Delhi District Court
Sh. Jitender Chawla vs Sh. Tarun on 12 August, 2014
Page no. 1 of 18
IN THE COURT OF SH. SUMEDH KUMAR SETHI
ACJ-cum-ARC-cum-CCJ (WEST) THC, DELHI
UID No. 02401C0194572013
E No.36/2013 U/s 14(1)(e) of DRC Act
Date of institution: 22.04.2013
Date of Order: 08.12.2014
Sh. Jitender Chawla
S/o. Late. Sh. Manohar Lal
R/o WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden
New Delhi-110018 ....... Petitioners
Versus
Sh. Tarun
Prop. M/s Ramditta Mal (Laley Di Hatti)
R/o Shop in property no. WZ-53
Ground Floor, Meenakshi Garden
New Delhi-110018
....Respondent
Order deciding Leave to Defend in Eviction petition
U/sec. 14(1)(e) r/w Section 25-B of DRC Act, 1958
1) Vide this order the Court shall dispose of the application U/s 25-B (4 & 5) of DRC
Act of the respondent seeking leave to defend the eviction petition, filed on
24.05.2013.
2) The eviction petition U/sec. 14(1)(e) Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act) was filed by the petitioners against the
respondent on 22.04.2013.
FACTS
3) The averments made in the petition are that:-
3.1 One shop at ground floor in Property no. WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi (herein after called tenanted premises/shop in question), as shown in red colour in the site plan, was let out to the respondent @ Rs. 495/- per month. The tenancy is oral and the respondent is an old tenant. The respondent has been a tenant before purchasing the property by the petitioner.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 2 of 18
3.2 The the first floor and second floor of the property is in occupation of petitioner and the same is being used as residential by the petitioner. That earlier the petitioner has been carrying on business of manufacturing cosmetics items from the backside of shop no. 1 and 2 of property no.
WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi-110018 at ground floor having a valid license of manufacturing of the cosmetics goods. The said business of manufacturing of cosmetics goods had not been running flourishing and the petitioner got the business wound up since the last about one year. The shop no.1 was being used as godown of the cosmetics goods which was being run by the petitioner. After winding up the business of manufacturing of cosmetics goods from shop no. 1 of WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi-110018 for the last about 3-4 months. The stock lying in the back portion of shop no. 1 and 2 is being cleared by the petitioner.
3.3 That after winding up the business of manufacturing cosmetics goods the petitioner started the business of confectionary items from shop no.1. The size of the shop no. 1 is not so big and the petitioner used to keep the goods at the back portion of the shop no. 1 and 2 for storage purpose also. That the business being run by the petitioner from shop no. 1 of confectionary items is a very small business and can not meet out the day to day family expenses of the petitioner and his family.
3.4 That the petitioner required the premises under the tenancy of the respondent i.e. shop no. 2 as shown in red colour of property no. WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi-18 bonafidely to start a business of ladies cosmetics items, ladies undergarments items and allied ladies items which are usable by the ladies. The said business of ladies cosmetics items, ladies undergarments items and allied ladies items shall be run by the wife of the petitioner namely Smt. Tanuja Chawla who is an educated lady and studied upto B.Com and is competent to run the abovesaid business from the tenanted shop no. 2. The petitioner has sufficient funds to accommodate the expenses for running the business of above said items by his wife. Hence, the petitioner required the shop in dispute bonafidely. The petitioner has no other commercial accommodation available with him in Delhi.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 3 of 18
3.5 That the wife of the petitioner can not start the business of cosmetics items from the first floor and second floor as the customers cannot go to the first and second floor and only the ground floor shop can attract the customers broadly and the petitioner can also assist his wife to run the business of ladies cosmetics items which is to be start at shop no.2. The shop no.2 is more suitable accommodation for start a business of ladies cosmetics and other allied items by the wife of the petitioner.
3.6 That the respondent is in arrears of rent since 01.01.12 @ 495/- p.m. exclusive of all other charges.
4) The respondent has filed application for leave to defend along with affidavit wherein he has admitted the following facts:-
4.1 That in the year 1971, Sh. Ram Ditta Mal, the father of the applicant/respondent with a view to run his business, took on rent, shop no.2 for commercial purpose i.e. running a kiryana shop on the ground floor of the property no.WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as suit property) at monthly rent of Rs. 60/- from its erstwhile owner Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma. The said Mr. Manohar Lal sold the shop to Mr. Harish Ahuja in the year 1980, who in turn sold it to Mr. Manohar Lal Chawla in 1984.1 4.2 That subsequently, the father of the respondent died intestate on 01.08.97, in turn bequeathing his tenancy rights on to the respondent being his only legal heir. Accordingly, the applicant/respondent became the sole proprietor of M/s. Ram Ditta Mal (Lale Di Hatti).2 4.3 That the applicant/respondent continued to run his business smoothly from the suit premises and used to timely and without fail, tendered the agreed rate of rent alongwith his share of the house tax against the receipt/acknowledgment to Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla, until 31.12.2008 and last paid rent was @ Rs. 450/- per month.3 4.4 That a legal notice dated 14.12.2011 sent by the petitioner through his 1 Para 7(ii) of the application under consideration.
2 Para 7(iii) of the application under consideration. 3 Para 7(iv) of the application under consideration.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 4 of 18
counsel was received by the applicant/respondent.4
5) Respondent has raised certain defenses in the application for leave to defend and the same are as under:
5.1 That the petition referred by the petitioner is not maintainable being hit by Section 14 (1) of DRC Act, 1958, since the ground as it exists in the statute with proviso clause 10, Section 14 (1) is not applicable to commercial properties.
5.2 That the petitioner is not the owner of the premises in question as has been wrongly alleged vide captioned petition and the document relied upon by the petitioner have been obtained by fraud.
5.3 That the ground floor front portion of the property comprises of 2 commercial shops of which shop no.2 is in possession of the respondent and the back portion alongwith first floor is utilized by the petitioner as his factory for manufacturing cosmetics products.5 5.4 That the applicant/respondent was running his business from the said premises, therefore, he was approached by Mr. Manohar Lal Chawla alongwith the petitioner with offer to purchase the tenanted premises. The said proposal was agreed between the parties, however, at the time of execution of the agreement, Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla and petitioner without assigning any reason backed off and since then neither he nor anybody claimed rent from applicant/respondent.
5.5 That the applicant/respondent gained knowledge that Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla has died on 05.10.2011 and the applicant/respondent is not aware of the whereabouts of all his legal heirs.
5.6 That the said legal notice was duly replied by the applicant/respondent vide the reply dated 28.12.2011, refuting all the allegations leveled therein.
The applicant/respondent objected to the ownership claimed by the him and requested for production of necessary documents.
5.7 That the petitioner alongwith two three goons of the area came at the shop 4 Para 7(vii) of the application under consideration. 5 Para 7(i) of the application under consideration.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 5 of 18
of the applicant/respondent and told him that as he has become the owner of the premises pursuant to his father's death and with a view to sell it further, wants the applicant/respondent to vacate the premises at the earliest and in case he objects to the same, then he shall face dire consequences in this regard.
5.8 That a bare perusal of the petition reveals that the petitioner on the basis of the Sale Deed dated 30.03.2006 has filed the captioned petition. It is apt to mention herein that the said sale deed is on the face of it forged and fabricated in as much as the rent receipt have been issued by Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla even after the execution of the alleged sale deed dated 30.03.2006. Further the petitioner had earlier claimed to have become the owner of the premises pursuant to the death of his father. This in turn prima facie shows that the claim of the petitioner is on the face of it farce and since triable issue has been raised.
5.9 That the petitioner is continuing to run his factory of manufacturing cosmetics products from the said premises and even sell the same to various concerns in Sadar Bazar, New Delhi. To the best of the knowledge of respondent, the petitioner also has a shop in Sadar Bazar, New Delhi which fact has also been concealed by him.6 5.10 That the petitioner's wife is already engaged in the profession of teaching under the name and style of 'Sai Tutorial Centre' from their residential premises.
5.11 That the petitioner has filed the captioned petition only with a view to somehow illegally usurp the suit premises and to dispose it off to third parties.
6) The petitioners have filed a reply to the application for Leave to Defend along with counter affidavits and in the counter affidavits the petitioners have denied the defences taken by the respondent. The petitioners further submitted as under:
6.1 That the father of the petitioner late Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla alongwith petitioner never offered the respondent to purchase the tenanted shop.
6.2 That the respondent was aware of the demise of Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla 6 Para 7(xv) of the application under consideration.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 6 of 18
who died on 05.10.2011. Only after the demise of Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla, the respondent attorned the petitioner and started paying rent to the petitioner.
6.3 That it is not denied that even after the execution of the sale deed, the father of the petitioner has been realizing rent from the respondent being the landlord.
6.4 That it is wrong and denied that the petitioner is having any shop in Sadar Bazar, Delhi. There is no shop owned/occupied at Sadar Bazar, Delhi by the petitioner.
6.5 That as the business of confectionery items is not a flourishing business, so the petitioner required the shop in dispute bonafidely by the petitioner for his wife, who is an educated lady and highly qualified to set up a new business of sale of ladies cosmetics, other ladies products etc. It is wrong and denied that the requirement of the petitioner is false and frivolous. However, it is not denied that about 3-4 years back, the wife of the petitioner had started a tutorial center with the sole motive to give financial assistance to the petitioner, but the said tutorial centre was not succeeded, hence, the same was closed down after 2-3 months.
7) Rejoinder to the reply to the application was filed by the respondent wherein it has been submitted that :-
7.1 That it is denied that after demise of Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla, the respondent ever acknowledged the petitioner as owner of the premises, either as alleged or even otherwise. It is submitted that the rent was paid to the petitioner by the respondent without prejudice to its rights and contentions.
7.2 That the demand draft sent alongwith the said reply by the respondent towards the arrears of rent was without prejudice to his rights and contentions.
8) Arguments were heard on the application under consideration on behalf of both the parties. Material on record has been perused. Submissions considered.
REQUIRMENTS
9) In order to succeed in a petition for eviction filed under section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act the petitioner must establish that:
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 7 of 18
i.He is the owner and landlord in respect of the tenanted premises. ii.That he requires the premises bonafide for himself or for any member of his family dependent upon him.
iii.That he has no other reasonably suitable accommodation
10) The defences which are taken by respondent are discussed below and the same are as under:-
DEFENCES
11) The petition is not maintainable:
11.1 The respondent has contended that the petition referred by the petitioner is not maintainable being hit by Section 14(1) of DRC Act, 1958, since the ground as it exists in the statute with proviso clause 10, Section 14(1) is not applicable to commercial properties.
11.2 The defence taken appears to be vague. However, it seems the respondent has expressed apprehension about the applicability of the provision to commercial properties.
11.3 In this regard, it is to be noted that the scope of the section has been enlarged in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court titled as Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India: AIR 2008 SUPREME COURT 3148 so as to include premises let out for commercial purposes also within the scope and ambit of a petition under section 14(1)(e) of DRC Act.
11.4 Therefore the defence does not raise any triable issue.
12) Petitioner is not the owner of the tenanted premises:
12.1 The respondent has alleged that the petitioner is not the owner of the premises in question as has been wrongly alleged vide captioned petition and the document relied upon by the petitioner have been obtained by fraud. The applicant/respondent gained knowledge that Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla has died on 05.10.2011 and the applicant/respondent is not aware of the whereabouts of all his legal heirs.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 8 of 18
12.2 The respondent has also alleged that the legal notice was duly replied by the applicant/respondent vide the reply dated 28.12.2011, refuting all the allegations leveled therein. The applicant/respondent objected to the ownership claimed by the him and requested for production of necessary documents.
12.3 He has further contended that a bare perusal of the petition reveals that the petitioner on the basis of the Sale Deed dated 30.03.2006 has filed the captioned petition. It is apt to mention herein that the said sale deed is on the face of it forged and fabricated in as much as the rent receipt have been issued by Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla even after the execution of the alleged sale deed dated 30.03.2006. Further the petitioner had earlier claimed to have become the owner of the premises pursuant to the death of his father.
12.4 To counter this, the petitioner has submitted that the respondent was aware of the demise of Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla who died on 05.10.2011. Only after the demise of Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla, the respondent attorned the petitioner and started paying rent to the petitioner. However, it is not denied that even after the execution of the sale deed, the father of the petitioner has been realizing rent from the respondent being the landlord.
12.5 In response, the respondent has submitted in his rejoinder that it is denied that after demise of Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla, the respondent ever acknowledged the petitioner as owner of the premises, either as alleged or even otherwise. The rent was paid to the petitioner by the respondent without prejudice to its rights and contentions. The demand draft sent alongwith the reply by the respondent towards the arrears of rent was without prejudice to his rights and contentions.
12.6 The present litigation is for eviction of an admitted tenant and as such the Court is not required to give a finding as regards absolute ownership of the property. In rent control legislation, the landlord can be said to be owner, if he is entitled in his own legal right, as distinguished from for and on behalf of someone else, to evict the tenant and then to retain, control, hold and use the premises for himself.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 9 of 18
12.7 In M.M.Quasim Vs Manohar Lal Sharma: (1981) 3 SCC 36 it was observed by the Apex Court that an "owner-landlord" can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own.
12.8 It was observed in Shanti Sharma Vs Smt Ved Prabha: AIR 1987 SC 2028 that the term "owner" has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. The Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But, at the same time, it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds. Ordinarily, the concept of the ownership may be absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereon. But in the modern context, where all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the Government or the authorities constituted by the State. The legislature, when it used the term "owner" in s. 14(1)(e), did not think of ownership as absolute ownership. The meaning of the term "owner" is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. In cases where the plot of land is taken on lease, the structure is built by the landlord and he is the owner of the structure.
12.9 In the present case the defence raised by the respondent as regards ownership is not tenable even prima facie for the simple reasons that the respondent has admitted that in the year 1971, Sh. Ram Ditta Mal, the father of the applicant/respondent with a view to run his business, took on rent, shop no.2 for commercial purpose i.e. running a kiryana shop on the ground floor of the property no.WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as suit property) at monthly rent of Rs. 60/- from its erstwhile owner Mr. Manohar Lal Sharma. The said Mr. Manohar Lal sold the shop to Mr. Harish Ahuja in the year 1980, who in turn sold it to Mr. Manohar Lal Chawla in 1984.7 Subsequently, the father of the respondent died intestate on 01.08.97, in turn bequeathing his tenancy rights on to 7 Para 7(ii) of the application under consideration.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 10 of 18
the respondent being his only legal heir. Accordingly, the
applicant/respondent became the sole proprietor of M/s. Ram Ditta Mal (Lale Di Hatti).8 The applicant/respondent continued to run his business smoothly from the suit premises and used to timely and without fail, tendered the agreed rate of rent alongwith his share of the house tax against the receipt/acknowledgment to Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla, until 31.12.2008 and last paid rent was @ Rs. 450/- per month.9 By virtue of the aforesaid, the respondent admitted the petitioner's father as landlord and now when eviction petition has been filed by petitioner, he cannot challenge/deny the relationship between the parties. Provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act are also attracted; the tenant is stopped from questioning the ownership or title of the landlord. The respondent has not stated that if the petitioner landlord is not the owner of the tenanted premises, then, who is.
12.10 At the very outset, it is pointed out that the respondent cannot call the documents of the petitioner into question in these eviction proceedings. No useful purpose would be served by citing multiple authorities on this point. Further, even if the sale deed is not looked into then also, at the most, the case of the respondent is that the petitioner who is the son of Manohar Lal Chawla is one of the co-owners of the property in question. The respondent cannot refute this as the petitioner became one of the co-owners of the property after the death of his father, who the respondent admitted to be the landlord.
12.11 Even if it is the case of the respondent that the petitioner does not have exclusive ownership of the suit premises it amounts to indirectly admitting that the petitioner is the owner of the premises but not exclusive owner of the premises. Thus, the petitioner is having a right against the whole world to occupy the tenanted premises in his own right and exclude anyone holding a title lesser than his own. Consequently, he is entitled to file the present petition. Further, it is not essential that the eviction petition is to be filed by all the co-owners of the property. As a co-owner petitioner can file eviction petition without impleading other co-owners. Reliance is placed on judgments Kanta Udharam Jagasia Vs C.K.S Rao: (1998)1 SCC 403; Surender 8 Para 7(iii) of the application under consideration. 9 Para 7(iv) of the application under consideration.
E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun
Page no. 11 of 18
Kumar Jhamb Vs Om Prakash Shokeen: 2000(2) RCR 540; Mohinder
Prasad Jain Vs Manohar Lal Jain: (2006) 2 SCC 724; India Umbrella
Manufacturing Co Vs Bhagadandei Aggarwal: (2004) 3 SCC 178; Sri
Ram Pasricha Vs Jagannath: (1976)4 SCC 184.
12.12 Thus, this defence raised by the respondent is a vague and sham defence and it does not raise any triable issue.
13) Need not Bonafide as the petitioner has other properties:
13.1 The respondent has contended that the ground floor front portion of the property comprises of 2 commercial shops of which shop no.2 is in possession of the respondent and the back portion alongwith first floor is utilized by the petitioner as his factory for manufacturing cosmetics products. He has also submitted that the petitioner is continuing to run his factory of manufacturing cosmetics products from the said premises and even sell the same to various concerns in Sadar Bazar, New Delhi. To the best of the knowledge of respondent, the petitioner also has a shop in Sadar Bazar, New Delhi which fact has also been concealed by him.
13.2 The petitioner has countered that it is wrong and denied that the petitioner is having any shop in Sadar Bazar, Delhi. There is no shop owned/occupied at Sadar Bazar, Delhi by the petitioner.
13.3 It has been observed in judgment titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors. Vs. Leela Wati & Ors.: 155 (2008) DLT 383 by Hon'ble Delhi High Court as under:
"11)....Thus, the affidavit filed by the tenant was shown to be false by the landlady on the basis of documents placed by it. No Rent Con-
troller is supposed to grant leave to the tenant on the basis of a false affidavit and false averments and assertions. Such affidavit should be outrightly rejected by the Rent Controller. Only those averments in the affidavit are to be considered by the Rent Controller which have same substance in it and are supported by some material. Mere as- sertions made by a tenant in respect of landlord's ownership of other E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun Page no. 12 of 18 buildings and in respect of alternate accommodation are not to be considered sufficient for grant of leave to defend."
13.4 The defence raked up by the respondent is more in the nature of an admission whereby the respondent has himself stated that the remaining portion of the premises except for the tenanted premises is being used by the petitioner for cosmetic manufacturing business. This necessarily entails that no portion of the property in question is vacant for the petitioner's wife to start her business. Moreover, the respondent cannot ask the petitioner to vacate the portions already occupied by him to get the business of his wife started. Rather, this fortifies the submission of the petitioner that he has no vacant premises for his wife to start her own business.
13.5 As far as a property in Sadar Bazaar is concerned, firstly, the petitioner has denied having any such property. Secondly, assuming the averment of the respondent to be true for a moment, it is noteworthy that the respondent has himself alleged that the petitioner is using the same for his business. Thus, the said shop in Sadar Bazaar, if any, has nothing to do with the petitioner's wife, Surely, it would be absurd to expect the petitioner to vacate any such shop already being utilized by him for his wife rather than utilizing the tenanted premises owned by him. Neither the Court nor the respondent can dictate such terms to the petitioner.
13.6 Accordingly, this defence raised by the respondent as regards bonafide requirement and as regards alternate accommodation is a sham defence and it does not raise any triable issue
14) Petitioner's wife is already running a tuition centre:
14.1 The respondent has contended that the petitioner's wife is already engaged in the profession of teaching under the name and style of 'Sai Tutorial Centre' from their residential premises.
14.2 To this, the petitioner has countered that as the business of confectionery items is not a flourishing business, so the petitioner required the shop in dispute bonafidely by the petitioner for his wife, who is an educated lady and highly qualified to set up a new business of sale of ladies cosmetics, other E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun Page no. 13 of 18 ladies products etc. It is wrong and denied that the requirement of the petitioner is false and frivolous. However, it is not denied that about 3-4 years back, the wife of the petitioner had started a tutorial center with the sole motive to give financial assistance to the petitioner, but the said tutorial centre had not succeeded, hence, the same was closed down after 2-3 months.
14.3 In the judgment titled as Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinary:
AIR 2000 SUPREME COURT 534 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. Moreover, as has been held in a plethora of cases, neither the Court nor the tenant cannot dictate terms to the landlord regarding the suitability of the premises or even the extent of the business proposed to be carried out.
14.4 In the present case, it has been clearly stated by the petitioner that about 3-4 years back, the wife of the petitioner had started a tutorial center with the sole motive to give financial assistance to the petitioner, but the said tutorial centre had not succeeded, hence, the same was closed down after 2-3 months.
14.5 Further, even if it is assumed that the petitioner's wife is in fact still earning from the tutorial centre then it is noteworthy that the petitioner's wife, being an educated lady and wanting to financially assist the petitioner can surely not be expected to sit idle till she manages to establish her own business as propounded in the petitioner.
14.6 If the petitioner and his wife found it proper to start her own business of cosmetics and ladies' inner-wear, then it would not be proper for the Court to interfere in such decision of the petitioner and his wife, as the petitioner is the best judge of his own requirements and that of the requirements of his family.
14.7 In the opinion of the Court it is the right of every person to excel in life.
If the wife of the petitioner and the petitioner is of the opinion that it would be better in life to start a business from the tenanted premises than merely running a tuition centre, then it would not be just for this Court to direct the petitioner otherwise and thereby stop the financial growth of the family of the E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun Page no. 14 of 18 petitioner. The Court cannot ask the wife of the petitioner to give up her plans of excelling in life and to establish her own business from a premises owned by her husband for the financial well being of her family. Though the success of the business to be established by the wife of the petitioner is not guaranteed, but, at the same time the Court cannot predict the failure of the same and thereby decline the petitioner and his family an opportunity to establish their own business from a premises owned by them. Thus, the requirement of the petitioner is a bona fide requirement and there is no reason for the Court to find any malafide intention behind the same.
14.8 Thus, this defence raised by the respondent does not raise any triable issue.
15) Petitioner wants to sell the premises and has threatened the respondent:
15.1 The respondent contended that the applicant/respondent was running his business from the said premises, therefore, he was approached by Mr. Manohar Lal Chawla alongwith the petitioner with offer to purchase the tenanted premises. The said proposal was agreed between the parties, however, at the time of execution of the agreement, Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla and petitioner without assigning any reason backed off and since then neither he nor anybody claimed rent from applicant/respondent.
15.2 The petitioner has countered that the father of the petitioner late Sh. Manohar Lal Chawla alongwith petitioner never offered the respondent to purchase the tenanted shop.
15.3 The respondent has further contended that the petitioner alongwith two three goons of the area came at the shop of the applicant/respondent and told him that as he has become the owner of the premises pursuant to his father's death and with a view to sell it further, wants the applicant/respondent to vacate the premises at the earliest and in case he objects to the same, then he shall face dire consequences in this regard. The petitioner has filed the captioned petition only with a view to somehow illegally usurp the suit premises and to dispose it off to third parties.
15.4 These defences are being taken up together as they are all interconnected E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun Page no. 15 of 18 and seek to raise doubt against the bonafide of the landlord's requirement. In the judgment titled as Sarwan Dass Bange Vs. Ram Prakash: 167 (2010) DLT 80 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi referring to the judgment of Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini: (2005) 12 SCC 778 observed in para 17 as under:
"..It was held that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation; a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given a right of restoration of possession; the landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only..."
15.5 Thus, it is clear that the special summary procedure provided for u/s 25B of the DRC Act is an exception to the general intent to the Act. The intention of the legislature is to provide an expeditious remedy to landlords who seek eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement under the stringent conditions imposed in the special procedure. Thus, the mere bald averment of the respondent to the effect that the petitioner wants to dispose off the tenanted premises cannot disentitle the petitioner from relief that he is entitled to get after fulfilling the stringent requirements provided for in the special procedure. Thus, this submission of the respondent is found to be untenable.
15.6 As far as any threats allegedly made by the petitioner to the respondent, there is nothing on record to show that the respondent took any action against such alleged threats. It is well settled law that bald allegation without any material on record to substantiate the same could not be looked into as the mere bald allegations are not enough for grant of leave to defend. It is held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Rajinder Kumar Sharma and Ors. Vs. Leelawati and Ors. (supra) that:
11....."Only those averments in affidavit are to be considered by Rent E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun Page no. 16 of 18 Controller which have some substance in it and are supported by some material."
15.7 Moreover, It is held by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a case tiled as Hari Shanker Vs. Madan Mohan Gupta: 111 (2004) DLT 534 that:
"Summary procedure in Section 25-B of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 cannot be defeated by merely making frivolous and vague allegations which can never be substantiated."
15.8 It is also held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Vinod Kumar Bhalla Vs. Sh. Nanak Singh: 1982 (2) RCR (Rent) 715 that in all applications for leave to defend the common defence raised by almost all the tenants, is that the landlord wanted to enhance the rent or to sell the property after getting it vacated. It was observed by the High Court that such types of allegations are without any foundation and that after an order of eviction is passed under section 14 (1)(e), the tenant is granted six months time to vacate the premises and the landlord is required to occupy the same within two months and the landlord is further dis-entitled for re-letting or alienating the whole or any part of the premises within three years from the date of obtaining possession from the tenant. Thus, the landlord is not in a position either to sell or re-let the tenanted premises for a period of three years and if a landlord does sell or re- let the premises within the said period then the tenant may proceed against the landlord for restoration of the possession under section 19 of the Act.
15.9 A similar observation was made in judgment titled Krishna Chopra & Anr. Vs. Smt. Raksha: 2000 Rajdhani Law Reporter 83.
15.10 Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid legal propositions the contention of the respondent is rejected as the same is a mere assertion without any substance. Moreover the contention of the respondent is not tenable because in such kind of cases protection/remedy is available/provided for such tenants under the DRC Act itself as they can file petition for repossession if the premises are re-let or transferred by the landlord after evicting the tenant, but certainly leave to defend cannot be granted solely on this ground.
15.11 Thus, this defence raised by the respondent is a sham defense and it E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun Page no. 17 of 18 does not raise any triable issue.
CONCLUSION
16) It is well settled that leave to defend is granted to the tenant in case any triable issue is raised by him, which can be adjudicated by consideration of additional evidence. The mere existence of any triable issue is not sufficient. The nature of the triable issue raised by the tenant must be such that it will disentitle the landlord from obtaining the eviction order.
17) In the judgment titled as Sarwan Dass Bange Vs. Ram Prakash (supra) the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi referring to the judgment of Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini (2005) 12 SCC 778 observed in para 17 as under:
"...the landlord who evicts a tenant on the ground of own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate in built strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine; the conditions and restrictions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the Court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bona fide - no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this Section, would approach the Court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that this inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the Court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bona fide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine.." (emphasis supplied)
18) The whole purpose and import of summary procedure under Section 25B of the Act would otherwise be defeated. The prayer for leave to contest should be granted to the tenant only where a prima facie case has been disclosed by him. In the absence of the tenant having disclosed a prima facie case i.e. such facts which disentitles the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, the Court cannot mechanically and in routine manner grant leave to defend. In the light of the aforesaid facts, circumstances and legal propositions, all the pleas taken by the respondents have E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun Page no. 18 of 18 failed to raise any triable issues regarding the ownership of the petitioner or the land lord-tenant relationship; the bonafide requirement of the landlord; or the availability of any alternative suitable accommodation. The contents of the application for leave to defend have failed to rebut the presumption of bonafide qua the requirement of the petitioner. The application for leave to defend filed by the respondent is thus rejected.
19) As a consequence thereof, an eviction order is passed U/s. 14 (1) (e), DRC Act against the respondents regarding the tenanted premises i.e One shop at ground floor in Property no. WZ-53, Meenakshi Garden, New Delhi, as shown in red colour in the site plan
20) However in light of Section 14 (7) DRCA, the aforesaid eviction order shall not be executable for a period of six months from today.
21) The parties are left to bear their own costs.
22) File be consigned to Record Room after due compliance.
Announced in the open Court on 08th day of December, 2014 (SUMEDH KUMAR SETHI) ACJ/ARC/CCJ(West)/08.12.2014 E. No. 36/2013 Jitender Chawla Vs Tarun