Delhi District Court
Mohit Chawla vs Indu Luthra Chawla on 27 May, 2025
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
DLNE010011062025
IN THE COURT OF SH. PULASTYA PRAMACHALA
ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-03,
NORTH-EAST DISTRICT
KARKARDOOMA COURTS: DELHI
Criminal Appeal No. : 56/2025
Under Section : 5 of Limitation Act
Police Station : Bhajanpura
CT No. : 1037/2022
CNR No. : DLNE01-001106-2025
In the matter of: -
1. Mohit Chawla
S/o. Sh. Madan Lal Chawla,
R/o. 116, Model Town,
Ferozepur City, Ferozepur, Punjab-152002.
2. Sh. Madan Lal Chawla
S/o. Sh. Sain Dass,
R/o. 116, Model Town,
Ferozepur City, Ferozepur, Punjab-152002.
3. Smt. Shama Chawla
W/o. Sh. Madan Lal Chawla,
R/o. 116, Model Towan,
Ferozepur City, Ferozepur, Punjab-152002.
4. Rohit Chawla
S/o. Sh. Madan Lal Chawla,
R/o. 116, First Floor, Model Town,
Ferozepur City, Ferozepur, Punjab-152002.
...Appellants
VERSUS
Smt. Indu Luthra Chawla
W/o. Sh. Mohit Chawla,
D/o. Sh. A.K. Luthra,
R/o. B-90, Gali No.6, Bhajanpura, Delhi-110053.
Digitally signed
by PULASTYA
PULASTYA PRAMACHALA (Pulastya Pramachala)
Page 1 of 19 PRAMACHALA Date: ASJ-03, North-East District,
2025.05.27 Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
12:00:07 +0530
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
Other known addresses:
1. 3301 West 150th Terrace, Leawood, Kansas, USA-66224.
2. JAK-601, Dr. Sushila Nayar Marg, Shipra Srishti Sapra
Apartments, Indirapuram, Ghaziabad-201012.
...Respondent
ORDER ON CONDONATION OF DELAY
Vide this order, I shall decide the application u/s. 5 of
Limitation Act, for condonation of delay in filing present
criminal appeal.
1. An appeal u/s. 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 (herein after referred to as the Act), has been
filed challenging the orders dated 19.09.2022, 29.11.2022,
05.12.2022, as passed by ld. MM (Mahila Court-01)/North-East
District, Karkardooma Court, Delhi and all subsequent
proceedings arising therefrom in complaint Case No. 1037/2022,
PS Bhajanpura. This appeal has been filed on 24.04.2025. An
application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, was filed by
appellant no.2/applicant herein, thereby seeking condonation of
delay of 143 days, in filing present appeal.
2. Briefly stated, the relevant facts leading to this appeal and the
application, are that respondent herein filed an application u/s. 12
of the Act, against appellants herein and one Smt. Megha Sanyal
(sister-in-law of appellant no.1). Sh. Mohit Chawla (appellant
no.1 herein) and respondent are husband and wife. Along with
the application u/s. 12 of the Act, respondent also filed another
application u/s. 23 of the Act, thereby seeking interim
maintenance and ex-parte orders. Trial court vide order dated
19.09.2022 issued notice to Protection Officer to file DIR. Notice
(Pulastya Pramachala)
Page 2 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
was also issued to R1 (appellant no.1 herein) and matter was
fixed for 29.11.2022. On 29.11.2022, trial court issued summons
to appellants no. 1 to 4 herein and dropped Smt. Megha Sanyal
(sister-in-law of appellant no.1). On 05.12.2022, file was taken
up on application of the respondent herein for placing fresh
address of appellant no.1 on the record and direction was
accordingly issued to serve appellant no.1 through Ministry of
External Affairs.
3. Appellants no.1 to 4 being aggrieved of afore-said orders, have
preferred appeal u/s. 29 of the Act, as already mentioned herein
above and an application u/s. 5 of Limitation Act has been filed
to seek condonation of delay in filing the appeal.
4. As per application/written submissions and contention of Sh.
Arpit Jain, ld. counsel for appellants herein, during the period of
10.02.2023 to 17.07.2023 appellants herein were legally barred
from proceeding, which constituted sufficient cause preventing
the filing of the appeal. Appellants were simultaneously
defending multiple proceedings initiated by
complainant/respondent herein across various jurisdictions.
Pursuant to direction of Hon'ble Supreme Court multiple
mediation sessions were held, which were time consuming and
during which focus was on potential settlement rather than
appellate litigation. It was further mentioned and contended that
appellants herein faced difficulties securing consistent and
effective legal representation before trial court, partly due to lack
of resources exacerbated by appellant no.1's unemployment
stemming from the US proceedings and multi-pronged litigation
(Pulastya Pramachala)
Page 3 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
initiated by the respondent herein. It was further contended that
necessitated changes in counsel, inherently caused delays in
continuity and strategy formulation, including the decision to file
the present appeal. Ld. counsel for appellants herein further
contended that upon engaging new counsel Mr. Arpit Jain in
around August 2024, it was discovered that copy of the complaint
petition provided to the appellants was partly illegible, hindering
proper understanding and defence. The new counsel being
visually impaired, required an accessible digital version. An
application to this effect was filed on 20.08.2024 and trial court
allowed the same vide order dated 20.08.2024, directing supply
thereof within weeks. Thereafter, trial court vide order dated
08.11.2024, directed ahalmad to provide accessible digital copies
of the previous ordersheets as well, allowing two weeks for the
same. It was further contended that effective knowledge of the
case details and proceedings, necessary to formulate
comprehensive grounds of appeal, could only be achieved after
receiving these accessible copies of both the complaint and the
complete ordersheets, which occurred on or around 30.11.2024.
It was further contended that after receiving the complete and
accessible records around 30.11.2024, appellants required
reasonable time to meticulously study the voluminous and
complex case file spanning multiple jurisdictions with their
counsel, understand the full import of the proceedings and orders
passed by trial court, appreciate their legal rights and finalize the
present comprehensive appeal along with necessary applications
and affidavits.
(Pulastya Pramachala)
Page 4 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
5. Application further mentions that by way of the period consumed
by the stay order of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the complexities of
managing simultaneous multi-jurisdictional litigations initiated
by the Respondent including appellant no.1's, required travel to
USA, the pursuit of remedies before trial court and High Court,
challenges with legal representation, health constraints of senior
citizen applicants and the significant procedural delay caused by
the non-availability of legible/accessible copies of the complaint
and order sheets until approximately 30.11.2024, appellants have
demonstrated sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present
appeal. Through this application, appellants prayed to condone
the delay of 143 days in filing present appeal.
6. In the written submissions filed on behalf of appellants, ld.
counsel for appellants herein relied upon certain case laws, which
are as under: -
A. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji &
Ors. 1987 INSC 54.
B. N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, 1998 INSC 345.
C. State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors., 2005 INSC 179.
D. Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghnathpur
Nafar Academy & Ors. 2013 INSC 620.
E. Jyotsana Sharda v. Gaurav Sharda, 2010 (92) AIC 298.
7. Reliance was placed upon the case of Katiji (supra), to highlight
the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court that "the
judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize
injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of
removing injustice and is expected to do so." Outlined principles
of the court favouring a liberal approach was also highlighted,
which is as under: -
(Pulastya Pramachala)
Page 5 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
"- Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an
appeal late.
- Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter
being thrown out at the very threshold, causing miscarriage of
justice.
- "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean a
pedantic approach; the doctrine must be applied reasonably."
8. Reliance was placed upon the case of N. Balakrishnan (supra), to
highlight the observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court that " the
condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court.
Length of delay is not the sole criterion; acceptability of the
explanation is the only one." It was also highlighted that " rules
of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties but are
intend to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics."
9. Reliance was placed upon the case of Lipok AO (supra) to
highlight the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court
that"sufficient cause must receive a liberal construction to foster
justice."
10. Reliance was placed upon the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra)
to highlight the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court
while summarizing the principles governing condonation, that
"substantial justice should be the decisive factor, balanced
against the need to prevent gross negligence and at the same time
the courts need to be mindful of the fact that no one gets away
with fraud misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse
to the technicalities of law of limitation ."
11. Respondent contested this application and Sh. Rakesh Sachdeva,
ld. counsel for respondent submitted that this appeal is not
(Pulastya Pramachala)
Page 6 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
maintainable being highly time barred. Ld. counsel further took
my attention to the appeal as well as the application u/s. 5, to
submit that they have been signed by only one appellant. My
attention was also taken to the supporting affidavit for the appeal
and the application, which is sworn by appellant no.2 only. Ld.
counsel submitted that this appeal and application therefore
cannot be treated to be valid qua other appellants except
appellant no.2.
12. Ld. counsel for appellants submitted that appellant no.2 was
given Special Power of Attorney by appellant no.1 and therefore,
appellant no.2 was competent to file this appeal and application
for appellant no.1 also. He took my attention to a copy of
translation of Special Power of Attorney by appellant no.1 in
favour of appellant no.2. My attention was also taken to copy of
Special Power of Attorney written in Gurumukhi and it was
submitted by ld. counsel for appellants that translation was done
from the said Special Power of Attorney.
13. In respect of other appellants, Mr. Jain ld. counsel for appellants
referred to the contents of affidavit of appellant no.2, to submit
that appellant no.2 has pleaded that he had implicit authorisation
from appellant no.3 and appellant no.4, to sign on their behalf
and to initiate the present proceedings.
14. Ld. counsel for respondent submitted that there is no concept of
implicit authorisation, in law.
APPRECIATION OF ARGUMENTS, FACTS AND LAW
15. I have given due consideration to the rival contentions. In the
case of Katiji (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court also observed
(Pulastya Pramachala)
Page 7 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District,
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi
CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025
Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla
Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
that:-
"The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature
is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a
meaning- full manner which subserves the ends of justice--that
being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of
Courts
.................
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk."
16. In the case of N. Balakrishnan (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that: -
"9. It is axiomatic that condonation of delay is a matter of discretion of the court Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not say that such discretion can be exercised only if the delay is within a certain limit. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. .......
11. Rule of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life- span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 8 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim Interest reipublicae up sit finis Mum (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time.
...............
13. It must be remembered that in every case of delay there can be some lapse on the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of a dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay the Could should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quiet a large litigation expenses."
17. In the case of Lipok AO (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that: -
"The expression "sufficient cause" must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay"
18. In the case of Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that: -
(Pulastya Pramachala) Page 9 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura "15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-
pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
(ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
(Pulastya Pramachala) Page 10 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.
(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.
(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: -
(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.
(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."
19. First of all I shall deal with the plea regarding competence and authority of appellant no.2 to file appeal and application in question, on behalf of all four appellants. I am in agreement with (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 11 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura the contention of ld. counsel for respondent that there is no concept of implicit authorisation in law. In the affidavits, appellant no.2 has stated that he had implicit authorisation from appellant no.3 (his wife) and appellant no.4 (his other son). This plea taken in the affidavits, was not supported by any law by ld. counsel for appellants, though he was asked to point out any such law which validates the concept of implicit authorisation. The vakalatnama filed by Mr. Jain on behalf of appellants, is also signed by appellant no.2 only. The concept of implicit authorisation is also negated by conduct of appellant no.2 himself. Appellant no.2 has relied upon a Special Power of Attorney from appellant no.1 in his favour. Appellant no.1 is also son of appellant no.2, still realising need of such power of attorney, appellant no.1 had purportedly executed afore-said Special Power of Attorney in favour of appellant no.2. Therefore, by no stretch of legal imagination, it can be said that appellant no.2 was authorised to either execute vakalatnama or appeal u/s. 29 of the Act or any application therein, on behalf of appellants no.3 and 4. Hence, I have no hesitation to hold that the appeal and application in question, cannot be maintained on behalf of appellants no.3 and 4.
20. As far as appellant no.1 is concerned, though ideally a duly certified copy of original SPA and certified translation thereof, should have been placed on the record, however, at least a photocopy of the same have been placed on the record. Treating them to be the basis, at the most it can be said that appellant no.2 was authorised to sign and file the appeal and application in (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 12 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura question on behalf of appellant no.1.
21. Before I analyse the given reasons and grounds for delay in filing the appeal u/s. 29 of the Act, it is appropriate to refer to the journey of this case before trial court till date. In the case before the trial court, after 05.12.2022, on 28.03.2023, a vakalatnama was filed for appellant no.1 herein and a memo of appearance was filed for remaining appellants. It was informed to the court that proceedings before the trial court was stayed by Hon'ble Supreme Court and the matter was also likely to be settled between the parties. Thereafter, on 01.08.2023 on the request of counsel for the appellants, direction was given to supply copy of petition to him and matter was fixed for filing of written statement/reply as well as income affidavit of the appellants within 30 days. Case was also fixed for arguments on the interim application. Thereafter, on 10.10.2023 time was sought by appellant no.1 for filing written statement/reply and income affidavit. Trial court granted time of 30 days and posted the matter for 07.02.2024. On 07.02.2024, appellant no.1 again sought time for filing written statement/reply and the trial court recorded that already sufficient opportunity was given for the same, but appellant no.1 failed to avail the opportunities. Trial court accordingly struck off defence of the appellants herein. However, on same day file was again taken up along with copy of order dated 04.05.2023 as passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Trial court recorded that none of the parties had informed about status of further stay order, though Hon'ble Supreme Court had stayed the proceedings between the parties vide order dated (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 13 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura 04.05.2023. Trial court recalled the order passed in that morning. On 15.05.2024 it was informed to the trial court that there was no stay on the proceedings before the trial court. It was further informed that petition for quashing the proceedings filed before Hon'ble High Court of Delhi was in respect of a connected State matter. Once again adjournment was sought on behalf of appellants on the grounds that the counsel was changed and a new counsel was engaged. Trial court noted that appellants were deliberately delaying the proceedings as they did not file WS/reply and income affidavit of appellant no.1. Appellant no.1 was given last opportunity to file income affidavit subject to cost. On next date of 20.08.2024, present counsel for the appellants filed his vakalatnama. An application was moved by present counsel to supply copy of petition and accompanying documents in accessible digital form, because ld. counsel was visible impaired. Trial court directed Ahalmad to provide the same to ld. counsel and another last and final opportunity was given to file written statement/reply within 30 days of receiving copy of documents in digital form. Thereafter on 08.11.2024 once again written statement was not filed and trial court again subject to further cost, granted time of 30 days to file written statement by appellants. On the same day, appellants filed two applications u/s. 258 Cr.P.C. and u/s. 340 Cr.P.C.
22. First of all, it has to be appreciated that an application u/s. 12 of the Act is not a complaint of any criminal offence. This Act provides for several remedies to an aggrieved person and application u/s. 12 is filed by the aggrieved person to seek one or (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 14 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura other of such remedies, which include order of maintenance, order of residence, order of compensation/damages. Therefore, when a notice of such application is issued to the opposite party by the court, that order is not to be treated as summoning order for an accused. The opposite party are just respondents, and they are not accused of any offence. The plea taken by applicants/appellants herein show that the order dated 19.09.2022 or 29.11.2022 were treated like summoning order of an accused, which is a fallacious notion.
23. Section 12 of the Act provides that any order passed in such proceeding shall be executable. It further provides that the Magistrate shall endeavor to dispose off every application made u/s. 12(1) of the Act within a period of 60 days from the date of its first hearing. Section 28 of the Act saves power of the Magistrate to lay down its own procedure of disposal of an application u/s. 12 or u/s. 23 of the Act.
24. The afore-said provisions leave no doubt that the legislature has intended for an expeditious hearing and disposal of an application filed u/s. 12 of the Act and for such reasons only, a period of 60 days has been prescribed for disposal of such application. The appellants herein were required to file their written statement/reply before the trial court, wherein they could have taken relevant plea including any objection regarding jurisdiction or maintainability of the application. However, the above mentioned narration of journey of the case before the trial court, shows that till date they did not opt to file their written statement/reply.
(Pulastya Pramachala) Page 15 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura
25. Before this court, Mr. Jain, ld. counsel for the appellants submitted that there is a grave issue involved in this case regarding territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, to entertain the application. He submitted that respondent herein had furnished a false address of her residence in her application under Section 12 of the Act. He took my attention to copy of a print taken from a website, to submit that the information given therein shows that the house mentioned to be local address of respondent herein in the application u/s. 12 and affidavit filed by her before the trial court, was sold to one Kamlesh Devi on 02.12.2019. Ld. counsel submitted that the application was filed by respondent before the court on 17.09.2022 with her affidavit dated 16.09.2022, wherein she mentioned the address of same house i.e. B-90, Bhajanpura, Delhi. Mr. Jain, ld. counsel submitted that this is a crucial question in this case, for which the appeal must be heard on merits in order to quash the proceedings before the trial court, without going into the technicalities of limitation.
26. I have considered this plea of the appellants and I have also taken note of the journey of the case before the trial court. First of all, it has to be appreciated that Section 29 of the Act provides for an appeal against such kind of order, which is passed under the Act. I have already explained that the order vide which simplicitor notice of application was issued to the respondents (appellants herein), is not alike summoning order of an accused. Therefore, such order is to be treated as merely procedural order. Section 29 of the Act does not contemplate appeal against such procedural order. Section 29 of the Act is meant for the other kind of order, (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 16 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura which is passed by the Magistrate on the basis of relief claimed in application u/s. 12 or u/s. 23 of the Act. Other provisions in the Act, provide for the kind of relief, which may be granted in the case by the Magistrate. All those reliefs are assessed on the basis of plea taken by the aggrieved person in the application/petition filed u/s. 12 of the Act. Thus, it has to be some substantial order, thereby affecting the rights and liabilities of the parties, in one or other manner, which is contemplated u/s. 29 of the Act for the purpose of challenging the same before the appellate court. That is the reason, that it is further requirement of the law to provide limitation of 30 days from the date on which the order made by the Magistrate is served on the aggrieved person or the respondent, as the case may be. Service of substantial order is required so that the concerned party takes steps for compliance of the same.
27. In the present case, till date no such substantial order to grant or disallow any relief provided in the Act, has been passed by the trial court till date. Therefore, I do not find any basis for filing this appeal by the appellants.
28. As far as territorial jurisdiction of the trial court is concerned, it is a matter of plea to be taken before the trial court. It is further matter of inquiry to be conducted by the trial court. Since appellants did not opt to take any such plea before the trial court, therefore, no order was passed by the trial court on this point. Straight away raising this plea before the appellate court, is uncalled for. Purpose of raising such plea before this court, is shown as to show that a grave issue is involved for adjudication (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 17 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura in the appeal. However, I find that under the garb of afore-said purpose shown, appellants actually intend to justify the delay caused by them in the proceedings before the trial court. The judgments cited by the appellants, do not intend to make the law of limitation redundant. They only point out that if the technicality of limitation is pitted against substantive justice in a case, then the court should opt for the latter. These judgments also point out that if the courts find that delay was occasioned deliberately and malafidely, in order to delay the litigation, then the court should not condone such delay blindly.
29. This is the case, which is classic example of time bought by the appellants before the trial court since 28.03.2023 till 08.11.2024 on one or other pretext. The appellants were well represented by the counsel of their choice, throughout afore-said period. Limitation operates against the remedy and it is the knowledge of the litigant rather than knowledge and preparedness of any counsel, which matters. Therefore, limitation cannot be counted from the time when a newly engaged counsel like the present one, finds himself to be prepared to take further steps. All such plea taken in the application and written submissions, are without any merit. An attempt has been made to gain undue sympathy on account of peculiar physical condition of the present counsel. However, the appellants herein themselves kept sitting over the matter and therefore such plea cannot help their cause. If such kind of plea raised on the basis of changing the counsels and their preparedness to take further steps, are accepted and entertained in routine manner, then for any litigant it will be very easy to keep (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 18 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi CNR No. DLNE01-001106-2025 Mohit Chawla & Ors. v. Indu Luthra Chawla Crl. Appl. No. 56/2025, CT No. 1037/2022, PS Bhajanpura delaying a litigation by way of keep changing his counsel. The period of delay is much more than 143 days and appellants have pleaded wrong fact in this regard, on the basis of self created notion of the time period, since when limitation starts.
30. Thus, I find that the delay in filing the appeal in question, was not on account of any bonafide reasons on the part of appellants.
DECISION
31. In view of my foregoing discussions and observations, I reach to two conclusions. First of all, there was no bonafide reasons for the appellants to file the appeal in question with so much of delay. The reasons given in the application u/s. 5 of the Limitation Act are not found genuine and bonafide for condoning the delay.
32. Secondly, I also find that this appeal has been filed without any cause of action. The reasons for such conclusion have already been explained herein-above. For both these reasons, appeal is rejected.
Digitally signed Ordered accordingly. by PULASTYA
PULASTYA PRAMACHALA
PRAMACHALA Date:
2025.05.27
12:00:16 +0530
Announced in the open court (PULASTYA PRAMACHALA) today on 27.05.2025 ASJ-03 (North- East) (This order contains 19 pages) Karkardooma Courts/Delhi (Pulastya Pramachala) Page 19 of 19 ASJ-03, North-East District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi