Patna High Court
Gorakh Singh vs Tata Iron And Steel Co. Ltd. And Anr. on 8 December, 1967
Equivalent citations: 1968(16)BLJR710
JUDGMENT S.C. Misra, J.
1. This is an appeal by the plaintiff arising out of a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession with respect to 0.58 acre of land situated in village Khuntadih within Bistupur Police station in the town of Jamshedpur. It bears Khata No. 48 and plot No. 1793. The plaintiff also prayed for a permanent injunction restraining defendant No. 1 from interfering with the possession of the plaintiff over the suit land.
2. Originally the suit land was agricultural land and belonged to one Md. Rafique who was its tenant. In 1944 proforma defendant No. 2 purchased it from the recorded tenant under a registered sale deed and came in possession. Defendant No. 2 constructed a hut on a portion of it and cultivated this land. On the 4th of December, 1961 a registered sale deed was executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of the plaintiff who claimed to have entered into possession on that date. Respondent No. 1, the Tata Iron and Steel Company Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Tatas), were trying to have their own name recorded in respect of this land and also trying to demolish the shed put up by the plaintiff on 11th of February, 1962, and hence this suit.
3. The case of the defendant Company, however, was that the plaintiff had no cause of action. The land in suit was acquired by this defendant under Section 50 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act (hereinafter called the Act) in 1944 and after that it remained in possession of the defendant. The plaintiff was a mere trespasser and had no right to seek the declaration as prayed for in this suit.
4. The two courts below have concurrently held that the plaintiff did not acquire any title to the suit land under his purchase1 in 1961. I have already stated that the plaintiff purchased the land on 4th of December, 1961 and the purchase of this land by defendant No. 2 under the sale deed (Ext. 1-A) is dated the 22nd of February, 1945 for a consideration of Rs. 450/-. The acquisition of the land was made sometime in 1944 and delivery of possession was made in favour of the defendant Tatas on 24th of June, 1944. Apparently, therefore, so far as the title to the land is concerned, the courts below have rightly held that Md. Rafique, the vendor of defendant No. 2, did not have any title to this land on the date of executing the sale deed in favour of defendant No. 2 on the 22nd of February 1945. It is true, no doubt, that there is a recital in the sale deed that the vended property was agricultural land of Md. Rafique, which was in his possession as a raiyat for more than 16 years and there was no mention of acquisition of this land for the Tatas, defendant No. 1, under Section 50 of the Act or of delivery of possession. That, however, as has been rightly held by the courts below, would not make any difference, because it might have been a fraudulent act on the part of Md. Rafique to suppress that fact in the recital in the sale deed, and defendant No. 2 or, for the matter of that, the plaintiff may have his remedy against Md. Rafique if they would be so advised to proceed against him. But so far as defendant No. 1 is concerned, its title cannot be affected in any manner by a sale deed executed by Md. Rafique in respect of this property, title to which he had already lost prior to the date of sale deed (Ext. 1-A), It was urged in the court below and an argument has been advanced again in this Court to the effect that the acquisition of this land for Tatas under Section 50 of the Act is invalid as it is hit by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. Under this provision, it was obligatory for defendant No. 1 to obtain a registered sale deed from the recorded tenant, and since such a sale deed was not executed, no title would pass to defendant No. 1 even under Section 50 of the Act. The argument has been negatived in the courts below, and I am satisfied that the view adopted by the courts below in this matter is correct. Reliance was placed on behalf of the plaintiff appellant on Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 50 of the Act. Clause (a), in so far as it is relevant, states-
On the application of the landlord of a holding and on being satisfied... the Deputy Commissioner may think necessary, authorize the acquisition thereof by the landlord upon such conditions as the Deputy Commissioner may think fit and require the tenant to sell his interest in the holding or part to the landlord upon such terms as may be approved by the Deputy Commissioner, including compensation to the tenant.
Clause (b), in so far as it is relevant, is in the same terms, namely:
on the application of the landlord of a tenure ... require all persons holding interests directly or indirectly subordinate to him in the land to sell their interests to the said landlord upon payment to every such holder or such compensation as the Deputy Commissioner may determine.
It is contended that since sale of the immovable property is contemplated in these two clauses and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that such a sale can be made only by registered instrument where the value of the property is Rs. 100/-or more, that is the only method legally recognised for transference of title. Section 54 is not consistent with the terms of Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section 1 of Section 50 of the Act. The two courts below have, however, referred to Sub-section (5) of Section 50 of the Act, which provides thus-
If the landlord making an application under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) tenders to any person, whose holding or interest or part thereof is being acquired, such sum as the Deputy Commissioner has determined as compensation under Sub-section (2) and such person refuses the same, the Deputy Commissioner may, on the landlord depositing the said sum with the Deputy Commissioner, give possession of such holding or interest to the landlord in the prescribed manner.
It has been rightly held that Sub-section (5) is not to be superseded by Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, as the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act is a self-contained Act. It is true, no doubt, that if no application would be made under Sub-section (5) of Section 50 of the Act by the landlord, he may also acquire title to the land under the Deputy Commissioner by getting a sale deed executed in his favour by the raiyat concerned. But where that procedure has not been adopted, and the landlord proceeding under Section 50 of the Act through it proper to apply to the Deputy Commissioner for delivery of possession after depositing the amount of compensation determined by the Deputy Commissioner, the latter may order possession of such holding or interest to be given to the landlord in the prescribed manner and in such a case the question of a regular sale deed by the raiyat in favour of the landlord will not arise. Hence the two courts below were right in not acceding to this contention put forward on behalf of the plaintiff appellant.
5. The next point urged by the learned Counsel is that the plaintiff has been admittedly in possession since his purchase in 1961. He can, therefore, claim in any case a possessory title to the land. The interest in the estate of the Tatas as a landlord vested in the State of Bihar under Section 3(1) of the Bihar Land Reforms Act on the 1st of January, 1956, and as such defendant No. 1 has no title to this land. As against defendant No. 1, however, the plaintiff has got a good possessory title and, therefore, he is entitled to the relief sought for by him in the suit. Mr. L.K. Chaudhary for the respondent has, however, contended that this argument is devoid of substance for several reasons. In the first place, it is a finding of both the Courts below that the vendor of the plaintiff was never in possession of this land since the date of purchase in 1945. Since the intermediary interest in respect of this village also vested in the State of Bihar on the 1st of January, 1956, the consequences following upon such vesting will follow as enumerated in Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act. The purposes of acquisition are set out in Section 50 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act and it provides that if a landlord requires any holding for some reasonable and sufficient purpose having relation to the good of the holding or of the tenure or estate in which it is comprised, such as the use of the land for any charitable, religious or educational purpose, or for the purpose of manufacture or irrigation, or as building ground for any such purpose or for access to land used or required for any such purpose, an enquiry is held by the Deputy Commissioner to satisfy himself that the acquisition is really sought on any of these grounds, and, on being satisfied, he may authorise the acquisition of the holding by the landlord. Where, therefore, the land is acquired for any such purpose, it cannot vest in terms of Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act in the State of Bihar, according to which, what will, as set out in its various clauses, vest in the State of Bihar are building or part of building only when it is used primarily as office or cutcherry for the collection of rent of the estate or tenure concerned and the interest of the proprietor in trees, forests, fisheries, Jalkars, hats, bazars, mela and ferries and all other sairati interests as also his interest in all sub-soil including any rights in mines and mineral, (other than the interests of raiyats or under-raiyats. The Section further provides that the proprietor or the tenure-holder concerned shall cease to have any interest in such estate or tenure other than the interests expressly saved by or under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. It is not necessary to set out other clauses of Section 4 which have no bearing upon this question. Any land acquired, therefore, for a purpose, other than a building which is being used primarily as office or cutcherry will not vest in the State. Under Section 50 of the Act, the land has been acquired in the present case, although it is not clearly brought out in the evidence on record, for manufacturing purposes of the Tatas. Such interest, therefore, in the nature of it is not an interest, which will vest in the state of Bihar, as is clear from a perusal of the various provisions. The right to collect rent from tenants, which is an intermediary interest, and the ghair mazarua land will vest apart from the specific interest enumerated in the various clauses of Section 4 of the Land Reforms Act. Any interest, therefore, which is not clearly enumerated in those clauses, will not be deemed to have vested in the State of Bihar, much less the site, which is required for a building or any other structure for manufacturing purposes. Apart, however, from this general consideration, Section 2 whereof provides as follows:
In the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 (Bihar Act XXX of 1950) after Section 2-A, the following Section and Explanation thereto shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been inserted, namely:
2-B. Act not to apply to land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for certain purposes.- Nothing in this Act shall apply to any land acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) for the purposes of any industrial undertaking except to such portion thereof as is in possession of a tenant who has, before the commencement of the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1960, acquired right of occupancy therein in accordance with the tenancy law of the area in which it is situated.
Explanation.- (I) For the purpose of this Section, expression 'industrial undertaking' shall mean-
(a) any industrial undertaking relating to-
(i) heavy industry; (ii) explosives; (iii) fertilizers; (iv) iron and steel; (v) cement; (vi) coal; and
(b) any other industrial undertaking which is declared by the State Government, by notification in the official Gazette, to be an industrial under taking.
It is stated that since originally this land was acquired by Tatas under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and subsequently it was acquired again under Section 50 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act which, for certain purposes, is in pari materia with the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, it is obvious that unless the tenancy right of a person accrued as a tenant in a land acquired by Tatas under Land Acquisition Act of 1894 before the commencement of the Bihar Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1960, such land shall not vest in the State of Bihar as the Land Reforms Act shall not apply to such land, which means that it shall not vest in the State of Bihar under that Act and it will remain in possession of the Industrial Concern for whose purpose the land had been acquired. In the present case, no doubt, the plaintiff claimed to have come into possession of the land sometime in 1961 but the clear finding recorded is that the vendor of the plaintiff had no possession over the land and had not acquired any title thereto as Md. Rafique himself had lost title and possession of the disputed land sometime in 1944. Since, therefore, neither defendant No. 2 nor the plaintiff acquired any title as a tenant to this land before 1960, such land must be deemed to be the property of the Tatas for whose purpose it was acquired, and the plaintiff, consequently, cannot claim any tenancy right. The argument advanced by Mr. Roy, on his behalf, therefore, as also urged in the courts below that after the order of vesting under Section 3(1) of the Land Reforms Act on the 1st of January, 1956, Tatas, which had only proprietary interest in such land, could not claim any right to it, is without any substance. The notification of vesting under the Bihar Land Reforms Act will not affect the title of defendant No. 1 to this land and it has, therefore, undisturbed title thereto and the plaintiff acquired nothing under the sale deed executed in his favour by defendant No. 1. The argument with regard to preferential possessory title of the plaintiff as a result of the notification under the Land Reforms Act is entirely academic and has no relevance on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case. There is, therefore no point in referring to Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1963 B.L.J.R. 921.
6. In the result, it must be held that there is no merit in the appeal. It must be dismissed but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs, in this Court.