Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mrs. Sunita Joshi vs Secretary State Of M.P. Department Of ... on 20 November, 2019
Author: S.C.Sharma
Bench: S.C.Sharma
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE
W P No. 13320 / 2013
MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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INDORE, Dated : 20/11/2019
Mr. LC Patne, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Mr. Saurabh Shrivastava, learned counsel for the
respondent State.
The petitioner before this Court has filed this present
writ petition being aggrieved by the order of termination
dated 22/12/2012 passed by the Project Officer, Integrated
Child Development Programme.
Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued before
this Court that the petitioner was appointed on 27/9/1997 and
she has worked with sincerity and devotion. The respondents
without holding any enquiry in the matter and without
complying with the provisions as contained under the
statutory Circular dated 10/07/2007 have passed the
impugned order. The impugned order dated 22/12/2012 is on
record. The same reveals that the petitioner was absent
without any leave application and has not submitted reply to
the Competent Authority.
Reply of the State Government is also on record which
reveals that no enquiry with the participation of the petitioner
has taken place in the matter and the services of the
petitioner have been put to an end based upon some enquiry
conducted behind her back and based upon the panchnama
prepared by the Project Officer / villagers.
This Court in the case of Smt. Parvati Pawar Vs. State
of MP and others (W.A.No. 111/2018, decided on
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE
W P No. 13320 / 2013
MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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18/2/2019) in paragraphs 6 and 7 has held as under :
6. Shri Patne has placed reliance upon the policy
issued by the State Government dated 10.7.2007 and his
contention is that for removing an Anganwadi Worker an
inquiry is mandatory with the participation of the
employee and in the present case, undisputedly the
petitioner was critically ill, as she met with an accident.
The certificates are on record issued by the Government
Doctors and in all fairness, proper opportunity of hearing
should have been given to the petitioner. In similar
circumstances, this Court while dealing termination of
Anganwadi Worker in the case of Smt. Kansa Vs. State
of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2015) 4 MPLJ 151 in
paragraphs 9 to 18 has held as under:-
"9. In the aforesaid order only the name of the village
has been changed in all 84 cases. The policy dt. 10/7/2007
issued by the State Government provides for a procedure
for discontinuing an "Aanganwadi worker" and the same
reads as under :
n& vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ @ lgkf;dk dks in ls gVkus dh izfdz;k
%
1;fn vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ @ lgkf;dk }kjk vkaxuokMh dsUnz dk
lapkyu fu;ekuqlkj ugha fd;k tkrk gS vFkok muds }kjk vius
drZO;ksa ,oa nkf;Roksa ds fuoZgu esa ykijokgh dh tkrh gS rks
ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh @ efgyk ,oa cky fodkl ds vU; mPp
vf/kdkjh }kjk vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ @ lgkf;dk dks lquokbZ dk
volj nsrs gq, tkWap es nks"kh ik;s tkus ij in ls i`Fkd fd;k tk
ldsxk A
2;fn lg;ksfxuh ekr` lfefr fdlh dk;ZdrkZ @ lgkf;dk ds
dk;Z ls larq"V ughs gSa rks i`Fkd lg;ksfxuh ekr` lfefr bl vk'k;
dk izLrko mi;qDr dkj.k n'kkZrs gq, cSBd esa izLrqr djsaxh ,oa
cSBd esa izLrko cgqer ls ikfjr gksus ij i;Zos{kd dks izsf"kr djsxh
A i;Zos{kd Lo;a lacaf/kr lfefr }kjk izkIr izLrko ds ifjiz{; esa
gVkus ds dkj.kksa ds rF;ksa dh tkap djsxh A mlds i'pkr viuk
tkap izfrosnu 15 fnol esa Li"V vuq'kalk lfgr cky fodkl
ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh dks Hkstuk gksxk A ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh }kjk
i;Zos{kd ds tkap izfrosnu dk ijh{k.k djus ,oa mi;qDr dkj.k
ik;s tkus ij lkr fnol esa vkaxuokMh dk;Zdrk @ lgkf;dk dh
lsok lekfIr dk fu.kZ; ysdj lsok lekfIr dk vkns'k tkjh fd;k
tkosxk A vkaxuokMh dk;Zdrk @ lgkf;dk dks in ls i`Fkd djus
ds iwoZ lquokbZ dk volj fn;k tkuk vfuok;Z gksxk A
;fn lg;ksfxuh ekr` lfefr o i;Zos{kd ds er esa fHkUurk gks rks
cky fodkl ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh }kjk tkap mijkar fu.kZ; fy;k
tkdj ftyk dk;Zdze vf/kdkjh @ ftyk efgyk cky fodkl
vf/kdkjh ds vuqeksnu i'pkr in ls i`Fkd fd;k tk ldsxk A
3;fn i;Zos{kd dh tkudkjh esa dk;ZdrkZ @ lgkf;dk ds fo:?n
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE
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MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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dksbZ xaHkhj f'kdk;r lh/ks vkrh gS rks og bu f'kdk;rksa ij tkap
mijkar viuk tkap izfrosnu 15 fnol esa Li"V vuq'kalk lfgr
cky fodkl ifj;kstuk vf/kdkjh dks Hkstuk gksxk A ifj;kstuk
vf/kdkjh }kjk i;Zos{kd ds tkap izfrosnu dk ijh{k.k djus ,oa
mi;qDr dkj.k ik;s tkus ij lkr fnol esa vkaxuokMh dk;ZdrkZ
@ lgkf;dk dh lsok lekfIr dk fu.kZ; ysdj lsok lekfIr ds
vkns'k tkjh fd;k tkosxk A vkaxuokMh dk;Zdrk @ lgkf;dk dks
in ls i`Fkd djus ds iwoZ lquokbZ dk volj fn;k tkuk vfuok;Z
gksxkA
4dk;ZdrkZ @ lgkf;dk dh mez 60 o"kZ iw.kZ gksus ij mudh lsok
Lor% lekIr gks tk,xh A
10. The aforesaid policy deals with the appointment as
well as removal of the Aanganwadi worker. In the
present case, no such procedure has been followed by the
respondents and no enquiry with the participation of the
petitioner was conducted by the employer. The employer
has even failed before this Court to establish that they
have issued notice to the petitioner. The respondents
have violated the principles of natural justice and fair
play.
11. In India there is no statute which prescribes the
minimum procedure which administrative agencies or
quasi judicial bodies must follow while taking decisions
which affect the rights of the individuals. Nonetheless,
they are bound by the principles of natural justice. The
principles of natural justice signify the basic minimum
fair procedure which must be followed while exercising
decision making powers. Natural justice forms the very
backbone of a civilized society.
12. The wheels regarding the application of principles
of natural justice to administrative and quasi-judicial
proceedings started turning from 1963 when the House
of Lords in the United Kingdom delivered the landmark
and oft-quoted judgment of Ridge v. Baldwin [1963]
UKHL 2. An order for dismissal of a Constable was
quashed because he was not provided any opportunity to
defend his actions. Presently, in our country, the
principles of natural justice are applicable in totality to
administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. This is
consistent and in line with the rapidly increasing role,
functions and jurisdiction of such bodies in a welfare
state like ours.
13. The below-mentioned passages by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Uma Nath Pandey v. State
of U.P. AIR 2009 SC 2375 exhaustively explain natural
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE
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justice and deserve to be quoted in full in the context of
the current dispute:
"6. Natural justice is another name for
commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are
not codified canons. But they are principles
ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural
justice is the administration of justice in a
commonsense liberal way. Justice is based
substantially on natural ideals and human values.
The administration of justice is to be freed from the
narrow and restricted considerations which are
usually associated with a formulated law involving
linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It
is the substance of justice which has to determine its
form.
7. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal
justice" do not present a water-tight classification. It
is the substance of justice which is to be secured by
both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this
solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of
legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice
from unnecessary technicality, grammatical
pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the
omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster
said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted
to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence.
8. The adherence to principles of natural justice as
recognized by all civilized States is of supreme
importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on
determining disputes between the parties, or any
administrative action involving civil consequences
is in issue. These principles are well settled. The
first and foremost principle is what is commonly
known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no
one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the
first limb of this principle. It must be precise and
unambiguous. It should appraise the party
determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given
for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable
him to make his representation. In the absence of a
notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity,
the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is
but essential that a party should be put on notice of
the case before any adverse order is passed against
him. This is one of the most important principles of
natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair
play.....
10. Principles of natural justice are those rules
which have been laid down by the Courts as being
the minimum protection of the rights of the
individual against the arbitrary procedure that may
be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and
administrative authority while making an order
affecting those rights. These rules are intended to
prevent such authority from doing injustice.
12. Lord Wright referred to the leading cases on the
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MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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subject. The most important of them is the Board of
Education v. Rice (1911 AC 179:80 LJKB 796),
where Lord Loreburn, L.C. observed as follows:
"Comparatively recent statutes have extended, if
they have originated, the practice of imposing upon
departments or offices of State the duty of deciding
or determining questions of various kinds. It will, I
suppose usually be of an administrative kind, but
sometimes, it will involve matter of law as well as
matter of fact, or even depend upon matter of law
alone. In such cases, the Board of Education will
have to ascertain the law and also to ascertain the
facts. I need not and that in doing either they must
act in good faith and fairly listen to both sides for
that is a duty lying upon everyone who decides
anything. But I do not think they are bound to treat
such a question as though it were a trial....The
Board is in the nature of the arbitral tribunal, and a
Court of law has no jurisdiction to hear appeals
from the determination either upon law or upon fact.
But if the Court is satisfied either that the Board
have not acted judicially in the way I have
described, or have not determined the question
which they are required by the Act to determine,
then there is a remedy by mandamus and certiorari".
13. Lord Wright also emphasized from the same
decision the observation of the Lord Chancellor that
the Board can obtain information in any way they
think best, always giving a fair opportunity to those
who are parties to the controversy for correcting or
contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to
their view". To the same effect are the observations
of Earl of Selbourne, LO in Spackman v. Plumstead
District Board of Works (1985 (10) AC 229:54
LJMC 81), where the learned and noble Lord
Chancellor observed as follows:
"No doubt, in the absence of special provisions as to
how the person who is to decide is to proceed, law
will imply no more than that the substantial
requirements of justice shall not be violated. He is
not a judge in the proper sense of the word; but he
must give the parties an opportunity of being heard
before him and stating their case and their view. He
must give notice when he will proceed with the
matter and he must act honestly and impartially and
not under the dictation of some other person or
persons to whom the authority is not given by law.
There must be no malversation of any kind. There
would be no decision within the meaning of the
statute if there were anything of that sort done
contrary to the essence of justice".
14. Lord Selbourne also added that the essence of
justice consisted in requiring that all parties should
have an opportunity of submitting to the person by
whose decision they are to be bound, such
considerations as in their judgment ought to be
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brought before him. All these cases lay down the
very important rule of natural justice contained in
the oft-quoted phrase 'justice should not only be
done, but should be seen to be done'.
15. Concept of natural justice has undergone a great
deal of change in recent years. Rules of natural
justice are not rules embodied always expressly in a
statute or in rules framed thereunder. They may be
implied from the nature of the duty to be performed
under a statute. What particular rule of natural
justice should be implied and what its context
should be in a given case must depend to a great
extent on the fact and circumstances of that case,
the frame-work of the statute under which the
enquiry is held. The old distinction between a
judicial act and an administrative act has withered
away. Even an administrative order which involves
civil consequences must be consistent with the rules
of natural justice. Expression 'civil consequences'
encompasses infraction of not merely property or
personal rights but of civil liberties, material
deprivations, and non-pecuniary damages. In its
wide umbrella comes everything that affects a
citizen in his civil life.
16. Natural justice has been variously defined by
different Judges. A few instances will suffice. In
Drew v. Drew and Lebura (1855(2) Macg. 1.8, Lord
Cranworth defined it as 'universal justice'. In James
Dunber Smith v. Her Majesty the Queen (1877-
78(3) App.Case 614, 623 JC) Sir Robort P. Collier,
speaking for the judicial committee of Privy
council, used the phrase 'the requirements of
substantial justice', while in Arthur John Specman
v. Plumstead District Board of Works (1884-85(10)
App.Case 229, 240), Earl of Selbourne, S.C.
preferred the phrase 'the substantial requirement of
justice'. In Vionet v. Barrett (1885(55) LJRD 39,
41), Lord Esher, MR defined natural justice as 'the
natural sense of what is right and wrong'. While,
however, deciding Hookings v. Smethwick Local
Board of Health (1890 (24) QBD 712), Lord Fasher,
M.R. instead of using the definition given earlier by
him in Vionet's case (supra) chose to define natural
justice as 'fundamental justice'. In Ridge v.
Baldwin (1963(1) WB 569, 578), Harman LJ, in the
Court of Appeal countered natural justice with 'fair-
play in action' a phrase favoured by Bhagawati, J.
in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978 (2) SCR
621). In re R.N. (An Infant) (1967 (2) B 617, 530), Lord Parker, CJ, preferred to describe natural justice as 'a duty to act fairly'. In Fairmount Investments Ltd. v. Secretary to State for Environment (1976 WLR 1255) Lord Russell of Willowan somewhat picturesquely described natural justice as 'a fair crack of the whip' while Geoffrey Lane, LJ. In Regina v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs Ex HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE W P No. 13320 / 2013 MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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Parte Hosenball (1977 (1) WLR 766) preferred the homely phrase 'common fairness'.
17. How then have the principles of natural justice been interpreted in the Courts and within what limits are they to be confined? Over the years by a process of judicial interpretation two rules have been evolved as representing the principles of natural justice in judicial process, including therein quasi-judicial and administrative process. They constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of man for fair-play and justice which is not the preserve of any particular race or country but is shared in common by all men. The first rule is 'nemo judex in causa sua' or 'nemo debet esse judex in propria causa sua' as stated in (1605) 12 Co.Rep.114 that is, 'no man shall be a judge in his own cause'. Coke used the form 'aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa quia non potest esse judex at pars' (Co.Litt. 1418), that is, 'no man ought to be a judge in his own case, because he cannot act as Judge and at the same time be a party'. The form 'nemo potest esse simul actor et judex', that is, 'no one can be at once suitor and judge' is also at times used. The second rule is 'audi alteram partem', that is, 'hear the other side'. At times and particularly in continental countries, the form 'audietur at altera pars' is used, meaning very much the same thing. A corollary has been deduced from the above two rules and particularly the audi alteram partem rule, namely 'qui aliquid statuerit parte inaudita alteram actquam licet dixerit, haud acquum facerit' that is, 'he who shall decide anything without the other side having been heard, although he may have said what is right, will not have been what is right' (See Bosewell's case (1605) 6 Co.Rep. 48-b, 52-a) or in other words, as it is now expressed, 'justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done'. What is known as 'useless formality theory' has received consideration of this Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1999(6) SCC 237). It was observed as under:
"Before we go into the final aspect of this contention, we would like to state that case relating to breach of natural justice do also occur where all facts are not admitted or are not all beyond dispute. In the context of those cases there is a considerable case-law and literature as to whether relief can be refused even if the court thinks that the case of the applicant is not one of 'real substance' or that there is no substantial possibility of his success or that the result will not be different, even if natural justice is followed (See Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn: (1971)2 All ER 1278, HL) (per Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce), Glynn v. Keele University: (1971) 2 All ER 89; Cinnamond v. British Airports HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE W P No. 13320 / 2013 MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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Authority: (1980) 2 All ER 368, CA) and other cases where such a view has been held. The latest addition to this view is R v. Ealing Magistrates' Court, ex p. Fannaran (1996 (8) Admn. LR 351,
358) (See de Smith, Suppl. P.89 (1998) where Straughton, L.J. held that there must be 'demonstrable beyond doubt' that the result would have been different. Lord Woolf in Lloyd v.
McMohan (1987 (1) All ER 1118, CA) has also not disfavoured refusal of discretion in certain cases of breach of natural justice. The New Zealand Court in McCarthy v. Grant (1959 NZLR 1014) however goes halfway when it says that (as in the case of bias), it is sufficient for the applicant to show that there is 'real likelihood-not certainty- of prejudice'. On the other hand, Garner Administrative Law (8th Edn. 1996. pp.271-72) says that slight proof that the result would have been different is sufficient. On the other side of the argument, we have apart from Ridge v. Baldwin (1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66, HL), Megarry, J. in John v. Rees (1969 (2) All ER
274) stating that there are always 'open and shut cases' and no absolute rule of proof of prejudice can be laid down. Merits are not for the court but for the authority to consider. Ackner, J has said that the 'useless formality theory' is a dangerous one and, however inconvenient, natural justice must be followed. His Lordship observed that 'convenience and justice are often not on speaking term'. More recently, Lord Bingham has deprecated the 'useless formality theory' in R. v. Chief Constable of the Thames Valley Police Forces, ex p. Cotton (1990 IRLR 344) by giving six reasons (see also his article 'Should Public Law Remedies be Discretionary?' 1991 PL. p.64). A detailed and emphatic criticism of the 'useless formality theory' has been made much earlier in 'Natural Justice, Substance or Shadow' by Prof. D.H. Clark of Canada (see 1975 PL.pp.27-63) contending that Malloch (supra) and Glynn (supra) were wrongly decided. Foulkes (Administrative Law, 8th Edn. 1996, p.323), Craig (Administrative Law, 3rd Edn. P.596) and others say that the court cannot prejudge what is to be decided by the decision-making authority. De Smith (5th Edn. 1994, paras 10.031 to 10.036) says courts have not yet committed themselves to any one view though discretion is always with the court. Wade (Administrative Law, 5th Edn. 1994, pp.526-530) says that while futile writs may not be issued, a distinction has to be made according to the nature of the decision. Thus, in relation to cases other than those relating to admitted or indisputable facts, there is a considerable divergence of opinion whether the applicant can be compelled to prove that the outcome will be in his favour or he has to prove a case of substance or if he can prove a 'real HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE W P No. 13320 / 2013 MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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likelihood' of success or if he is entitled to relief even if there is some remote chance of success. We may, however, point out that even in cases where the facts are not all admitted or beyond dispute, there is a considerable unanimity that the courts can, in exercise of their 'discretion', refuse certiorari, prohibition, mandamus or injunction even though natural justice is not followed. We may also state that there is yet another line of cases as in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma (1996 (3) SCC 364), Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. (1996 (5) SCC 460) that even in relation to statutory provisions requiring notice, a distinction is to be made between cases where the provision is intended for individual benefit and where a provision is intended to protect public interest. In the former case, it can be waived while in the case of the latter, it cannot be waived. We do not propose to express any opinion on the correctness or otherwise of the 'useless formality theory' and leave the matter for decision in an appropriate case, inasmuch as the case before us, 'admitted and indisputable' facts show that grant of a writ will be in vain as pointed by Chinnappa Reddy, J."
14. Natural justice is the essence of fair adjudication, deeply rooted in tradition and conscience, to be ranked as fundamental. The purpose of following the principles of natural justice is the prevention of miscarriage of justice." With regard to the disputed nature of the useless formality test as discussed in the M.C. Mehta case (see supra), it is important to note that in the instant petition, the petitioner and other similarly placed petitioners, were dismissed by a cyclostyle order. The order for dismissal for the Anganwadi workers is identical word by word in all the 84 cases. Only the name of the village has been changed in the orders. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that following audi alteram partem will most definitely not be a useless formality.
15. The principles of natural justice are firmly grounded in Article 14 and Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law. Through the process of interpretation, procedural safeguards have been read into Article 14 by the Courts. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Union, AIR 1991 SC 101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "the audi HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE W P No. 13320 / 2013 MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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alteram partem rule, in essence, enforce the equality clause in Art 14 and it is applicable not only to quasi-judicial bodies but also to administrative order adversely affecting the party in question unless the rule has been excluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule." Not giving any hearing results in decisions which are arbitrary in nature. Arbitrariness and equality are antithesis of each other. Similarly under Article 21 of the Constitution, no person can be deprived of his life or liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Audi alteram partem forms a part of the procedural due process under the Indian Constitution. Procedure established by law must be just, fair and reasonable and not oppressive, unreasonable or arbitrary.
16. The present case reflects a very sorry state of affair in respect of functioning of the Department. By a common order about 84 Aanganwadi workers have been terminated. The petitioner is having a family to support. She has not committed any misconduct and is serving with the Department without any blemish.
17. This Court keeping in view the fact that the respondents have not followed the prescribed procedure is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dt. 9/3/2015 has to pave the path of extinction.
18. Resultantly, the impugned order dt. 9/3/2015 is hereby quashed. The Writ Petition is allowed. The petitioner shall be entitled for backwages and all consequential benefits flowing out of this order. The petitioner shall also be entitled for a cost of Rs.2000/-. Cost be paid to the petitioner within 30 days from the date of receipt of copy of this order."
7. In light of the aforesaid judgment, as there was violation of principles of natural justice of fair play, the circular dated 10.7.2007 was not followed merely because the appellant was not available at the time of inspection that too on account of her being critically ill, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned order passed by the respondents dated 26.11.2015 deserves to be quashed and is accordingly, quashed. The appellate order dated 15.5.2017 is also quashed. The judgment HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, BENCH AT INDORE W P No. 13320 / 2013 MRS. SUNITA JOSHI VS. STATE OF MP AND ORS.,
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delivered by the learned Single Judge dated 28.8.2017 is set aside. The writ appeal is allowed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the appellant forthwith in service. The appellant shall also be entitled for 50% backwages/honorarium.
In the light of the aforesaid judgment, as the petitioner's service were put to an end, without conducting any enquiry with the participation of the petitioner and the so-called enquiry, if any, was conducted behind the back of the petitioner, the impugned order dated 02/12/2012 is hereby quashed. The Writ Petition is allowed. The petitioner shall be entitled for 50% honorarium / backwages. It is needless to mention that the respondent No.4 who has not marked her presence inspite of service of notice, shall be adjusted somewhere else by the respondents in the neighbouring area wherever possible. The respondents shall reinstate the petitioner forthwith.
(S. C. SHARMA) JUDGE KR Digitally signed by Kamal Rathor Date: 2019.11.20 16:32:13 +05'30'