Gujarat High Court
Vira Meru Jotwa vs Ramshi Sidi Gadhe on 11 February, 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 17 of 2003
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS) NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 17 of 2003
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY)
NO. 1 of 2024
In CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR BRINGING HEIRS)
NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 17 of 2003
With
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR SET ASIDE ABATEMENT)
NO. 2 of 2023
In R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 17 of 2003
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI Sd/-
=====================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
Yes
=====================================================
VIRA MERU JOTWA
Versus
RAMSHI SIDI GADHE & ANR.
=====================================================
Appearance:
MR PJ KANABAR(1416) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
DELETED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR ASHISH M DAGLI(2203) for the Respondent(s) No. 1
=====================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 11/02/2026
JUDGMENT
1. By way of this application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the Page 1 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined heirs and legal representatives of the original plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs:-
"5.A. Your Lordship may be pleased to admit and allow this Civil Application and may further be pleased to condone the delay of 6110 days in preferring the application for setting aside the abetment and CA for joining the legal heirs of the original Appellant in captioned Second Appeal No. 17 of 2003 in the facts and the circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice;
B. Any other relief or further relief may be granted as deemed fit in the interest of justice."
2. The facts of the case in a nutshell are as under:-
2.1 That the respondent No.1 herein filed a Regular Civil Suit No. 102 of 1985 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Kodinar against the present appellant and respondent No.2 herein for declaration of right of way in Survey Nos. 10 and 3 of the appellant to reach to the land Survey Nos. 11 and 4 of respondent No.1 and further the declaration to the effect that respondent No. 1 has right to carry water upto Survey No.11 of him through Survey No.10 of the appellant and upto Survey No.4 of him through Survey Nos. 10 and 3 of the appellant.
Respondent No.1 also prayed for permanent injunction with respect to these easementary rights against the appellant and respondent no.2. That, admittedly respondent no.2 herein has sold his land bearing Survey No.3 vide a registered sale deed dated 16.07.1985 to the appellant herein and accordingly. respondent No.2 is no more interested in this proceedings.
Page 2 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined 2.2 The learned trial Court, vide its judgment and decree dated 09.08.1993, partly allowed the suit inter alia declaring that respondent No.1 has right to carry water on eastern side of the agricultural land bearing Survey No. 10 belonging to the appellant upto the land Survey No.11 of respondent No.1. The learned trial Court has dismissed the suit of respondent No.1 with regard to the right of way claimed in Survey No.10 to reach his field of Survey No.11 and in Survey Nos. 10 and 3 of the appellant to reach the land Survey No.4 of respondent No.1. The learned trial Court also dismissed the suit against the claim of right to carry water and right of way for Survey No.4 through Survey Nos. 10 and 3 of the appellant.
2.3 That respondent No.1 preferred an appeal being Regular Civil Appeal No. 25 of 1993 in the Court of learned District Judge at Amreli. The appellant and respondent No.2 filed cross-objections under Order XLI Rule 22 of 'the Code' against the findings of the learned trial Court on Issue Nos. 2 and 5 within the time prescribed. That Kodinar Taluka became part of the Junagadh District and accordingly, the appeal of respondent No.1 along with the cross objections filed by the appellant and respondent No.2 came to be transferred to the Court of learned Joint District Judge, Veraval and it was re- numbered as Regular Civil Appeal No. 102 of 2001. The learned Second Joint District Judge, vide his judgment and decree dated 04.02.2003, partly allowed the appeal of respondent No.1 holding that respondent No.1 has right to carry water from his Survey No. 9 through a canal through the land Survey No.8/1 and Survey No.3 and accordingly, permanent injunction has also Page 3 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined been granted in favour of respondent No.1. Hence, this second appeal before this Court.
3. The deceased appellant - Virabhai Merubhai Jotwa has filed this second appeal challenging the judgment and decree dated 04.02.2003 passed in RCA No.102 of 2001 (Old RCA No.25 of 1993) passed by the Joint District Judge, Veravel, whereby judgment and decree dated 09.08.1993 passed by the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Kodinar, was quashed and set aside for belonging the right of way of the plaintiff and right to carry water for Survey No.4. Rest of the judgment for the right of way and for the right to carry water for Survey No.10 was confirmed with the modification in the original decree that the plaintiff has a right of way and also has a right to carry water for his field at Survey No.4 through the way situated on the southern side of Survey No.8/1 and thereafter entering into the northern side of the field of Survey No.3, which runs at northern side of field of Survey No.3. The cross-objection filed by the respondent - defendant was dismissed.
4. In the first appeal, the perpetual injunction issued to the aforesaid effect. Being aggrieved, the second appeal was preferred by the appellant - Virabhai Merubhai Jotwa, who was the original defendant No.2.
5. Along with the present application for condonation of the delay, the appellant has also filed the application for setting aside the abatement and to permit the legal heirs to substitute themselves as the appellant.
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6. Heard learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar appearing for the applicants and learned advocate Mr. Ashish Dagli assisted by learned advocate Mr. Utsav Shah for the respondent.
6.1 It is the argument of learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar that the second appeal was in dormant. Therefore, learned advocate representing the original appellant was not aware of the death of the appellant.
6.2 He would further submit that since the file was as dormant, no occasion arose for the learned advocate for the appellant to verify about whether appellant is alive or not.
6.3 He would further submit that, likewise, the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased appellant were also not aware of the pendency of this appeal, and therefore, no such occasion had arised for them to approach the learned advocate to inform that the appellant died on 16.06.2006.
6.4 In light of aforesaid submission, he would submit that the learned advocate appearing for the appellant had written a letter to the appellant and called him for the discussion and instructions, it came on record that the appellant had expired long back ago and thus, the heirs and legal representatives of the appellant have filed the present application for condonation of the delay of 16 years and 9 months caused in bringing themselves and also an application for quashing and setting aside the abatement and permitting them to be joined as appellant.
Page 5 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined 6.5 Learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar further submitted that the right to sue survives in favor of the present appellants as they have inherited the estate of the deceased. Moreover, since the delay has occurred during the pendency of the second appeal, which was admitted by this Court vide order dated 20.01.2004, the Court should take the liberal approach and should permit the applicants to be joined in the second appeal.
6.6 It was further argued that the cause of action since continued in favor of the present applicants, they should be allowed to agitate their cause of action on merit before the Court instead of refusing to condone the delay and close the door for the applicants to agitate their dispute on merit.
6.7 One more submission has been made that condonation of delay caused in filing the fresh matter and caused for filing application for bringing the heirs, etc. are to be viewed differently, as in former inaction on the part of litigant is large, but in later part, delay became procedural delay.
6.8 Learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar, in support of his submission, relied upon the judgment in the case of Inder Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339 and submitted that though explanation of sufficient cause is germane to condonation of the delay, the case's merit cannot be discarded solely on the technical ground of limitation. In the aforesaid submission, he would submit that this Court is required to take the liberal approach, more particularly when limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs the substantial justice.
Page 6 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined 6.9 Learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Gupta Alias Lalloowa (Now Deceased) Through LRs & Ors. v. Satish Chandra (Now Deceased) Through LRs, reported in 2025 INSC 183, to contend the same proposition and submitted that the Court is needed to take the liberal approach in such matters.
6.10 Inter-alia, it is submitted that learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar to condone the delay and to substantiate the prayer to bring on record the heirs and legal representatives by setting aside the abatement.
7. Hotly contesting the application, learned advocate Mr. Ashish M. Dagli referring to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of H. Anjanappa v. A. Prabhakar with H. Anjanappa v. Beena Anthony, reported in 2025 (0) AIR (SC) 924, State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2025 (2) GLR 987, Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 899, and in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2014 (0) AIR (SC) 746, would submit that the provision of Section 5 of 'the Act' would remain same be it for initiation of any appeal/application proceedings or it is for bringing the heirs of the appellant or respondent.
7.1 He would submit that the rigors of Section 5 of 'the Act' cannot be diluted on the ground that it would apply differently when the relief of delay condonation has been sought for initiation of any appeal/application and when application for Page 7 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined bringing the heirs are moved. Therefore, he submitted that no distinction can be made in application of Section 5 of 'the Act'.
7.2 He would further submit that the applicant, seeking condonation of the delay needed to pass through the rigors of Section 5 of 'the Act' and has to explain the sufficient cause, may not require to explain the day to day delay, but the delay deserves to be explained with sufficient cause, which may wriggle out any doubt or suspicion.
7.3 He would further submit that the substantial law of Limitation cannot be thrown out or jettisoned, on the ground of taking liberal approach, etc. 7.4 He would further submit that justice-oriented and liberal approach can be taken, provided that the sufficient reasons are provided and established by the applicant in the application for condonation of delay.
7.5 After arguing the aforesaid, learned advocate Mr. Ashish M. Dagli took this Court to the pleading made by the applicant in delay condonation application and reply tendered by Ramshibhai Sidibhai Gade on affidavit and submitted that the entire vague and evasive, but spacious grounds are raised by the applicants, without making a specific, but convincing reason to condone the delay. Thus, he submits that the colossal delay of 16 years and 9 months may not be condoned on the vague and general reasons.
7.6 Learned advocate Mr. Ashish M. Dagli also argued that it is a case, where legal heirs of the appellant are pressing to Page 8 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined replace them in place of the appellant, who is their father, and claim condonation of delay to replace them in place of their father.
7.7 He further submits that, the death of father must be within the knowledge of the legal heirs of the deceased appellant, and therefore, the applicants should have explained by cogent and convincing reason that why they have not approached the Court within the stipulated time period.
7.8 It is further submitted that, it cannot be said that the file was dormant. He took this Court to the various order-sheet and submitted that the various orders were passed in the year 2011 in presence of the learned advocate appearing for the appellant and then, the matter was called out in the year 2015 also and subsequently, it was repeatedly called out till the year 2025.
7.9 He further submits that at different intervals, it is recorded that the appeal was listed before the roster bench for final hearing. In view of this submission, submission of learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar that appeal was dormant, is hardly sustained.
7.10 Upon the above submission, he submits that the colossal delay of 16 years and 9 months should not be condoned on the vague and spacious reasons. Thus, he submits to dismiss this application and consequently, to abate the appeal.
8. Having heard learned advocates for the parties, at the outset let me refer Section 5 of 'the Act' , which reads as under:-
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Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
9. Plain reading of provision of law suggest that, the applicants were obliged to satisfactorily demonstrate and explicate the colossal delay and to convince the Court that sufficient cause existed for not preferring the appeal application or moving the requisite application within the statutorily prescribed period. Ordinarily, the Courts should adopt a liberal approach while considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, provided that the delay is duly attributable to sufficient cause. Delay cannot be condoned by a mere invocation of "liberal approach," "justice- oriented approach", or "substantial justice." These oft-quoted expression cannot be deployed in jettison or emasculate the substantive law of limitation.
10. Rule of limitation is based upon principles of sound public policy and principles of equity Indeed expression 'sufficient cause' should receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. This proposition comes into picture when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide in Page 10 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined imputable to party seeking condonation of delay Whether explanation furnished would constitute 'sufficient cause or not will depend on facts of each case and there cannot he straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for delay caused in taking steps. While considering the matter, the Court is also required to consider all the fact that why party has not taken steps within time prescribed. The Court should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed time, valuable right has accrued to other party which should not lightly be defeated by condoning delay in routine like manner.
11. Having said so, let me notice the reasons stated by the applicant claiming it to be sufficient cause for the relief of condonation of delay.
"2. The Applicants respectfully state and submit that the applicant no.2, herein, received the communication dated:
13/02/′23, from the learned advocate Shri P. J. Kanabar, informing inter alia, that the captioned appeal is listed for final hearing. The applicants submit that in response to the said communication, the applicant no.2. visited Ahmedabad, on 21/05/'23, and met the learned advocate Shri Kanabar. The applicants submit that during the introductory discussion of the matter, the applicant no.2, informed Shri Kanabar, about the factum of death of the original appellant occurred on 16/06/'06, at Vadnagar. It is respectfully submitted that it was for the first time that the factum of death was revealed to Shri Kanabar, who immediately explained to applicant no.2, to apply for setting aside the abatement, condonation of delay and joining the applicants as the legal heirs of the original appellant in the appeal.
3. The applicants submit that thus the applicant no.2 came to know for the first that the applicants are required to apply to be joined as legal heirs in the captioned appeal and Page 11 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined setting aside the abatement of the appeal. The applicants without prejudice submit that the applicants otherwise had no reason to see Shri Kanabar, the learned advocate appearing in the Second Appeal. The applicants submit that the applicants were completely unaware about the relevant provisions and/or the legal consequences of non-filing the application of bringing the legal heirs of the deceased within the time prescribed. The applicants are illiterate and rustic villagers. The Applicants are residing in a very remote village and have very limited resources. The Applicants are not aware about the intricacies of law.
4. The applicants however have preferred this application at the earliest after coming that on the death of the original Appellant, his legal heirs are required to be joined as party appellant in the Appeal and the right to sue survives in their favor. The applicants respectfully state and submit that the applicants have live interest in the matter. The applicants further submit that the applicants are neither negligent nor are otherwise interested in prolonging the appeal and therefore the applicants have preferred this application without any delay. The Applicants further submit that the delay is not on account of any carelessness on the part of the Applicants. The applicants submit that otherwise also the right to sue survives and in the peculiar facts of this case the applicants are required to be permitted to be joined as legal heirs of the original appellant in the interest of justice."
12. Perusal of the reasons stated by the applicant, it is found that the blame is put upon learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar. It is a growing tendency noted by the Apex Court that blame is put upon the learned advocates for delay and the condonation of delay is claimed upon such blaming.
13. The original appellant, who died on 16.06.2006, is survived by the present applicants. It is nowhere stated in the aforesaid reasons that the present applicants were not aware about the pendency of the second appeal.
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14. The reason is otherwise stating that when learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar called them for instruction and communication, it came to the notice that the applicants are required to applied to be joined as legal heirs in the captioned appeal as the appellant in place of their father, who died on 16.06.2006.
15. It is a case of colossal delay of 16 years and 9 months in joining the legal heirs. No convincing words, much less cogent words are pleaded by the applicants to claim it to be a sufficient cause for condonation of the huge delay of 16 years and 9 months. Merely because learned advocate called for the discussion would not be a reason to condone such a huge delay.
16. Learned advocate Mr. P.J. Kanabar, without making any averment that appeal was dormant, argued that since the second appeal was dormant, it did not give the applicants a chance to join themselves in place of the deceased appellant, submission, thus, found to be on a false foundation.
17. The second appeal is regularly listed since 2011, which could be noticed from the order-sheet. Even otherwise, the appeal is dormant would not be a reason preventing applicants from filing application to bring them as appellant in place of deceased appellant or to condone the delay or would not be a reason to permit the applicants to be joined themselves belatedly.
18. Theory of liberal approach should be adjudicated on the theory of Due Diligence. In the present case, length of the Page 13 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined delay is 16 years and 9 months. It is quite long delay and on going through the application as well as argument, it remains unexplained. The reasons, which are claimed as sufficient cause to condone the delay reproduced hereinabove does not seem to be germane.
19. It would be apt to refer the recent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah Since Deceased by Lrs., reported in 2025 INSC 53, a recent judgment on the subject of condonation of delay held as under:-
"[13] We are at our wits end to understand why the High Court overlooked all the aforesaid aspects. What was the good reason for the High Court to ignore all this? Time and again, the Supreme Court has reminded the District judiciary as well the High courts that the concepts such as "liberal approach", "Justice oriented approach", "substantial justice"
should not be employed to frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation.
14] We are constrained to observe that the High Court has exhibited complete absence of judicial conscience and restraints, which a judge is expected to maintain while adjudicating a lis between the parties.
[15] The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.
[16] The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on Page 14 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
[17] We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time." (emphasis supplied)
20. The Supreme Court in case of Rajneesh Kumar & Anr v. Ved Prakash, reported in 2024 (14) SCALE 406, has also noticed the growing tendency of throwing the blame upon the head of the learned advocate appearing for the petitioner while seeking the condonation of delay as under:-
"[10] It appears that the entire blame has been thrown on the head of the advocate who was appearing for the petitioners in the trial Court. We have noticed over a period of time a tendency on the part of the litigants to blame their lawyers of negligence and carelessness in attending the proceedings before the court. Even if we assume for a moment that the concerned lawyer was careless or negligent, this, by itself, cannot be a ground to condone long and inordinate delay as the litigant owes a duty to be vigilant of his own rights and is expected to be equally vigilant about the judicial proceedings pending in the court initiated at his instance. The litigant, therefore, should not be permitted to throw the entire blame on the head of the advocate and thereby disown him at any time and seek relief."Page 15 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026
NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined [12] As regards the law of limitation, we may refer to the decision of this Court in Bharat Barrel & Drum MFG Go. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation, reported in 1971 2 SCC 860, wherein this Court held as under:-
'The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without asserting them in a Court of law. The principle which forms the basis of this rule is expressed in the maximum vigilantibus, non dermientibus, jura subveniunt (the laws give help to those who are watchful and not to those who sleep). Therefore, the object of the statutes of limitations is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims.' (emphasis supplied)."
21. It is apposite to refer to the decision in the case of K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in 2024 (4) Scale 759, whereby the Apex Court revisited the law on the aspect of condonation of delay and held as under:-
"10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of a court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that the words sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a Page 16 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor want of bona de is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC
81). The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, nonpedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms sufficient cause should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay Page 17 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (emphasis supplied)"
22. In the case of Lanka Venkateswarłu v. State of Andhra Pradesh, reported in AIR 2011 SC 1199, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:-
"Generally the Courts including Supreme Court adopt a liberty approach in considering application for condonation of delay on ground of sufficient cause under section 5 of the Act. However, the concept such as "liberal approach", justice oriented approach, "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation"
23. Following the ratio laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, there is no gainsaying that the discretionary power of a Court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not to be exercised where is gross negligence or want of due diligence on the part of the litigant [See : Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasiroa v. Reddy Sridevi and Ors, reported in (2021) 18 SCC 384].
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24. In the case of Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh and Ors, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 685, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that even if the term sufficient cause has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of reasonableness as it is understood in general connotations. Relevant paras 25, 26 and 27 are extracted and read as under :-
"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause"
has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation.
26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a Valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.
27. The application filed by the applicants lacks in details. Even the averments made are not correct and ex facie lack bona fide. The explanation has to be Page 19 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined reasonable or plausible, so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. If it does not specify any of the enunciated ingredients of judicial pronouncements, then the application should be dismissed. On the other hand, if the application is bona fide and g based upon true and plausible explanations, as well as reflects normal behaviour of a common prudent person on the part of the applicant, the Court would normally tilt the judicial discretion in favour of such an applicant. Liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party."
25. With profit, I may also refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY LRs & Ors. v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), reported in 2024 INSC 286, whereby the Supreme Court, after referring the previous decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of limitation vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of 'sufficient cause' and it held as under:-
"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;Page 20 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026
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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in ling the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision." (emphasis supplied).
26. Reference is also required to be made to the judgment in the case of Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 2013 (14) SCC 81.
27. Last but not the least, in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. v. Karnataka Housing Board and Others, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, whereby Supreme Court in para 258 to 261 held as under:-
"258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the Page 21 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026 NEUTRAL CITATION C/SA/17/2003 JUDGMENT DATED: 11/02/2026 undefined tenor of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non- deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
259. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
260. From the above exposition of law, it is abundantly clear that the High Court has erroneously condoned a massive delay of 3966 days on account of certain lapses at the administrative levels and of there being no follow-ups in the proceedings, along with finding certain merits in the case of the respondent no. 1 against the maintainability of the suit of the appellant and that of the relief molded by the First Appellate Court. We have no hesitation in stating that such grounds are nowhere near to being "sufficient cause"
as per Section 5 of the 1963 Act. The High Court lost sight of the fact that the precedents and authorities it relied upon by it had delays of two-digits, or even that of single-digit, more particularly the delay in those cases was supported by sufficient cause. The present case, however, stands on a very different footing, owing to such an enormous delay. Hence, we are not inclined to accept the condonation of the delay by the High Court.
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261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude."
28. On factual facts, if we go through the appeal, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the original plaintiff - Ramshibhai Sidibhai Gadhe against two defendants, Karshanbhai Govindbhai Jotwa and Virabhai Merubhai Jotwa. Karsanbhai did not file the appeal. The appeal filed by Virabhai Merubhai before the appellate Court, though partly allowed, the decision thereof largely remains in favor of the original plaintiff.
29. In this second appeal, the appellate Virabhai passed away in 2006. It was a dispute about the easementary right, which was concurrently held in favor of the original plaintiff. In view of aforesaid aspects, according to this Court, in absence of the convincing reasons for delay, much less a word, which could be treated as sufficient cause and permit the Court to adopt the Rule of Literal construction, the application sans merit.
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30. Rather, it could be noticed that the applicant taking the Law of Limitation as a joyride, the reasons are found baseless and as such, it debased the application for condonation of the delay. In the aforesaid circumstances, I am not inclined to exercise the discretion.
31. As far as judgment of Om Prakash Gupta (Supra) is concerned, it is a case where the Supreme Court was seized with the issue that whether in absence of the prayer of setting aside the abatement, a simple prayer for bringing the legal representative on record is maintainable. In so far as judgment in the case of Inder Singh (Supra) is concerned, the factual aspects of the judgment are completely different. Again, in this case, the Supreme Court emphasized for existence of sufficient cause, permitting Court to take the legal approach. Thus, both the judgments would not render any assistance to the applicant.
32. In the premises of the aforesaid reasons, the Civil Application for condonation of delay is hereby rejected. Consequently, the other Civil Application does not survive.
33. The second appeal stands abated. Interim-relief, if any, granted earlier stands discontinued.
34. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the concerned Court forthwith.
Sd/-
(J.C. DOSHI, J.) Raj Page 24 of 24 Uploaded by Raj Subhash Dhobi(HC01779) on Wed Mar 11 2026 Downloaded on : Fri Mar 13 20:44:07 IST 2026