Central Administrative Tribunal - Lucknow
Promila Jaiswal vs Defence on 15 April, 2026
CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors.
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
LUCKNOW BENCH LUCKNOW
ORIGINAL APPLICATION No. 332/00247 of 2025
Dated, this 15th day of April, 2026
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Anil Kumar Ojha, Member- Judicial
Hon'ble Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Member-Administrative
Promila Jaiswal, aged about 47 years, Daughter of Sri Ram Asrey
Jaiswal, R/o - 30, Nehru Road, DEO - Lucknow. Presently posted
as Defence Estates Officer, Lucknow Cantt., Lucknow.
.....Applicant
By Advocate: Shri Praveen Kumar
VERSUS
1. Union of India through Defence Secretary, Ministry of Defence,
Room No 234 - South Block, Ministry of Defence, New Delhi.
2. Directorate General of Defence Estates, Delhi Cantt, Delhi
3. Principal Director, Defence Estates, Western Command,
Chandigarh.
4. Director-l, PDDE, Western Command, Chandigarh.
.....Respondents
By Advocate: Smt. Prayagmati Gupta
ORDER (ORAL)
Per Hon'ble Mr. Pankaj Kumar, Member-Administrative In this case relating to charge sheet, the applicants have sought following reliefs:
"(i) To quash the impugned chargesheet dated 09.09.2024 (contained as Annexure No. A-1 to this OA), with all consequential benefits.
(ii) Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit, just and proper under the circumstances of the case, may also be passed.
(iii) Cost of the present case."
2. The facts of the case are that the applicant was proceeded against departmentally with the issue of memorandum dated 09.09.2024 under rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Page 1 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors.
Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 [CCS (CCA) Rules, hereafter] related to her posting as Additional Defense Estates Officer, Pathankot (holding charge of Defense Estates Officer or DEO, Pathankot) during the period 11.07.2017 to 12.10.2020. The memorandum contains two charges. The first charge is that the applicant filed only one SLP in the main case in Hon'ble Supreme Court against an order dated 17.02.2016 of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana in RFA No. 2909/99 titled as UOI vs Major Pritam Singh, instead of filing SLPs in all the 485 cases decided vide said order dated 17.02.2016, as per the existing procedure of Hon'ble Supreme Court to be followed in such cases. The second charge is that the applicant filed only one SLP in the main case in Hon'ble Supreme Court against an order dated 04.04.2016 of Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana in RFA No. 2037/2000 titled as UOI vs Pardhan Singh & Ors, instead of filing SLPs in all the 383 cases decided vide said order dated 04.04.2016, as per the existing procedure of Hon'ble Supreme Court to be followed in such cases. Aggrieved with the memorandum of charges dated 09.09.2024, the applicant has preferred this OA.
3.1 The applicant's contention is that though the two judgments of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court were passed in the year 2016 and the matter was pending with her predecessors and also at various levels, she joined as Additional DEO, Pathankot on 11.07.2017 and ensured filing of SLP within 3 months of the date of joining. The applicant states that the procedure in Defense Estates Department involves obtaining legal opinion from the counsel concerned and posing the proposal to the immediate higher authority (Principal Director, Defense Estates, Western Command) which, in turn, refers the matter to the Director General, Defense Estates for expert opinion. She contends that during her tenure as Additional DEO, Pathankot from Page 2 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors. 11.07.2017 to 14.10.2020, no instructions or directions were ever received for filing SLPs in all the connected matters and that it is only after Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed displeasure with regard to delay in filing SLPs that the respondents started searching for scapegoat and issued letter dated 15.02.2024 to her asking for her version. The applicant states that she asked for time vide her letter dated 21.02.2024 and submitted her version on 11.03.2024 and also submitted representation to Hon'ble Raksha Mantri on 12.08.2024, but the impugned memorandum came to be issued on 09.09.2024. She contends that she asked for additional documents vide her representation dated 25.09.2024 in reply to which the respondents advised her to visit the offices of DEO, Pathankot and Directorate, WC, Chandigarh for the same vide their letter dated 01.10.2024; when she asked for providing the documents through e-mail or registered post on 04.10.2024 the respondents, vide letter dated 10.10.2024, forced her to submit her representation within the next 5 days and so she was compelled to submit her reply on 15.10.2024. The applicant further contends that the disciplinary authority has appointed the Inquiring Authority and the Presenting Officer vide order dated 23.12.2024 without deciding her representation.
3.2 The applicant contends that the impugned memorandum dated 09.09.2024 is liable to be set aside as on ground of delay [as held by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Than Singh vs UOI & Ors 2003 (3) ATJ 648] as well as for lack of gravity of alleged misconduct [State of Punjab vs Chaman Lal Goyal 1995 (2) SCC 570].
4. Per contra, the respondents contend that at the time of issue of the memorandum of charges the charged officer is to simply deny or admit the charges and no inspection of documents is necessary at this stage under rule 14(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and that the reply Page 3 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors. submitted by the applicant was duly considered by the competent disciplinary authority. It is further contended that the legal opinion to file SLPs was received in both the cases during the tenure of the applicant and that the decision to file single SLP in both the cases was taken by the applicant without any legal opinion and further that the SLP in Pritam Singh's case was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court on the ground that SLPs in remaining cases were not filed.
5. We have heard both the parties. Learned counsel for the applicant has cited the judgments passed by Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad in Writ Petition No. 1977 of 1998 State of UP vs Chunnu Khan, by the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in OA No. 530 of 2022 Dr Surendra Singh vs LG Govt of NCT of Delhi & Ors, and by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs J Ahmed 1979 SCC (2)
286. 6.0 Scope of Judicial Review of Charge Sheet 6.1 The scope of judicial review of the charge sheet has been circumscribed through various judicial pronouncements. The Supreme Court, in Union of India & Ors. v. A.N. Saxena; JT 1992 (2) SC 532 observed:
"It is surprising that without apparently considering whether the memorandum of charges deserved to be enquired into or not, granted a stay of disciplinary proceedings as it has done. If the disciplinary proceedings in such serious matters are stayed so lightly as the Tribunal appears to have done, it would be extremely difficult to bring any wrongdoer to book..."
"In the case of charges framed in a disciplinary inquiry the Tribunal or Court can interfere only if on the charges framed (read with imputation or particulars of the charges, if any) no misconduct or other irregularity alleged can be said to have been made out or the charges framed are contrary to any law. At this stage, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or truth of the charges. The Tribunal cannot take over the functions of the Disciplinary Authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the Disciplinary Authority to go into. Indeed, even after the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings, if the matter comes to Court or Tribunal, they have no jurisdiction to look into the truth of the charges or into the Page 4 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors.
correctness of the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority or the appellate authority as the case may be.
Now if a court cannot interfere with the truth or correctness of the charges even in a proceeding against the final order, it is un-understandable how can that be done by the Tribunal at the stage of framing of charges?"
(emphasis supplied) Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union of India & Another vs. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 observed:
"Admittedly, the respondent has not yet submitted his reply to the charge- sheet and the respondent rushed to the Central Administrative Tribunal merely on the information that a charge-sheet to this effect was to be issued to him.
The respondent has the full opportunity to reply to the charge-sheet and to raise all the points available to him including those which are now urged on his behalf by learned counsel for the respondent. In our opinion, this was not the stage at which the Tribunal ought to have entertained such an application for quashing the charge- sheet and the appropriate course for the respondent to adopt is to file his reply to the charge-sheet and invite the decision of the Disciplinary Authority thereon."
In State of Punjab and Others v. Ajit Singh, (1997) 11 SCC 368, the Apex Court observed:
"We are, however, of the view that the High Court was in error in setting aside the charge-sheet that was served on the respondents in the disciplinary proceedings. In doing so the High Court has gone into the merits of the allegations on which the charge-sheet was based and even though the charges had yet to be proved by evidence to be adduced in the disciplinary proceedings. The High Court, accepting the explanation offered by the respondent, has proceeded on the basis that there was no merit in the charges levelled against the respondent. We are unable to uphold this approach of the High Court."
(emphasis supplied) Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Union of India & Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, AIR 2007 SC 906 further elaborated on the matter in following terms:
"The reason why ordinarily a Writ Petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at this stage the Writ Petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an Page 5 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors.
enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter."
(emphasis supplied) From the above, it emerges that a charge sheet can be interfered with only if it is without jurisdiction or issued by an authority not competent to do so, or when no misconduct or other irregularity is made out. 6.2 The applicant has canvassed two limbs of arguments against the impugned memorandum dated 09.09.2024. The first argument is that no misconduct can be made out from the impugned memorandum. The second argument is on the aspect of delay. Both arguments are discussed in separate paragraphs below.
7.0 Misconduct 7.1 Before coming to the impugned memorandum dated 09.09.2024 on the aspect of misconduct, it would be relevant to advert to the manner in which the batch of SLPs relating to the case of UOI vs Major Pritam Singh (referred to in the first charge against the applicant) were addressed by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 30.01.2024 in SLP (Civil) Diary No(s). 39125/2023:
"1. There is an inordinate delay of 2683 days in filing of present Special Leave Petitions and that too after the dismissal of a batch of earlier matters.
2. It may be noted that earlier the petitioner UOI had filed only one appeal bearing C.A. No. 23521/2017 (UOI vs Major Pritam Singh) against the impugned common order dated 17.02.2016 passed by the High Court disposing of 347 appeals before it. This Court vide the order dated 23.02.2023 dismissed the said appeal only on the ground that when the judgment of High Court qua large number of claimants had attained finality, there was no justification to consider the question raised at the Page 6 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors.
instance of UOI and that no two different standards could be adopted by UOI in reference to the claimants who are covered under the self-same land acquisition proceedings. Thereafter the Review Petition filed in the said C.A. was also dismissed on 02.08.2023. Again, this Court dismissed a batch of 271 SLPs filed by the UOI challenging the said self-same judgment vide the order dated 03.01.2024. Now, this batch of SLPs have been filed challenging the same judgment dated 17.02.2016 by the UOI with the delay of 2683 days without any justification whatsoever particularly for the period from February, 2017 to February, 2023 (about six years).
3. The learned A.S.G., Mr. Banerjee, seeks time to take instructions, as to what action shall be taken by the department for fixing the accountability of the errant officers, for not filing the Special Leave Petitions for such a long time, and to avoid such delay in future.
4. List after four weeks."
(emphasis supplied) It is noted from above that Hon'ble Supreme Court viewed adversely the delay of about six years (from February 2017 to February, 2023) in filing of the SLPs.
7.2 Coming to the impugned memorandum of charges dated 09.09.2024, the following aspect stands out in paragraphs 8 and 9 below Article - I of Annexure-II (Statement of Imputation of Misconduct in support of the Articles of Charge framed against Smt. Promila Jaiswal...) of the memorandum quoted below:
"8. The Dte., WC, Chandigrah suo moto issued following directions to DEO Pathankot approx. 05 months after filing of SLP by Smt. Promila Jaiswal vide letter No. PB5453/Arjan/Pa. Ka./Ra. Sa./28335 dated 23.02.2018:
"...LA (Defence) has since opined to file SLPs against High Court order dated 17.02.2016 in Major Pritam Singh's cases as well as High Court order dated 04.04.2016 in Pardhan Singh's cases. It is believed that SLP in both the cases have been filed in main titled case only to 'save delay'. You are advised to be careful in future to file SLPs in all connected cases also without fail, failing which seeking condonation of delay may become another issue in such pending cases as huge financial implications arise out of enhancement of land acquisition cost due to court order.
Therefore, please ensure timely action and confirm..."
9. Even after receipt of Dte. DE, WC, Chandigarh letter dated 23.02.2018, wherein it was directed to ensure timely action for filing of SLPs in all the remaining connected cases and confirming the same, Smt. Promila Jaiswal failed to take any remedial steps for next 6 months (approx..) and proceeded on maternity leave w.e.f. Page 7 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors. 23.08.2018 to 10.03.2019. The said act of Smt. Promila Jaiswal may lead to avoidable financial liability on account of enhanced compensation which works out approximately to Rs. 407 crore (including interest)."
(emphasis supplied) It is noted that a similar allegation is levelled under Article - II in Annexure - II in paragraphs 9 and 10.
Now these allegations of not following directions are specific in nature whose truth, or otherwise, can only be stablished in the course of the enquiry.
7.3.1 Learned counsel for the applicant has cited cases. In Chaman Lal Goyal (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus:
"13. Applying the balancing process, we are of the opinion that the quashing of charges and of the order appointing enquiry officer was not warranted in the facts and circumstances of the case. It is more appropriate and in the interest of justice as well as in the interest of administration that the enquiry which had proceeded to a large extent be allowed to be completed..."
(emphasis supplied) We do not think the case quoted above can be of any aid to the applicant.
7.3.2 The other case is J Ahmed (supra) involving removal of an officer of the Indian Administrative Service from service even as he was retiring from service on account of disturbances in Nowgong District where he was posted as District Magistrate, for failing to take preventive measures, showing lack of leadership, not personally visiting the scene of disturbances, not keeping government informed and showing ineptitude. Hon'ble Supreme Court took note of the officer's age and agreed with Hon'ble High Court that the officer was not in service on the date an order removing him from service was made and, therefore, the order was illegal and void. Hon'ble Supreme Court delved into the aspect of misconduct in the following manner:
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CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors.
"It would be appropriate at this stage to ascertain what generally constitutes misconduct, especially in the context of disciplinary proceedings entailing penalty. Code of conduct as set out in the Conduct Rules clearly indicates the conduct expected of a member of service. It would follow that conduct which is blameworthy for the Government servant in the context of Conduct Rules would be misconduct. If a servant conducts himself in a way inconsistent with due and faithful discharge of his duty in service, it is misconduct [see Pierce v. Foster]. A disregard of an essential condition of the contract of service may constitute misconduct [see Laws v. London Chronicle. (Indicator Newspapers)]. This view was adopted in Shardaprasad Onkarprasad Tiwari v. Divisional Superintendent, Central Railway, Nagpur Division, Nagpur and Satubha K. Vaghela v. Moosa Raza. The High Court has noted the definition of misconduct in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary which runs as under:
"Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistakes, do not constitute such misconduct."
In industrial jurisprudence amongst others, habitual or gross negligence constitute misconduct but in Management, Utkal Machinery Ltd. v. Workmen, Miss Shanti Patnaik, in the absence of standing orders governing the employees' undertaking, unsatisfactory work was treated as misconduct in the context of discharge being assailed as punitive. In S. Govinda Menon v. Union of India, the manner in which a member of the service discharged his quasi judicial function disclosing abuse of power was treated as constituting misconduct for initiating disciplinary proceedings. A single act of omission or error of judgment would ordinarily not constitute misconduct though if such error or omission results in serious or atrocious consequences the same may amount to misconduct as was held by this court in P.H. Kalyani v. Air France, Calcutta, wherein it was found that the two mistakes committed by the employee while checking the load-sheets and balance charts would involve possible accident to the aircraft and possible loss of human life and, therefore, the negligence in work in the context of serious consequences was treated as misconduct. It is, however, difficult to believe that lack of efficiency or attainment of highest standards in discharge of duty attached to public office would ipso facto constitute misconduct. There may be negligence in performance of duty and a lapse in performance of duty or error of judgment while evaluating the developing situation may be negligence in discharge of duty but would not constitute misconduct unless the consequence directly attributable to negligence would be so heavy that the degree of culpability would be very high. An error can be indicative of negligence and the degree of culpability may indicate the grossness of the negligence. Carelessness can often be productive of more harm than deliberate wickedness or malevolence. Leaving aside the classic example of the sentry who sleeps at his post and allows the enemy to slip through, there are other more familiar instances of which a railway cabinman signals in a train on the same track where there is a stationary train causing headlong collision; a nurse giving intravenous injection which ought to be given intramuscular causing instantaneous death; a pilot overlooking an instrument showing snag in engine and the aircraft crashes causing heavy loss of life. Misplaced sympathy can be a great evil [see Navinchandra Shakerchandshah v. Manager, Ahmedabad Co-op. Department Stores Ltd.]. But in any case, failure to attain the highest standard of efficiency in Page 9 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors. performance of duty permitting an inference of negligence would not constitute misconduct nor for the purpose of Rule 3 of the Conduct Rules as would indicate lack of devotion to duty. The High Court was of the opinion that misconduct in the context of disciplinary proceedings means misbehaviour involving some form of guilty mind or mens rea. We find it difficult to subscribe to this view because gross or habitual negligence in performance of duty may not involve mens rea but may still constitute misconduct for disciplinary proceedings."
(emphasis supplied) From the above, it is evident that mere inefficiency, negligence or error of judgment would not constitute misconduct unless the consequences or impact of such conduct is severe. In the instant case, the allegation against the applicant inter alia is that she failed to abide by the directions issued to her vide letter dated 23.02.2018. Moreover, the matter is yet to be enquired into. In view of these distinguishing elements, J Ahmed (supra) is also of no avail to the applicant. 7.3.3 In Chunnu Khan (supra) cited, the matter involved inefficiency, carelessness and non seriousness on part of the driver and Hon'ble High Court upheld the order of the State Administrative Tribunal setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service for theft of official vehicle in which he had no collusive role. In the instant case, the matter is at the stage of charge sheet and the enquiry is yet to be completed. Further, the impact of the matter is alleged as substantial in financial terms. Thus Chunnu Khan (supra) is distinguishable from the applicant's case.
8.0 Delay 8.1 Turning to the aspect of delay, it would be apposite to refer to the following observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. N. Radhakishan 1998 (4) SCC 154:
"19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The Page 10 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors.
essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
(emphasis supplied) It follows from the above that unexplained and inordinate delay may be fatal to the disciplinary proceedings if it causes prejudice to the charged officer.
8.2 In Dr Surendra Singh (supra), the Principal Bench of this Tribunal quashed the charge sheet noting the delay of 15 years from the incident (2006) till its issue (2021) with no satisfactory explanation. In Than Singh (supra), Hon'ble High Court observed that though the incident had taken place in 1981 and the officer involved submitted his explanation in the years 1982 and 1983, the charge sheet came to be issued only in 1993 and there was not sufficient explanation of the delay (of more than 12 years from the time of the incident) and penalty was imposed in 1997.
8.3 In the instant case, it is noted that the memorandum of charges dated 09.09.2024 was issued about four years after the applicant Page 11 of 12 CAT, Lucknow Bench O.A. No. 332/00247 of 2025 Promila Jaiswal Vs. UOI & Ors. demitted the charge of Additional DEO, Pathankot on 12.10.2020; further, some time was taken by the applicant herself in replying to the queries posed by the respondents before the issue of memorandum of charges. In such a scenario, we do not think that the delay in issuing the memorandum of charges is inordinate or that it is solely due to the inaction of the respondents.
9. In conclusion, the applicant has failed to make out a case for grant of relief.
10.1 In view of the foregoing, this OA is dismissed as being devoid of merit.
10.2 Pending MAs, if any, also stand disposed of. 10.3 Parties shall bear their own costs.
(Pankaj Kumar) (Justice Anil Kumar Ojha)
Member (A) Member (J)
Warij Digitally
signed by
warij
Yadav Warij Yadav
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