 of 2013 including the order dated 18.01.2013, whereby, cognizance of an offence under Section 24 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (herein after to be referred to as the Act) against the petitioners, pending in the Court of learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Seraikella-Kharsawan, so far as these petitioners are concerned, is hereby, quashed.
13. Accordingly, these petitions stand allowed and disposed of.
14. Pending I.A., if any, also stands disposed of. Interim orders are vacated.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) satyarthi/