Allahabad High Court
Brajendra Pratap Singh Objection Filed vs State Of U.P. Through Collector Unnao ... on 30 May, 2025
Author: Jaspreet Singh
Bench: Jaspreet Singh
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:33286
RESERVED
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 3000028 of 2000
Petitioner :- Brajendra Pratap Singh Objection Filed
Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Collector Unnao And Others
Counsel for Petitioner :- R.B.S.Rathaur,Abhisht Saran,Govind Saran Nigam,Rahul Kumar Kashyap
Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,A.K.Nigam
*****
Hon'ble Jaspreet Singh,J.
1. The instant petition calls in question the order passed by the Additional Commissioner (Administration), Lucknow Division, Lucknow acting as the Appellate Authority in terms the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling On Land Holdings Act, 1960 (for short, 'the Act of 1960'), whereby the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed, affirming the order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 29.08.1992.
2. Shri Brajendra Pratap Singh, the original-petitioner died during pendency of the instant petition and his legal representatives were substituted in his place. However, an application bearing I.A. No.7/2025 was moved by the petitioner informing that the petitioner No.1/4, namely, Smt. Kanti Devi, widow of the original-petitioner Brajendra Pratap Singh also died and since her legal heirs were already on record, hence, a formal application to correct the array of the parties along with condonation of delay was moved. The said application being formal in nature and having no impact on the merits, hence, the delay is condoned and the said application is allowed.
3. Counsel for the petitioner before being issued a certified copy shall carry out the necessary amendments in the array of the parties. Office to ensure the said compliance.
4. The facts giving rise to this petition are being noticed first. Shri Brajendra Pratap Singh, the original-petitioner while assailing the impugned orders had primarily urged that the proceedings initiated under the Act of 1960 was barred by res judicata as initially a notice was issued to the petitioner on 28.06.1976 which was registered as Case No.188 and after the objections were filed, the notice was discharged holding that the petitioner did not possess the land in excess of ceiling limit prescribed.
5. It was further urged that once again in the year 1994, a notice was issued to the petitioner, which was registered as Case No.27/64/107 and the petitioner submitted his objections and by means of the order dated 15.11.1994, it was held that the subsequent notice was barred by res judicata.
6. The State being aggrieved against the order dated 15.11.1994, preferred an appeal which came to be allowed on 23.02.1996 and the order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 15.11.1994 was set aside and the matter was remanded to decide the matter afresh considering whether post 28.06.1976, the petitioner had inherited any land which made a change in his holding so as to bring him within the ambit of the Act of 1960 for holding surplus land. It was also required to ascertain as to whether the land which earlier was held to be unirrigated has now become irrigated so as to make any material difference in the holding of the petitioner so as to bring him within the ambit of the Act of 1960 with surplus land.
7. After the aforesaid remand, the matter was contested before the Prescribed Authority and by means of the order dated 31.12.1996 it was found that the petitioner had inherited some land and the earlier land which was unirrigated had become irrigated now. Accordingly, 5.2958 hectares of land was declared surplus in the hands of the petitioner.
8. This order dated 31.12.1996 passed by the Prescribed Authority was challenged in two separate appeals filed by two separate persons. One, was filed by the present petitioner, Brajendra Pratap Singh, which was registered as Appeal No.25/1996-97 and the other appeal was filed by Smt. Rajendra Kumari, which was registered as Appeal No.22/1996-97.
9. The common thread in both the appeals was that while determining the ceiling limit, the Prescribed Authority had committed a grave error inasmuch as the land of other tenure holder had been included in the hands of the Brajendra Pratap Singh, which was legally not permissible.
10. Both the appeals filed by Brajendra Pratap Singh and Smt. Rajendra Kumari were clubbed together and decided by means of the order dated 12.08.1998 and both the appeals were allowed. The order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 31.12.1996 was set aside and the matter was remanded to the Prescribed Authority to consider the matter afresh, however, it further provided that none of the parties would be permitted to lead fresh evidence.
11. At this stage, it will be relevant to mention that Smt. Rajendra Kumari assailed the order dated 12.08.1998 by filing a writ petition before the High Court. The said writ petition was partly allowed by the High Court and it set aside part of the order dated 12.08.1998, whereby the Appellate Authority had laid an embargo that the parties would not be permitted to lead evidence.
12. In this backdrop, the matter was again before the Prescribed Authority to be reconsidered on its own merit and the parties were also permitted to lead their evidence. Then the Prescribed Authority framed certain additional issues and also permitted the parties to lead their evidence and thereafter vide its order dated 23.08.1999 it excluded the land of Smt. Rajendra Kumari and Kunti Devi (which was earlier included in the holding of the petitioner Brajendra Pratap Singh) and thereafter declared 7.744 hectares of land surplus in the hands of the petitioner Brajendra Pratap Singh.
13. The petitioner being aggrieved preferred an appeal and the appeal too by means of the judgment dated 21.02.2000 was dismissed and in the aforesaid factual background, the instant petition was filed.
14. Shri Abhisht Saran, learned counsel for the petitioner has attacked the two judgments passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority on the ground that the ceiling proceedings had been initiated against the petitioner vide notice dated 28.01.1976 and it was discharged, stating that the petitioner did not have land beyond the ceiling prescribed and this finding would operate as res judicata.
15. It is urged that a second time notice was issued which was discharged by the Prescribed Authority vide order dated 15.11.1994 holding that it was barred by res judicata, hence, the findings recorded in the earlier proceedings would operate as res judicata, accordingly, the entire proceedings culminated in the order passed by the Prescribed Authority dated 23.08.1999 and the Appellate Authority by means of the order dated 21.02.2000 are bad.
16. In support of his submissions on the aforesaid ground, he has relied upon a decision of Coordinate Bench of this Court in Kr. Shiv Mahendra Kumar Singh v. The State of U.P. and others, 1982 ALL.L.J. 106.
17. The other ground of attack of the counsel for the petitioner is that both the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority has misconstrued the provisions of Section 6(f) of the Act of 1960.
18. It is urged that there was a clear contention both before the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority that certain land which has been treated to be the land holding of the petitioner actually did not belong to him rather the said land belonged to a temple to whom it was endowed and the petitioner was merely a Manager of the said land which was belonging to a temple, hence, in such circumstances, considering the said land as that of the petitioner, was a grave error committed which has vitiated the judgment passed by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority. If the said land of the temple is excluded and the issue regarding irrigated land is appropriately noticed then no land of the petitioner would be beyond the prescribed ceiling limit, hence, the impugned orders are bad in the eyes of law and deserves to be set aside.
19. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in R.M. Sundaram alias Meenakshisundaram v. Sri Kayarohanasamy and Neelayadhakshi Amman Temple (Through its Executive Officer) Nagapattinam, Tamil Nadu, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 888. He has also relied upon decisions of this Court in Bhagwan Dass v. Prescribed Authority (Ceiling) Konch, Distt. Jalaun and others, 1979 ALL.L.J. 105 and State of U.P. v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, 1981 AWC 186.
20. Shri J.P. Maurya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State has refuted the aforesaid submissions and has urged that the issue of res judicata which has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is no more available to the petitioner.
21. It has been urged that the order dated 15.11.1994 passed by the Prescribed Authority, whereby it held that the notice issued to the petitioner in the year 1994 was barred by res judicata was challenged by the State by filing an appeal, which was allowed on 23.02.1996. The order of the Prescribed Authority dated 15.11.1994 was set aside and the Prescribed Authority was directed to consider as to whether the petitioner had inherited any land after 28.06.1978 and after whether any land which was earlier unirrigated is now irrigated so as to initiate fresh proceedings to consider whether the petitioner had land in excess of the ceiling limit. This order of remand dated 23.02.1996 was not challenged by the petitioner. Thus, the issue of res judicata pales into insignificance as the matter was contested thereafter on merits and it was found that the petitioner had inherited fresh land and the earlier land of unirrigated was now irrigated and in such circumstances, the findings on merits have been rendered. Even at a later stage, the petitioner had filed another appeal against the order dated 31.12.1996 which came to be allowed on 12.08.1998 and the matter was remanded again and even at that stage the matter was directed to be considered afresh, hence, for the said reasons to rake up the issue of res judicata is absolutely misconceived.
22. Shri Maurya, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State has further urged that the second limb of argument of the petitioner is also misconceived for the reason that it was an admitted case that the petitioner had inherited land from his aunt (Chachi) Smt. Tankunwari. An alleged plea was taken that the land of the Village Singramau was dedicated to 'Mahavir Swami' (deity). Similarly, the land of Village Tiyar and land situated in Village Durgagadi were also dedicated to temples and on the aforesaid account, the said land was sought to be excluded from the holdings of the petitioner.
23. It is urged that no worthwhile evidence was produced by the petitioner to indicate that the said land actually was dedicated or endowed to the temple. No deed of endowment or a deed of trust or any other evidence was led to indicate that the original holder Smt. Tankunwari had divested herself of her interest in the land and vested the same with the deity or a temple.
24. It is urged that clear evidence was led on behalf of the State to indicate that the petitioner was the real beneficiary and he was utilizing the said land for his personal benefits. Merely because the name of the petitioner was shown as the Manager in itself did not lead to any conclusive evidence that the land belonged to the temple or the deity. In absence of any such clear evidence, it is not open for the petitioner to raise the aforesaid averments.
25. It is also urged that this issue has been taken note of by the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority and both have affirmed the said findings on the basis of material available on record which are pure questions of fact which cannot be assailed in a writ petition especially in absence of any evidence to the contrary. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition has no merit and it deserves to be dismissed.
26. The Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and also perused the material on record.
27. So far as the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner relating to the issue of res judicata is concerned, this Court finds that it is undisputed fact that first notice was discharged on 28.06.1976. The second notice was issued in the year 1994, wherein the Prescribed Authority by means of the order dated 15.11.1994 had discharged the notice as barred by res judicata. It is also an undisputed fact that the order was set aside in appeal vide order dated 23.02.1996. While remanding the matter, two issues were required to be considered by the Prescribed Authority. On both the issues, the Prescribed Authority returned positive findings in its order dated 31.12.1996. Though the said order dated 31.12.1996 was assailed, but it was not on the ground that it was barred by res judicata rather it was assailed on the ground that the land of another tenure holder had been included in the land of the petitioner and that the earlier unirrigated land has been treated to be irrigated which as per the petitioner was not correct.
28. This aspect was considered and again the matter was remanded on 12.08.1998 whereafter the order dated 23.08.1999 and the order passed by the Appellate Authority dated 21.02.2000 was passed.
29. In the aforesaid backdrop, once there was changed circumstances where the petitioner had acquired a fresh land by inheritance and the nature of the land held by him had also changed from unirrigated to irrigated, hence, as per the Scheme of the Act of 1960 itself it permits the authorities to make a fresh assessment.
30. In the instant case, fresh assessment has been made on account of changed circumstances. The learned counsel for the petitioner could not dispute the fact that in terms of the Scheme of the Act of 1960, upon changed circumstances, fresh assessment can be made. That being the situation and a clear findings being that the petitioner had acquired land by inheritance and certain land which was earlier unirrigated had now been irrigated gives authority to make afresh assessment. It is one thing to say that because of res judicata, there cannot be any initiation of any proceedings at all and it is another thing to say that even though there may be changed circumstances, but even then the land still would be within the prescribed period of ceiling, hence, the order declaring surplus may not be sustainable.
31. The Scheme of the Act of 1960 clearly confers power on Authorities to initiate fresh proceedings upon changed circumstances. That being so merely, to state that on 28.01.1976, the notice for the first time was discharged and, hence, further proceedings initiated in the year 1994 could not have been proceeded is misconceived. In the given facts and circumstances of the instant case, this plea of res judicata which has been raised by the petitioner is absolutely misconceived. The decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Kr. Shiv Mahendra Kumar Singh (supra) has no applicability to the instant case and even in the said report, it has been held that earlier findings would only operate as res judicata provided that there is no change at the subsequent stage. Since, there is an admitted change in the instant case, consequently, the said decision has no applicability nor does it help the petitioner in any case. Moreover, once the order was passed by the Appellate Authority dated 23.02.1996 remanding the matter and then the petitioner contested the same on merits, hence, the plea of res judicata cannot be pressed into service. Accordingly, the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner fails.
32. Considering the second submission regarding the dedication of the land to the temple, if the aforesaid submission is seen in light of the record, it indicates that both the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority has discarded the said argument on the ground that the petitioner did not file any document to indicate how and when the said trust was created and when and how the said endowment was made. The revenue records also indicated the name of the petitioner as a Manager, but there is nothing to indicate the actual dedication to the Deity/Temple.
33. The petitioner in order to establish his case apart from examining himself, also examined Ram Dulare son of Mahaveer, who is said to be the priest of 'Radha Krishna Temple', situated in Village Tiyar. In case, if the testimony of the said witness is seen, which has been brought on record as Annexure No.8-A with the writ petition, it would indicate that his testimony is merely formal in nature. It does not in any manner indicate as to when the said land was ever dedicated to the temple. He also did not indicate as to whether what was the nature of endowment; whether it was private or public in nature.
34. Even, the petitioner himself did not lead any worthwhile evidence in this regard. At this stage, it will be relevant to notice that in the pleadings before this Court, the petitioner has not come out with clear pleadings regarding the stand, the petitioner wished to take. A mixed plea and submission has been raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner urging that the land was dedicated to the trust/temple and sometimes it has been urged that it was endowed to the temple. It has also been urged that the endowment does not require any specific document and it can be even done orally by user. It has further been submitted that since it was a trust/endowment in favour of the temple/deity, accordingly, such land could not have been included in the holding of the petitioner.
35. The learned counsel for the petitioner had placed heavy reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in R.M. Sundaram (supra), however, at this stage, it will be relevant to notice the Paragraphs 18-29 of the aforesaid report which is reproduced as under:-
"18. We are in agreement with the said findings recorded by the High Court. The findings are supported by the legal position on the effect of endowment, which is well settled and we would like to refer to only a few decisions.
19. In Deoki Nandan v. Murlidhar, AIR 1957 SC 133, a bench of five Judges of this Court has held that:
"the true beneficiaries of religious endowments are not the idols but the worshippers, and that the purpose of the endowment is the maintenance of that worship for the benefit of the worshippers, the question whether an endowment is private or public presents no difficulty. The cardinal point to be decided is whether it was the intention of the founder that specified individuals are to have the right of worship at the shrine, or the general public or any specified portion thereof. In accordance with this theory, it has been held that when property is dedicated for the worship of a family idol, it is a private and not a public endowment, as the persons who are entitled to worship at the shrine of the deity can only be the members of the family, and that is an ascertained group of individuals. But where the beneficiaries are not members of a family or a specified individual, then the endowment can only be regarded as public, intended to benefit the general body of worshippers.
xxxxxxxxx Endowment can validly be created in favour of an idol or temple without the performance of any particular ceremonies, provided the settlor has clearly and unambiguously expressed his intention in that behalf. Where it is proved that ceremonies were performed, that would be valuable evidence of endowment, but absence of such proof would not be conclusive against it."
20. Following the above ratio in The Commissioner for Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, Mysore v. Sri Ratnavarma Heggade (Deceased) by his L.Rs. (1977) 1 SCC 525, this Court has observed that:
"Neither a document nor express words are essential for a dedication for a religious or public purpose in our country. Such dedications may be implied from user permitted for public and religious purposes for sufficient length of time. The conduct of those whose property is presumed to be dedicated for a religious or public purpose and other circumstances are taken into account in arriving at the inference of such a dedication. Although religious ceremonies of Sankalpa and Samarpanam are relevant for proving a dedication, yet, they are not indispensable"
21. Thus, extinction of private character of a property can be inferred from the circumstances and facts on record, including sufficient length of time, which shows user permitted for religious or public purposes.
22. Earlier, in M.R. Goda Rao Sahib v. State of Madras, (1966) 1 SCR 643, this Court has observed that in an absolute dedication, the property is given out and out to an idol or religious or charitable institution and the donor divests himself of all beneficial interests in the property comprised in the endowment. Where the dedication is partial, a charge is created on the property or there is a trust to receive and apply a portion of the income for the religious or charitable purposes. In the latter case, the property descends and is alienable and partible in the ordinary way, but the only reference is that it passes with a charge upon it. The Court had relied on the provisions of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1951 and in particular to Section 321 thereof, to observe that:
36. "There is no dispute that in order that there may be an endowment within the meaning of the Act, the settlor must divest himself of the property endowed. To create an endowment he must give it and if he has given it, he of course has not retained it; he has then divested himself of it. ....By the instrument the settlors certainly divested themselves of the right to receive a certain part of the income derived from the properties in question. They deprived themselves of the right to deal with the properties free of charge as absolute owners which they previously were. The instrument was a binding instrument. This indeed is not in dispute. The rights created by it were, therefore, enforceable in law. The charities could compel the payment to them of the amount provided in Schedule B, and, if necessary for that purpose, enforce the charge. This, of course, could not be if the proprietors had retained the right to the amount or remained full owners of the property as before the creation of the charge....By providing that their liability to pay the amount would be a charge on the properties, the settlors emphasised that they were divesting themselves of the right to the income and the right to deal with the property as if it was unencumbered. By creating the charge they provided a security for the due performance by them of the liability which they undertook. Further Section 32 of the Act provides that where a specific endowment to a temple consists merely of a charge on property, the trustees of the temple might require the person in possession of the properties charged to pay the expenses in respect of which the charge was created. This section undoubtedly shows that the Act contemplates a charge as an endowment."
23. Interpreting the said section, this Court held that specific endowment attached to a math or a temple may consist merely of a charge on the property. Therefore, in order to constitute specific endowment it is not necessary that there must be transfer of title or divestment of the title to the property.
24. For the sake of completeness, we must record that under the 1926 Act, the expression 'religious endowment' or 'endowment' was defined vide sub-section (11) to Section 9 to mean "all property belonging to, or given or endowed for the support of, maths or temples or for the performance of any service or charity connected therewith and includes the premises of maths or temples but does not include gifts of property made as personal gifts or offerings to the head of a math or to the archaka or other employee of a temple".
25. The 1959 Act, on the other hand, defines 'religious endowment' or 'endowment' in sub-section (17) to Section 6 as under:
""Religious endowment" or "endowment" means all property belonging to or given or endowed for the support of maths or temples, or given or endowed for the performance of any service or charity of a public nature connected therewith or of any other religious charity; and includes the institution concerned and also the premises thereof, but does not include gifts of property made as personal gifts to the archaka, service holder or other employee of a religious institution Explanation.-- (1) Any inam granted to an archaka, service holder or other employee of a religious institution for the performance of any service or charity in or connected with a religious institution shall not be deemed to be a personal gift to the archaka, service holder or employee but shall be deemed to be a religious endowment.
Explanation.-- (2) All property which belonged to, or was given or endowed for the support of a religious institution, or which was given or endowed for the performance of any service or charity of a public nature connected therewith or of any other religious charity shall be deemed to be a "religious endowment" or endowment" within the meaning of this definition, notwithstanding that, before or after the date of the commencement of this Act, the religious institution has ceased to exist or ceased to be used as a place of religious worship or instruction or the service or charity has ceased to be performed:
Provided that this Explanation shall not be deemed to apply in respect of any property which vested in any person before the 30th September 1951, by the operation of the law of limitation;"
26. Sub-section (19) to Section 6 defines 'specific endowment' reads as under:
""specific endowment" means any property or money endowed for the performance of any specific service or charity in a math or temple or for the performance of any other religious charity, but does not include an inam of the nature described in Explanation (1) to clause (17);
Explanation. -- (1) Two or more endowments of the nature specified in this clause, the administration of which is vested in a common trustee, or which are managed under a common scheme settled or deemed to have been settled under this Act, shall be construed as a single specific endowment for the purposes of this Act;
Explanation.-- (2) Where a specific endowment attached to a math or temple is situated partly within the State and partly outside the State, control shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Act over the part of the specific endowment situated within the State;"
27. In the context of the present case and the facts recorded above, it is clear that the suit jewellery was a 'specific endowment' for the performance of the specific service of adorning the deity, Sri Neelayadhakshi Amman, to be taken out in the Temple car and ratham in a grand procession during the Adipooram festival. Further, as explained below, it was a charity in favour of the Temple and was for performance of a religious charity. The involvement of the family of the appellant was limited and restricted to retaining the keys of the Kudavarai and the iron safe which were to be opened at the time of the festival of Adipooram and the suit jewellery was to be taken out for the specific purpose of adorning the deity, Sri Neelayadhakshi Amman.
28. Lastly, we would refer to a recent judgment of this Court in Idol of Sri Renganathaswamy represented by its Executive Officer, Joint Commissioner v. P.K. Thoppulan Chettiar, Ramanuja Koodam Anandhana Trust, represented by its Managing Trustee, (2020) 17 SCC 96 which draws a distinction between a 'religious charity' as defined in sub-section (16) to Section 6 from a charity associated with a finite group of identifiable persons, which is a charity of a private character. It was observed that:
"for a charity to constitute a "religious charity", there is no requirement for the public charity to be connected with a particular temple or a math. In terms of the statutory definition, for a charity to constitute a "religious charity" under the 1959 Act, two conditions must be met. First, it must be a "public charity" and second, it must be "associated with" a Hindu festival or observance of a religious character. If these two conditions are satisfied, a charity is a "religious charity (emphasis added) xxxxxxxxx Where the beneficiaries of a trust or charity are limited to a finite group of identifiable individuals, the trust or charity is of a private character. However, where the beneficiaries are either the public at large or an amorphous and fluctuating body of persons incapable of being specifically identifiable, the trust or charity is of a public character."
29. This decision has referred to an earlier decision in M.J. Thulasiraman v. Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Administration, (2019) 8 SCC 689, which had examined and elucidated on the words 'endow' and 'endowment' to state that they relate to idea of giving, bequeathing or dedicating something, whether property or otherwise, for some purpose. The purpose should be with respect to religion or charity. In our opinion, the said tests are satisfied in the present case and the specific endowment of the suit jewellery as religious charity is established beyond doubt."
37. From a careful reading of the aforesaid paragraphs, it would indicate that the concept of trust or endowment are two different issues. One cannot be interchangeably used for the other. This has been noticed by the Apex Court as noticed in the above quoted paragraphs. Even if at all that there was an endowment which may not require a specific document but the fact remains that if the said was endowed for the benefit of the temple or the deity then there ought to have been clear evidence in this regard. Mere absence of any document may not conclusively decide that there can be no endowment. However, without there being any document and without clear evidence in this regard, it cannot be said that an endowment can be made merely on the say of a party. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to have led cogent evidence in this regard. This aspect has been noticed by the Apex Court in Paragraphs 19 to 22 which have been quoted hereinabove.
38. Taking note of the Paragraphs 24 to 28, it would reveal that the Apex Court has also noticed that the kind of evidence and the document required to establish an endowment and if the aforesaid principles are applied to the case at hand, it would reveal that there is no evidence in this regard. In absence of any evidence, the principles as laid down by the Apex Court cannot be applied in abstract. Learned counsel for the petitioner could not point out any evidence available on record by which it can be inferred that the endowment was made or a trust was created.
39. It is in the aforesaid backdrop that the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority has discarded the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner that he could not establish his plea regarding the land being dedicated to the deity. On the contrary, the State had led positive evidence of Shri Mohan Lal, who was the Lekhpal as well as the statement of Shri Roop Chand, who was also the Lekhpal, who clearly stated that all the lands were sowed by the petitioner, all the agriculture produce was utilized by the petitioner for his benefit and no religious function or ceremonies were being held. Once the aforesaid evidence was on record, the petitioner could have examined Members from the public, who may have been visiting the said temple for the purposes of religious ceremonies and worship, however, no such evidence was led.
40. A feeble attempt has been made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to state that a civil suit for partition was also instituted, wherein, it was held that the said land belonged to the temple. However, the fact remains that the said document is not on record nor it was placed before the trial Court or the Appellate Court. Moreover, prima-facie, the aforesaid submissions also does not inspire confidence for the reason that if it was a suit for partition then perhaps it must be amongst the co-owners. If the entire land belonged to the temple/deity, then the temple/deity cannot be co-owner with the petitioner and the other co-owners. Hence, the said submission also does not find favour with the Court.
41. The decision of this Court in Bhagwan Dass (supra) and State of U.P. v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi (supra), if noticed, would indicate that there facts are completely different and moreover in light of the principles which have been laid down by the Apex Court in R.M. Sundaram (supra) and as considered by this Court in previous paragraphs, in absence of any evidence to the contrary, the said decisions may not have any applicability.
42. Even the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that certain unirrigated land had now become irrigated is also incorrect, has no legs to support it. The findings of the Prescribed Authority as well as the Appellate Authority indicate that the said land was well irrigated. There is no evidence to contrary, hence, merely making the submission is not going to dislodge the weight of the findings recorded by the Prescribed Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority and for the aforesaid, this submission also does not find favour wit the Court.
43. This Court also takes notice that the instant petition is pending before this Court since 2000 and 25 years have lapsed. However, there was no effort of the petitioner to file any evidence on record to indicate that certain evidence which may have been filed before the Prescribed Authority to establish that the findings returned by the trial Court or the Appellate Authority is contrary to the records. Otherwise, the findings which have been returned by the Prescribed Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority are pure findings of fact and as noticed above in absence of contrary evidence, the findings cannot be said to be perverse, for this Court to interfere in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
44. Thus, for the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds that there is no palpable error which may persuade this Court to interfere with the findings of the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority. The writ petition sans merit and is accordingly dismissed. Costs are made easy.
Order Date :-30.05.2025 Rakesh/-