Karnataka High Court
Raghava Bhattar vs The State Of Karnataka on 11 March, 2020
Author: B.Veerappa
Bench: B.Veerappa
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 11th DAY OF MARCH, 2020
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE B.VEERAPPA
WRIT PETITION NO.3963/2018 (KLR-RR/SUR)
BETWEEN :
Raghava Bhattar
Since deceased, Rep. by his LR's.
1. Sri V.R.Raghurama Bhattar
S/o late Raghava Bhattar
Aged about 45 years
2. Sri V.R.Mukunda
S/o late Raghava Bhattar
Aged about 42 years
3. Sri V.R.Sudarshan
S/o late Raghava Bhattar
Aged about 40 years
Represented by GPA holder
V.R.Mukunda.
4. Smt. Sowmya Lakshmi
D/o late Raghava Bhattar
Aged about 36 years
All are resident at
Sri Veeranjaneya Temple
9th Main, Puttenahalli,
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J.P.Nagar, 7th Phase,
Bengaluru-560 078.
...Petitioners
(By Sri Padmanabha Mahale, Senior Counsel a/w
Sri V.Ranga Ramu, Advocate)
AND :
1. The State of Karnataka
Represented by its Secretary of
Revenue Department, M.S.Building,
Bengaluru-560 001.
2. The Special Deputy Commissioner
Bengaluru South Sub-Division,
K.G.Road, Behind Kandaya Bhavana,
Bengaluru-560 009.
...Respondents
(By Smt. M.C.Nagashree, AGA for R1 and R2)
This Writ Petition is filed under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India praying to quash or set
aside the impugned order passed by the respondent No.2
dated 31.08.2015 a copy at Annexure-A; and to direct
the respondent to change the khatha in the name of
Petitioner No.2 in respect of the land bearing Sy.No.25/3
Measuring 0-35 guntas including 05 guntas of Karab
Land, situated at Puttenehalli Village, Uttarahalli Hobli,
Bengaluru South Taluk, as his father has executed the
registered Will in favour of the Second Petitioner, for that
others petitioners have given no objection.
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This Writ Petition coming on for Preliminary Hearing
in 'B' Group this day, the Court made the following:-
ORDER
The petitioners who are the legal representatives of the deceased Raghava Bhattar, alleged Archaka of Sri Anjaneya Temple, Puttenahalli, J.P.Nagar, Bengaluru, are before this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 31.8.2015 made in No.RRT(S)CR-70/2013- 14 passed by respondent No.2 and direct the respondents to change khata in the name of petitioner No.2 in respect of the land bearing Sy.No.25/3, measuring 35 guntas, including 5 guntas of karab land, situated at Puttenahalli Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk as petitioners' father has executed a registered Will in favour of petitioner No.2 and other petitioners have no objection for the same.
2. It is the case of the petitioners that petitioners' grand father Vasudeva Ramachandra Bhattar was performing pooja in Sri Anjaneya Temple at Puttenahalli -4- Village as he was appointed by the Muzrai Department for the purpose of performing pooja in the said temple. Thereafter, petitioners' father Raghava Bhattar was continued to perform pooja in the said temple and he was appointed as Archaka by Muzrai Department. The land bearing Sy.No.25/3, measuring 35 guntas (30 guntas of pakka and 5 guntas of kharab) was given to the temple and the same was being cultivated through hired labourers by the petitioners' father. Thereafter the petitioners' father Raghava Bhattar had applied for grant of occupancy rights in respect of the land in question before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams, Bengaluru. The Special Deputy Commissioner considering the entire material on record and after holding a detailed enquiry, by the order dated 30.7.1975 granted occupancy rights in favour of the father of the petitioners in No.A1MI.224/1975-76 in respect of the land in question under the provisions of Section 6A of the Karnataka (Religious and Charitable) Inams Abolition Act, -5- 1955 (for short 'Inams Abolition Act'), subject to payment of Rs.175/- to the Government. It is also contended that before granting the said land by the Special Deputy Commissioner, enquiry was held. There were three witnesses i.e., Thoti Achappa, H.S.F.Knight (Tahsildar of Bengaluru South Taluk) and Thimmarayappa who have given their evidence before the Special Deputy Commissioner. On 30.7.1975, the Office of the Special Deputy Commissioner issued an endorsement stating that they received a premium of Rs.140/- in eight instalments.
3. It is further case of the petitioners that petitioners' father was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property in question by growing the crops, vegetables, etc. He was performing pooja in the said temple and the jurisdictional Surveyor has surveyed and demarcated the property in question on 25.3.1975 as per Annexure-G. The petitioners' father died on 6.9.2000 leaving behind the present petitioners as his -6- LRs. After the death of the petitioners' father, petitioner No.2 Mukunda was appointed as Archaka of the said temple by the letter dated 4.12.2008. When things stood thus, the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, initiated proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the Land Revenue Act, 1964 ('KLR Act' for short). In response to the notice issued, the petitioners filed objections and the Deputy Commissioner considering the entire material on record, by the impugned order dated 31.8.2015 held that the application filed by the LRs. of Raghava Bhattar, cannot be considered and rejected the said application. She further directed the Tahsildar to take suitable action to protect the Government land in respect of Sy.No.25/3, measuring 35 guntas, including kharab, situated at Puttenehalli Village, Uttarahalli Hobli, Bengaluru South Taluk from further being encroached. She also held that there was no grant of occupancy rights in favour of the -7- father of the present petitioners. Hence, the present writ petition is filed.
4. Respondents-Government have not filed any objections to the main writ petition.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties to the lis.
6. Sri Padmanabha Mahale, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners would contend that the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division exercising the powers under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the KLR Act is totally without jurisdiction after lapse of more than 38 years and therefore it is liable to be quashed. He would further contend that the impugned order is not sustainable in law when already the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams has passed the order granting occupancy rights in favour of the petitioners in respect of 35 guntas of land in Sy.No.25/3 -8- of Puttenehalli Village, as far back as on 30.7.1975 in A1MI.224/75-76. The said order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner has reached finality and thereafter the revenue authorities prepared a sketch and effected mutation entry in favour of the petitioners' father. Therefore, the proceedings initiated by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, without verifying the original records cannot be sustained.
7. He would further contend that from 1975 till 2013 the revenue authorities recognizing the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner prepared the sketch and entered the name of the petitioners in RTC and other revenue records. He would further contend that the Deputy Commissioner in the impugned order has recorded a finding that the alleged proceedings in A1MI.224/75-76, dated 30.7.1975 by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams are bogus and not sustainable. She also recorded a finding that -9- even after receiving an endorsement by the father of the petitioners Raghava Bhattar, the khata has not been transferred in his name till date. The explanation offered by the petitioners about ignorance is not a ground and ignorance of law is no excuse and therefore proceeded to pass the impugned order, which cannot be sustained. He would further contend that after passing of the impugned order, private parties tried to interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the petitioners over the land in question and petitioner No.2 filed O.S.No.793/2016 for permanent injunction. The trial Court considering the entire material on record, recorded a finding that the plaintiff proved his peaceful possession and interference of the defendants and accordingly decreed the suit. The said judgment and decree dated 15.9.2018 has reached finality. He would further contend that as the Deputy Commissioner has no jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings after 38 years under the provisions of Section 136(3) of KLR Act.
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8. In support of his contention, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District & another Vs. D.Narsing Rao & others reported in 2015 AIR SCW 622 (paragraphs-11, 24 and 25). Therefore, he sought to allow the petition.
9. Per contra, Smt.Nagashree, leaned AGA for the State sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner and would contend with vehemence that even assuming that the grant was genuine, the grantee had to pay Rs.175/- as premium to get the ownership. There is neither any reference nor it is submitted by the present petitioners for having paid the premium, as part of the record. Therefore, the ownership lies with the Government even till today. She would further contend that there is no reference or records produced by the petitioners to show that
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petitioner No.2 was Archaka before filing the application. There is no record to show that he was in possession of the land before grant was made. Column No.12(2) of RTC for the year 1970 up to the year 1977-80 clearly shows the name of Sri Shamayya. There is no statement recorded with regard to ownership of the land in question. She would further contend that the date of hearing, recording the evidence of the witnesses, including the Tahsildar and passing of the order is on the same day, i.e., on 30.7.1975, so also the date of issue of endorsement is on the same day. Therefore, practically it is not possible and therefore the Deputy Commissioner is justified in initiating the proceedings, vesting of the land in Government and rejecting the application of the LRs. of Raghava Bhattar is in accordance with law and therefore she sought to dismiss the writ petition.
10. In view of the rival contentions urged by the learned counsel for the parties, the only point that arises for consideration in this writ petition is:
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"Whether the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, is justified in initiating the proceedings under the provisions of Section 136(3) of the KLR Act after lapse of 38 years in the presence of the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition Act, dated 13.7.1975 in No.AIMI.224/1975-76 and in the facts and circumstances of the case?
11. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material on record carefully.
12. It is the specific case of the petitioners that their grand father Vasudeva Ramachandra Bhattar was performing pooja in Sri Anjaneya Temple at Puttenahalli Village and he was appointed by the Muzrai Department. After his death is son Raghava Bhattar i.e., father of the present petitioners was performing pooja and he was appointed as Archaka in the said temple by the Muzrai
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Department. The land bearing Sy.No.25/3, measuring 35 guntas, including kharab was given to the temple and petitioners' father was cultivating the said land through labourers. Subsequently, he filed an application before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams, Bengaluru for grant of occupancy rights. As could be seen from Annexure-B, dated 30.7.1975, proceedings have been initiated as against the father of the petitioners represented by his LRs. who are the present petitioners. The petitioners' father produced about five documents. The statement of the witnesses were recorded on 30.7.1975 including the then Tahsildar H.S.F.Knight who stated on oath "I was working as Tahsildar, Bengaluru South Taluk. I know the facts of the case from the records available. Sri Raghava Bhattar has applied for the registration of occupancy right of land measuring 30 guntas of land in Sy.No.25/3 of Puttenahalli village, Uttarahalli hobli, Bangalore south taluk which is Govt. land the above mentioned land is in
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possession and enjoyment of Sri Raghava Bhattar and cultivation the land. In the interest, the land be registered in the name of the petitioner according to the provisions of Inams Abolition Act". The said statement made in the proceedings before the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams, Bengaluru was duly signed.
13. As could be seen from Annexure-D, the other two witnesses were Thoti Achappa, Thimmarayappa who made the statement that they have no objections. Their statement is to the effect that Raghava Bhattar was performing pooja in the temple in question and they have no objection to register the land in his name. The Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams considering the entire material on record, has recorded a finding that the land is in possession and enjoyment of Raghava Bhattar, father of the petitioners who is appointed as Archaka in the temple in question. Petitioners' father was continued to be in possession and
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enjoyment of the said land by growing ragi, horsegram, avare, thogare, etc. The three witnesses including the then Tahsildar have no objection for registration of the said land in favour of the petitioners. In view of the facts and circumstances, the petitioners' father Raghava Bhattar, Archaka in the said temple was ordered to be registered as occupant in respect of the land measuring 35 guntas including kharab at Puttenahalli Village, which is inam land under the provisions of Section 6A of the Karnataka (Religious and Chartiable) Inams Abolition Act subject to payment of Rs.175/- as premium to the Government, which is equal to 100 times of land revenue. The said order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams passed in the year 1975 has reached finality.
14. It is also not in dispute that in pursuance of the grant made, the petitioners' father has paid premium of Rs.140/- which is accepted by the Office of the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams by an
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endorsement dated 30.7.1975. Thereafter, the Surveyor has made a survey and demarcated the land in favour of Raghava Bhattar, i.e., father of the present petitioners. It is also relevant to state at this stage that some of the private parties have tried to interfere with the possession and peaceful enjoyment of the present petitioners. Therefore, petitioner No.2 was constrained to file O.S.No.793/2016 for permanent injunction in respect of the property in question and produced Ex.P1 to P39 including the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams at Ex.P23 and depositions made by the three witnesses in the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams at Ex.P25 to P28. The trial Court after considering the entire material on record has decreed the suit and granted permanent injunction. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the said decree dated 15.9.2018 has reached finality.
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15. On careful perusal of the impugned order dated 31.8.2015, the Deputy Commissioner has recorded a finding: "In the present case if assuming that the grant file is genuine also, according to the Act and the order of the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams, the grantee had to pay a sum of Rs.175/- as premium to get the ownership of the land. There is no reference of payment of the said premium in the original file nor it has been submitted by the respondents as a part of their record. Therefore the ownership lies with the Government even till today." If such statement is made by a responsible Officer who is none other than the Deputy Commissioner, there was no necessity for the Government or for the Deputy Commissioner to initiate proceedings under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act and if such records are not produced before the Special Deputy Commissioner in the year 1975, the petitioners cannot be blamed as they are the beneficiaries by an order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of
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Inams as far back as in the year 1975. A statute does not prescribe the time-limit for exercising the power and it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time, rather it should be exercised within a reasonable time because the law does not expect the settled things to be unsettled after a long lapse of time i.e., more than 38 years. On that ground alone, the impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner cannot be sustained.
16. Though the learned AGA sought to justify the impugned order on the ground that there is no reference in the records that the petitioners' father was Archaka in the temple and somebody's name is shown in Column No.12(2) of RTC and the order passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner in the year 1975 seems to be created as held by the Deputy Commissioner, the said submission cannot be accepted. The application was filed by the petitioners' father for grant of occupancy rights and the authorities after considering the application have
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granted occupancy rights in favour of the petitioners' father. It is not the case of the State Government or the Special Deputy Commissioner that they initiated the proceedings to cancel the grant. Admittedly, the occupancy rights granted by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams in a separate proceeding dated 30.7.1975 has reached finality. Therefore, the Deputy Commissioner cannot initiate the proceedings after lapse of inordinate delay of more than 38 years and cannot exercise the power under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act after such a long lapse of time to unsettle the settled things. Petitioners have been in possession for more than 38 years and they cannot be deprived of at this belated stage.
17. It is well settled that if there is no limitation prescribed under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act, the authorities would initiate the proceedings within a reasonable time as held by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again. My view is also fortified
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by the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Joint Collector, Ranga Reddy District & another Vs. D.Narsing Rao & others (cited supra), wherein at paragraphs-11, 24 and 25 it has been observed as under:-
"11. No time limit is prescribed in the above Regulation for the exercise of suo motu power but the question is as to whether the suo motu power could be exercised after a period of 50 years. The Government as early as in the year 1991 passed order reserving 477 acres of land in Survey Nos.36 and 37 of Gopanpally village for house-sites to the Government employees. In other words the Government had every occasion to verify the revenue entries pertaining to the said lands while passing the Government Order dated 24.9.1991 but no exception was taken to the entries found. Further the respondents herein filed Writ Petition No.21719 of 1997 challenging the Government order dated 24.9.1991 and even at that point of time no action was initiated pertaining to the entries
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in the said survey numbers. Thereafter, the purchasers of land from respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein filed a civil suit in O.S.No.12 of 2001 on the file of Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District praying for a declaration that they were lawful owners and possessors of certain plots of land in survey No.36, and after contest, the suit was decreed and said decree is allowed to become final. By the impugned Notice dated 31.12.2004 the suo motu revision power under Regulation 166B referred above is sought to be exercised after five decades and if it is allowed to do so it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties over immovable properties."
"24. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such
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powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extent the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.
25. In the case at hand, while the entry sought to be corrected is described as fraudulent, there is nothing in the notice impugned before the High Court as to when was the alleged fraud discovered by the State. A specific statement in that regard was essential for it was a jurisdictional fact, which ought to be clearly asserted in the notice issued to the respondents. The attempt of
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the appellant-State to demonstrate that the notice was issued within a reasonable period of the discovery of the alleged fraud is, therefore futile. At any rate, when the Government allowed the land in question for housing sites to be given to Government employees in the year 1991, it must be presumed to have known about the record and the revenue entries concerning the parcel of land made in the ordinary course of official business. In as much as, the notice was issued as late as on 31st December, 2004, it was delayed by nearly 13 years. No explanation has been offered even for this delay assuming that the same ought to be counted only from the year 1991. Judged from any angle the notice seeking to reverse the entries made half a century ago, was clearly beyond reasonable time and was rightly quashed."
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering an identical issue in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav Vs. Hari Kishore Yadav, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 527 has held that where the statute does not provide for
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period of limitation for exercising the power, such power has to be exercised by the authority suo moto or otherwise within a reasonable time - even while dealing with beneficial legislations, rights accrued by third persons cannot be ignored lightly where no period of limitation prescribed and actions initiated after delay and at paragraphs-9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 it has been held as under:-
"9. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants vehemently submitted that the delay must be overlooked because the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to bring relief to farmers who had been dispossessed during the proscribed period. The reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. C. Padma [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.C. Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1709] , where this Court held that in a motor accident which took place on 18-12-1989, a claim petition barred by time but filed on 2-11-1995, after limitation itself was removed from the statute was maintainable. This Court held that there
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could be no resort to Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 even though no period of limitation was prescribed. Accordingly, the Court held that the claim petition could not be rejected at the threshold on the ground of limitation, after the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which had provided a period of six months. This view was taken having regard to the purpose of the statute. We, however, find that the judgment relied on has no application to the present case. It is a settled law where the statute does not provide for a period of limitation, the provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time.
10. In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edn., "reasonable time"
is explained as follows:
"That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party from losses that he ought not to suffer."
Thus, time must be reckoned reasonably, not only in order to preserve rights and
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advantages a party possesses, but equally to protect each party from the losses he ought not to suffer. Thus, whether an action has been taken within a reasonable time, must also be viewed from the point of view of the party who might suffer losses.
11. In the instant case, we find that the High Court had observed as follows:
"The auction-sale took place in 1942, the application for restoration of the lands was first made in 1975 and the appeal from it was dismissed for default in 1983. In the meanwhile, the disputed lands changed hands twice and were in the possession of the appellant-writ petitioners from 1962 and 1986. Such a long-settled position could only be upset for some very compelling reasons and on making out an extremely strong case for restoration of the appeal. There is nothing on record to suggest anything remotely like that. Secondly, the action of the Additional Collector in restoring the appeal even without any
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notice to the appellant-writ petitioners was clearly illegal and in contravention of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act."
The High Court was clearly right in the view it had taken.
12. It is argued on behalf of the appellants that power of the Additional Collector for restoration of lands could have been exercised suo motu and since no limitation was prescribed for exercise of such power, the delay in this case may be overlooked. This submission presupposes that where the power can be exercised suo motu, such exercise may be undertaken at any time. The submission is directly contrary to a decision of this Court in Collector v. D. Narsing Rao[Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3 SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] where this Court affirmed the view [Collector v. D. Narasing Rao, 2010 SCC Online AP 406 : (2010) 6 ALD 748] of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Para '17' of the judgment reads as follows: (D. Narsing Rao case [Collector v. D. Narsing Rao, (2015) 3
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SCC 695 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 396] , SCC p. 706, para 17) "17. ... that the suo motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law."
Thus, we have no hesitation in rejecting this contention.
13. In our view, where no period of limitation is prescribed, the action must be taken, whether suo motu or on the application of the parties, within a reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is reasonable time would depend on the circumstances of each case and the purpose of the statute. In the case before us, we are clear that the action is grossly delayed and taken beyond reasonable time, particularly, in view of the fact that the land was transferred several times during this period, obviously, in the faith that it is not encumbered by any rights.
14. We are of the view that merely because the legislation is beneficial and no limitation is
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prescribed, the rights acquired by persons cannot be ignored lightly and proceedings cannot be initiated after unreasonable delay as observed by this Court in Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand[Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340] .
19. It is not in dispute that the petitioners are claiming their right by virthe of the order dated 30.7.1975 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner of Abolition of Inams under the provisions of Section 6A of Inams Abolition Act. When the said order dated 30.7.1975 has reached finality, by way of the provisions under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act, the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, Bengaluru by the impugned order dated 31.8.2015 cannot deprive the right of the petitioners' father in respect of the land in question, which is impermissible. The authorities under different enactments under Government are under constitutional duty coupled with power. Every public servant is a trustee of the society and in all facets of
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public administration, every public servant has to exhibit honesty, integrity, sincerity and faithfulness in implementation of the political, social, economic and constitutional policies to integrate the nation, to achieve excellence and efficiency in the public administration. A public servant entrusted with duty and power to implement constitutional policy under Articles 14, 21 and 300A and all inter-related directive principles of state policy under the Constitution, should exhibit transparency in implementation and of accountable for due effectuation of constitutional goals.
20. In the present case, the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, has not discharged the duty entrusted to her within a reasonable period and initiated the proceedings after an inordinate delay of 38 years. The Deputy Commissioner who is a public servant entrusted with the duty under the KLR Act has to maintain the spirit of the KLR Act and cannot misuse the
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provisions after inordinate delay of 38 years as held by this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court stated supra.
21. It is also relevant to state here itself that though the learned AGA has submitted with vehemence that the observations made by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams are not genuine, the said submission is not supported by filing the statement of objections to the main writ petition. Therefore, an adverse inference has to be drawn as against the State under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
22. For the reasons stated above, the point raised for consideration in the present petition has be answered in the negative holding that the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division is not justified in initiating the proceedings under Section 136(3) of the KLR Act after lapse of 38 years in the presence of the order dated 30.7.1975 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner for Abolition of Inams in No.A1MI.224/1975-76 in respect
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of the land in question under the provisions of Inams Abolition Act.
23. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 31.8.2015 passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru South Sub-Division, Bengaluru District in No.RRT(S)CR-70/13- 14 is hereby quashed.
Rule is made absolute.
Sd/-
JUDGE *ck/-