Madras High Court
Srinivasa Perumal vs Station House Officer on 30 January, 2013
Author: B.Rajendran
Bench: B.Rajendran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated : 30.01.2013 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE B.RAJENDRAN Criminal Revision Case No. 634 of 2012 Srinivasa Perumal ... Petitioner Versus Station House Officer Gingee Police Station Gingee 604 202 ... Respondent Criminal Revision Petition filed under Section 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code against the Order dated 11.08.2011 passed in Crl.M.P. No. 84 of 2011 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Tindivanam. For Petitioner : Mr. Arun Anbumani For Respondent : Mr. Prathap Kumar Government Advocate ORDER
The petitioner, who is arrayed as A-4 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009, has come forward with this Criminal Revision Case questioning the correctness of the order dated 11.08.2011 in Crl.M.P. No. 84 of 2011 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009 passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Tindivanam, by which his petition to discharge him from the criminal prosecution was dismissed.
2. The case of the prosecution is that one Jayaraman, who was also arrayed as A-10 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009, has given a complaint to the respondent police on 29.06.2009 relating to the murder of a women in the lodge namely 'Devi Lodge' which he had taken on lease. On the basis of his complaint, the case in Crime No. 502 of 2007 came to be registered on 29.06.2007 by the respondent for the offence under Section 302 of IPC. According to the complaint/A-10 he had taken the premises for running a lodge in the name and style of 'Devi Lodge' on lease from Dr. Santhanam for Rs.10,000/- per month. While so, during the course of his business, on 27.06.2007 at about 4.30 pm, a man and a women came to his lodge and sought for a room stating that they have come to Gingee in connection with their friend's wedding on 28.06.2007. On their request, after taking advance, room No.28 in the first floor was allotted to them. According to the complainant, room Nos. 16 to 20 in the first floor and 38, 40, 42, 47 and 48 were allotted to some other persons who had come for the wedding of one Sivakumar. In Room No.20, one Anandan, Radhakrishnan and Dharuman, who were later arrayed as A-1 to A-3, were staying and the key to the said room was directly given to the bridegroom Sivakumar. While so, on 29.06.2007, blood stains were found from room No. 28 to Room No.20 in the first floor which was kept locked till 2.00 pm on 29.06.2007. At about 3.00 pm, the room No.28 was opened by the complainant/A-10 with spare key where the deceased was found dead in the bathroom with her throat slit. According to the complainant, the man who accompanied the deceased could not be found in the room.
3. On the basis of this complaint, the respondent took up investigation and during the course of the investigation, he arrested some of the accused and ultimately filed the charge sheet on 19.09.2008 under Sections 376 (2) (g) read with 511 of IPC, 201 read with Section 302 of IPC, 202, 203, 506 (ii) and 302 of the IPC.
4. Pending trial, A-10 Jayarama Reddiar filed Crl.M.P. No. 197 of 2009 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009 for discharge on the ground that he was only a lessee of the lodge and he had allowed the victim and the accused to stay together on their representation that they have come to Gingee Town to attend their friend's marriage. According to A-10, he was arrayed as an accused only due to the reason that he had given the complaint belatedly. According to the respondent, the occurrence took place on 27.06.2007, but the complaint was given by A-10 only on 29.06.2007 and therefore, he was also arrayed as an accused. The trial court, by order dated 12.10.2010 dismissed the petition for discharge filed by A-10 against which he have filed Crl.R.C. Nos. 1299 of 2010 before this Court. This Court, by an order dated 04.01.2011 allowed the aforesaid Criminal Revision Case whereby discharged A-10 from the criminal prosecution by holding that the except the confession of the co-accused, there is no iota of material evidence on record to attract the ingredients of the offence alleged against the petitioner. It was also held that no suspicion much less a strong suspicion, could be raised against the petitioner therein warranting the trial Court to frame charge against him.
5. Similarly, A-9 filed an application in Crl.M.P. No. 198 of 2009 for discharge before the Court below by contending that he was working as a Manager in 'Devi Lodge' during the relevant point of time and therefore, he cannot be, in any way, held responsible or liable for the incident. The said petition was dismissed by the Court below on 12.10.2010 against which A-9 filed Crl.R.C. No. 528 of 2011 before this Court and the same was allowed on 21.04.2011. Thus, A-9 was also discharged from the purview of criminal prosecution.
6. It is seen from the records that A-4 to A-7 also filed Crl.M.P. No. 84 of 2011 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009 seeking discharge, which were dismissed on 11.08.2011. As against the same, A-5 to A-7 alone have filed Crl.R.C. No. 1171 of 2011 and by order dated 16.09.2011, this Court allowed the Criminal Revision Case on the ground that the only allegation against A-5 to A-7 is that they have entered the room, one after the other, where the deceased was staying. This Court further held that there was absolutely no material available to show that the deceased was subjected to rape. Further, A-5 to A-7 came to be impleaded on the basis of the confession statement obtained from the co-accused after 14 months from the date of occurrence. Thus, A-5 to A-7 in the Sessions Case were also discharged from the criminal case.
7. Thereafter, the petitioner herein/A-4, whose petition for discharge was dismissed by the Court below on 11.08.2011 along with A-5 to A-7, has filed the present Criminal revision case questioning the correctness of the order of dismissal passed by the Court below.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner/A-4 would contend that the allegation against the petitioner/A-4 is that, he, along with A-5 to A-7, have entered the room where the deceased was staying, one by one and except this allegation, there is nothing adverse material filed against him. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further contend that the confession statement of a co-accused cannot be a base for consideration of his involvement in the crime. Further, the court below failed to consider that the evidence, which the prosecution propose to adduce against the petitioner to establish his guilt, if fully accepted, cannot show that he committed the offence or there will be sufficient ground for proceeding him with the trial. According to the counsel for the petitioner, the statement of the witnesses were recorded by the respondent police after 14 months from the date of occurrence and based on such statement, the petitioner cannot be subjected to trial to prove his guilt. It is the further contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the nacro analysis test would not be legally admissible in evidence as has been held by the Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in Selvi and others vs. State of Karnataka (2010) 7 SCC 263. It is the further contention of the counsel for the petitioner that even if the petitioner is subjected to trial, the chance of convicting him are remote inasmuch as there is absolutely no evidence, much less legal evidence, to suspect the involvement of the petitioner in the criminal case. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, in the absence any material evidence to proceed with the trial against the petitioner/A-4, the petitioner need not be subjected to undergo the ordeal of trial. The learned counsel for the petitioner further relied on the decision of this Court rendered in Crl.R.C. No. 1171 of 2011 dated 16.09.2011 and contended that the findings rendered by this Court in the order dated 16.09.2011 are equally applicable to the petitioner as well and therefore, the petitioner is entitled for discharge.
9. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the following decisions namely
(i) (Pancho vs. State of Haryana) (2011) 10 SCC 165 for the proposition that confession of co-accused cannot be a ground for proceeding against a person and it is extremely a weak piece of evidence.
(ii) (Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra) (2008) 10 SCC 394 to argue that for proceeding against the petitioner, there is no material on record to show that he, along with other accused, has hatched a conspiracy to commit the offence of murder.
(iii) The constitutional bench decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar) 1964 (6) SCR 623 to contend that a confession of a co-accused cannot be a basis for conviction as it is not a substantive evidence against a co-accused person.
10. Per contra, the learned Government Advocate appearing for the respondent/State would vehemently oppose the prayer of the petitioner to discharge him from the purview of the criminal prosecution and contended that the petitioner must be directed to face the trial inasmuch as there are enough materials available to prove his guilt. According to the learned Government Advocate, it is premature on the part of the petitioner to seek for discharge and only during the course of trial, the prosecution will be in a position to prove the complicity of the petitioner in the Criminal case. In support of his contention, the learned Government Advocate relied on the below mentioned decisions
(i) (Ashish Chadha vs. Asha Kumari and another) 2011 (8) Supreme 105 to contend that it is for the trial court to decide whether the evidence on record is sufficient to make out a prima facie case against the accused and to frame charges against him. This Court, in exercise of its revisionary powers, cannot appreciate or re-appreciate the evidence on record to discharge the accused from the case. In that decision, the Honourable Supreme Court also followed the earlier decision rendered in (Munna Devi vs. State of Rajasthan) (2001) 9 SCC 631 and held that revisionary powers can be exercised only if it is shown that there is a legal bar for continuing the criminal proceedings or framing of charges against an accused or if the evidence on record, if taken on its face value, do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.
(ii) The learned Government Advocate also placed reliance on the unreported decision of the Honourable Supreme Court rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1803 of 2012 dated 09.11.2012 and submit that the Court trying the case can discharge the accused by recording reasons for such conclusion only if it considers the charge against the accused to be groundless. In that decision, it was held that Section 240 of the Criminal Procedure Code provides for framing of a charge, if, upon consideration of the police report and the documents sent thereon and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under Chapter XIX, which such Magistrate is competent to try and which can be adequately punished by him. In the said decision, reference was made to the decision reported in (Onkar Nath Mishra and others vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and another) 2008 2 SCC 561 wherein it was held that at the stage of framing of charges, the Court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record and what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion, founded on materials on record which leads the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. In fact, the said decision was passed by also following the decisions reported in (State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy) 1977 Crl.LJ 115; (State of Maharashtra and others vs. Som Nath Thapa and others) 1996 Crl. LJ 2448 and (State of Maharashtra vs. Mohanlal Soni) 2000 Crl.LJ 3504 wherein it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that if, on the basis of materials on record, the Court can come to a conclusion that commission of offence is probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists or in the alternative, if the Court were to think that accused might have committed the offence, it can frame the charge, even though, for conviction, the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. The Honourable Supreme Court also stated that the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as at that stage the Supreme Court gone to the extent of stating that the charges should be framed if the Court prima facie finds there is sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused and the Court is not required to appreciate the evidence to determine the materials produced are sufficient to convict the accused.
(iii) Relying on the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and another) 1979 3 SCC 4, the learned Government Advocate would further contend that the Honourable Supreme Court laid down guidelines to be followed in the context of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which would indicate that if there is a prima facie evidence to proceed against an accused, the accused is liable to be proceeded with.
11. I heard the counsel for both sides and perused the material records placed. In the present case, the respondent had recorded the statement of Munusamy, Rajendran and Ravi, who have categorically stated that they have also stayed in the occurrence spot namely 'Devi Lodge' and they saw the accused, along with other persons, entering room No.20 and coming out one after the other. They have also identified the petitioner. This piece of evidence recorded by the investigation officer would prima facie raises a suspicion about the involvement of the petitioner and therefore, based on such evidence, the guilt or otherwise of the petitioner/A-4 can be tested only at the time of trial. Further, the recovery under Section 27 is admissible and the participation of the petitioner in the occurrence is prima facie elicited from the deposition of the witnesses proposed to be adduced by the prosecution. The specific direction given by the petitioner to conceal the murder weapon is also a criteria to be taken into consideration. As rightly pointed out by the court below, the petitioner also was subjected to polygraph test and in the report, it was stated that when the petitioner was subjected to such test, he showed the signs of deception when questions related to the crime were administered to him indicating the non-truthfulness in his statement, which suggest having knowledge of the crime. The findings of the trial court is also justifiable in so far as it relates to DNA test as the trial court held that merely because the swab test does not indicate the presence of the petitioner's semen, it will not entitle the petitioner to seek for discharge. The absence of the petitioner's semen can be attributed due to possible use of condom by the petitioner during intercourse. However, the contrary can be proved only during the course of trial and therefore, the petitioner cannot be discharged at this stage.
12. In the decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner reported in (Pancho vs. State of Haryana) (2011) 10 SCC 165 the Honourable Supreme Court has held that confession made out of coercion, that too after five months after the incident, cannot be relied on to base a conviction. It was also held that A-1 denied having made such confession before the Court. Further, the Honourable Supreme Court held that in dealing with a case against an accused, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt, which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. Thus, it could be evident that the confession of co-accused cannot be said to be unreliable and it can be relied on after recording the evidence of the other witnesses for the purpose of corroboration during trial. Further, in that case, the Honourable Supreme Court was examining the validity of the judgment of conviction imposed on the accused, on the basis of the confession of co-accused, but in the present case, even charges are yet to be framed and therefore the said decision will not lend any support to the petitioner to seek for discharge. There are lot of distinction between the stage of appreciating the evidence before framing charges and after evidence was let in which formed the basis for imposing conviction and sentence.
13. In (Yogesh @ Sachin Jagdish Joshi vs. State of Maharashtra) (2008) 10 SCC 394 relied on by the counsel for the petitioner it was held by the Honourable Supreme Court that the material evidence to prove the criminal conspiracy, even if accepted in their entirety, only create a suspicion of motive, which is not sufficient to bring home an offence of murder. The facts in the said case are different and it cannot be made applicable to this case. This decision is on an appeal against conviction by the trial court and not at the stage of discharge. In this case, even charges are yet to be framed besides that, prima facie, there are enough materials available to proceed against the petitioner.
14. Even the constitutional bench decision relied on by the counsel for the petitioner reported in (Haricharan Kurmi vs. State of Bihar) 1964 (6) SCR 623 cannot lend support to his argument. In that decision, it was categorically held that in dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the Court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the accused person, the Court can turn to the confession with a view to ensure itself that the conclusion, which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence, is right. Thus, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that confession of a co-accused cannot be relied on to base a conviction against the accused is not acceptable inasmuch as the confession of a co-accused cannot be always regarded as untrustworthy. It was further held in the above decision that Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and that a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. It was also held that the stage to consider the confessional statements arrives only after the other evidence is recorded and found to be satisfactory. In the present case, the trial has not commenced and therefore the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was arrayed as an accused based on the confession of the co-accused and therefore he should be discharged cannot be considered at this stage. Para Nos. 13 and 14 of the said decision of the Constitution Bench can usefully be extracted hereunder:-
"13. As we have already indicated. this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. in dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one accused person against another accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbuttv(1) a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused". In In re. Peryaswami Noopan,(2) Reilly J. observed that the provision of s. 30 goes not further than this : "where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if,. believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in s. 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence." In Bhuboni Sahu v. King(1) the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir. John Beaumont who spoke for the Board observed that a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of "evidence" contained in s. 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the Court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved in the case, it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence." It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in s. 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of s. 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by s. 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in s. 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1) where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu's (2) case has been cited with approval.
14. In appreciating the full effect of the provisions contained ,in s. 30, it may be useful to refer to the position of the evidence given by an accomplice under s. 133 of the Act. Section 133 provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person; and that conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Illustration (b) to s. 114 of the Act brings out the legal position that an accomplice is unworthy of credit, unless he is corroborated in material particulars. Reading these two provisions together, it follows that though an accomplice is a competent witness, prudence requires that his evidence should not be acted upon unless it is materially corroborated; and that is the effect of judicial decisions dealing with this point. The point of significance is that when the Court deals with the evidence by an accomplice, the Court may treat the said evidence as substantive evidence and enquire whether it is materially corroborated or not. The testimony of the accomplice is evidence under s. 3 of the Act and has to be dealt with as such. It is no doubt evidence of a tainted character and' as such, is very weak; but, nevertheless, it is evidence and may be acted upon, subject to the requirement which has now become virtually a part of the law that it is corroborated in material particulars."
15. In the latest decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (Amit Kapoor vs. Ramesh Chander and another) (2012) 9 Supreme Court Cases 460, the Honourable Supreme Court had occasion to lay down principles to be considered for exercising jurisdiction under section 397 of Cr.P.C. or Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The relevant paragraphs of the decision is extracted hereunder:-
"27............... At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1.Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2.The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere.
27.3.The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
27.4Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers.
27.5.Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused.
27.6.The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender.
27.7.The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose.
27.8.Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a "civil wrong" with no "element of criminality" and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence.
27.9.Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
27.10.It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
27.11.Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained.
27.12.In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution.
27.13.Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie.
27.14.Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge.
27.15.Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e., to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist.
27.16.These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence."
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision of this Court passed in Criminal Revision Case No. 1171 of 2011 16.09.2011, by which A-5 to A-7 were discharged. As far as the petitioner is concerned, immediately after dismissal of the petition for discharge, he did not file the Criminal Revision Case before this Court. However, after the Criminal Revision Case filed by A-5 to A-7 was allowed by this Court on 16.09.2011, he rushed to this Court by filing the present Criminal Revision Case with a petition for condoning the delay. Further, there is a clear distinction between the participation of the petitioner/A-4 in the commission of offence and A-5 to A-7. There are evidence to show that the petitioner entered into the room where the deceased was lying in a pool of blood, besides he is charged for concealing the material object namely knife used in the commission of offence. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner stayed in Devi Lodge on the date of occurrence namely 27.06.2007. As per the statement of witnesses namely Munusamy, Rajendran and Ravi, the petitioner, along with others, was consuming liquor and they have entered into Room No.20, one after the other, where, subsequently, the deceased was found lying in the bathroom with her throat slit. One of the accused Anandan/A-1, in his confessional statement on 02.02.2007 stated that as per his direction, the petitioner/A-4 has concealed the knife used for the murder and the subsequent recovery of the weapon throws much light on the involvement of the petitioner in causing disappearance of the evidence. Even in the Nacro Analysis test conducted on A-1 on 24.10.2007 by the Forensic Sciences Lab, Madival, Bangalore, A-1 has categorically implicated the petitioner in the participation and commission of the offence. Such test conducted on A-1 assumes significance in the case atleast to show that the petitioner/A-4 has some knowledge about the occurrence or participation in the commission of the offence for which the petitioner/A-4 must be directed to face trial. Only during the course of trial the guilt or otherwise of the petitioner can be brought to light. Therefore, it is premature on the part of the petitioner to file the petition for discharge and the Court below is right in dismissing it.
17. As far as A-9 and A-10 are concerned, they were discharged by this Court on finding that they are only Lessee and Manager in the Devi Lodge and they have nothing to do with the alleged occurrence. Therefore, the reliance placed on by the counsel for the petitioner on the order dated 04.11.2011 in Crl.R.C. No. 1299 of 2010 discharging A-10 or the order dated 12.10.2010 in Crl.R.C. No. 528 of 2011 by which A-9 was discharged from the case cannot lend support to the case of the petitioner.
18. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the order dated 11.08.2011 passed in Crl.M.P. No. 84 of 2011 in S.C. No. 290 of 2009 on the file of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.1, Tindivanam, dismissing the petition for discharge filed by the petitioner/A-4, is in accordance with law and it warrants no interference by this Court.
19. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case fails and it is dismissed.
rsh To The Additional District and Sessions Judge Fast Track Court No.1 Tindivanam