Madhya Pradesh High Court
Kalyan Das And Ors. vs Narayan Singh And Ors. on 21 August, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2001(5)MPHT374
Author: Dipak Misra
Bench: Dipak Misra
ORDER Dipak Misra, J.
1. In this civil revision challenge is to the order dated 28-9-1999 passed by the learned Second Additional District Judge, Raigarh, in C.S. No. 5-A/95.
2. The facts as have been unfolded are that the plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction. It is setforth in the plaint that in the year 1991 the plaintiffs had purchased certain land described in Schedule A from the defendant No. 1. Various sale-deeds were executed by the defendant No. 1. After purchase of the suit land the plaintiffs are in possession and in peaceful enjoyment of the same. It is averred that after sale of the said property to the plaintiffs the defendant No. 1 again sold the said property to other defendants. The plaintiffs have further pleaded as the defendant No. 1 had sold the some of the properties to the other defendants in a malafide manner a cloud has been cast in respect of the right, title and interest of the plaintiffs. With the aforesaid base the plaintiffs prayed for declaration and permanent injunction. The plaintiffs valued the suit at Rs. 60,000/- for declaration and paid a fixed Court Fee of Rs. 30/-. The reliefs sought for by the plaintiffs are that they are the title-holders in respect of the suit property; that sale-deeds executed the defendant No. 1 in favour of the other defendants are null and void; and further the defendants be permanently injuncted to act in a manner which would go against the interest of the plaintiffs.
3. After some of the defendants entered appearance the defendant Nos. 5 and 6 filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short 'the Code') for rejection of the plaint on the ground that proper Court Fee has not been paid on the plaint. It was putforth by the defendants as the suit was valued at Rs. 60,000/- the plaint was returned by the Court below and, therefore, the plaintiffs should pay the Court Fee on the valuation at which the suit has been valued. At this juncture, an application was filed under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code to pay the Court Fee of Rs. 300/- on the valuation of Rs. 60,000/- and to value permanent injunction at Rs. 300/- and to pay Court Fee of Rs. 60/-. The Court below came to hold that he had already opined that the plaintiff was liable to pay the Court Fee on Rs. 60,000/- and accordingly so directed.
4. I have heard Mr. Awadh Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Prashant Mishra, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 (a) to 1 (i) and Mr. Ashok Kumar Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 3 to 6.
5. Assailing the aforesaid order it is submitted by Mr. Tripathi that the plaintiffs are not parties to the saledeed and they have only sought declaration of their right, title and interest and, therefore, they are not liable to pay the ad valorem Court Fee. It is further submitted by him that when the plaintiffs have valued the relief of injunction at Rs. 300/-, fixed Court Fee of Rs. 60/- should have been allowed to be paid. The learned counsel in support of his submission has placed reliance on the decision rendered in the case of Nainsukh Kishandas and Ors. v. Smt. Manish Choudhary and Ors., 1998 (2) MPLJ 79.
Resisting the aforesaid submission, it is contended by Mr. Prashant Mishra, learned counsel appearing for some of the non-applicants that the plaintiffs in the relief clause have prayed for declaration of the subsequent sale deeds as null and void and hence, they are required to pay the ad valorem Court Fee. It is his submission that though the plaintiffs are not parties to the sale-deeds but as they are claiming their right on the basis of sale deed executed by the defendant No. 1 they are liable to pay the ad valorem Court Fee. It is his further submission that the plaintiffs have valued the suit at Rs. 60,000/- and, therefore, they are also liable to pay ad valorem Court Fee. In support of his submission he has placed reliance on the decisions rendered in the cases of Kapoori Bai v. Bhagwan Singh, 2000 (I) MPWN Note 65 and Raj Kaur w/o Garumukh Singh Randhawa v. M/s Kinetic Gallery and Anr., 2000 (2) MPLJ 72.
6. Before I deal with the facts of the case it is apposite to refer the decisions cited at the Bar. In the case of Kapoori Bai (supra) the plaintiffs had brought the suit for restraining the defendant to interfere with the possession of land in question. It was pleaded that there was an agreement to sale between the parties for a sum of Rs. 2,10,000/- and against that sum an amount of Rs. 1,30,000/- had already been paid. The Trial Court directed that the plaintiffs had to pay Court Fee on the basis of the 20 times of the land revenue. This Court reversed the said direction and came to hold as the valuation of the suit has been assessed to the tune of Rs. 2,10,000/- the plaintiffs are liable to pay the ad valorem Court Fee as per Clause 7 (iv)(d) of the Court Fee Act. In the case of Nainsukh Kishandas (supra) this Court opined that if a person wants to avoid a deed or an instrument to which he himself is a party then he has to pay ad valorem Court Fee but in a case where he is not a party to the document and does also not claim from the person who is a party to the sale deed, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that he has to pay the ad valorem Court Fee. The Court also expressed the view that where consequential relief has been prayed for but it can be granted de hors the declaration, Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act would not be applicable. I may profitably reproduce Para 11 from the case of Nainsukh Kishandas (supra):
"11. Whether the Court Fees is required to be paid under Section 7(iv)(c) or Article 17 (iii) Schedule II, the Court has to consider whether the person was a party actual or constructive to the deed or the decree. If the Court comes to the conclusion that he was not, a declaration would be sufficient. The Court may also take into consideration that whether the suit is under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act and if it comes to the conclusion that it is so, then the Court Fees is to be paid under Article 17 (iii) and not under Section 7(iv)(c). If the Court comes to the conclusion that it is necessary for the plaintiffs to have a decree or document set aside or declared as void, in such a case he has to pay the ad-valorem Court fees, but if the Court comes to the conclusion that without avoiding those documents or without even a declaration, an effective decree can be granted in favour of the plaintiff restraining the other party for giving effect to the deed or decree, then in such a case Section 7(iv)(c) would not be applicable, and the Court Fees paid under Article 17 (iii) shall be sufficient. The Court may also consider whether the plaintiff is seeking the relief that the document is nullity or void-ab-initio. If he proves to the satisfaction of the Court, even prima facie in the plaint allegations that the document does not bind him or he was not a party then in such a case Section 7(iv)(c) would be applicable."
Recently in the case of Raj Kaur (supra) S.C. Pandey, J. held as under :
"The plaintiff would not be entitled to value the relief or permanent injunction simpliciter less than the relief of declaration and consequential injunction in respect of the same property, if the value of the relief to the plaintiff be the same. What has to be valued is the relief and not the thing affected. The general rule is, if the relief sought for has a real money value which can be objectively ascertained, then the plaintiff can value the suit in accordance with that value. Where the relief of declaration in favour of the applicant was directly and inextricably related with the relief of permanent injunction claiming that she was the sub-dealer of two companies and consequently, the non-applicant No. 1 was liable to be restrained to run the show-room established by him in front of her show room, the relief of permanent injunction flowed from the relief of declaration. They are not unconnected in such manner that each could be called an independent relief. The suit was governed by Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act. The right of permanent injunction rightly flowed from the right of declaration and, therefore, the applicant could be put his value for the relief of declaration and permanent injunction.
(quoted from the placitum)
7. The present factual matrix has to be scrutinised keeping the aforesaid pronouncement of law in the field. On a reading of the plaint in entirety it is plain as noon day that the plaintiff has made a prayer for declaration of his right, title and interest on the basis of sale deed which was executed by defendant No. 1 in his favour. The essence of the averments is that the defendant No. 1 has no saleable interest if he had sold the property to the plaintiff. Thus it is obvious that the plaintiffs are not claiming through the defendant No. 1 According to them the title of defendant No. 1 got extinguished after he executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. The subsequent sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 would not bind the plaintiffs as they could not be either a party or privy to subsequent sale deed as per the averments made in the plaint. In view of this factual backdrop the suit of the plaintiffs can be categorised as one for declaration which requires payment of fixed court fee under Schedule II Article 17 (iii) of the Court Fees Act. This is because the relief sought is an independent relief and not connected with the relief of permanent injunction. Hence, the concept of consequential relief with the meaning of Section 7(iv)(c) of the Act is not attracted. On a close scrutiny of the plaint it is apparent that the plaintiffs have claimed independent relief of declaration and in the case of independent relief of declaration the suit is governed by Section 4 of the Suits Valuation Act read with Section 3 there of. It cannot be disputed that the plaintiffs were bound to value the suit land for the purpose of jurisdiction in accordance with its market value and they have so done.
The question that falls for consideration whether the Trial court is justified in directing the plaintiffs to pay the court fee on Rs. 60,000/- for the relief of permanent injunction which is covered under Section 7(iv)(d) of the Act. In a relief of permanent injunction the plaintiffs are permitted to quote their own valuation and the Court ordinarily does not interfere with the valuation put forth by the plaintiffs unless it is absurd or outrageously low or high. In the case at hand the relief of permanent injunction is valued at Rs. 300/- though the market value of the land is 60,000/- in as much as the plaintiffs have claimed that they are owners of the suit land in view of the execution of sale deed by defendant No. 1 in their favour. They also further claimed that they were placed in possession of the suit land. The subsequent sale deed merely cast a cloud on their title. The property in question has a market value but the normal rule of valuation of relief as per market value of the property would not apply to this case. The plaintiffs are in possession of the suit property and they seek a declaration that subsequent sale deed is null and void as it casts a cloud in the enjoyment of the rights of the plaintiffs. There is further apprehension that taking shelter of the second sale deed the defendants may interfere in their possession. Keeping in view the wordings of the relief Clause it becomes luminously clear that plaintiffs want a permanent injunction of such nature which is not relevant to the market value of the land. The relief of permanent injunction as put forth by the plaintiffs can be recorded as incapable of valuation in terms of money. The relief sought for does not have the same money value as the subject matter of the suit. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Court to accept the value put by the plaintiffs as the Court cannot be in a position to say that the value of relief of permanent injunction which is to value at Rs. 300/- is palpably or outrageously low.
8. In view of the preceding analysis, I am of the considered opinion that the direction given by the Court below to pay ad valorem court fee is unsustainable.
9. In the result the civil revision is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. However, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.