Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Ajay Garg vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 18 August, 2025
1 OA No.4408 of 2024
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
PRINCIPAL BENCH, NEW DELHI
O. A. No. 4408/2024
Reserved on: 14.07.2025.
Pronounced on: 18.08.2025.
Hon'ble Mr. R. N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. B. Anand, Member (A)
Ajay Garg
S/o Shri Jagdish Prasad Garg
R/o L-2/76, Shastri Nagar
Delhi-110052 ... Applicant
(By Advocate: Ms. Ashu Goyal with Mr. Deepak Aggarwal and Mr.
Akash Dubey )
Versus
Central Bureau of Investigation
Through its Director
6th Floor, Lodhi Road
Plot No. 5-B, Jawaharlal Nehru
Stadium Marg, CGO Complex
New Delhi, Delhi-110003 ... Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. Hanu Bhaskar)
ORDER
Hon'ble Mr. R. N. Singh, Member (J): -
By way of the present O.A., filed under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the applicant, in Para 8 of the OA, has prayed for the following reliefs: -
"A. Pass necessary orders and directions thereby setting aside the impugned disciplinary proceedings emanating out of the Charge Memorandum no. 1176/53/02/2023/RDA dated 12.08.2024 registered by the respondent/CBI qua the Applicant and the letter CBI ID No. DP/RDA Cell/2024/1201/53/02/2023/RDA dated 19.08.2024 and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom; B. Such other order or orders as this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the applicant."2 OA No.4408 of 2024
2. Pursuant to notice, the respondents have filed their counter affidavit opposing the claim of the applicant and have prayed for dismissal of the present Original Application.
3. The applicant has filed rejoinder and has reiterated his claim and the grounds in support thereof. The learned counsel for the parties have filed written synopsis.
4. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the pleadings available on records as well as the relied upon judgments.
FACTS OF THE CASE
5. The facts, as submitted by the applicant and as borne out from the pleadings on record, are as follows: The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) registered an FIR bearing RC No. RC 221/2017/E0025 dated 25.12.2017 against the applicant under Section 120-B of the IPC read with Sections 66 and 43 of the Information Technology Act, Section 143 of the Indian Railways Act, and Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Pursuant to the said FIR, the CBI initiated an investigation, alleging that the applicant--then working as Assistant Programmer (under suspension), CBI, New Delhi--developed automation software tools, namely 'WinZip', 'Neo', and 'Reget', which could bypass the manual entry procedures of IRCTC and expedite the booking of tickets, including Tatkal tickets, of Indian Railways. Statement of article of charge framed against the applicant reads as under:-
3 OA No.4408 of 2024
"Article-I Shri Ajay Garg while posted and functioning in capacity as Assistant Programmer, System Division, CBI during the period 2015-2017, failed to maintain absolute integrity by developing illegal software "WINZIP" and "NEO" for duping the Tatkal ticket booking system being run by Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation (IRCTC) which is illegal and violation of rules and regulations of IRCTC and also under the Railways Act, 1989 and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant, in contravention of Rule 3(1) (i), Rule 3 (1) (iii) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article-II Shri Ajay Garg while posted and functioning in capacity as Assistant Programmer, System Division, CBI, during the period 2015-2017, failed to maintain absolute integrity in as much as he conspired with private persons in distributing the illegal software developed by him to private persons/agents for its unauthorized use in lieu of hefty consideration.
By aforesaid acts of commissions and omissions, Sh. Ajay Garg, Assistant Programmer, failed to maintain absolute integrity, engaged himself directly or indirectly in trade or business of booking of Tatkal Railway Ticket and acted in a manner, which is unbecoming of a government servant, in contravention of Rule 3 (1)
(i), Rule 3 (1) (iii) and Rule 15 (1) (a) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules. 1964.
Article -III Sh. Ajay Garg while posted and functioning in capacity as Assistant Programmer, System Division, CBI during the period 2015-2017, failed to maintain absolute integrity by receiving sale proceeds of illegal software developed by him in the form of Bitcoins, through Hawala and personal meetings and failed to inform to CBI about his movable property, assets and liabilities and cash including bank deposits acquired by him.
Sh. Ajay Garg, Assistant Programmer by above mentioned acts failed to maintain absolute integrity and acted in a manner of unbecoming of a government servant, in contravention of Rule 3 (1)
(i), Rule 3 (1) (iii), Rule 15 (1) (a) and Rule 18 (3) of Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
5.1 In connection with the said case, the CBI filed a charge-sheet (Annexure A/3) before the Learned Special Judge (PC Act), Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi, against the applicant and other co-accused, under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, and 471 of the IPC read with Sections 66 and 43 of the IT Act, and Section 143 of the Indian Railways Act, in 4 OA No.4408 of 2024 the matter titled Ajay Garg & Ors. vs. Central Bureau of Investigation. Subsequently, the CBI also filed a supplementary charge-sheet dated 14.09.2021 in the said matter. The Director, CBI granted sanction for prosecution of the applicant in the case Ajay Garg & Ors. vs. CBI, and the Learned Special Court took cognizance of the offence on 15.09.2021. A second supplementary charge-sheet dated 22.04.2024 was also filed by the CBI before the same court. Additionally, the CBI registered another FIR bearing No. 7 (A)/2018/CBI/AC-III/New Delhi dated 16.05.2018 (Annexure A/6) against the applicant under Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (Disproportionate Assets case), which is an offshoot of the earlier FIR RC 221/2017/E0025 dated 25.12.2017.
5.2 It is further submitted that the CBI filed a chargesheet dated 19.05.2023 (Annexure A/7) in the Disproportionate Assets case under Section 13 (2) read with Section 13 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, before the Learned Special Judge (PC Act), Rouse Avenue Court, New Delhi, against the applicant and his father. Based on this Disproportionate Assets case, the CBI also initiated disciplinary proceedings for a major penalty under Rule 15 (1) (b) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, through a charge memorandum dated 27.09.2023 bearing No. 1528/53/30/2023/RDA (Annexure A/8). The Special Court took cognizance of the offence in the said Disproportionate Assets case on 09.10.2023.
5.3 The applicant further submits that, in the Disproportionate Assets case, it has been alleged that during the period from 5 OA No.4408 of 2024 06.09.2011 to 26.12.2017, while working as Assistant Programmer in the CBI, he was in possession of assets disproportionate to his known sources of income, for which he could not satisfactorily account. The applicant filed Writ Petition No. 14849/2024 before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court challenging the aforesaid charge memorandum. However, vide order dated 23.10.2024 (Annexure A/9), the Hon'ble High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of maintainability, granting liberty to the applicant to approach this Tribunal.
5.4 It is pertinent to note that the CBI, based on the very same allegations as contained in FIR RC No. RC 221/2017/E0025 dated 25.12.2017, initiated the impugned disciplinary proceedings for major penalty against Shri Ajay Garg under Rules 14 and 15 of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964, after an inordinate delay of seven years. The CBI appointed a Presenting Officer and an Inquiring Authority in this regard and informed the applicant through letter dated 30.10.2024 (Annexure- A/10), which was received on 01.11.2024. 5.5 The present Original Application raises the following questions of law:
i. Whether the Disciplinary Authority can initiate disciplinary proceedings after a delay of more than seven years, particularly when the applicant's defence has already been disclosed before the criminal court?
ii. Whether the Disciplinary Authority can initiate departmental proceedings on the same set of allegations as in the criminal case FIR wherein the chargesheet/supplementary chargesheet has been filed and allegations in the departmental enquiry and 6 OA No.4408 of 2024 the criminal case FIR are similar and evidences in both are also common?
iii. Whether the statements of co-accused in the criminal case can be recorded in the departmental proceedings when such recording has been stayed in the criminal case and both matters arise from the same facts and laws?
Hence, the present O.A. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
6. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the present OA deserves to be allowed on the following grounds:-
i. There has been a delay of almost 7 years in initiating the impugned disciplinary proceedings i.e., Charge memorandum bearing no. 1176/53/02/2023/RDA dated 12.08.2024 from the date of registration of the FIR bearing RC no. RC 221/2017/E0025 dated 25.12.2017. However, there is no explanation with regard to the delay by the respondent/CBI and that the prolonged period significantly deviates from the standard timelines expected for such proceedings, thereby undermining the principals of justice and efficiency.
ii. It is submitted that the extensive delay has prejudiced the applicant's ability to defend against the charges effectively. With the passage of time, evidence may be lost and witness's recollection may become unreliable, hampering the accused's right to fair enquiry.
iii. It is submitted that the delay in initiation of the impugned disciplinary proceedings has lent room for allegations of bias, mala fide and misuse of powers against the applicant by the respondent.
iv. The prolonged delay has caused significant distress to the applicant, affecting his professional reputation and personal 7 OA No.4408 of 2024 well-being. The ongoing uncertainty disrupts their career and life, adding to the injustice of delay.
v. In light of the above, it is submitted that since there is an inordinate unexplained delay of 7 years in initiating the impugned disciplinary proceedings qua the Applicant, thus the impugned disciplinary proceedings deserve to be set aside.
REPLY OF THE RESPONDENTS
7. The respondents have filed their reply on 01.01.2025 and they have not disputed the facts stated as noted above, however they have submitted that the inquiry proceedings cannot be quashed at this stage and the present OA as filed is premature. The charge memo has been issued by the Competent Authority and on the face of the same, the charges are made out. There is no malice in issuance of the charge sheet and none has been pleaded for such allegations. It is further submitted that the FIRs as lodged against the applicant and the cognizance of the said offences has been taken by the competent court of law/jurisdiction and the same are matter of record. Further, the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court on 23.10.2024 is also matter of record. It is submitted that the FIR against the applicant was registered on 25.12.2017 and further investigations in the matter were carried out and on account of which the supplementary charge sheet was filed on 14.09.2021 and the second supplementary charge sheet was filed ort 22.04.2024. Thus, it cannot be said that there was a delay of seven years in initiating the present disciplinary proceedings. The questions of law as projected by the applicant are misconceived. The allegations are based on mostly supporting documentary evidence gather during investigation. It is well settled law that the 8 OA No.4408 of 2024 criminal prosecution as well as the disciplinary proceedings can be initiated and continued alongside each other. The applicant would be afforded complete opportunity to participate in the inquiry proceedings in accordance with the Principles of Natural Justice. 7.1 In response to the grounds raised by the applicant in support of the relief sought, the respondents submitted that the charge memorandum has been issued by the Competent Authority, and, on the face of it, the allegations set out therein are substantiated. The applicant has not pleaded any malice in the issuance of the charge memorandum. Furthermore, there is no delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings. As previously submitted, the FIR was registered on 25.12.2017, followed by investigations, pursuant to which a supplementary charge sheet was filed on 14.09.2021 and a second supplementary charge sheet on 22.04.2024. The allegations against the applicant are serious in nature. He is alleged to have defrauded IRCTC and the public at large and, while employed with the CBI, to have developed software applications without any authority. These acts amount to criminal misconduct, and accordingly, criminal proceedings have been initiated against him. The applicant was placed under deemed suspension with effect from 26.12.2017 and has remained under suspension ever since. His case has been periodically reviewed by the Review Committees, which have consistently decided to continue the suspension. Notably, the applicant has never challenged the suspension orders. The judgments cited by the applicant are not applicable to the facts of the present case. The charge memorandum was issued only after the filing of the complete charge sheets and after due consideration of all allegations 9 OA No.4408 of 2024 against the applicant. The court of competent jurisdiction, which is trying the criminal offences, has taken cognizance of both the original and supplementary charge sheets. The framing of charges is still pending in the criminal case. Therefore, the applicant cannot legitimately claim delay in the initiation of disciplinary proceedings. Moreover, there is no legal bar to initiating departmental proceedings against a government servant who is also facing criminal prosecution for the same misconduct. It is well settled that the standards of proof in the two proceedings are distinct. While the criminal trial seeks to determine criminal liability beyond reasonable doubt, the disciplinary proceedings are governed by the principle of preponderance of probabilities and are aimed at determining misconduct. 7.2 Admittedly, the line of defence taken by the applicant has already been set out before the criminal court, and there is no indication that a different defence is to be taken in the disciplinary proceedings. The core issue is whether the applicant, while serving in the CBI, developed certain software applications without authority. This, in itself, constitutes misconduct, irrespective of the criminal culpability, which will be adjudicated by the criminal court. The issues involved are neither complex nor such as to warrant any undue delay in the disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the applicant has admitted that he has already disclosed his defence before the criminal court, which negates any claim that proceeding departmentally would prejudice his defence.
7.3 The respondent also contended that the present application as filed by the applicant is liable to be dismissed as the applicant has 10 OA No.4408 of 2024 already given his voluntary statement before the IO of the case regarding his culpability in the matter and the modus operandi as adopted by him to defraud the IRCTC and public at large. Thus, the defence of the applicant has already been disclosed by him and therefore at this stage to avoid participating in the proceedings, he has not filed his WSD. The IO/PO in the matter have been appointed. Moreover, the inquiry proceedings proceed on the basis of preponderance of the acts committed. It is further submitted that the applicant has already disclosed his defence in the criminal court and thus, there is no bar in continuing with the disciplinary proceedings. The application as filed by the applicant is liable to be dismissed as the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that there is no bar in initiating as well as continuing with the domestic/departmental inquiry while the criminal proceedings are pending or going on simultaneously against the Charged Officer.
7.4 In view of the above facts and circumstances of the case, it is submitted that the applicant is not eligible for any of the reliefs interim or otherwise as claimed in the above application and therefore the O.A. is liable to be rejected being devoid of merits and in the interest of justice.
CASE LAW RELIED UPON BY THE PARTIES
8. Learned counsel for the applicant placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Bani Singh and Another, reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 738, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:-
11 OA No.4408 of 2024
"The appeal against the order dated December 16, 198 7 has been filed 0n the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely 0n the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. We are unable to agree with this contention of the learned counsel. The irregularities which were the subject matter of the enquiry is said to have taken place between the years 1975-77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it 0nly in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going 0n since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as slated by the Tribunal. There is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal."
8.1 Learned counsel for the applicant further places reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in P. V Mahadevan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 2006 SC 207, wherein it is held as under:-
"4. In the first case of Bani Singh 1, an OA was filed by the officer concerned against initiation of departmental enquiry proceedings and issue of charge-sheet on 22-4-1987 in respect of certain incidents that happened in 1975-76 when the said officer was posted as Commandant, 14th Battalion, SAF, Gwalior. The Tribunal quashed the charge memo and the departmental enquiry on the ground of inordinate delay of over 12 years in the initiation of the departmental proceedings with reference to an incident that took place in 1975-76. The appeal against the said order was filed in this Court on the ground that the Tribunal should not have quashed the proceedings merely on the ground of delay and laches and should have allowed the enquiry to go on to decide the matter on merits. This Court rejected the contention of the learned counsel. While dismissing the appeal this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 740, para 4) "The irregularities which were the subject-matter of the enquiry are said to have taken place between the years 1975-
77. It is not the case of the department that they were not aware of the said irregularities, if any, and came to know it only in 1987. According to them even in April 1977 there was doubt about the involvement of the officer in the said irregularities and the investigations were going on since then. If that is so, it is unreasonable to think that they would have taken more than 12 years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings as stated by the Tribunal. There is no 12 OA No.4408 of 2024 satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge memo and we are also of the view that it will be unfair to permit the departmental enquiry to be proceeded with at this stage. In any case there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's orders and accordingly we dismiss this appeal."
11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer."
8.2 Learned counsel for the applicant also places reliance on the order/judgment of the Hon'ble Delhi High court in Union of India & Anr. Vs. Hari Singh in WP (C) No. 4245/2013 dated 23.09.2013, wherein it is held as under:-
"51. So far as the delay which the Applicant had to explain in issuance of charge memo dated 25th February, 2011 is concerned, this memo was thus initiated more than thirteen years after the transaction in question; more than eleven years after completion of the custom investigation and after completion of the adjudication by the Commissioner Custom on 2nd November, 2001; more than 8 years after the 6th August, 2003 when the DRI informed the Applicant about the recommendations for departmental action against 23 officials and 7 years after the Applicant had been called for and interrogated on the 27th of October, 2004.
57. In the instant case, so far as delay is concerned, the Applicants do not remotely suggest that the respondent attributed to any delay. It is a hard fact that there is delay which is abnormal and extraordinary. The explanation of the Applicants is completely unacceptable for the reason that it is an after thought. In fact the Applicants had available with them the entire record which they claimed to have acquired belatedly.
58. It would be most inappropriate to accept the only justification tendered by the respondents of merely having written a few 13 OA No.4408 of 2024 communications to the DRI for the documents. In any case, if the Applicant was serious about initiating disciplinary action in the above noted circumstances, it could have done so. We have noted above that the Applicant had available with them the necessary record and there was really no reason or occasion for delaying the proceeding for want of original documents. The final adjudication order as well as all inquiry reports was based on the records of the Applicants. Even after obtaining the inquiry report, the respondents delayed the matter not by one or two years but by several years as set out above.
65. In view of the above narration of facts, the delay in initiation of the proceedings certainly has lent room for allegations of bias, mala fide and misuse of powers against the respondent by the Applicants. In the judgment reported at 1995 (1) ILJ 679 (SC) State of Punjab Vs. Chaman Lal Goyal it has also been observed that when a plea of unexplained delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings as well as prejudice to the delinquent officer is raised, the court has to weigh the facts appearing for and against the Applicants pleas and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. The court has to indulge in a process of balancing.
68. The respondents have failed to provide a sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the Applicant.
69. We have noted the judicial pronouncements laying down the applicable consideration in some detail hereinabove only to point out that the law on the subject is well settled. The Applicants were fully aware of the position in law as well as of the necessary facts to adjudicate upon the issue. In our view, the present writ petition was wholly inappropriate and not called for.
70. For all these reasons, the judgment of the Tribunal cannot be faulted on any legally tenable grounds. The writ petition and application are devoid of legal merits and are hereby dismissed. The respondent shall be entitled to costs of litigation which is quantified at Rs. 20,000/-."
8.3 The learned counsel also makes a reference of the order/judgment of this Tribunal in the case of CM Tiwari Vs. Union of India in O.A. NO. 3659/2012 wherein the Tribunal by relying upon the judgment of Union of India & Anr. Vs Hari Singh has held that:-
"13. From the aforesaid it is clear that there is no hard and fast rule that delay would automatically vitiates the proceedings. One of the tests to establish that the delay vitiates the disciplinary proceedings is that the concerned employee should bring to fore some material that his defence in the disciplinary proceedings could be prejudiced on account of delay. Nevertheless, there is another aspect also when there is inordinate delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings 14 OA No.4408 of 2024 it may be presumed that the concerned authority decided to condone the misconduct.
14. Taking note of the aforementioned judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Union of India & Anr. Vs Hari Singh in WP (C) No. 4245/2013 decided on 23.9.2013 viewed as under: -
64. In view of the above narration of facts, the delay in initiation of the proceedings certainly has lent room for allegations of bias, mala fide and misuse of powers against the respondent by the petitioners. In the judgment reported at 1995 (1) ILJ 679 (SC) State of Punjab v. Chaman Lal Goyal it has also been observed that when a plea of unexplained delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings as well as prejudice to the delinquent officer is raised, the court has to weigh the facts appearing for and against the petitioners pleas and take a decision on the totality of circumstances.
The court has to indulge in a process of balancing.
65. The alleged misconduct claimed to have been done by the respondent Hari Singh has also not been treated to be a major delinquency by the respondent in the light of the principles laid down in Meera Rawther (supra). It, therefore, has to be held that the delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings would constitute demal of reasonable opportunity to defend the charges in the case and therefore, amounts to violation of principles 0f natural justice. WP(C) No. 4245/2013 page 41 of 43
67. The respondents have failed to provide a sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner.
15. In view of the magnitude of misconduct, we take a view that the penalty order is liable to be interfered with on the ground ls. in view of the magnitude of misconduct, we take a view that the penalty order is liable to be interfered with on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings and non-supply of advice of UPSC, thus accepting the submissions put forth on behalf of the applicant that the impugned order of penalty is vitiated on the ground of delay and non-supply of the advice of the UPSC to the delinquent before imposition of penalty, we quash the impugned penalty order. of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings and non-supply of advice of UPSC, thus accepting the submissions put forth on behalf of the applicant that the impugned order of penalty is vitiated on the ground of delay and non-supply of the advice of the UPSC to the delinquent before imposition of penalty, we quash the impugned penalty order.
8.4 The learned counsel also places reliance on the order/judgment of this Tribunal in the case of Sunil Kumar Vs. Commissioner of Police in O.A. No. 1535/2022, wherein this Tribunal has held that: 15 OA No.4408 of 2024
"9. In M.V Bijlani vs. Union of India (2006) 5 SCC 88, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that
6. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and it continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced to the delinquent officer.
11. It is trite law that disciplinary proceedings should be conducted soon after the alleged mis-conduct or negligence on the part of the employee is discovered. Inordinate delay cannot be said to be fair to the Delinquent Officer and since it would also make the task of proving the charges difficult, it would also not be in interest of administration. If the delay is too long and remains unexplained, the court may interfere and quash the charges. However, how much delay is too long would depend upon the facts of each and every case and if such delay has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice the delinquent in defending the enquiry ought to be interdicted.
14. As held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decisions, though it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law or a rule or universal application that if there is a delay in initiation of proceedings, they must necessarily be quashed but in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered opinion that there is a gross, inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating the departmental proceedings against the applicants is occurred and initiation of the same after 15 years would seriously prejudice them resulting in miscarriage of justice. On the other hand, the option of initiating/passing appropriate disciplinary proceedings/orders depending on the final result of the criminal case would be available to the respondents, even after the impugned order is quashed.
15. In the circumstances and for the aforesaid reasons, all the aforesaid three OAs are allowed and the impugned orders therein are quashed."
8.5 Learned counsel for the applicant places reliance on the order/judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the matter of Union of India Vs. Shri V. K. Sareen in W.P. (C) No. 4757/2007 dated 03.07.2009, wherein the High Court has held as under:
"4. A perusal of the Charge Sheet would show that the charges pertained to the period between 12.06.1990 to 12.04.1993. Even if we accept that the alleged violation came to the notice of the Applicants only on 19.03.1996, the Applicants are still required to explain the delay of about 7 years, as the Charge Sheet was issued only on 28.02.2003.
13. It is trite law that disciplinary proceedings should be conducted soon after the alleged mis-conduct or negligence on the part of the 16 OA No.4408 of 2024 employee is discovered. Inordinate delay cannot be said to be fair to the Delinquent Officer and since it would also make the task of proving the charges difficult, it would also not be in interest of administration. If the delay is too long and remains unexplained, the court may interfere and quash the charges. However, how much delay is too long would depend upon the facts of each and every case and if such delay has prejudiced or is likely to prejudice the delinquent in defending the enquiry ought to be interdicted.
14. In P.V. Mahadevan Vs. M.D. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, JT 2005(7) SC 417, a charge memo was issued to the appellant on 8th January, 2000 for the irregularity in issuing a sale deed in the year 1990. There was no explanation for the unordinary delay of 10 years in initiating the proceedings. The respondent explained that the irregularities for which disciplinary action had been initiated had came to light only in the second half of 1994-95, when the audit report was released. The Hon'ble Supreme court did not accept the contentions of the respondent that the period from date of commission of the irregularities by the appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings. The Hon'ble Supreme court felt that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the enquiry would be very prejudicial to the Applicant and would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. During the course of judgment the Hon'ble Supreme court observed as under:-
"The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a Government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the Government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the Government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer."
15. In these circumstances when we find no convincing explanation for the delay in instituting the disciplinary proceedings as well as in taking final decision on the Enquiry Report despite specific order of this court and also considering the fact that some relevant documents were not made available to the respondent, which prejudiced him in making his defence; he has superannuated during pendency of this Writ Petition and has since been engaged as a Consultant, we do not find any valid justification for interfering with the orders of the Tribunal in exercise of our extra-ordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution."
17 OA No.4408 of 20248.6 Learned counsel places reliance on the order/judgment of this Tribunal in the case of Subhas Chandra Pandey Vs Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. in OA No. 1447/2018, by relying upon the judgment of Bani Singh (Supra) & Hari Singh (Supra), this Tribunal has held as follows:-
"7. ...................It appears that the respondents without applying their mind have issued the charge-sheet to the applicant thereby alleging a vague charge in respect of an incident which took place more than 12 years back. On perusal of the charge and other material placed on record we find that there is inordinate and unexplained delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. The applicant has specifically raised the plea of delay and latches in issuing the charge-sheet to which no satisfactory reply has come-forth from the respondents. It is well settled that if the delay is inordinate and unexplained it causes great prejudice to the delinquent employee, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in N. Radhakishn (supra). The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also reiterated this principle in Bani Singh (supra) where it has been clearly ruled that inordinate delay in issuance of the charge-sheet vitiates the entire process and the charge memo as well as further proceedings deserve to be quashed and set aside. The matter is required to be given a quietus especially when the respondents are not serious in the enquiry. Had the respondents been vigilant enough they would have acted promptly and issued the chargesheet immediately when the incident took place. They have failed to provide a sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. It is well settled that delay defeats justice.
9. Ione has regard to the above, it is trite that delay which is unexplained and unreasonable would cause prejudice to the delinquent employee. Such delay clearly manifests the lack of seriousness on the part of the DA in pursuing the charges against the employee. In the event of any employee deviating from path of honesty, efficiency and diligence, action should expeditiously be taken as per prescribed procedure. The Supreme Court has laid down the principles holding that unexplained and unreasonable delay per se results in prejudice to the charged officer except when the employer can show that the employee was responsible for delay or is otherwise able to explain the delay. While evaluating the impact of the delay, the court must consider the nature of the charge, its complexity and for what reason the delay has occurred. In the instant matters the respondents have not tendered any explanation as to the delay in issuing the chargesheet, rather a vague charge has been leveled against him, that too, without application of mind. The respondents have failed to provide a sufficient and reasonable explanation for the delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the delay in issuing the charge sheet after 18 OA No.4408 of 2024 12 years has greatly prejudice the applicant in the matter of his defense.
10. We have noticed the judicial pronouncements laying down the applicable consideration in some detail hereinabove only to highlight that the law on the subject is well settled. It is not as if that the respondents were not aware of the above settled position in law. In so far as, judgments referred and relied on behalf of the respondents are concerned, a few of them have already been considered by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in the cases referred to hereinabove. Moreover, it is not even the contention on behalf of the respondents that in no circumstances, the Courts and Tribunals are not required to interfere at the stage of issuance of charge- memos, more so when non-application of mind and unexplained delay in issuance of the charge memo is writ large on the fact of it.
11. Even on merit, we find that the respondents have not applied their mind while issuing the charge-sheet to the applicant. It has been issued without ascertaining the facts and has been based on stale and vague allegations. Hence, applying the principles laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Than Singh (supra), the chargesheet is liable to be quashed."
8.7 The learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance on an order /judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Brij Raj Tripathi @ Raju vs. State in Criminal Appeal No.105/2011 to say that even if he has disclosed his defence, however, there are three stages in a criminal trial where the accused is permitted to disclose his defence and in such view of the law position, the applicant will still get further opportunities to disclose his defence in the criminal trial. However, the fact remains that only for the reason that the criminal case is pending, in view of the settled law, the departmental enquiry is not required to be deferred for indefinite period. In the present case even the charges have not been framed in the said case FIR by the learned Trial Court and there are 166 PWs and thus criminal trial is likely to be over for long time to come. Thus, the judgment in the case of Brij Raj (supra) is of no help to the applicant.
19 OA No.4408 of 2024
9. Before we advert to the judgments referred by the learned counsels for the parties, we may consider the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a few cases as to when interference by the Court(s)/Tribunal(s) at the stage of issuance of show cause notice/charge memo initiating departmental enquiry has been laid down. In Union of India & Another v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28, Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled as under :-
"13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467, Ulagappa and others vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others 2001(10) SCC 639, State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943 etc.
14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance.
15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet.
16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter."
9.1 In Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others v. V. Appala Swamy, (2007) 14 SCC 49, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
20 OA No.4408 of 2024
"12. So far as the question of delay in concluding the departmental proceedings as against a delinquent officer is concerned, in our opinion, no hard and fast rule can be laid down therefor. Each case must be determined on its our facts. The principles upon which a proceeding can be directed to be quashed on the ground of delay are:
(1) Where by reason of the delay, the employer condoned the lapsee on the part of the employee;
(2) where the delay caused prejudice to the employee.
Such a case of prejudice, however, is to be made out by the employee before the Inquiry officer."
9.2 In Union of India Vs. Ashok Kacker, reported in 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 180, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that impugning the Charge Sheet without replying to the same is pre-mature and the applicant would have all opportunity to raise the defences before the Inquiry Authority.
9.3 In Union of India Vs. Upender Singh, JT 1994 (1) SC 658, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the Ld. Tribunal ought not to interfere at the interlocutory stage and the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. 9.4 In Dy. Inspector General of Police Vs. K. S. Swaminathan, reported in (1996) 11 SCC 498, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the scope of judicial review of Charge Sheet, held to examine the correctness of charges at the stage of framing of charges is beyond the scope of judicial review. It has only to be seen whether the statement of facts and material supplied discloses the misconduct as alleged.
10. Learned counsel for the applicant has mainly contended that the unexplained delay of seven years in issuing the charge memo renders the proceedings bad in law, and that simultaneous conduct of departmental and criminal proceedings is impermissible. 21 OA No.4408 of 2024
11. Vide the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to in para 9 above, it is authoritatively held that admittedly no writ lies against a chargesheet or a show cause notice. However, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a chargesheet or a show cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. Further, vide the judgment(s) referred to para 8, it is settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble High Court that there is no hard and false rule that the delay would automatically vitiate the proceedings. One of the tests to establish that the delay vitiates the disciplinary proceedings is held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Hari Singh (supra) is that the concerned employee should bring some material that his defence in the disciplinary proceedings could be prejudiced on account of delay. Further, in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Apala Swamy (supra), such prejudice is to be made out by the employee before the enquiry officer.
12. In the case in hand, nothing has been brought on record to prove that the alleged delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings has prejudiced the defence of the applicant. Moreover, admittedly the applicant has already disclosed his defence at this stage. Further, he is likely to get adequate opportunity of defence in the departmental enquiry. Moreover, we find that the respondents have adequately explained the delay. Mere registration of FIR does not require immediate initiation of departmental enquiry. Furthermore, when the prosecuting department itself is the employer of the applicant and they have waited the outcome of the criminal investigation, we do not find any illegality. The records reveal that the 22 OA No.4408 of 2024 matter was under investigation by the criminal court of competent jurisdiction and/or other competent authorities, and certain approvals from higher authorities were pending during the intervening period. The delay, therefore, cannot be termed as inordinate or unexplained. Accordingly, the reliance placed by the applicant on various judgments on the point, referred to in paras 8 to 8.6 hereinabove is misplaced, as those were based on the fact-specific failure to explain the delay. The present case, being factually distinguishable, does not attract the ratio of those judgments. Therefore, the same are not of any help to the applicant. In this view of the matter, we do not find the ground of alleged delay in initiating the departmental enquiry to be sustainable in law.
13. Another question to be considered here is whether an employee can be subjected to disciplinary inquiry for the same set of facts for which a criminal proceeding is also contemplated or instituted. Primarily any misconduct attributable to a public servant in a service matter has civil consequences and should be dealt with according to service rules and provisions for applicable for subjecting him to a departmental enquiry which may or may not result into a punishment under the rules but any punishment imposed upon an employee under the service rules has the consequences on the prospects of his employment. But at the same time, a misconduct committed by an employee has the element of criminal force as well presuming that an employee has committed some embezzlement which is of course misconduct under the Service Rules as he has not maintained total devotion and integrity to his duties and is liable to be dealt with as per service rules but embezzlement is a criminal offence also for which 23 OA No.4408 of 2024 the proceeding under the criminal law can be instituted against the employee.
14. This issue invited the attention of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a number of cases and in the case of State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena (1996) 6 SCC 417, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the principle that in grave cases the enquiry should be permitted to be completed as expeditiously as possible otherwise the administration would be jeopardized and considered the question whether it would be right to stay criminal proceeding pending a departmental enquiry. It was observed by Hon'ble K. Venkataswamy J., "It would be evident from the above decision that each of the proceedings starts with the undisputed proposition that there is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously and further opined that in certain situations it may not be desirable, advisable or appropriate to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges. The stay of a disciplinary proceeding is a matter to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case and with no hurt and offence can be enunciated in that behalf. The only ground suggested in the above decision as a valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceeding is that the defense of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. This ground has been added in by providing further that this may be done in case of grave nature involving questions of fact and law and not only the charges must be grave but the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. Moreover, advisability, desirability, and propriety have to be determined in each case on the basis of its facts and circumstances."
15. One of the contending considerations is that disciplinary enquiry cannot be and should not be delayed unduly. So far as criminal cases are concerned it is well known that they drag endlessly when high officials or persons holding high public offices are involved. If a criminal case is unduly delayed that may itself be a good ground for going ahead with the disciplinary enquiry. The interest of administration and good governance demands that these proceedings 24 OA No.4408 of 2024 are concluded expeditiously and it is not in the interest of administration. It only serves the interest of the guilty. A Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Depot Manager, A.P.S.R.T.C. v. Mohd. Yusuf Miyan and others, (1997) 2 SCC 699 held that there is no bar to proceed simultaneously with the departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal case is of a grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. This issue was again considered in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) and the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following five parameters to help make a decision regarding the conduct of both proceedings
i) Departmental Proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.
ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on an identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.
iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of the offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during the investigation or as reflected in the charge sheet. 25 OA No.4408 of 2024
iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.
v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings even if were stayed on account of pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.
16. As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is permissible to conduct the departmental proceeding as well as the criminal proceeding simultaneously on the same charges. The legal position in this regard was further crystallized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena (supra) wherein it was settled that the approach and objective in the criminal proceeding and disciplinary proceeding are altogether distinct and different. On one hand in the disciplinary proceeding, the question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct which may merit his dismissal or imposition of any other punishment as per service rules, as the case may be, but in the criminal proceeding, the question is whether an offence attributed against the employee, if established, would warrant punishment under the criminal law.
17. No doubt, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has settled through a catena of judgments that the standard of proof, procedure of enquiry and the Rules governing disciplinary proceeding are altogether 26 OA No.4408 of 2024 different from the standard of proof, mode of trial and the provisions governing the criminal act in disciplinary proceeding and an employee may be punished on mere preponderance of probability in a departmental proceeding whereas to establish the charge against him under the criminal law the employee has to be proved guilty beyond doubt, on these premises the legal proposition was settled that stay of disciplinary proceeding during pendency of criminal proceeding should not be a matter of routine but has to be considered decision based upon the facts that the evidences in departmental and criminal proceedings are same and identical as well as based upon similar set of facts and the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact but similarity in evidence, the facts of the charges are the issues which have to be considered only after the charges have been framed in the criminal case and the charge-sheet has been issued in the departmental proceeding. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Neelam Nag, (2016) 9 SCC 491 again had the occasion to consider this issue and again propounded that there is no legal bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceeding and criminal trial simultaneously. It was stressed that the court has to keep in mind the broad approach to be adopted in such matters on case to case basis and pendency of the criminal case against the delinquent employee cannot be the sole basis to suspend the departmental proceeding for an indefinite period. The balance has to be drawn between the need for a fair trial to the accused on one hand and in an ongoing disciplinary proceeding on the other hand. The Hon'ble Supreme Court itself has stressed 27 OA No.4408 of 2024 upon the need for the conclusion of the disciplinary proceeding expeditiously and the criminal liability of an employee cannot be overlooked simply for the reason that for the same set of charges, the disciplinary proceeding is also instituted against him. Simultaneous departmental and criminal proceedings can go simultaneously and stay of the departmental proceedings is only in exceptional circumstances. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi vide order/judgment dated 18.07.2025 in W.P. (C) 10179/2025 titled Vijender Kumar vs. Delhi Metro Rail Corporation & Ors., para 21 of which reads as under:-
"21. The prayer for stay of the disciplinary proceedings pending conclusion of the criminal case is equally without substance. The law in this regard has been examined by us recently in our decision in Dushyant Yadav v UOI, after tracing the precedential history on the point, through Stanzen Toytetsu India (P) Ltd v Girish GV (which takes into consideration the oft-cited decision in Capt. M. Paul Anthony v Bharat Gold Mines Ltd, SBI v Neelam Nag and SBI v P. Zandenga. We may reproduce in this context the following passages from the said decision:
"7. From a reading of the aforesaid judgments, the principles that emerge are the following:
(i) Stay of the disciplinary proceedings pending criminal trial is not automatic or a matter of course but can only be granted for a reasonable period of time depending on the circumstances of each case.
(ii) The gravity of the charge is itself not enough for stay, unless there is a complicated question of law involved or if the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings would prejudice the applicant's case before the criminal court.
(iii) A balance needs to be drawn between the need for a fair trial and the expeditious completion of the proceedings.
8. Thus, it is clear that there is no sacrosanct principle of law that, merely because the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal proceedings are based on the same set of facts, and involve the same allegations, the concerned officer or employee has an inflexible right to stay of the disciplinary proceedings pending conclusion of the criminal proceedings.28 OA No.4408 of 2024
9. The decisions cited supra also note the concern expressed by the employee that, if the disciplinary proceedings are allowed to continue, it may result in the employee having to disclose his defence, which may prejudice his case in the criminal proceedings. Despite this, the Supreme Court has held that courts should not, merely on this consideration, stay disciplinary proceedings, especially whether the charge involved is grave, in which case the interests of justice require that the proceedings are brought to an end expeditiously.
10. Ergo, the Supreme Court has included, among the considerations which should guide courts in that regard, the issue of whether the charges are grave, and whether the case involves complex issues of fact and law, as would be required to be appropriately decided by the Court."
22. The charge against the petitioner is unquestionably grave. Mr. Mattoo has not sought to contend, much less sought to demonstrate, that it involves complex questions of fact and law, as could not be decided in a disciplinary proceeding. It is the petitioner's own case that the officers of the DMRC, conducting the inquiry, are persons of vast experience, over several years. Ironically, the petitioner, who seeks to urge this plea, himself declined to produce any evidence in his favour, on being called up to do so.
23. No case for staying the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner, pending conclusion of the criminal trial, therefore, exists.
24. We may note, before concluding, that Mr. Mattoo also drew our attention to the fact that he had challenged the Notification dated 1 December 2008 issued under Section 14(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 whereby the DMRC was included in the list of organisations which were subject to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Besides the fact that we do not see how such a challenge could at all be maintainable, the aspect of inclusion of institutions within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal being essentially an administrative and ministerial act, the petitioner, in any event, would be estopped from raising such a challenge, having himself withdrawn WP (C) 6267/2024, which was preferred before this Court with liberty to approach the Tribunal, as recorded in the order dated 22 May 2024 (supra). Having thus acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, the petitioner cannot seek to lay any challenge thereto. Conclusion
25. Clearly, therefore, the attempt of the petitioner, from the very beginning, culminating in the filing of the present petition, is only to stultify the disciplinary proceedings against him, without allowing them to continue to fruition."
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.K. Meena (supra) has held that there is no legal bar to proceed with both the proceedings simultaneously, and it is only in rare and exceptional cases where staying the departmental inquiry would be justified. No such exceptional circumstances are shown here. In fact, departmental 29 OA No.4408 of 2024 proceedings are concerned with breach of service rules and standards of conduct, while criminal proceedings address the violation of penal laws. Thus, the mere pendency of a criminal case does not ipso facto vitiate the disciplinary inquiry. Thus the reliance on B.K. Meena (supra) is again misconceived, as the facts therein involved a clear apprehension of prejudice and overlapping of issues, which is not the case here in hand. The disciplinary proceedings in the instant matter are based on distinct service misconduct, which can be decided independently of the outcome of the criminal case. We are also fortified in our view by the decision of the Supreme Court in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan & Others v. T. Srinivas, (2004) 7 SCC 442. As regards the other contention of the applicant that he would be prejudiced in the matter of his defence, if both the departmental as well as criminal proceedings are allowed to be continued simultaneously, we find that the applicant himself has admitted that he has already disclosed his defence before the criminal court in the criminal case filed against him by the CBI. This contention of the applicant does not hold any water and is accordingly rejected.
19. With regard to the second contention relating to the simultaneous conduct of departmental and criminal proceedings, it is well settled that both can proceed concurrently unless it is demonstrated that the departmental proceedings would cause serious prejudice to the delinquent employee. In the present case, the applicant has not substantiated any such exceptional circumstances, as enumerated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (supra) that would warrant the stay of the disciplinary 30 OA No.4408 of 2024 proceedings. Moreover, the delay in issuing the charge-sheet has been well explained by the respondents. Further prayer of the applicant of quashing the impugned charge sheet on the ground of delay has not been found by us maintainable hereinabove.
20. Another plea taken on behalf of the applicant in support of the relief prayer din the OA is that whether the statement of the co- accused can be recorded in the departmental proceedings when such recording has been stayed in the criminal case. In this regard, it is noted that in the criminal case there are 166 witnesses whereas in the intra-departmental proceedings 19 witnesses have been indicated. How and by which documents and witnesses, the respondents intend to prove the allegations, this Tribunal is not expected to comment and that too at this initial stage of the departmental enquiry.
21. In view of the above, the grounds raised by the applicant do not merit interference by this Tribunal. The decisions relied upon are inapplicable to the facts of the present case, where the delay has been satisfactorily explained, and no case of prejudice in simultaneous conduct of proceedings has been made out. Accordingly, the Original Application is dismissed. The interim order issued on 29.05.2025 is hereby vacated.
22. Pending MA, if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
23. No order as to costs.
(B. Anand) (R. N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
/NS/