Patna High Court
Lalit Kumar Kujur vs State Of Bihar on 27 November, 1968
Equivalent citations: 1969(17)BLJR769
JUDGMENT R.J. Bahadur, J.
1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and under Section 491, Code of Criminal Procedure, by one Lalit Kumar Kujur for his release from detention made by the order of the District Magistrate of Ranchi under Sections 3 and 4 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950), hereinafter referred to as 'the Act.'
2. It appears that at 5 A.M. on the 3rd July, 1968, the petitioner was arrested by the police from his residence at Kathan Tola in the town of Ranchi and sent to Jail. That very clay he was served with an order of detention as it was necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of public order. On the 5th July, 1968, the petitioner was served with a copy of the order, along with the grounds of his detention, which are mentioned in paragraph 3 of the petition and are as follows:
i. That on 10-3-1968 in a speech at a meeting organised at Birsa Chowk P.S. Hatia he instigated the Adivasis to violence and further asked them to attack the H.E.C. Factory armed with bows and arrows and to stage a Gherao of the Chairman in order to force him to concede to the demands. He further asked them to start agitation on the lines of Mizoo and Nagas.
ii. That on 2-5-1968, he organised a demonstration in front of the H.E.C. Administrative Building and was trying to indulge in lawlessness.
The demonstrators were highly agitated and had the police not visited the place promptly, breach of peace could not have been averted.
iii. That he met the Chairman, H. E. C. on 3-5-68, in his Office and threatened to go violent and to storm the H. E. C. if demands were not fulfilled.
iv. That he led a procession of Advasis armed with bows and arrows on 11-5-1968 from Hinoo and moved in Rarichi town shouting the following, among other slogans which excited the Adivasis:
UTTAR BIHARI BHAGA JAO", LEKE RAHENGE JHARKAND", "KAISE LARENGE TIR SE.
v. That during the course of his speech at a meeting of the Birsa Sewa Dal in the Naria School Garden at Lohardaga on the 26th May, 1968, only a few days before the mob violence by the Adivasis on the house of Bhola Sahu at Chiri, only about five miles away from the place of the meeting, he incited the Adivasis masses to violence stating the following among other things:
JAB AISE GADDARI DEKHTE THANE KO KUCHAL DIJIE, BIRENDRA KE PAS BAHUT PAISA HAI TO AP KE PAS BIRSA SEWA DAL HAI, JHARKHAND HAMARKA HAI CHOTANAGPUR HAMARA HAI, GOONDON KO THOKAR MAR KAR BHAGAIYE, KABJA KARENGE DANTA SE TIR SE BANDUK SE, KHUN SE BHANNA KAHIN HAI, KABJA KARNA HAI, YAH JAMIN HAMARI HAI, BIRSA SEWA DAL KA KAM CHOTANAGPUR KE HAR JAMIN PAR KABJA KARNA HAI.
vi. That on the 2nd June 1968, he and some other members of Birsa Sewa Dal held a secret meeting in Chutia Mahalla at Ranchi in which they hatched conspiracy to behave like Nagas and Mizoos for securing fulfilment of their demands, to inflame the feelings of Adibasis against non-adibasis, and to beat up the non-adibasis and loot their properties.
vii. That in the night between the 16th and 17th June 1968 he held a secret meeting in the St. Xavier's College Hostel and instigated the Christian Adibasi boys to disturb the pre-university examination and also to indulge in violence. It was in pursuance of such instigation that the Christian Adibasi boys created rowdysm in the premises of the St. Xavier's College on the 17th (sic) Jine (June), 1968 during the course of which they threw brickbats in the examination hall, hurled filthy abuses on the police and local administration as well as the Vice-Chancellor and chased away Non-adibasi boarders of the Hostel.
viii. That on the 25th June, 1968, he and some other persons of Birsa Sewa Dal led a procession of village Nagri, P.S. Ratu forcibly entered the liquor shop of Ram Babu of Silli and snatched away the bottles from the hands of the customer. They also threw away and scattered the stock of Mahua of Sahdeo Sah, which the latter had placed for sale and the market.
ix. That on the 2nd July 1968, he held a secret meeting on Mohalla Pathakuduwa (Ranchi) in which he instigated Moses Guria, Willin Khalkho and others present to storm the University Office on the 3rd July 1968, to set fire to it and to assault the Vice Chancellor and the Registrar of the Ranchi University.
x. That he is instigating and is likely to instigate the Adibasis masses against the Non-Adibasis of the District to indulge in violence which has already resulted in considerable panic among the Non-adibasi population and such action on his part may adversely affect the security of the non-adibasis and may result in the breach of peace.
xi That his activities above and his being at large are bound to result in the maintenance of public order being prejudicially affected.
3. Appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Bifendra Prasad Sinha has contended that all grounds are vague and indefinite. He has also stated that paragraph 5 of the petition shows that the petitioner had been previously detained under the Act on the 3rd June, 1968, and was released on the 15th June, 1968; and ground Nos. 1 to 6 are merely reproduction of the grounds of his earlier detention. It is urged that those grounds cannot be made any basis for his subsequent detention; namely, the present detention.
4. the principles applying to cases of preventive detention have been dealt with by the Supreme Court in a large number of cases and we have had occasion to deal with some of the leading cases in our judgment in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 44 of 1968, which has been disposed of today. There is no controversy at the Bar that it is now too well settled that the order of detention can only be challenged in a Court of law on the following grounds:
(a) Whether all or any of the grounds are vague, so that the detenu would be unable to make an effective representation;
(b) Whether all or any of the grounds are irrelevant or nonest; and/or, (c) Whether the order of detention is mala fide.
5. Recently the Supreme Court has reviewed the important decisions of that Court in the case of Motital Jain v. State of Bihar 1968 P.L.J.R. 52-A (S.C.). It is, therefore, not necessary to reproduce the law on the subject as counsel are agreed that this Court must examine for itself each ground and see whether any of the grounds is hit by the decisions of the Supreme Court.
6. In respect of ground No. 1, it is urged that the name of the person or of the organisation is not given and the demand has not been specified, it has been rightly urged on behalf of the State that the names are not relevant and what is really relevant is the nature of instigations, which is given. The rest is clearly indicated in the ground and nothing more is required to be given. So far as ground No. 2 is concerned, the allegation is about organising a demonstration, which, it is said, is no offence. It is, however, conceded that lawlessness resulting from such organisation may be an. offence but the contention is that it is not said in this ground in what manner the demonstration was being done. As such, it is urged that this ground is clearly vague. Further, this ground could be divided into two parts and the second part, wherein it is said that the demonstrators were highly agitated is vague and the agitation is merely a matter of notion. It is difficult to accept the contention because the entire ground has to be read as a whole. There does not appear any vagueness, which would prevent the petitioner from making an effective representation. No detail is really necessary. The Supreme Court in the case of Chander Shekhar v. State of Jammu & Kashmir W.P. No. 243 of 1968 decided on 17th October 1968, after examining the grounds observed:
In our opinion, the grounds are sufficient to make a representation. After all the detenu would be required only to show that he never made a speech or even if he did the speech did not incite persons to violence and he could also have stated in his representation that he did not send any letter and even if any letter was sent by him it did not include any incitement to violence. It is the general conduct of the detenu from start to finish which was the ground for detention and this ground sets out sufficient particulars for the purpose of making a representation. The Government had also added that they had reliable information about his activities and given details of those activities. In the circumstances, we cannot say that the grounds are so vague as not to afford the detenu an adequate opportunity of making a representation. We, therefore, do not accept this contention also.
7. It is then urged that ground No. 3 is vague because the nature of demand has not been stated nor is the time given when the petitioner was made the Chairman. The argument for- the State is that threatening to go violent and to storm the H. E. C. are matters which are clearly contemplated under the Act. It is said that ground No. 4 does not mention the time, route and the names of the processionists and the names of the organisers have net been given; as such, this ground is vague. In my opinion, the contention is clearly without substance because those are matters, which are not material in making a representation. In respect of ground No. 5 the argument is similar, that is, the time of the meeting has not been stated and the name of the organiser of the meeting has also not been given. The answer to this contention is also similar as that of ground No. 4.
8. Learned Counsel has then urged that in respect of ground No. 6 names of the other members have not been given. The exact place also has not been given and what has been given is the name of the Mahalla, which is by no means sufficient and must, therefore, be held to be vague. It is also said that it has not been specified what is the behaviour of Nagas and Mizoos, This ground contains matters of common knowledge, such as, the activities of Nagas and Mizoos and the criticism on other parts of this ground is really beside the point and the answer is similar as given in respect of other grounds earlier. In any case, it cannot be said that there is any thing vague in this ground so as to make it difficult for the detenu to make a representation. In my opinion, none of the grounds suffers from vagueness. Learned Counsel has further urged that these are the very grounds which were furnished at the time of the earlier arrest and the petitioner was released. As such, it is said that later grounds have now been made in order to justify his detention and even those grounds, namely, 7 to 11, are still vague. It is said that the names of the persons with whom some secret meetings had been held are not given in ground No. 7; nor is the time of the meeting given. The answer to the criticism of learned Counsel, so far as this ground is concerned, is the same, namely, they are not material in making the representation and sufficient particulars have been given. For ground No. 8, it is said that some more particular were needed as they appeared to be irrelevant, as there can be no complaint about entering the liquor shop of Ram Babu of Silli. In my opinion, this ground is merely illustrative and is sufficiently specific and there is nothing vague about it. For ground No. 9, it is said that the exact spot and time have not been given. This again is like the other grounds dealt with above, in that, further details are not necessary for the purpose of making a representation. Ground No. 10 is allacked and learned Counsel says that it is not a ground at all but is merely a conclusive. I think, he is quite right that it is nothing else but a conclusion. Mr. Sinha's alternative argument, however, is that if it is a ground, then it is vague. As I have said, it is merely a conclusion. So far as ground No. 11 is concerned, it is of a general nature and is really conclusion and Mr. Smha has not attacked this ground.
9. It has then been urged by learned Counsel that if the earlier grounds are included in the grounds for the purpose of the present detention, then if some of the grounds are bad, in spite of the fact that the other grounds are good, his detention would be bad. He has relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shibban Lal Saksena v. The State of U.P. . It was laid down in that case that where the Government while confirming the detention admitted that one of the two grounds mentioned in the original order was unsubstantial or non-existent, the other ground, which still remained, was quite sufficient to sustain the order would be to substitute an objective Judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority, which was against the legislative policy underlying the statute. In such cases, the position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wholly illusory and that would vitiate the detention order as a whole. In my opinion, this case does not support the contention of learned Counsel because it dealt with an entirely different aspect; since the decision proceeds on the principle that where some grounds are found to be non-existing or cancelled or given up, detention could not be justified. This view was reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Lal Patwari v. The State of Bihar Cr. A. No. 183 of 1967 disposed of on 1st December, 1967 and dealt with in the case of Motilal Jain v. State of Bihar. The case of Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab , is actually relevant on the point and the relevant observation may be usefully reproduced here:
Let us now turn our attention to the main contentions. There is nothing strange or suprising in the fact that the same grounds have been repeated after the lapse of several months in both the cases, when it is remembered that the petitioners were under detention and in jail during the whole of the intervening period. No fresh activities could be attributed to them. There could only be a repetition of the original ground or grounds, whether good or bad. It does not follow from this that the satisfaction of the detaining authority was purely mechanical and that the mind did not go with the pen. The past conduct or antecedent history of a person can be taken into account when making a detention order, and, as a matter of fact, it is largely from prior event's showing the tendencies or inclinations of the man that an inference could be drawn whether he is likely even in the future to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. If the authority satisfied himself that the original ground was still available and that there was need for detention on its basis, no mala fides can be attributed to the authority from this fact alone.
10. Further, the case of Naresh Chandra Ganguli v. The State of West Bengal has clearly held that vagueness was irrelevant term. Its meaning must vary with the facts and circumstances of each case. What might be said to be vague in one case might not be so in another case, and it could not be asserted as a general rule that a ground was necessarily vague if the only answer of the detained person could be to deny it. If the statement of facts was capable of being understood and was sufficiently definite to enable the detained person to make his representation, it could not be said that it was vague. Further particulars of what had taken place could be more definitely stated than those events which were yet in the offing. In the very nature of things the" main object of the Act was to prevent persons from doing something which come within the purview of any of the sub-clauses of Clause (a) of Section 3 Sub-section (1) of the Act. In the same case it was observed that the statements of various paragraphs, which if read together as being parts of the connected whole, then the meaning would be quite clear and it has been explained in paragraph 14 of the Report. The contention of Mr. Sinha relying on the decision of Shibhan Lal Saksena, referred to above, can also be answered by saying that on the facts of this case the situation does' not arise; because, I am of opinion that none of the grounds is either vague, irrelevant or non-existent.-See for instance the observations of the Supreme Court in Nuresh Chandra Ganguti's case.
11. It is indicated by the Supreme Court in a recent case, namely, Writ Petition No. 167 of 1968, Karurta Basak v. The District Magistrate, Tripura Petition No. 167 of 1968 decided on 26th September, 1968, that the grounds have to be read as a whole and then it has to be seen whether they are sufficient or not to make a representation. On a consideration of the principles laid down in various cases and on examination of all the grounds, I am satisfied that there is no merit in the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner and his detention is quite legal.
12. The application is, accordingly, dismissed.
P.A. Banerji, J.
13. I agree.