Central Administrative Tribunal - Ahmedabad
Mukesh Kumar Khandelwal vs Central Board Of Excise & Custom on 8 May, 2026
:1: OA No.180/430/2017
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
AHMEDABAD BENCH
Original Application No.430 of 2017
Dated this the 08th day of May, 2026.
Reserved on: 17.02.2026
Ordered on: 08.05.2026
CORAM:
Hon'bleMr. Jayesh V Bhairavia, Member (J)
Hon'ble Mr. Hukum Singh Meena, Member (A)
MUKESH KUMAR KHANDELWAL
Aged: 46 years (Date of Birth: 08.09.1970)
Son of Shri Nanak Chand Khandelwal,
Presently serving as Superintendent of Customs, Hazira, Surat,
Under the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Hazira, Surat,
& presently residing at No. 113, Ajanta Row House, Near L.P. Savani
School, Adajan,
Surat - 394510.
... Applicant
(By Advocate: M.S. Rao)
V/s.
1. UNION OF INDIA
(To be represented through its Secretary to the Government of India,
Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance,
Government of India, North Block, New Delhi - 110001)
2. CENTRAL BOARD OF EXCISE & CUSTOMS,
(Through its Chairman, CBEC, Department of Revenue,
Ministry of Finance, Government of India,
North Block, New Delhi - 110001)
3. THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER,
Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax, Vadodara Zone,
(Cadre Controlling Authority)
Department of Central Excise, Customs & Service Tax,
2nd Floor, Central Excise Building,
Race Course Circle,
VADODARA - 390007.
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4. THE JOINT COMMISSIONER (P&V),
CENTRAL EXCISE & CUSTOMS,
DAMAN Commissionerate,
Adarshdham Building, 3rd Floor,
Opp. Town Police Station,
VAPI-DAMAN Road,
VAPI - 396191.
5. THE COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE,
CUSTOMS & SERVICE TAX, SURAT-I,
O/o The Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs,
Surat-I Commissionerate,
3rd Floor, New Central Excise Building,
Chowk Bazaar,
Gandhi Baug,
SURAT - 395001.
6. THE ADDITIONAL DIRECTOR GENERAL (VIGILANCE),
Directorate General of Vigilance,
Customs & Central Excise,
2nd 3rd Floor, Hotel Samrat, Kautilay Marg,
Chanakyapuri,
NEW DELHI - 110021.
7. CENTRAL VIGILANCE COMMISSION,
(Notice to be served through its Director,
CVC, Satarkta Bhavan, GPO Complex,
Block-A, INA,
NEW DELHI - 110023.
8. SHRI KEWAL CHAND JAIN,
Presently serving as Superintendent of Central Excise,
O/o The Commissioner of GST & Excise,
"Customs House", Opp. Old High Court,
Navrangpura,
AHMEDABAD - 380009.
... Respondents
(By Advocate: Mr. H.D. Shukla)
ORDER
Per: Hon'ble Shri Jayesh V Bhairavia, Member (J)
In the instant OA, it is the grievance of the applicant that though the alleged misconduct pertained to the year 2003, departmental disciplinary enquiry came to be initiated against him under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, only on 04.10.2007, just a few days prior to the meeting of the 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :3: OA No.180/430/2017 DPC for considering his case for promotion to the post of Superintendent, allegedly with a view to deprive him of the said promotion. Further, the said disciplinary proceedings instituted in the year 2007 for no fault on the part of the applicant, the same was remained pending for an inordinately long period of about eight(8) years and ultimately culminated on 17.04.2015 in the imposition of a minor penalty of reduction of pay by three stages for one year without cumulative effect by the Disciplinary Authority, which, in appeal, came to be modified by the Appellate Authority vide order dated 31.07.2015 to reduction of pay by two stages for six months without cumulative effect. The revision application preferred by the applicant on 16.09.2015 also came to be rejected by the Revisional Authority vide order dated 19.12.2016. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the applicant has filed the present OA under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985seeking the following reliefs:-
"A. Call upon the official respondents herein to place before this Hon'ble Tribunal all the original documents pertaining to the present departmental disciplinary enquiry proceedings which gave rise to the issuance of the impugned documents at Annexure-A/1 to Annexure-A/8 hereto. B. Upon perusal of the aforesaid original documents, Your Lordships may be further graciously pleased to:
B-1 Quash and set aside:(i) the impugned Charge Memorandum bearing No. II/10(A)(CON)/01/07-08 dated 04.10.2007 at Annexure-A/1 hereto, issued by the Joint Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Daman;
(ii) the impugned Memorandum bearing No. II/10(A)(CON)/04/2012 dated 14.02.2013 at Annexure-A/2 hereto, issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Surat-I;
(iii) CVC's 2ndStage Advice being OM No. 007/CEX/059/278601 dated 18.03.2015 at Annexure-A/3 hereto;
(iv) the consequent impugned 2ndStage Advice bearing No.V.680/09/2004/Pt.VI/2384 dated 31.03.2015 at Annexure-A/4 hereto, issued by the Additional Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Vigilance, CBEC, New Delhi;
(v) the impugned Memorandum bearing No. II/10(A)(CON)/04/2012 dated 08.04.2015 at Annexure-A/5 hereto, issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Surat-I;
(vi) the impugned ORDER-IN-ORIGINAL bearing No. II/10(A)(CON)/04/2012 dated 17.04.2015 at Annexure-A/6 hereto, issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Surat-I;
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(vii) the impugned ORDER-IN-APPEAL bearing No. II/39(Con)/31/CCO/2015 dated 31.07.2015 at Annexure-A/7 hereto, issued by the Chief Commissioner of Central Excise & Customs, Vadodara; and
(viii) the impugned Revisional Order bearing No. C-16012/12/2015- Ad.V/8927-08 dated 19.12.2016 at Annexure-A/8 hereto, issued by the President of India through the Under Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Revenue, Ministry of Finance,and declaring the same as ex facie arbitrary, unreasonable, discriminatory, actuated by extraneous considerations on the part of the respondents herein, and in violation of the stringent procedures laid down in the CCS (CCA) Rules. B-2 Issue appropriate directions to the official respondents herein commanding them to forthwith restore the pay of the applicant herein as it was obtaining prior to the issuance of the impugned Order-in-Original dated 17.04.2015 at Annexure-A/6 hereto, along with consequential benefits of arrears of salary, interest thereon, etc. B-3 Issue appropriate directions to the official respondents herein commanding them to forthwith convene a Review DPC to consider the case of the applicant herein and grant him promotion to the post of Superintendent of Central Excise & Customs with effect from 15.10.2007, i.e. the date on which the applicant's junior, namely respondent No.8 herein, came to be granted promotion, with all consequential benefits flowing therefrom including grant of higher Grade Pay of Rs.5400/- due on 15.10.2011 upon completion of four years of service as Superintendent, appropriate seniority above respondent No.8 herein, increments, arrears of pay, etc. C. Grant such other and further reliefs as may be deemed fit and proper in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case."
FACTS OF THE CASE
2. It is stated by the applicant that he holds the Post Graduate Degree in M.Sc. (Physics) from Government College, Ajmer, Rajasthan. He had joined the services of the Department of Central Excise & Customs in the month of April, 1993 on 26.04.1993 as a direct recruit Inspector of Central Excise & Customs in consequence of the Staff Selection Commission having selected, he was initially, posted as Inspector at Ankleshwar in Vadodara Commissionerate between 1999 and 2004, the applicant was serving as Inspector in Surat-I Commissionerate. In April, 2004, the applicant was transferred to Daman Commissionerate with Station Headquarters at Vapi.
2.1 On 04.12.2004, the applicant was placed under suspension by the competent authority in contemplation of a departmental disciplinary enquiry against him. However, 81 days thereafter, the said suspension came to be revoked by the Disciplinary Authority on 21.02.2005.
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2.2 In April, 2005, the applicant was granted first Assured Career Progression (ACP) on his completion of 12 years of regular service on 26.04.2005.
2.3 Between 2004 and 2008, the applicant was serving as Inspector in Daman Commissionerate. During the period between 2008 and 2012, the applicant was serving as Inspector in Vapi Commissionerate and during the period between 2012 and June, 2015, he was serving as Inspector in Surat-I Commissionerate.
From July, 2015, the applicant had been serving in Customs Hazira, under the Customs Commissionerate, Ahmedabad.
2.4 By virtue of his completion of 20 years of regular service on 26.04.2013, the applicant was granted 2nd Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) w.e.f. 01.11.2015.
2.5 In the month of July, 2016, the applicant came to be promoted as Superintendent of Central Excise & Customs, even though he ought to have been promoted to the said post way back on 15.10.2007 when his immediate junior Shri Amodwala Shankarlal Bhikhabhai came to be promoted superseding him. The applicant also stated that ever since his joining the services of the respondents‟ organization, his service record has been unblemished and punctilious.
2.3 In the year 2007, just a few days before the applicant was due to be promoted to the post of Superintendent of Central Excise & Customs considering his impeccable record of service and sterling performance as Inspector when the DPC had met in October, 2007, the applicant, while serving as an Inspector in Daman Commissionerate of Central Excise & Customs (falling under Vapi), he was served with a Major Penalty Charge Memorandum dated 04.10.2007 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as „the Rules of 1965‟) by the Disciplinary Authority by respondent No.4, being the applicant‟s Disciplinary Authority at that relevant point of time, with regard to certain alleged misconduct said to have been committed by 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :6: OA No.180/430/2017 the applicant in the year 2003 while he was serving as Inspector of Central Excise in Range III, Division V of Surat-I Commissionerate.
2.4 It is stated that on 15.10.2007, the applicant‟s immediate five juniors, i.e. one Amodwala Shankarlal Bhikhabhai and four other juniors, came to be granted promotion to the post of Superintendent w.e.f. 15.10.2007 vide Establishment Order No.142/2007 dated 15.10.2007 (Annexure-A/9). Since the aforesaid Shri Amodwala Shankarlal Bhikhabhai and Shri Pathan B. Rasulkhan retired from the services of the department in 2012 and 2013 respectively, the applicant has impleaded Shri Kewal Chand Jain, who is junior to the applicant and is presently serving in the department in the promoted post of Superintendent, as respondent No.8.
2.5 In view of the initiation of the aforesaid major penalty departmental disciplinary enquiry, the applicant‟s case was kept in sealed cover by the DPC.
2.6 On receipt of the aforesaid Charge Memorandum dated 04.10.2007 (Annexure A/1), the applicant had submitted a representation dated 20.06.2008 to the respondent No.4 denying all the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, the applicant‟s Disciplinary Authority had proceeded to nominate Inquiry Officer and Presenting Officer on 29.01.2008 to conduct the departmental inquiry against the applicant. Thereafter, there had been no progress at all in the departmental disciplinary enquiry initiated against the applicant. It is noteworthy that not even a single hearing was held by the Inquiry Officer Shri Nitesh Srivastava at the relevant time.
2.7 In the month of August, 2009, in consequence of the transfer of the aforesaid Inquiry Officer Shri Nitesh Srivastava, the Disciplinary Authority had changed the Inquiry Officer by nominating one Shri S.K.H. Meshram, Assistant Commissioner (Review) Vapi Commissionerate as Inquiry Officer on 06.08.2009.
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2.8 Commencing the inquiry proceedings on 28.10.2009, the said Inquiry Officer had conducted the inquiry on 17.02.2010, 25.08.2010 and 16.09.2010 and closed the inquiry on 30.09.2010. The Presenting Officer had submitted his PO Brief dated 31.01.2011 (Annexure-A/10 refer) to the Inquiry Officer, to which the applicant herein had submitted his detailed Defence Brief dated 15.03.2011 (Annexure- A/11 refer) to the Inquiry Officer, which the applicant replied.
2.9 Thereafter, the aforesaid Inquiry Officer had submitted his detailed Inquiry Report dated 12.10.2012 (Annexure-A/12 refer) to the erstwhile Disciplinary Authority of the applicant wherein the Inquiry Officer returned his findings that all the charges as "NOT PROVED".
2.10 However, the applicant‟s erstwhile Disciplinary Authority, though was gracious to agree with the findings and conclusions of the Inquiry Officer with regard to the Articles of Charge Nos.I to IV contained in the Charge Memorandum dated 04.10.2007 (Annexure-A/1), was not agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer in respect of Article of Charge V of the said Charge Memorandum and accordingly, the said erstwhile Disciplinary Authority had issued a Memorandum of Disagreement dated 14.02.2013 (Annexure-A/2) to the applicant wherein the said authority had opined that the imposition of a minor penalty on the applicant would act as a deterrent and called upon the applicant to submit his representation, if any, against the said Memorandum of Disagreement.
2.11 Immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid Disagreement Note dated 14.02.2013, the applicant herein had duly submitted his detailed representation dated 25.02.2013 (Annexure-A/13 refer) to his erstwhile Disciplinary Authority praying that the applicant might be exonerated of the said charge as well.
2.12 The applicant‟s erstwhile Disciplinary Authority upon receipt of the applicant‟s aforesaid representation dated 25.02.2013 had referred the case to the Directorate General of Vigilance in the CBEC for its 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :8: OA No.180/430/2017 2ndstage advice vide office letter bearing F.No.II/10A(CON)/04/2012/37 dated 11.04.2013.
2.13 After a lapse of two years, the DG Vigilance in CBEC through its Additional Commissioner (Vigilance), vide letter dated 31.03.2015 (Annexure-A/4), had informed the Disciplinary Authority that the CVC, in its 2ndstage advice vide OM No.007/CEX/059/278601 dated 18.03.2015 (Annexure-A/3), had advised for imposition of major penalty proceedings against the applicant and accordingly further advised the erstwhile Disciplinary Authority that a copy of the Inquiry Officer‟s report along with the tentative disagreement note shall be supplied to the applicant.
2.14 Acting on the said advice received from the Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC, the erstwhile Disciplinary Authority, vide Memorandum dated 08.04.2015 (Annexure-A/5), had called upon the applicant to submit his representation, if any, against the tentative disagreement as drafted by the Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC and forwarded to the erstwhile Disciplinary Authority.
2.15 Immediately upon receipt of the aforesaid Memorandum dated 08.04.2015, the applicant had submitted his detailed representation dated 09.04.2015 (Annexure-A/14) to the erstwhile Disciplinary Authority once again requesting for his exoneration from the charges levelled against him. A few days thereafter, the applicant had also submitted a further representation dated 13.04.2015 (Annexure-A/15) making further legal submissions.
2.16 Within a couple of days thereafter, the erstwhile Disciplinary Authority vide Order-in-Original dated 17.04.2015 (Annexure A/6) impose the penalty of reduction of the applicant‟s time scale of pay by three stages from the present pay of Rs.20,910/- (Basic Pay) + Rs.4,800/- Grade Pay to Rs.18,720/- (Basic Pay) + Rs.4,800/- Grade Pay in the time scale of pay of Rs.9,300-34,800/- + Rs.4,800/- Grade 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :9: OA No.180/430/2017 Pay for a period of one year w.e.f. 01.05.2015 without cumulative effect.
2.17 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid penalty order dated 17.04.2015, the applicant had preferred the statutory departmental appeal dated 26.05.2015 (Annexure-A/16) to the Appellate Authority, i.e. respondent No.3. The Appellate Authority, vide its Order-in-Appeal dated 31stJuly, 2015 (Annexure-A/7) reduced the aforesaid penalty imposed by the erstwhile Disciplinary Authority and instead imposed the penalty of reduction of the applicant‟s pay by two stages from the current pay for a period of six months w.e.f. 01.05.2015 without cumulative effect.
2.18 Being aggrieved by the aforesaid penalty imposed by the Appellate Authority, the applicant had preferred a revision application dated 16.09.2015 (Annexure-A/17) to the Competent Revisionary Authority.
2.19 During the pendency of his aforesaid revision application, the applicant came to be promoted as Superintendent of Central Excise & Customs on his having undergone the aforesaid penalty.
2.20 Thereafter, the said pending Revision Application of the applicant came to be rejected by the Revisional Authority, vide Order No.17/2016 dated 08/19thDecember, 2016 (Annexure-A/8), the copy of said order of the Revisional Authority was served upon the applicant only in the month of February, 2017. Hence, this OA.
3. Pursuant to notice issued by this Tribunal, Mr. H.D. Shukla entered appearance on behalf of the respondents and filed reply opposing the claim of the applicant to which the applicant has also filed rejoinder reiterating the contentions as raised in the O.A. CONTENTIONS OF THE APPLICANT
4. Shri M.S. Rao learned counsel appearing for the applicant contended that none of the Articles of Charge No. I to V disclose any misconduct on applicant‟s part. The Inquiry Officer, after conducting the enquiry 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :10: OA No.180/430/2017 and considering the Written Brief dated 15.03.2011 submitted by the applicant, held all the charges as "NOT PROVED" in the Inquiry Report dated 12.10.2012 (Annexure A/12).
4.1 It is submitted that the impugned Charge Memorandum suffers from inordinate and unexplained delay. Though the alleged incident pertains to the year 2004 and the applicant‟s statement had already been recorded by the Vigilance authorities on 07.01.2005, the charge-sheet was issued only on 04.10.2007, immediately prior to the convening of the DPC for promotion to the post of Superintendent, resulting in denial of promotion to the applicant and grant thereof to his junior.
4.2 It is further submitted that the Disciplinary Authority did not act independently while issuing the Charge Memorandum and acted under the influence of the Vigilance Section.
4.3 It is also submitted that the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the Inquiry Officer only in respect of Article of Charge No.V on the ground that the applicant ought to have been more vigilant while scrutinizing rebate claim documents. It is contended that while disagreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority failed to consider the detailed observations recorded by the Inquiry Officer in favour of the applicant in the said Inquiry Report.
4.4 Further it is argued that the Disciplinary Authority exceeded his jurisdiction by proposing penalty on the premise that it would act as a deterrent, despite there being no actual loss of Government revenue.
4.7 Learned counsel argued that the CVC issued its 2ndStage Advice recommending major penalty in a casual and mechanical manner without independent application of mind. According to the learned counsel for the applicant, the CVC relied solely upon the version of the CVO, CBEC, New Delhi, alleging gross negligence on the part of the applicant, without considering the favourable findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer.
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4.8 It is further submitted that the CVC failed to consider the applicant‟s representation dated 25.02.2013 submitted against the Memorandum of Disagreement.
4.9 It is also submitted that the Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC, issued the impugned communication and tentative Disagreement Note without any independent application of mind and virtually dictated the course of action to the Disciplinary Authority, as no reasons were assigned by the Vigilance authorities as to why the findings of the Inquiry Officer in favour of the applicant could not be accepted. Further, the Vigilance authorities failed to consider the Defence Brief and representation submitted by the applicant against the earlier Memorandum of Disagreement.
4.10 It is contended that while issuing the penalty order dated 08.04.2015, the Disciplinary Authority failed to act as an independent quasi- judicial authority and merely acted upon the dictates of the CVC and Vigilance authorities. According to the applicant, the Disciplinary Authority acted merely as a "post office" without independent consideration of the matter.
4.11 It is also submitted that the since the Disciplinary Authority did not supplied any Disagreement Note in respect to findings recorded by the IO on Charge No. I, it is not open for the DA to subsequently held that Charge No. I is proved. It is reiterated that the said Charge No. I was not established or proved as recorded by the IO in his Inquiry Report. Thus, without there being any disagreement on it, the decision of the DA is bad in law.
4.12 The applicant also alleged bias on the part of the Disciplinary Authority while imposing the penalty and contended that the reasons assigned for holding Charge No. V as „proved‟ are unsustainable in law.
4.13 Learned counsel vehemently argued that the applicant has performed quasi judicial duties and his verification/assessment is always subject 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :12: OA No.180/430/2017 to further scrutiny and approval of the higher authorities, in other words, report of the applicant as an Inspector is not a final decision. Therefore, the alleged charges that the applicant remained negligent while preparing the verification report and failed to notice the discrepancy as alleged in Charge No. V is as such not tenable in eye of law. According to the applicant, this is a case of absolute no evidence and he has been victimized by the respondents and his carrier has been put far behind to his junior.
4.14 It is submitted that although the Appellate Authority modified the penalty, the appeal was not considered objectively and the said order of the Appellate Authority also suffers from non-application of mind, as several substantial grounds raised in the departmental appeal were ignored and the Appellate Authority wrongly observed that no new points had been raised. Thus, it is contended that the Appellate Authority improperly distinguished the case of Shri A.C. Patel, despite the fact that the said officer held a higher post of Superintendent.
4.15 The applicant is also challenging the observations of the Appellate Authority alleging casualness and lack of devotion to duty by contending that such findings are unsupported by any documentary evidence and were never part of the original charges.
4.16 Learned counsel also argued that the Revisional Authority rejected the revision application in a casual and mechanical manner without considering the additional grounds raised therein, as the Revisional Authority wrongly concluded that no new grounds had been raised warranting interference.
4.17 Learned counsel also argued that though the Charge Memorandum was issued on 04.10.2007, the disciplinary proceedings culminated only on 17.04.2015, after more than eight years. According to the applicant, the charge-sheet was deliberately issued immediately before the DPC to ensure that the applicant‟s case remained under sealed cover and he was denied promotion. As such the prolonged delay in concluding the 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :13: OA No.180/430/2017 enquiry caused serious prejudice and violated the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Prem Nath Bali vs. Registrar, High Court of Delhi & Anr. reported in (2015) 16 SCC 415, wherein it was held that departmental enquiries should ordinarily be completed within six months and, in exceptional cases, within one year.
4.18 Learned counsel further argued that even after submission of the applicant‟s representation in 2013, the matter remained pending for nearly two years before being referred to the CVC for 2ndStage Advice, without any explanation for such delay. As such the entire disciplinary proceedings deserve to be quashed on account of inordinate and unexplained delay causing grave prejudice.
4.19 Learned counsel emphasized that despite the DoP&T O.M. dated 14.09.1992, the applicant was not granted even ad hoc promotion to the post of Superintendent after expiry of two years from the DPC held in 2007, though no delay in conclusion of the enquiry was attributable to him. Had the departmental proceedings been concluded within the prescribed period, the applicant would have secured promotion in 2009-10 along with his juniors and would also have become entitled to higher Grade Pay upon completion of four years‟ service as Superintendent in 2013-14. Therefore, grave and irreversible prejudice has been caused to the applicant due to the prolonged disciplinary proceedings and denial of timely promotion.
CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS
5. Shri H.D. Shukla learned counsel appearing for the respondents by referring to the reply submitted that the applicant joined the services of the Department of Central Excise & Customs on 26.04.1993 as a direct recruit Inspector of Central Excise & Customs.
5.1 It is also submitted that a Charge Memorandum dated 04.10.2007 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules for major penalty proceedings came to be issued against the applicant in respect of alleged misconduct during his posting as Inspector in Range III, Division V of 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :14: OA No.180/430/2017 Surat-I Commissionerate.During the pendency of the said disciplinary proceedings, the applicant‟s immediate junior, namely the private respondent No.8, was granted promotion to the post of Superintendent, whereas the applicant‟s case was kept in sealed cover.
5.2 It is also submitted that after completion of inquiry, the Presenting Officer submitted his brief and the applicant submitted his defence brief. Thereafter, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 12.10.2012 holding all the charges against the applicant as "NOT PROVED".
5.3 It is also submitted that despite the Disciplinary Authority issued his Disagreement Note dated 14.02.2013 and called for representation from the applicant. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC for obtaining 2 ndstage advice of the CVC.The Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC, vide communication dated 31.03.2015, informed the Disciplinary Authority that the CVC, vide OM dated 18.03.2015, had advised imposition of major penalty upon the applicant and further advised issuance of disagreement note along with the Inquiry Report to the applicant.
Pursuant thereto, the applicant submitted detailed representations 09.04.2015 as well additional legal submissions in support of it vide representation dated 13.04.2015 and sought exoneration from all the charges.
Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority passed Order-in-Original dated 17.04.2015 imposing penalty of reduction of pay by three stages in the time scale for a specified period.
Aggrieved thereby, the applicant preferred departmental appeal, whereupon the Appellate Authority modified the penalty and reduced the same to reduction of pay by two stages for a period of six months without cumulative effect. The Revision application filed by the applicant was also considered by the Competent Authority and rejected vide order dated 19.12.2016. Thus, the Disciplinary Authority, Inquiry 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :15: OA No.180/430/2017 Authority, Appellate Authority and the Revisionary Authority followed the principle of natural justice as well the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 and 15 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and since there is no procedural lacuna in decision making process, the impugned orders are therefore just and proper.
5.4 Learned counsel argued that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after detailed investigation into a large-scale rebate scam involving fake shipping bills and substantial revenue implications. According to the respondents, the applicant failed to notice glaring discrepancies in export documents resulting in wrongful sanction of rebate claims.
5.5 Learned counsel also argued that the role of the CVC and Vigilance authorities was merely advisory in nature and that the Disciplinary Authority independently considered the material on record before imposing penalty.
5.6 Learned counsel also submitted that delay in completion of inquiry proceedings by itself would not vitiate the disciplinary proceedings, particularly when the charges stood substantially proved according to the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities.
5.7 So far as claim of the applicant that he was entitled to ad hoc promotion under the DoP&T‟s OM dated 14.09.1992 is concerned, it is contended that promotion is subject to recommendation of the DPC and satisfaction of the competent authority.
6. In response to the reply, the applicant has filed rejoinder besides refuting the contents of the reply, reiterating the contentions as raised in the OA.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the pleadings as well as judgments on which reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the applicant.
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8. Having perused the pleadings of the parties and the contentions of the parties, it emerges from the record that the applicant joined the services of the Department of Central Excise & Customs on 26.04.1993 as a direct recruit Inspector of Central Excise & Customs pursuant to selection through the Staff Selection Commission. While the applicant was serving as Inspector in Range III, Division V of Surat-I Commissionerate, allegations relating to irregular sanction of rebate claims based on fake shipping bills came to be investigated by the department in connection with a large-scale rebate scam. The applicant was placed under suspension on 04.12.2004 in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, the suspension of the applicant was subsequently revoked on 21.02.2005. Thereafter, a Major Penalty Charge Memorandum dated 04.10.2007 under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 came to be issued against the applicant alleging misconduct pertaining to the year 2003-04. It is also not in dispute that on 15.10.2007, the applicant‟s juniors, including private respondent No.8 herein, were promoted to the post of Superintendent, whereas the applicant‟s case was kept in sealed cover due to pendency of the said disciplinary proceedings.
8.1 The Inquiry Officer conducted inquiry proceedings and ultimately submitted Inquiry Report dated 12.10.2012 holding all the Articles of Charge against the applicant as "NOT PROVED".
It is also admitted that the Disciplinary Authority while agreeing with the findings of the Inquiry Authority in respect to Article of Charges No. I to IV, the Disciplinary Authority expressed its tentative disagreement for the findings of the IO on Charge No. V. Accordingly, the Disagreement Note for Charge No. V along with Inquiry Report was supplied to the applicant vide communication dated 14.02.2013. It is not in dispute that after receipt of the applicant‟s representation on the Disagreement Note, the matter was referred to the Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC for obtaining 2ndStage Advice of the CVC and in response to it, thereafter the CVC, 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :17: OA No.180/430/2017 vide OM dated 18.03.2015, advised imposition of major penalty upon the applicant. It is further admitted that pursuant to the said CVC advice, the applicant was furnished with disagreement note and he submitted detailed representations dated 09.04.2015 and 13.04.2015 seeking exoneration. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 17.04.2015 held that Charge No. V is proved and imposed the penalty of reduction of pay by three stages for a period of one year without cumulative effect. As noted herein above, the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 31.07.2015, modified the penalty to reduction of pay by two stages for a period of six months without cumulative effect. The Revision Application filed thereon came to be rejected on 19.12.2016. It is also admitted that during pendency of the revision proceedings, the applicant came to be promoted to the post of Superintendent in July, 2016. Thus, the controversy in the present OA essentially revolves around the legality and validity of the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the applicant, the inordinate delay in conclusion thereof, the propriety of the disagreement recorded by the Disciplinary Authority despite the favourable Inquiry Report, the role of the Vigilance/CVC authorities in the decision-making process, and the consequential denial of timely promotion and service benefits to the applicant.
9. Upon consideration of the pleadings and submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the following issues emerge for adjudication in the present Original Application:-
(a) Whether the departmental proceedings initiated against the applicant are liable to be quashed on account of inordinate and unexplained delay causing serious prejudice to the applicant?
(b) Whether the Disciplinary Authority was justified in differing from the Inquiry Officer's findings exonerating the applicant and in holding the Charge No. "V" proved?
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(c) Whether the CVC/Vigilance advice and the consequential actions of the Disciplinary Authority suffers from non- application of mind or dictate of vigilance authorities?
(d) Whether the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Revisional Authority are arbitrary, unsustainable and violative of principles of natural justice? and
(e) Whether the applicant was wrongly denied promotion and consequential service benefits on account of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings?
ANALYSIS
10. With regard to Issue No.(a) as noted in para 9 above, i.e., whether the departmental proceedings initiated against the applicant are liable to be quashed on account of inordinate and unexplained delay causing serious prejudice to the applicant, the admitted factual position emerging from the record is that the alleged misconduct pertains to the year 2003-04, whereas the Charge Memorandum under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 came to be issued only on 04.10.2007.
Further, though the applicant had submitted his representation against the Memorandum of Disagreement as early as on 25.02.2013, the matter remained pending for almost two years before the Directorate General of Vigilance referred the matter to the CVC for its 2ndStage Advice, which ultimately came to be rendered on 18.03.2015. The disciplinary proceedings ultimately culminated only on 17.04.2015, i.e., after more than eight years from the issuance of the charge-sheet.
10.1 The respondents have attempted to justify the delay by contending that the matter related to a large-scale rebate scam involving fake shipping bills and investigation against several officers posted in Surat-I Commissionerate. However, except making a general reference to the 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :19: OA No.180/430/2017 complexity of investigation, no satisfactory explanation has been furnished for the prolonged delay at every stage of the proceedings.
10.2 It is well settled that though delay by itself may not automatically vitiate disciplinary proceedings, inordinate and unexplained delay causing prejudice to the delinquent employee strikes at the root of fairness in disciplinary jurisprudence. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State of A.P. vs. N. Radhakishan, reported in (1998) 4 SCC 154, held that whether delay vitiates disciplinary proceedings depends upon the facts of each case and where the delay is abnormal and unexplained causing prejudice to the employee, the proceedings deserve to be interfered with. The Court observed that disciplinary proceedings cannot be permitted to continue indefinitely and the Court must balance the interests of administration with the prejudice caused to the delinquent employee.The relevant para of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"19. It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh them to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any fault on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on what account the delay has occurred. If the delay is unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from this path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately, the court is to balance these two diverse considerations."
2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :20: OA No.180/430/2017 10.3 Similarly, in P.V. Mahadevan vs. M.D., Tamil Nadu Housing Board, reported in (2005) 6 SCC 636, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that protracted disciplinary proceedings cause unbearable mental agony and monetary loss to the employee and such proceedings should not be allowed to continue endlessly. The Court further held that the Government employee should not be made to suffer for lapses attributable to the department.The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"8. Our attention was also drawn to the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent Board in this appeal. Though some explanation was given, the explanation offered is not at all convincing. It is stated in the counter-affidavit for the first time that the irregularity during the year 1990, for which disciplinary action had been initiated against the appellant in the year 2000, came to light in the audit report for the second half of 1994-95.
9. Sections 118 and 119 of the Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Act, 1961 (Tamil Nadu Act 17 of 1961) read thus:
"118. At the end of every year, the Board shall submit to the Government an abstract of the accounts of its receipts and expenditure for such year.
119. The accounts of the Board shall be examined and audited once in every year by such auditor as the Government may appoint in this behalf."
10. Section 118 specifically provides for submission of the abstracts of the accounts at the end of every year and Section 119 relates to annual audit of accounts. These two statutory provisions have not been complied with at all. In the instant case the transaction took place in the year 1990. The expenditure ought to have been considered in the accounts of the succeeding year. In the instant case the audit report was ultimately released in 1994-95. The explanation offered for the delay in finalising the audit account cannot stand scrutiny in view of the above two provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 17 of 1961. It is now stated that the appellant has retired from service. There is also no acceptable explanation on the side of the respondent explaining the inordinate delay in initiating departmental disciplinary proceedings. Mr R. Venkataramani, learned Senior Counsel is appearing for the respondent. His submission that the period from the date of commission of the irregularities by the appellant to the date on which it came to the knowledge of the Housing Board cannot be reckoned for the purpose of ascertaining whether there was any delay on the part of the Board in initiating disciplinary proceedings against the appellant has no merit and force. The stand now taken by the respondent in this Court in the counter-affidavit is not convincing and is only an afterthought to give some explanation for the delay.
11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :21: OA No.180/430/2017 this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer."
Further, in Prem Nath Bali vs. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, reported in AIR 2016 SUPREME COURT 101, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court emphasized that disciplinary proceedings should ordinarily be completed within six months and in exceptional cases within one year. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"26. Time and again, this Court has emphasised that it is the duty of the employer to ensure that the departmental enquiry initiated against the delinquent employee is concluded within the shortest possible time by taking priority measures. In cases where the delinquent is placed under suspension during the pendency of such inquiry then it becomes all the more imperative for the employer to ensure that the inquiry is concluded in the shortest possible time to avoid any inconvenience, loss and prejudice to the rights of the delinquent employee.
27. As a matter of experience, we often notice that after completion of the inquiry, the issue involved therein does not come to an end because if the findings of the inquiry proceedings have gone against the delinquent employee, he invariably pursues the issue in court to ventilate his grievance, which again consumes time for its final conclusion.
28. Keeping these factors in mind, we are of the considered opinion that every employer (whether State or private) must make sincere endeavour to conclude the departmental enquiry proceedings once initiated against the delinquent employee within a reasonable time by giving priority to such proceedings and as far as possible it should be concluded within six months as an outer limit. Where it is not possible for the employer to conclude due to certain unavoidable causes arising in the proceedings within the time-frame then efforts should be made to conclude within the reasonably extended period depending upon the cause and the nature of inquiry but not more than a year."
10.4 In the present case, the delay is not merely procedural but has had serious civil consequences upon the applicant. It is an admitted position that the applicant‟s immediate juniors were promoted as Superintendent 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :22: OA No.180/430/2017 on 15.10.2007 whereas the applicant‟s case was kept in sealed cover due to pendency of the said disciplinary proceedings. The disciplinary proceedings thereafter remained pending for more than eight years and ultimately culminated in imposition of a comparatively minor penalty, which itself came to be reduced by the Appellate Authority. The respondents have also failed to explain why, despite the Inquiry Officer submitting his report on 12.10.2012 exonerating the applicant of all charges, the matter remained pending till April, 2015.Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the disciplinary proceedings suffered from inordinate and unexplained delay, which has caused grave prejudice to the applicant in matters relating to promotion, career progression and service benefits.
However, considering the fact that the disciplinary proceedings have already culminated and the applicant has already undergone the penalty, we are not inclined to quash the entire disciplinary proceedings solely on the ground of delay. Nevertheless, the delay is certainly a relevant mitigating circumstance while examining the legality and proportionality of the impugned orders.
11. With regard to Issue No.(b) as noted in para 9 above, i.e., whether the Disciplinary Authority was justified in differing from the Inquiry Officer‟s findings exonerating the applicant from all the Charges and in holding the Charge No. "V" is proved, the record reveals that the Inquiry Officer, after conducting a full-fledged inquiry and by analyzing the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record, submitted his report dated 12.10.2012 holding all the Articles of Charge as "NOT PROVED" for the said findings, the IO has recorded cogent reasons. It is noticed that on receipt of IO‟s Report dated 12.10.2012, the Disciplinary Authority issued Memorandum of Disagreement dated 14.02.2013 only with regard to Article of Charge No.V. Undisputedly, there was no disagreement recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in relation to Articles of Charge Nos.I to IV.
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11.1 It is trite law that the Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the findings of the Inquiry Officer and can disagree with such findings. However, such disagreement must be based upon cogent reasons and the delinquent employee must be afforded reasonable opportunity to represent against the proposed disagreement. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84, held that where the Disciplinary Authority proposes to differ with the findings of the Inquiry Officer, principles of natural justice require that the delinquent employee must be informed of the tentative reasons for disagreement and afforded opportunity to represent before any adverse finding is recorded. Similarly, in Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1999) 7 SCC 739, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court reiterated that disagreement with favourable findings of the Inquiry Officer cannot be recorded behind the back of the delinquent employee.
11.2 In the present case, the Memorandum of Disagreement dated 14.02.2013 was admittedly confined only to Article of Charge No.V. Despite the same, while passing the final order dated 17.04.2015, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to hold Article of Charge No.I also as proved. This action, in our considered opinion is clearly unsustainable in law. Reason is obvious, once the Disciplinary Authority had not recorded disagreement regarding Article of Charge No.I in the Memorandum of Disagreement dated 14.02.2013, it was not open for the said authority to subsequently hold the said charge as proved without affording any opportunity to the delinquent employee. The respondents‟ contention that the subsequent Memorandum dated 08.04.2015 cured the defect cannot be accepted. The said Memorandum merely forwarded the CVC advice and tentative disagreement note and did not clearly communicate any independent disagreement by the Disciplinary Authority in relation to Article of Charge No.I. Moreover, the Inquiry Officer had recorded detailed findings in favour of the applicant after appreciation of evidence. The Disciplinary Authority, 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :24: OA No.180/430/2017 while differing from such findings, was required to record clear and cogent reasons demonstrating perversity or patent error in the findings of the Inquiry Officer.
11.3 At this stage, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority in the impugned order dated 17.04.2015 qua the Article of Charge No.1 as under:-
"10.3. I have carefully gone through the above findings of Inquiry Officer, Defence put forth by the C.O, and the memorandum of disagreement issued by the D.G. (Vigilance), New Delhi. I observe that the Disciplinary Authority was tentatively agreed with the findings of the Inquiry Officer in respect of the said Article of Charge at the time of issuance of Memorandum of disagreement dated 14.02.2013. However, I observe that the Inquiry officer is giving benefit of doubt to the C.O. is not correct. I observe that the CO in his defense submitted that the officer posted in the field formations are not expected to act as detective to find out genuineness of Shipping bills / signature of other formations. Further, the CO has submitted that the range staff was not trained nor exposed to customs appraising work to equip them to deal with such possible manipulation. Further, the findings of the IO is that the Central Excise Officers are not trained with regard to the customs documentation/procedures followed at the Port nor there any mechanism in place to verify the genuineness of the Shipping Bills. The forgery in this case was confirmed by the Government Examiner of Questioned. Further, I observe that the CO in his defence submitted the various circulars/ Notifications and on the basis of same, he submitted that it is the responsibility of the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise or the Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise having jurisdiction over the factory of manufacture or warehouse or, as the case may be, Maritime Commissioner of Central Excise shall compare the duplicate copy of application received from the officer of customs with the original copy received from the exporter and with the triplicate copy received from the Central Excise Officer and if satisfied that the claim is in order, he shall sanction the rebate either in whole or in part. Further he submitted that the role of officer posted in the range is to check the particulars of the duty paid or duty payable on the exported goods. The I.O. in his findings, on the basis of defence submitted by the C.O. as discussed in foregoing paras, held that the said Article of Charge is not proved. I find that as a responsible revenue officer, it was expected of C.O. that while verifying the rebate claim, which were claimed to have been exported under self sealing procedure, he was very careful but he has acted quite negligently and casually. It was no excuse that he was not trained in Customs documentation/procedures. I observe that once he is attending to the Customs documents it is expected that he acquire the relevant knowledge of Customs also. Verifying documents in routine manner, without realizing the importance of such certification of documents involving government revenue, in no circumstances acceptable. Thus I do not fully convinced with the findings of Inquiry Officer and hold that, the C.O. failed miserably in his duty and therefore exhibited lack of devotion to duty."
2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :25: OA No.180/430/2017 11.4 As noted hereinabove, it is an admitted and undisputed position that the memorandum/note of disagreement issued by the disciplinary authority pertained only to Article of Charge No. V. However, while passing the impugned order, the disciplinary authority proceeded to record an adverse finding even with respect to Article of Charge No. I, that too without issuing any disagreement note thereon or affording any opportunity to the applicant to submit his explanation/representation in that regard. Such a course adopted by the disciplinary authority is ex facie contrary to the settled principles of natural justice, inasmuch as the applicant was condemned on a charge in respect of which no notice of disagreement was ever communicated to him.
In the absence of a specific disagreement note and a reasonable opportunity to respond thereto, the finding recorded on Article of Charge No. I, stands vitiated being violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India as well as the mandatory procedural safeguards governing disciplinary proceedings.
11.5 Further, we find that the Disciplinary Authority primarily proceeded on the premise that the applicant ought to have been more vigilant while scrutinizing rebate claims. However, mere negligence or error of judgment, unless coupled with culpable misconduct, cannot automatically amount to misconduct warranting major penalty proceedings. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. J. Ahmed, reported in (1979) 2 SCC 286, held that negligence or error of judgment by itself does not constitute misconduct unless the conduct is blameworthy or actuated by improper motive. Similarly, in Inspector Prem Chand vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, reported in (2007) 4 SCC 566, it was held that misconduct must involve culpable negligence and not mere inadvertence. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced as under:-
"13. The Tribunal opined that the acts of omission on the part of the appellant were not a mere error of judgment. On what premise the said opinion was arrived at is not clear. We have noticed hereinbefore that the Appellate Authority, namely, the Commissioner of Police, Delhi, 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :26: OA No.180/430/2017 while passing the order dated 29-8-2003 categorically held that the appellant being a raiding officer should have seized the tainted money as case property. In a given case, what should have been done, is a matter which would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down therefor.
14. The criminal court admittedly did not pass any adverse remarks against the appellant. Some adverse remarks were passed against the investigating officer, who examined himself as PW 4 as he had handed over the tainted money to the complainant PW 2.
15. A finding of fact was arrived at that the accused did not make demand of any amount from the complainant and thus no case has been made out against him. This Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India [(1999) 7 SCC 409 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1299] has categorically held: (SCC p. 430, para 42) "42. Initiation of disciplinary proceedings against an officer cannot take place on information which is vague or indefinite. Suspicion has no role to play in such matter. There must exist reasonable basis for the disciplinary authority to proceed against the delinquent officer. Merely because penalty was not imposed and the Board in the exercise of its power directed filing of appeal against that order in the Appellate Tribunal could not be enough to proceed against the appellant. There is no other instance to show that in similar case the appellant invariably imposed penalty."
16. We, therefore, are of the opinion that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, the appellant cannot be said to have committed any misconduct."
11.5 In the present case, neither the Inquiry Officer nor the respondents including the Disciplinary Authority have established any mala fide intention, pecuniary gain or collusion on the part of the applicant. Neither any material in this regard has been placed on record. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority in relation to Article of Charge No.I are unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside on this aspect also. However, considering that the Appellate Authority had already reduced the penalty substantially and that some degree of negligence in scrutiny of documents was attributed to the applicant, we are not inclined to entirely exonerate the applicant from all blame.
12. With regard to Issue No.(c) as noted in para 9 above, i.e., whether the CVC/Vigilance advice and the consequential actions of the Disciplinary Authority suffer from non-application of mind or dictate of vigilance authorities, the principal contention raised by the applicant is that the 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :27: OA No.180/430/2017 Disciplinary Authority failed to act independently as a quasi-judicial authority and merely acted under the dictates of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) and Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC. According to the applicant, the entire decision-making process after submission of the Inquiry Report became mechanically driven by vigilance advice, thereby vitiating the disciplinary proceedings.
12.1 At the outset, it is necessary to note that under the scheme of departmental disciplinary proceedings, the role of the CVC is advisory in nature. The ultimate responsibility to independently assess the evidence, consider the defence of the delinquent officer and arrive at findings rests solely with the Disciplinary Authority. The Disciplinary Authority exercises quasi-judicial powers and therefore cannot surrender its independent discretion to vigilance agencies.
12.2 In the present case, the Inquiry Officer, after conducting a full-fledged inquiry and appreciating oral and documentary evidence, submitted his report dated 12.10.2012 holding all Articles of Charge as "NOT PROVED". Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority issued a disagreement note dated 14.02.2013 only in relation to Article of Charge No.V. The applicant submitted a detailed representation dated 25.02.2013 against the said disagreement note.Significantly, thereafter the matter remained pending for nearly two years without any progress. Ultimately, the Directorate General of Vigilance, CBEC forwarded the CVC‟s 2ndStage Advice dated 18.03.2015 recommending imposition of major penalty and simultaneously communicated a tentative disagreement note to be supplied to the applicant.
12.3 The chronology of events clearly demonstrates that immediately after receipt of the vigilance communication dated 31.03.2015, the Disciplinary Authority issued Memorandum dated 08.04.2015 forwarding the vigilance disagreement note and within a very short span thereafter passed the penalty order dated 17.04.2015.The manner in which the proceedings were processed gives substantial force to the applicant‟s contention that the Disciplinary Authority acted more under 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :28: OA No.180/430/2017 the influence of vigilance authorities than upon independent evaluation of the Inquiry Report and defence submissions.The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India vs. D.C. Aggarwal, reported in 1993 (1) SCC 13, held that where the disciplinary authority acts solely under the dictates of the vigilance department or external authorities without independent application of mind, the proceedings become vulnerable in law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the disciplinary authority must independently consider the material and cannot merely reproduce vigilance advice.Similarly, in Nagaraj Shivarao Karjagi vs. Syndicate Bank, reported in 1991 (3) SCC 219,the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that quasi-judicial discretion vested in the disciplinary authority cannot be surrendered to external agencies and any such abdication would render the decision-making process arbitrary.Further, in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L.K. Ratna, reported in 1986 (4) SCC 537, the Hon'ble Supreme Court emphasized that whenever statutory authorities exercise quasi-judicial powers affecting civil consequences, they are required to independently evaluate the matter and comply with principles of fairness and natural justice.
12.4In the present case, neither the CVC advice nor the vigilance communication reveals independent discussion regarding the favourable findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The Inquiry Officer had categorically held that the charges were not established on evidence. However, the vigilance authorities proceeded substantially on the basis that the applicant ought to have been "more vigilant" while scrutinizing documents.Merely because an officer could have exercised greater care cannot automatically justify reversal of a detailed Inquiry Report exonerating him, particularly in absence of any finding regarding mala fide intention, collusion or pecuniary benefit.At the same time, we are conscious of the settled legal position that consultation with vigilance authorities by itself does not automatically vitiate disciplinary proceedings. The proceedings become vulnerable only where the disciplinary authority completely abdicates its own discretion.
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12.5 In the present case, though the conduct of the respondents strongly indicates excessive dependence upon vigilance advice and mechanical processing of the matter after receipt of the CVC advice, the materials on record do not justify total annulment of the entire disciplinary proceedings solely on this ground, particularly when the Appellate Authority had already reduced the penalty substantially.Nevertheless, the facts clearly establish procedural unfairness and lack of proper independent consideration while differing from the Inquiry Officer‟s findings. This aspect, coupled with prolonged delay and inadequate reasoning, materially affects the sustainability of the impugned orders and therefore warrants interference to a limited extent.Accordingly, this issue is answered partly in favour of the applicant.
12. With regard to Issue No.(d) as noted in para 9 above, i.e., whether the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary, Appellate and Revisional Authorities are arbitrary, unsustainable and violative of principles of natural justice, the applicant has seriously assailed the impugned orders on the ground that the authorities failed to consider his defence objectively and passed non-speaking and mechanical orders.
12.1 It is now a settled principle of administrative law that disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities exercising quasi-judicial powers must pass reasoned and speaking orders. Recording of reasons is an integral facet of fairness, transparency and natural justice.
12.2 We have carefully perused the orders passed by the Disciplinary, Appellate and Revisional Authorities and find that the grounds raised by the applicant in his representation, appeal and revision have not been given due consideration by the said authority. Further, in the present case, the Inquiry Officer had exonerated the applicant from all charges after detailed appreciation of evidence. The Disciplinary Authority initially disagreed only with regard to Article of Charge No.V through Memorandum dated 14.02.2013. However, while passing the final penalty order dated 17.04.2015, the Disciplinary Authority proceeded to hold Article of Charge No.I also as proved. This action, in our 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :30: OA No.180/430/2017 considered opinion is legally unsustainable. Once the Disciplinary Authority had not expressed his disagreement with regard to Charge No.I, in the original disagreement note, it could not subsequently hold the said charge proved without specifically putting the applicant to notice and granting opportunity to represent against such proposed disagreement.
12.3 The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Punjab National Bank vs. Kunj Behari Misra reported in 1998 (7) SCC 84, categorically held that where the disciplinary authority proposes to differ from favourable findings of the Inquiry Officer, the delinquent employee must be informed of tentative reasons for disagreement and granted opportunity of hearing before recording adverse findings. Likewise, in Yoginath D. Bagde vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1999 (7) SCC 739, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that recording adverse findings without supplying disagreement reasons violates principles of natural justice.
12.4 The respondents‟ contention that Memorandum dated 08.04.2015 amounted to disagreement regarding Charge No.I cannot be accepted because the said memorandum merely forwarded vigilance advice and did not contain any independent or specific disagreement by the Disciplinary Authority concerning Charge No.I. Further, the Appellate Authority, while modifying the penalty, failed to properly deal with several substantial grounds raised by the applicant, including absence of disagreement regarding Charge No.I; Inquiry Officer‟s exoneration; inordinate delay in proceedings; alleged mechanical reliance upon vigilance advice; and discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis similarly situated officers. Instead, the Appellate Authority merely observed that the applicant attended the work "casually" and reduced the penalty.
12.5 Similarly, the Revisional Authority dismissed the revision application simply observing that no new grounds were raised warranting interference. Such cursory disposal cannot satisfy the requirements of a reasoned quasi-judicial determination. In Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. vs. Masood Ahmed Khan, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Hon‟ble 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :31: OA No.180/430/2017 Supreme Court held that reasons are the heartbeat of every judicial and quasi-judicial order and absence of reasons renders the order arbitrary. Similarly, in Roop Singh Negi vs. Punjab National Bank, reported in 2009 (2) SCC 570, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that disciplinary conclusions must be based upon legally admissible evidence and authorities must record reasons while affirming findings of guilt.
12.6 The Revisional Authority, in particular, failed to independently examine whether the proceedings suffered from procedural irregularities, delay or violation of natural justice. A revision cannot be rejected mechanically merely because no "new grounds" are raised, especially when substantial legal infirmities are pointed out. Thus, we hold that the impugned appellate and revisional orders suffer from serious non- application of mind and inadequate consideration of the applicant‟s defence. However, considering that the proceedings have attained finality long back; the applicant has already undergone the modified penalty; the Appellate Authority had substantially reduced the punishment; and remanding the matter after such prolonged passage of time would serve no useful purpose, therefore, we deem it appropriate to mould the relief instead of setting aside the entire proceedings.
12.6 Accordingly, the findings relating to Charge No.I deserve to be quashed and the applicant deserves consequential reconsideration in service matters, while the modified penalty imposed by the Appellate Authority may not require further interference. Thus, this issue is answered substantially in favour of the applicant.
13. With regard to Issue No.(e) as noted in para 9 above, i.e., whether the applicant was wrongly denied promotion and consequential service benefits on account of the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the admitted position on record is that the applicant‟s immediate juniors were promoted to the post of Superintendent on 15.10.2007 whereas the applicant‟s case was kept in sealed cover because of pendency of the disciplinary proceedings initiated on 04.10.2007.The applicant 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :32: OA No.180/430/2017 ultimately came to be promoted only in July, 2016 after culmination of disciplinary proceedings and undergoing the modified penalty.
13.1 The applicant has contended that the disciplinary proceedings remained pending for more than eight years entirely due to departmental delay and therefore he suffered grave prejudice in matters of promotion, seniority, pay fixation and career progression. This contention merits substantial acceptance. It is true that once disciplinary proceedings are pending, the sealed cover procedure becomes applicable in terms of service jurisprudence. However, the sealed cover procedure cannot be allowed to operate oppressively or indefinitely because prolonged departmental delay would otherwise permanently destroy the employee‟s promotional prospects. In Union of India vs. K.V. Jankiraman, reported in 1991 (4) SCC 109, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that the sealed cover procedure is only an interim arrangement and cannot be used to unjustly deny legitimate promotional benefits to an employee. Further, in State of Punjab vs. Chaman Lal Goyal, reported in 1995 SCC (2) 570, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that unexplained delay in disciplinary proceedings causing prejudice to career advancement constitutes an important factor warranting judicial interference.
13.2 The record clearly establishes that after submission of the Inquiry Report in October, 2012, the matter remained stagnant for nearly two years before the CVC advice was obtained. The applicant cannot be faulted for this delay. The respondents have also not disputed that the applicant ultimately suffered only a modified minor penalty of reduction of pay by two stages for six months without cumulative effect. Had the proceedings been concluded within a reasonable period, the applicant would have become eligible for consideration for promotion much earlier along with his juniors.
13.3 The applicant has also relied upon DoP&T O.M. dated 14.09.1992 regarding grant of ad hoc promotion after prolonged pendency of disciplinary proceedings. Though such promotion is not automatic and 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :33: OA No.180/430/2017 depends upon satisfaction of the competent authority, the spirit underlying the said O.M. is to ensure that employees do not suffer endlessly because of administrative delay.
13.4 The facts of the present case unmistakably reveal that the applicant suffered substantial prejudice in career progression due to extraordinary delay attributable largely to the department itself. At the same time, this Tribunal cannot ignore that ultimately some penalty did survive against the applicant upon modification by the Appellate Authority. Therefore, automatic retrospective regular promotion with full monetary arrears cannot be granted as a matter of course.
13.5 Balancing equities and applying settled principles of service law, we are of the considered opinion that the ends of justice would be met by directing the respondents to convene a Review DPC for reconsideration of the applicant‟s case for promotion from the date his immediate junior was promoted, keeping in view the modified penalty ultimately imposed. If found fit, the applicant shall be entitled to notional promotion; consequential fixation of pay; revision of seniority; recalculation of retiral/service benefits; and all consequential notional benefits. However, applying the principle of "no work no pay", the applicant shall not be entitled to actual arrears of salary for the retrospective period during which he did not actually work on the promotional post. This course would balance the prejudice caused to the applicant due to prolonged proceedings while simultaneously protecting administrative discipline. Accordingly, this issue is answered substantially in favour of the applicant and the OA deserves to be partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.
14. In the result, for the forgoing reasons, the impugned Order-in-Original dated 17.04.2015, the Order-in-Appeal dated 31.07.2015 and the Revisional Order dated 19.12.2016 are modified to the extent that the penalty imposed upon the applicant shall be treated as a minor penalty confined only for the limited purpose of record and shall not operate to deny the applicant consequential service benefits beyond the actual 2026.05.21 PRATIK VYAS 12:43:07+05'30' :34: OA No.180/430/2017 currency period of punishment already undergone by him. As such, the respondents are directed to convene a Review DPC for reconsideration of the applicant‟s case for promotion to the post of Superintendent from the date his immediate junior was promoted, keeping in view the modified effect of penalty as indicated hereinabove and in accordance with applicable rules/instructions governing sealed cover procedure and retrospective promotion.
14.1 In the event the applicant is found fit by the Review DPC, the respondents shall grant him notional promotion from the date his junior was promoted together with consequential fixation of pay, seniority and other admissible benefits. However, the applicant shall not be entitled to actual arrears of salary for the retrospective period and the benefits shall remain confined to notional fixation except for consequential retiral benefits.
14.2 The aforesaid exercise shall be completed by the respondents within a period of four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
15. Accordingly, the OA is partly allowed. No order as to costs.
(Hukum Singh Meena) (Jayesh V. Bhairavia)
Member (A) Member (J)
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2026.05.21
PRATIK VYAS
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