Gujarat High Court
Rajkumar Khimatmal Dhamejani vs Zahid Hussain Allauddin ... on 21 August, 2014
Author: Ravi R.Tripathi
Bench: Ravi R.Tripathi
C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO. 218 of 2014
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RAJKUMAR KHIMATMAL DHAMEJANI....Applicant(s)
Versus
ZAHID HUSSAIN ALLAUDDIN HARIYANI....Opponent(s)
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Appearance:
MR MEHUL S SHAH, ADVOCATE for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR C B UPADHYAYA, ADVOCATE for the Opponent(s) No. 1
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CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE RAVI R.TRIPATHI
Date : 21/08/2014
ORAL ORDER
1. Petitioner-original defendant-appellant is before this Court being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No.139 of 2000 by the Principal Civil Judge, Palitana whereby the learned Principal Civil Judge ordered as under:
"1. This suit is partly allowed. The defendant is hereby ordered to handover peaceful and vacant possession of suit premises to the plaintiff within one month of date of this order. The plaintiff is entitled to rent of Rs.8720/-.
2. Standard rent of the suit premises is Rs.80/- P.M. exclude all taxes.Page 1 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER
3. The standard rent is fixed at Rs.80 per month and defendant has deposited at Rs.1400/-. The excess amount be refunded to defendant.
4. The defendant to pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiffs and bears his own costs.
Decree shall be drawn accordingly."
2. The matter was carried in appeal by the plaintiff as well as defendant being Regular Civil Appeal No.41 of 2009 and Regular Civil Appeal No.59 of 2009 respectively. These two appeals are decided by the learned 2 nd Additional District Judge, Bhavnagar by judgment and order dated 28.2.2014. The operative part reads as under:
"1. The Appeal by the defendant i.e. Regular Civil Appeal No.59 of 2009 is hereby rejected.
2. The Appeal by the plaintiff i.e. Regular Civil Appeal No.41 of 2009 is hereby allowed.
3. The judgment and decree passed by the Learned Principal Civil Judge, Palitana in Regular Civil Suit No.139 of 2000 dated 15.04.2009 is modified to the extent that the eviction is to be treated as one under Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act and the Standard rent is fixed at Rs.1400/- per month excluding all taxes for the suit premises.Page 2 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER
4. The defendant is given 6 weeks time to deposit the amount of difference of standard rent. It is further ordered that the amount deposited by the defendant pursuant to the order passed by this Court dated 29.08.2009 below Ex.6 is Regular Civil Appeal No.59 of 2009 be adjusted while calculating the amount standard rent to be deposited by the defendant.
5. The defendant is hereby ordered to hand over peaceful and vacant possession of suit premises to the plaintiff within 45 days from the date of this order.
6. The defendant is further ordered to pay the costs of the appeal to the plaintiff and bear his own cost.
7. Decree be drawn accordingly.
8. Record and proceedings to be sent back to the Trial Court along with the copy of this order.
9. Copy of this judgment be kept in Regular Civil Appeal No.59 of 2000."
3. Learned advocate Mr.Shah appearing for the petitioner - original defendant - appellant vehemently submitted that both the Courts below have erred in passing the decree for eviction. Learned advocate submitted that the trial Court could not have passed the decree of eviction as the protection under Section 12(3)(b) was available, the tenant could not have deposited Page 3 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER the standard rent as the amount of standard rent was not known.
3.1 Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that the first appellate Judge has committed error in holding that the decree for eviction can be passed under Section 12(3)(a). Learned advocate strenuously argued the matter and tried to convince this Court that the Courts below have committed an error in passing the decree for eviction. In substance, the challenge remains to the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Appeal Nos.41 and 59 of 2009 as the decree for eviction is modified by the learned first appellate Judge. Learned advocate relied upon the following decisions:
(1) Hotel Kings And Others V/s Sara Farhan Lukmani & Others, reported in (2007)1 SCC 202.
(2) Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed V/s Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai, reported in 1964(V) GLR 55.
(3) Naranbhai Nathabhai Koli V/s Modhia Panalal Maganlal, reported in XXIII(2) GLR 98.
(4) Raju Kakara Shetty V/s Ramesh Prataprao Shirole And Another reported in (1991)1 SCC 570.Page 4 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER
4. The discussion is in paragraph 9 to 13 of the first appellate Judge's judgment, which reads as under:
"9. It clearly transpires that initially the notice issued by the plaintiff dated 09.09.2000 through his advocate to recover arrears of rent and to put and end to relationship of landlord and tenant and to recover the possession of the suit premises was given to the defendant by RPAD and UPC since the first notice remained un-served to the defendant the said notice was reissued to the defendant on 06.10.2000 by RPAD which came to be served to the defendant on 17.10.2000. It is an admitted fact that the defendant neither replied to the said notice nor did he paid the rent as demanded in the said notice within the stipulated time of one month from the date of receipt of the said notice nor did he filed any application before the Trial Court for fixing standard rent within one month of receiving the notice for eviction and paying the arrears of rent, however for the first time raised contention to the effect in the written statement at Ex. 23 has averred to the effect that he is ready and willing to pay Rs.1400/- per month for the suit premises as per the rent agreement Page 5 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER putting aside the dispute of standard rent. He has also admitted the fact of entering in to rent agreement which is dated 14.05.1995 and has also admitted the fact of rent for the suit premises was Rs.1400/- per month, however has challenged the increase in the rent every two years at the rate of 30% on the ground of being against the statute and also being opposed to public policy. The defendant has admitted the fact that he has paid rent up to February 2000 as per the rent agreement and increment stated therein, however the same is because of ignorance of law. It is also clear from the record that the defendant for the first time filed an application vide Ex.74 to fix the standard rent of the suit premises on 22.12.2005. Issues were framed on 24.01.2002 vide Ex.17 where as written statement was filed on 14.03.2002. The defendant also preferred an amendment application on 21.07.2003 which was allowed by order below Ex.44 and by amending his written statement had also raised dispute for standard rent. The plaintiff has admitted in his cross examination that tax were to be paid by the defendant and these taxes were payable every year. He has also admitted that he had entered into rent agreement with the plaintiff which was dated 11.04.1995 and was Page 6 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER effective from 15.04.1995. The defendant in his cross examination has admitted the fact that he has not paid the rent by money order to the plaintiff-landlord after receipt of notice. He has also admitted that fact for the first time he deposited the rent before the Court on 31.07.2002 with regards to the suit. He has also admitted in his cross examination that he was paying Rs.1400/- rent per month for the suit premises in the year 1995 and from year 1999-2000 he was paying Rs.2366/- per month for the rented premises. He has also admitted that fact that from 15.04.1995 to February 2000 he has paid rent with 30% increase. He has also admitted that he has never sent any notice to the plaintiff landlord alleging that the rent is excessive. He has also admitted the fact that the compromise entered in to between the plaintiff and himself in RCS No.5/99 was with regards to contractual rent. Thus following facts emerges from the record of the case.
(1) Taxes were to be paid by the defendant-
tenant and were to be paid yearly, (2) defendant-tenant was in arrears of rents for six months as on date of filing of the suit, (3) defendant-tenant did not reply to the notice of the plaintiff-landlord, (4) defendant tenant raised the dispute of Page 7 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER standard rent for the first time in his written statement.
10. Therefore what is to be considered by this Court is as to whether the Trial Court had come to the correct conclusion with regards to application of Section 12(3)(b) to the present case. Now the Trial Judge has held that since the taxes were to be paid by the tenant and that too yearly the rent is not payable by month (Refer IInd Paragraph at page 12 of the impugned judgment). However in the case of Hotel Kings V/s. Sara Farhan Lukmani reported in 2007 (1) SCC 202 it is held that:
"35 The argument advanced on behalf of the lessee that notwithstanding the said stipulation, since the lessee was required to pay the rates and taxes which formed part of the permitted increase and was, therefore, a part of the rent payable, does not appeal to us. The consequential submission made in this regard that since the rates and taxes were payable either annually or after every six months, and the same formed part of the rent, it must be held that the rents were payable not each Page 8 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER month but after every six months, does not also appeal to us.
36 Notwithstanding the decisions in the Bombay Municipal Corporation case and Raju Kakara Shetty (supra), the views expressed therein are distinguishable on facts with the facts of these two appeals. Both the said judgments deal with payment of education cess under the Maharashtra Education (Cess) Act, 1962, under which the landlord is liable to pay such cess annually but has the right to recover the amount so paid by him from the tenant in addition to the standard rent as a part of the rent itself. By operation of law education cess has been made a component of the rent payable by the tenant in respect of the tenanted premises. In such a case, the concept of 'permitted increase' would include the cess payable as part of the rent itself. In the instant case, however, the lessee is required to pay the rates and taxes and other outgoings for the demised premises in respect whereof the landlord has been given the right to effect permitted increase equivalent to the amount paid towards Page 9 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER rates and taxes. The same does not, in our view, makes such payment a part of the rent though it may be a consideration for the grant of lease. The 'permitted increase' in the instant case serves as a yardstick for the landlord to increase the rents on account of payment of rates and taxes by the landlord".
Thus it is held in the aforesaid case that rates and taxes to be paid by
lessee would not form part of rent and that the lease rent was required to be paid on monthly basis thus governed by Section 12(3)
(a) of the Rent Act. Therefore the finding of the Trial Judge with regards to rent not payable by month is erroneous. Thus based on the aforesaid Supreme Court Judgment the finding of the Trial Court that the rent is not payable by month since the taxes were to be paid by the tenant and that too yearly are set aside. Thus the first condition to attract Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act gets fulfilled, namely the rent is payable by month. Now second condition is with regards to dispute of standard rent. Admittedly the defendant-tenant did not raise any dispute in the reply to the notice by the plaintiff-Page 10 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER
landlord but for the first time in his written statement. Therefore the question would be would such raising of dispute by the defendant-tenant for the first time in the written statement will take out the case from the rigors of Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act? At this juncture it would be profitable to refer the judgments relied by the plaintiff. In the case of Harbans Lal Jagmohan Dass V/s. Prabjudas Shiv Lal reported in 1976 ACR 756, it is held that tenant cannot claim protection from the operation of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act when he had failed to make an application within one month of the service of the said notice regarding dispute as to standard rent but took the plea in the written statement. In the case of Gaznafarali Fatchali Hakim V/s. Ratilal Maganlal Panchal reported in 1988(1) GLH 490 it is held that in absence of showing willingness to pay arrears within one month from the date of notice or filing of application for standard rent, eviction decree must follow. In the case of Kantilal Nanchand Sheth V/s. Jeramdas Vajubhai Parmar reported in 2000(2) GLH 641 it is held that when there is more than six months rent due and service of notice of demand is made and thereafter no rent is paid within one month Page 11 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER of notice of demand under such circumstances raising of dispute of standard rent for the first time in the written statement cannot take out the case form the ambit of S.12(3)
(a) and the court has no option but to decree suit. In the case of Gandalal Kababhai Tankaria (Dec.) through his Heirs Jayaben V/s. Mansukhlall Virjibhai reported in 1996(1) GLR 759 it is held that in order to avail protection of Section 12(3)(b) the tenant must raise the dispute regarding standard rent within the time laid down by law.
In the present case the defendant- tenant has not replied to the notice by the plaintiff-landlord nor has filed any application within one month on receipt of the said notice for fixing standard rent and for the first time has raised dispute of standard rent in the written statement. Hence such raising dispute for the first time in the written statement will not take the case out of Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act. Thirdly it is admitted fact that the defendant-tenant was arrears of rent on the date of filing of the suit for six month.
11. The contention of the defendant-tenant is Page 12 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER that the notice is illegal/invalid since the notice is for recovery of amount excess to standard rent and permitted increase. In this regards it would be profitable to refer to the judgment in the case of Modi Mohanlal Bhagwandas Versus Shah Keshavlal Jethalal reported in 1967 GLR 814 it is held that:
"Merely because in the notice a claim for a larger amount than the standard rent and permitted increases is made the notice would not be rendered illegal. What is intended by the Legislature by providing for giving of a notice is that the tenant must know what was demanded from him and if the notice made it clear that he was demanding also the standard rent and the permitted increases the notice would comply with the requirements of sec. 12(1). It may be that if by the notice any amount is claimed which is beyond the amount of the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases the plaintiff may not be entitled to recover that amount ultimately if he were to file a suit to recover such an amount. It has also to be taken into consideration as in this case it is the case of the landlord that Page 13 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER the tax which the tenant had undertaken to pay is permitted increase in the eye of law under the Rent Act and therefore he was entitled to claim it from the tenant as permitted increase. Again the landlord might honestly believe that the particular amount was standard rent which he was entitled to claim and accordingly make such demand in the notice. Ultimately it may turn out that under the provisions of law and after the evidence is led the amount due was less than what he had claimed to be the amount of standard rent in the notice. It is not possible to interpret this provision of law to mean that in any case where the demand exceeds the actual amount of standard rent and permitted increases the notice would be rendered illegal if such a demand is in excess of such standard rent or permitted increases which may ultimately be held to be the standard rent or permitted increase. In this view of mine I am supported by a decision in Labhabhai Vithaldas V/s. Laxmidas Vithaldas IV G. L. R. page 567 wherein it has been held that when a notice under sec. 12(2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act is given for Page 14 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER the payment of arrears of rent not at the rate of contractual rent but at a rate higher than standard rent the notice itself does not become invalid so as to take away the right of the landlord to institute the suit one month after the notice. It is the fact of the notice which is important under sec. 12(2) and not the correctness of the contents of the notice. Similar is the view taken by this High Court in another decision in Panchal Mohanlal Ishwardas V/s. Maheshvari Mills Ltd. 3 Guj.Law Reporter page 574 wherein also a demand over and above the standard rent and permitted increase was made in the notice and a similar contention had been raised on behalf of the tenant which was negatived and the notice was held to be a legal notice which could form the basis of a suit by the landlord".
Thus in view of the facts of the present case and the above referred judgment the contention of the defendant-tenant that the notice is illegal has no basis.
12. Now in the case of Monghiba Lakhaji Versus Hira Kunvar Mulji reported in 2005 (3) Page 15 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER GCD 2034 after referring to the various provisions of the Bombay Rent Act, it is held by the division bench of the Hon'ble High Court of Gujarat in paragraphs 6 and 7 as under:
"6 On an analysis of the aforesaid statutory provisions, the following propositions emerge:
(i) A landlord shall not be entitled to recover possession of any premises on the ground of nonpayment of rent/permitted increase (hereinafter referred to as "rent" or "standard rent"
and shall include permitted increases) so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of standard rent. The tenant's readiness and willingness to pay rent is to be determined not with reference to the date of decree, but on the anvil of the provisions of Sections 12 and 11 of the Act.
(ii) Sub-section(2) of Section 12provides for a condition precedent that no suit for recovery of possession on the ground of non-payment of the Page 16 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER standard rent due shall be instituted by a landlord against the tenant, until the expiry of one month after service of written notice of the demand of the standard rent which notice is required to be served in the manner provided in Section 106 of the TP Act, 1882. The object of this provision for giving one month's notice is twofold - the first is to give the tenant an opportunity to pay/tender the standard rent which has become due and which would enable the tenant to earn protection granted by subsection (1) of Section 12, and secondly in case the tenant has any dispute about standard rent, to give the tenant an opportunity to raise such a dispute. The tenant may raise such a dispute, within one month from the date of service of the notice, either by filing an application before the Rent Court under Section 11(3) of the Act (Explanation to Section 12) or in his reply to the notice.
(iii) The first question, therefore, to be asked to ascertain whether the tenant is ready and willing to pay the standard rent is whether the tenant has paid or Page 17 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER tendered standard rent within the aforesaid period of one month from the date of service of notice under Section12(2).
(iv) If the tenant pays or tenders the amount of standard rent/permitted increases within the aforesaid statutory period of one month, the embargo placed by Section 12(1) comes into operation and the landlord shall not be entitled to recover possession of the premises on the ground of non-payment of rent. In other words, the suit on the ground of non-payment of rent will not be maintainable if the amounts due are paid/tendered within one month from the date of service of notice for such payment.
(v) It is only if the tenant does not pay or tender the amount of arrears of standard rent and permitted increases within the aforesaid statutory period of one month that the landlord's suit for recovery of possession on the ground of nonpayment of the standard rent or permitted increases due will be maintainable. In such a suit how is the Page 18 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER Court to exercise its power and whether or not the Court shall pass a decree for eviction are questions to be decided by applying the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 12. A conjoint reading of all the sub-sections of Section 12 of the Act makes it clear that the question of the Court passing the decree for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent/permitted increases would arise if and only if the tenant does not pay or tender the amount of arrears of standard rent and permitted increases within the period of one month from the date of expiry of service of notice on the tenant as provided in Section 12(2) of the Act. What is ordinarily considered as the fourth condition in Section 12(3)
(a), namely, where the tenant has neglected to make payment of such arrears within the period of one month from the date of service of the notice is not a condition exclusive to the operation of clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 but that is the condition upon the fulfillment of which the Court proceeds to entertain the suit for eviction on the ground of non- payment of rent and permitted increases.
Page 19 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER(vi) THEREAFTER (i.e. after the Court finds that the tenant did not pay or tender the standard rent/permitted increases within the stipulated period of one month) where the Court finds that the following cumulative conditions are satisfied:-
- where the rent is payable by month;
- where there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases;
- where such rent or permitted increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more;
then the Court has to pass a decree of eviction.
That is what Section 12(3)(a) provides. ["may" is to be read as "shall" - as held in Mrs. Manorama vs. Mrs. Dhanlaxmi, 7 GLR 1061]. In short, if all the cumulative conditions stipulated in Section 12(3)(a) are fulfilled, the liability of the tenant to be evicted gets crystallized upon expiry of one month from the date of service of notice, which is a serious consequence.Page 20 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER
(vii) But if ANY of the THREE conditions stipulated in Section 12(3)(a) is not fulfilled, the tenant gets locus penitentiae, if he - (1) pays the arrears of rent on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other dates as the Court may fix and;
(2) thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court the standard rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided as may be directed by the Court - which would be directions under sub-sections (3) and/or (4) of Section 11; and (3) also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. If the tenant makes payments as aforesaid, the tenant gets protection under Section 12(3)(b), otherwise, the Court will pass a decree for eviction on the ground of non-
payment of standard rent and permitted increases.
7 These propositions make answer to the question under consideration self evident. But before proceeding further, Page 21 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER let us consider the following situations:-
Where in a given case the Court finds that the rent is not payable by month, but the other conditions are fulfilled, meaning thereby, there is no dispute as to the standard rent and the tenant is in arrears of rent for a period of six months or more, the Court will have to consider the case as going out of Section 12(3)(a) and, therefore, falling in the residuary clause being clause (b) of subsection (3) of Section 12. Similarly, if the dispute as to the standard rent is raised within one month from the date of service of notice, the Court will have to consider the case under clause(b) of subsection (3) of Section 12 even if the rent is payable by month and the tenant is in arrears of rent for a period of six months or more".
13. Thus the readiness and willingness of the defendant-tenant stands fails when tested on the anvil of section 11 and 12 of the Rent Act. The notice is valid and the tenant has not raised any dispute with regards to Page 22 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER standard rent since he has not replied to the notice nor has filed any application before the concerned Court for fixing standard rent within the stipulated time under the law i.e. one month from the receipt of the suit notice despite of having opportunity to raise such dispute. The defendant has not made any payment of arrears of rent within one month of the receipt of the notice. The rent was payable by month. The defendant was arrears of rent for six months on the date of filing of the suit. Thus all the conditions are cumulatively satisfied in the present case and hence the Court had no other option but to pass eviction decree. Though the Trial Court has passed the decree of eviction under provisions of 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act, however the same is modified as is to be treated as if passed under Section 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act for the reasons stated herein above. It is also required to be noted that the plaintiff has also filed an appeal against the finding of standard rent. Though, the decree is in favour of the plaintiff, he can still challenge the findings which are against him in the appeal filed by the defendant. The above position is clear from the provisions of Order-41, Rule-22. After the 1976 amendment of Order-41, Rule-22, the Page 23 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER insertion made in sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross-objection against a finding. The difference is basically that a respondent may defend himself without taking recourse to file a cross-objection to the extent the decree stands in his favour, but if he intends to assail any part of the decree, it is obligatory on his part to file the cross- objection. In the case of Banarsi and Others V/s. Ram Phal reported in AIR 2003 SC 1989, it has been observed that the amendment inserted in 1976 is clarificatory and three situations have been adverted to therein. Situation No. 1 deals with the impugned decree which is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in favour of the respondent. Dealing with such a situation, the Apex Court observed that in such a case, it is necessary for the respondent to file an appeal or take cross-objection against that part of the decree which is against him if he seeks to get rid of the same though he is entitled to support that part of the decree which is in his favour without taking any cross-objection. In the present case the plaintiff has filed appeal against the findings of fixation of standard rent. Now as far as two other situations which deal with a decree entirely in favour of the respondent Page 24 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER though an issue had been decided against him or a decree entirely in favour of the respondent where all the issues had been answered in his favour but there is a finding in the judgment which goes against him, in the pre-amendment stage, he could not take any cross-objection as he was not a person aggrieved by the decree. But post-amendment, read in the light of explanation to sub-rule (1), though it is still not necessary for the respondent to take any cross-objection laying challenge to any finding adverse to him as the decree is entirely in his favour, yet he may support the decree without cross-
objection. It gives him the right to take cross-objection to a finding recorded against him either while answering an issue or while dealing with an issue. It is also important to note that after the amendment in the Code, if the appeal stands withdrawn or dismissed for default, the cross-objection taken to a finding by the respondent would still be adjudicated upon on merits which remedy was not available to the respondent under the un- amended Code. Therefore the plaintiff's challenge qua the finding of the Trial Court that the suit is governed by Section 12(3)(b) can be looked in to by this Court and hence for the reasons stated herein above it is Page 25 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER held that the same is governed by provisions of 12(3)(a) of the Rent Act. As far as the judgments relied upon by the defendant are concerned in the case of Dineshchandra Chunilal V/s. Thakkar Chhotalal Popatlal(supra)the tenant in reply to suit notice had offered the rent but it was evaded by the landlord under false pretext, in the present case no such offer was made by the tenant. The next judgments that are relied are in the case of Vora Abbasbhai Alimahomed V/s. Haji Gulamnabi Haji Safibhai (supra) and Mahant Madhavramji Durgaramji since deceased through Ramkishor and Ors. V/s. Ambalal Nagarji Naik(supra) in the case of Vora Abbasbhai the tenant had replied to the notice and had raised dispute with regards to the standard rent and had also filed an application to the concerned Court within one month of receipt of notice for fixing standard rent, nothing that sort of is done in the present case hence the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case, as far as the case of Ramkishor V/s. Ambalal(supra) and Abdul Gani Abdul Latif v/s. Sarifa Begum (supra) is concerned there it was found that the defendant was liable to pay taxes and hence it was held that the rent was not payable by month, however as held by Page 26 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Kings V/s. Sara Farhan Lukmani (supra) it is held that only because the taxes are to be paid by the tenant it cannot be said that the rent is not payable by month, hence also the referred judgments are of no help to the defendant. In the case of Heirs of Kasam Umar V/s. Fakir Amnabai Abu(supra) it was an admitted fact that in the reply to the suit notice dispute of standard rent was raised which was within one month of the receipt of the said notice, hence it was held that no fixed terminology or rigid terms are laid to arrive as to what is dispute of standard rent and when the nature of dispute is to challenge the rate demand it has to be assumed as standard rent dispute, in the present case the defendant has not replied to the suit notice hence on facts the case is not applicable. The next judgment relied is in the case of Vatati Lalmohmed V/s. Sarfunnissa Abdulmajid (supra), in that case also the defendant tenant had raised dispute of standard rent in the reply to the suit notice and under such circumstances it was held that in absence of pleading by the landlord to the effect that dispute raised by tenant as regards standard rent was not a bonafide dispute the Court could not arrive Page 27 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER at any finding to that effect, however in the present case there was no question of such pleading by the plaintiff-landlord since the defendant-tenant has not raised the dispute of standard rent in reply to the suit notice since in the present case no reply is filed, hence the referred judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case. As far as the judgment relied by the defendant in the case of Abdulgani@ Gani Ismail V/s. Jaiswal Chimanlal Maneklal (supra) the same has been overruled in the case of Surjitsing Acchalsing Thro Proprietor Versus Motilal Hiralal Warehouse And Estate Limited reported in 2004(1)GLR 4 and it is held that, notice terminating tenancy is required when eviction sought on ground of non-payment of standard rent or permitted increase due while no notice is required where suit is filed for recovery of possession under S. 13(1)(a) or any other grounds mentioned in S. 13(1), hence the said judgment on facts also is not applicable to the present case."
4. Taking into consideration the above discussion, this Court is of the opinion that the learned first appellate Judge has not committed any error and therefore this Civil Revision Application is found without any substance and Page 28 of 29 C/CRA/218/2014 ORDER the same is dismissed.
5. It is a trite-law that when the Court is in agreement with the reasons set out in the judgment under challenge, the Court is not required to reiterate the entire reasoning.
(RAVI R.TRIPATHI, J.) Srilatha Page 29 of 29