Delhi District Court
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-Operative Marketing ... on 6 August, 2011
IN THE COURT OF SH. RAKESH KUMAR SINGH:
METROPOLITAN MEGISTRATE (NI ACT)-1, CENTRAL:
ROOM NO.-42, TIS HAZARI COURT COMPLEX, DELHI
06.08.2011
CC No. 915/10
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd.
ORDER on Sentence
The issue to be decided is can this Court impose a fine exceeding Rs. 10,000/-?
The question arises in the following facts situation:
Convict No.1 is a company. Convict No.2 and 3 are persons made vicariously liable U/s 141
NI Act. The case involves cheques for more than Rs.50 lacs.
It is clear that no sentence of imprisonment can be awarded against a company and,
therefore, the only option is to impose a fine as held by the Constitution Bench of Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Standard Chartered Bank & Anr. Vs. Directorate of Enforcement vide order
dated 05.05.2005.
The individual convicts have suffered a 14 years of trial. The convict company is basically a
State undertaking and individual convicts were in one sense merely employee, though under the
circumstances they have been made vicariously liable. It does not stand to the reason that a
compensation of Rs.1 crore should be imposed upon individual convicts.
The bare reading of Section-357 Cr.P.C. will go to show that an unlimited compensation
cannot be provided unless the court passes a sentence of imprisonment (I will advert to it a little
later).
The imposition of such a huge compensation amount on the individual convicts cannot be
justified rather it would tantamount to injustice as primarily individual convicts are not responsible
for non payment of cheque amount in their individual capacity. They have been made liable only
with the help of a legal fiction which has already played its role.
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `1
And if compensation is not awarded to the complainant, it would again tantamount to gross
injustice.
This court has to make a balance.
Earlier, in view of Pankajbhai Nagjibhai Patel vs The State Of Gujarat & Anr 2001 AIR
SC 567, the matter was referred to the Ld. CMM, Delhi under Section-325 Cr.PC. However, ld.
CMM has returned the case stating that this Court is competent to pass the maximum sentence.
Subsequent to that, lengthy arguments have been heard on the point of sentence. Both the ld.
Counsels have rendred valuable assitance.
The question arises can this court impose a fine exceeding Rs.10,000/- i.e. limit of power
provided U/s 29(2) Cr.P.C?
The question has to be answered considering the concept of justice, they object to the
introduction of Section-138 NI Act.
Discussion
There are following types of sentences which can be passed.
1. Death.
2. Imprisonment for life.
3. Imprisonment for any term.
4. Forfeiture of property.
5. Fine.
It is apparent that a sentence can involve an imprisonment + fine or imprisonment without
fine or only fine. Death + fine may also be awarded.
In the light of this, we have to understand Section-357 Cr.P.C.
Section-357 Cr.P.C. is as under:
"357. Order to pay compensation:
(1) When a Court imposes a stence of fine or a sentence (including a
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `2
sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may, when
passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be
applied:
***********
(3) When a Court imposes a sentence, of which fine does not form a part, the Court may, when passing judgment, order the accused person to pay, by way of compensation, such amount as may be specified in the order to the person who has suffered any loss or injury by reason of the act for which the accused person has been so sentence.
*********"
The first Sub-section is applicable only when a sentence of fine or a sentence including fine is passed.
Sub-section(3) applies only when the court imposes a sentence but does not impose a fine meaning thereby that there must be a sentence except the fine. It is clear that except the fine, the sentence which can be passed is as under:
1. Death.
2. Imprisonment for life.
3. Imprisonment for any term.
4. Forfeiture of property.
For the offence U/s 138 NI Act, three sentences i.e. Death, Imprisonment for life and Forfeiture of property are out of question. Meaning thereby that only a sentence of term can be imposed to satisfy the requirement of sub-section-3.
In the light of the above, it is clear that Sub-section-3 requires a passing of sentence for a term and only upon the satisfaction of this condition, a compensation can be awarded under Sub- section-3 whereas under Sub-section-1, compensation can be awarded out of the imposed fine.
It can be safely said that if court does not pass any sentence for an offence, no compensation can be awarded under Sub-section-3. Passing of sentence is a pre-requisite for awarding a compensation under Sub-section-3. Court cannot award a compensation where it has not passed a sentenced upon the accused.
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `3 It is also to be noted that Court can not pass a sentence of imprisonment to one accused and on the basis thereof direct another accused to pay a compensation under sub-section(3). The expression "the accused person" appearing in sub-section-3 clearly supports the above construction.
In the present case however sentence of imprisonment can not be passed upon the company and imposition of such a huge compensation on the individual accused can not be treated as justified (discussed in the earlier paragraph).
On the limit of power Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajbhai Nagjibhai Patel vs The State Of Gujarat & Anr 2001 AIR SC 567 has held that:
"Thus, the non-obstante limb provided in Section 142 of the NI Act is not intended to expand the powers of a Magistrate of first class beyond what is fixed in Chapter III of the Code. Section 29, which falls within Chapter III of the Code, contains a limit for a Magistrate of first class in the matter of imposing a sentence as noticed above i.e. if the sentence is imprisonment it shall not exceed 3 years and if the sentence is fine (even if it is part of the sentence) it shall not exceed Rs.5000/-.
Two decisions holding a contrary view have been brought to our notice. The first is that of a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in A.Y. Prabhakar vs. Naresh Kumar N. Shah {1994 Madras Law Journal (Crl.) 91 = 1995 Company Cases (Vol.83) 191}. The other is that of a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court which simply followed the aforesaid decision of the Madras High Court [K.P. Sahdevan vs. T.K. Sreedharan, {1996(2) Criminal Law Journal 1223 = 1996(1) Kerala Law Times 40}]. The learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court (Balanarayana Marar, J) dissented from a contrary view expressed in an earlier judgment of the same High Court and had chosen to agree with the view of the Madras High Court held in Prabhakar vs. Naresh Kumar N. Shah (supra). What Marar, J. had adopted was not a healthy course in the comity of Judges in that he had sidelined the earlier decision of the same High Court even after the same was brought to his notice. If he could not agree with the earlier view of the same High Court he should have referred the question to be decided by a larger bench. Learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court did not advance any reasoning except saying that Section 29(2) of the Code is not applicable in view of the primary clause in Section 142 of the NI Act. As pointed out by us earlier, the scope of the said primary clause cannot be stretched to any area beyond the three facets mentioned therein. Hence the two decision cited above cannot afford any assistance in this appeal."
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `4 Section-143 NI Act reads thus:
"143. Power of Court to try cases summarily.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), all offences under this Chapter shall be tried by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of sections 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code shall, as far as may be, apply to such trials:
Provided that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial under this section, it shall be lawful for the Magistrate to pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year and an amount of fine exceeding five thousand rupees:"
Provided further that when at the commencement of, or in the course of, a summary trial under this section, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason, undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall after hearing the parties, record an order to that effect and thereafter recall any witness who may have been examined and proceed to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the said Code.
(2) The trial of a case under this section shall, so far as practicable, consistently with the interests of justice, be continued from day to day until its conclusion, unless the Court finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded in writing.
(3) Every trial under this section shall be conducted as expeditiously as possible and an endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date of filing of the complaint."
It may be noted that the limit of Rs. 5,000/- was in the Cr.PC. Prior to the amendement made in the year 2006 by which limit was enhanced to Rs. 10,000/-, whereas section-143 NI Act was inserted in the year 2003 and therefore it has no mention of the Rs. 10,000/- limit.
Pankajbhai Nagjibhai Patel(supra) is a decision rendered in the year 2001. The Parliament has made an amendement to provide the power to impose an enhanced fine exceeding Rs. 5,000/-. It is clear from the Objects & Reasons of that amendement which provides as under:
(ix) to provide that the Magistrate trying an offence shall have power to pass sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and amount of fine exceeding five thousand rupees;
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `5 Clearly, the Parliament has diluted the regour of the prohibition imposed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The power to impose a fine of double the cheque amount as provided in Section-138 NI Act has come out of the eclipse. A magisterial court trying an offence under Section-138 NI Act can impose a fine exceeding his limit under Section-29 Cr.PC. as long as the same falls within the ambit of punishment prescribed in Section-138 NI Act.
Now, the question is will the frist proviso to Section-143 NI Act which provides for such exercise of power apply only to a summary trial since it is mentioned in the proviso itself?
Needless to say that a summary trial envisages a quick disposal and Section-263 & 264 CrPC do not provide much opportunity as in the case of summons or warrant trail. Even in terms of the judgment of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Ishan Systems Pvt. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Vijaya Bank, Crl.MC 3871/2010, dt. 27.01.2011 and Gurpreet Singh Vs. M/s. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. & decided on 02 August, 2010, case filed under Section-138 NI Act can be decided on basis of material available on the record if accused does not disclose a tenable defence. Whereas a summons trial is somehow more elaborate than the summary trial procedure. Only taking into consideration, limit of sentence is provided as 3 months in Section-262(2) CrPC that is to say a less sentence than the normal one provided for the offence. In the same line, Section-143 NI Act also restricts the substantive sentence to a maximum of one year i.e. less than the punishment provided in Section-138 NI Act.
It does not stand to reason that in a summary trial, Court can impose maximum fine but in a summons trial the same can not be imposed.
Unfortunately, the Legislature has not made the provision express in this behalf. Purposive construction of provision is therefore necessary.
A somewhat similar situation was once before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The situation was as under:
Section-357(1) provides for application of fine, Section-357(2) provides for automatic stay of the fine, Section-357(3) provides for compensation.
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `6 The situation may be seen in the following paragraphs of that judgment i.e. Dilip S. Dahanukar vs Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. & Anr decided on 10 April, 2007:
"It is, therefore, apparent that if a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence or where it forms a part thereof, the Court is entitled to direct that whole or any part of the fine recovered, to be applied to in respect of the factors enumerated in clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d). Section 421 of the Code deals with the mode and manner in which the fine levied is to be recovered. Section 424 deals with the steps required to be taken by the Court where the amount of fine has not been paid forthwith. Section 357 deals with two types of cases, namely, (i) where only a sentence has been imposed; and (ii) where fine also forms part of the sentence. When a fine is imposed simplicitor Section 421 read with Section 424 would be applicable but where fine forms part of the sentence, it would not have any application.
A statute must be read harmoniously. An amount of compensation directed to be paid may not form part of a fine. It may be awarded separately. It may be recoverable as if it is a fine in terms of Section 431 of the Code but by reason thereof it would not become automatically recoverable forthwith. The legal position, however, must be considered keeping in view the purport and object of the Act.
The question is as to whether the matter would come within the purview of sub- Section (3) and if so, whether sub-Section (2) of Section 357 would automatically be attracted. The purposes for application of fine imposed has been set out in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-Sections (1) of Section 357. Clause (b) of sub- Section (1) of Section 357 provides for payment of compensation out of the amount of fine. The purpose enumerated in clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 357 is the same as sub-Section (3) thereof, the difference being that whereas in a case under sub-Section (1) fine imposed forms a part of the sentence, under sub-Section (3) compensation can be directed to be paid whence fine does not form a part of the sentence.
The fine can be imposed only in terms of the provisions of the Act. Fine which can be imposed under the Act, however, shall be double of the amount of the cheque which stood dishonoured. When, however, fine is not imposed, compensation can be directed to be paid for loss or injury caused to the complainant by reason of commission of the offence. Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 357 only provides for application of amount of fine which may be Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `7 in respect of the entire amount or in respect of a part thereof. Sub-Section (3) of Section 357 seeks to achieve the same purpose.
We must, however, observe that there exists a distinction between fine and compensation, although, in a way it seeks to achieve the same purpose. An amount of compensation can be directed to be recovered as a 'fine' but the legal fiction raised in relation to recovery of fine only, it is in that sense `fine' stands on a higher footing than compensation awarded by the Court.
If, therefore, under sub-Section (2) of Section 357, realization of fine, at least in respect of the factor(s) enumerated in clause (1) of sub-Section to be stayed automatically, we see no reason as to why the legislative intent cannot be held to apply in relation to amount of compensation directed to be paid in terms of sub- Section (3).
It does not appeal to us that although a compensation payable out of the quantum of fine would remain stayed under sub-Section (2) of Section 357 of the Code, if a compensation is directed to be paid under sub-Section (3) thereof, the same would not attract the said provision. [See P. Suresh Kumar v. R. Shankar, 2007 (4) SCALE 143] Magistrates cannot award compensation in addition to fine. When a fine is imposed, however, the private party has no right to insist that compensation may be awarded to him out of the amount of fine. The power to award compensation under Section 357(3) is not an ancillary power. It is an additional power. {See Balraj vs. State [1995 Crl. Law Journal 3217}.
Clause (b) of sub-Section (1) of Section 357 and sub-Section (1) of Section 357 and sub-Section (3) of Section 357 seek to achieve the same purpose. What is necessary is to find out the intention of the law maker and the object sought to be achieved. Sub-Section (2) of Section 357 uses the word `fine'. It does not say that what would be stayed i.e. application of fine. Sub-Section 2 of Section 357, in our opinion, does not contemplate any other interpretation. Even assuming that Mr. Lalit was correct in his submission, still then sub-Section (3) would be squarely attracted.
The amount of compensation, in view of the legal fiction, may be recovered under Section 421 of the Code. But the amount of compensation, having regard to Sub- Section (2) of Section 357 of the Code cannot be recovered forthwith unless the period of appeal expires.
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `8 This Court in an appropriate case may have to consider as to whether in economic offence like Negotiable Instruments Act, the Courts should at all invoke sub- Section (3) of Section 357 of the Code, when the purpose can be achieved by taking recourse to substantive provision of Section 138 of the Act read with Section 357(1) thereof. We, however, do not intend to lay down any law in this behalf, as at present advised, as we are not concerned herein with such a situation.
If realization of an amount of compensation payable to a victim as envisaged under Clause (d) of sub-Section (1) of Section 357 is to be stayed under sub- Section (2) thereof, there is no reason why the amount of compensation payable in terms of sub-Section (3) shall not receive the same treatment. "
The question was would the sub-section(2) control sub-section(3) and thereby making the payment of compensation subject to the disposal of appeal?
The situation was a similar one. Parliament provided the condition only for "fine" in sub- section(2) and not for compensation provided in sub-section(3). However, the Hon'ble Supreme Court using the doctrine of purposive construction has answered the question in affirmative.
It was held in Dilip S. Dahanukar (supra) as under:
"Doctrine of Purposive Interpretation in a situation of this nature, in our opinion, shall be applied. In R (Haw) vs. Secretary of State for the Home Department & Anr. [(2006) 3 All ER p.428 at p.438], Lord Smith stated:-
"42...a passage from Bennion Statutory Interpretation (4th edn, 2002) 810 (section 304) entitled, `Nature of purposive construction'. That begins with the following words: `A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by- (a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where the meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-
and-literal construction), or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `9 legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction).' xxx xxx
44. The passage from Bennion continues: '...I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction, even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. [Kammins Ballroom Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (1970) 2 All ER 871, [1971] AC 850, [1970] 3 WLR 287] provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed.'
45. The passage from Bennion continues: 'Lord Diplock's third point is, with respect, erroneous. The argument that in Jones v. Wrotham Park Settled Estates Lord Diplock was mistaken in saying that for a rectifying construction to be effected it must be possible to state with certainty what the missing words are, has been endorsed by the House of Lords. Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead said that the court must be sure of "the substance of the provision Parliament would have used" [See Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (a firm) [2000] 2 All ER 109, [2000] 2 All ER 109, [2000] 1 WLR 586].'"
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `10 {See also K.L. Gupta vs. Bombay Municipal Corpn. [(1968) 1 SCR 274 : AIR 1968 SC 303]; Maruti Udyog Ltd. vs. Ram Lal [(2005) 2 SCC 638 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 308]; Reserve Bank of India vs. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. [(1987) 1 SCC 424]; Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer, Labour Court [(1990) 3 SCC 682]; Balram Kumawat vs. Union of India [(2003) 7 SCC 628] and Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand [(2005) 3 SCC 682].} Recently, in National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Laxmi Narain Dhut [2007 (4) SCALE 36], a Division Bench of this Court laid down the law in the following terms:
"A statute is an edict of the Legislature and in construing a statute, it is necessary to seek the intention of its maker. A statute has to be construed according to the intent of those who make it and the duty of the court is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature. If a statutory provision is open to more than one interpretation the Court has to choose that interpretation which represents the true intention of the Legislature. This task very often raises difficulties because of various reasons, inasmuch as the words used may not be scientific symbols having any precise or definite meaning and the language may be an imperfect medium to convey one's thought or that the assembly of Legislatures consisting of persons of various shades of opinion purport to convey a meaning which may be obscure. It is impossible even for the most imaginative Legislature to foresee all situations exhaustively and circumstances that may emerge after enacting a statute where its application may be called for. Nonetheless, the function of the Courts is only to expound and not to legislate. Legislation in a modern State is actuated with some policy to curb some public evil or to effectuate some public benefit. The legislation is primarily directed to the problems before the Legislature based on information derived from past and present experience. It may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in future. But, from the very nature of things, it is impossible to anticipate fully the varied situations arising in future in which the application of the legislation in hand may be called for, and, words chosen to communicate such indefinite referents are Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `11 bound to be in many cases lacking in clarity and precision and thus giving rise to controversial questions of construction. The process of construction combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e., the true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and it remedy to which the enactment is directed. (See District Mining Officer and Ors. v. Tata Iron & Steel Co. and Anr.JT 2001 (6) SC 183). It is also well settled that to arrive at the intention of the legislation depending on the objects for which the enactment is made, the Court can resort to historical, contextual and purposive interpretation leaving textual interpretation aside."
It was also opined:
"More often than not, literal interpretation of a statute or a provision of a statute results in absurdity. Therefore, while interpreting statutory provisions, the Courts should keep in mind the objectives or purpose for which statute has been enacted. Justice Frankfurter of U.S. Supreme Court in an article titled as Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes (47 Columbia Law Reports 527), observed that, "legislation has an aim, it seeks to obviate some mischief, to supply an adequacy, to effect a change of policy, to formulate a plan of Government. That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air; it is evidenced in the language of the statutes, as read in the light of other external manifestations of purpose".
We, therefore, are of the opinion :
i) In a case of this nature, Sub-Section (2) of Section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be attracted even when Appellant was directed to pay compensation......"
In my considered view, Dilip S. Dahanukar(supra) will apply in the present case and a purposive construction has to be given to amendment providing the exemption of limit in respect of imposition of fine.
Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `12 Prohibition under Article-20 of Constitution of India.
It appears that contention in respect of such prohibition is misconceived. Article-20 only provides that sentence cannot be imposed in the excess of the punishment provided by the statute.
Pertinently Section-138 NI Act provides for a punishment upto a fine of double the cheque amount. This punishment was provided in the statute even when the offence was committed.
The complaint U/s 138 NI Act may be tried by any of the Metropolitan Magistrate having jurisdiction. The same may even be tried by the Ld. ACMM or Ld. CMM. Ld. ACMM and Ld. CMM have no limit to impose a fine. If a complaint is decided by Ld. CMM, he can impose a fine of double the amount of the cheque.
Therefore, by imposing a fine in excess of the earlier pecuniary limit does not fall under the prohibition of Article-20. Accused does not have any claim over the quantum of sentence unless it is in excess of the punishment provided in the statute. If a statute provides for X amount of fine, the accused can be punished for X amount of fine. The way may differ according to the circumstances and the accused has no claim to raise an objection unless the quantum of punishment exceeds the punishment prescribed by the statute.
Section-138 NI Act prescribes a punishment of fine upto double the amount of the cheque and, therefore, the same punishment can be awarded to the accused if allowed by the provision of law.
Law in respect of retrospective effect of amended provisions in the NI Act has already been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court holding that Section-143 to 147 NI Act shall be applicable even to the cases pending on the date when these provisions came into effect.
It is apt to quote Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Mandvi Co-op Bank Ltd vs Nimesh B thakore, (2010) 3 SCC 83:
"28. Mr. Ranjit Kumar also made a feeble attempt to contend that the provisions of sections 143 to 147 inserted in the Act with effect from February 6, 2003 would operate prospectively and would not apply to cases that were pending on that date. The Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `13 High Court has considered the issue in great detail and has rightly taken the view that the provisions of sections 143 to 147 do not take away any substantive rights of the accused. Those provisions are not substantive but procedural in nature and would, therefore, undoubtedly, apply to the cases that were pending on the date the provisions came into force. We are fully in agreement and in order to buttress the view taken by the High Court we will only refer to a decision of this court."
Result:
In the light of the above, it is clear that this Court can impose a sentence exceeding Rs. 10,000/- for the offence punishable under Section-138 NI Act.
The cheques in the present complaint are of Rs. 50,15,993/-. Consequently, a fine of Rs. 1 crore is imposed upon the convict company. Out the fine, Rs. 70 lacs to be given to the complainant under Section-357(1) CrPC and remaining Rs. 30 lacs to be deposited with the state.
Having considered the fact that individual accused persons have laready suffered a trial for 14 years and the complainant is being adequetly compensated, this Court deem it appropriate to sentence the individual convicts to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each.
A copy of this order be place on the official website of the District Court.
(Rakesh Kumar Singh) MM(NI Act)-01, Central 06.08.2011 Gagn Entereprises vs Kerala State Co-operative Marketing Ltd. `14