Madras High Court
Mohammed Arif And Ors. vs K.P.R. Jafarullah on 2 December, 1997
Equivalent citations: (1998)2MLJ399
JUDGMENT K. Govindarajan, J.
1. The tenants who suffered order of eviction before the authorities below have filed the above revisions.
2. The landlords are the owners of the shops of the premises in which the petitioners are the tenants. The landlord filed R.C.O.P. No. 24 of 1982 for eviction under Sections 10(2)(i) and 14(1)(a) of the Act 18 of 1960. The said R.C.O.R. relates to shop Nos. 8A and 8B situate in Kamaraj Street, Sirkali Town. The respondent filed R.C.O.P. No. 25 of 1982 to evict the tenant with respect to shop Nos. 8C and 8D under Sections 10(2)(i) and 14(1)(a) and 10(2)(iii) of the Act. The respondent also filed R.C.O.P. No. 26 of 1982 to evict the tenant with respect to shop Nos. 8E and 8F. of the said premises under Sections 10(2)(i) and (iii) and 14(1)(a) of the Act. The respondent has also filed R.C.O.P. No. 26" of 1984 against the tenant with respect to shop Nos. 8C and 8D of the said premises, under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Act. The learned Rent Controller, Sirkali, accepting the case of the landlord on all grounds, except the ground raised under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Act in R.C.O.P. No. 25 of 1982, ordered eviction. Aggrieved against the same, the tenants filed R.C.A. Nos. 16, 14, 17 and 22 of 1985 respectively. The learned Appellate Authority/Sub-Judge, Mayiladuthurai also concurred with the findings of the Rent Controller and dismissed the Appeals. Aggrieved against the same, the tenants have filed the C.R.P. Nos. 2990, 2989, 2991 and 2986 respectively.
3. With respect to the requirement of the landlord under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord brought to my notice that with respect to other shops, the landlord filed eviction proceedings along with the abovesaid proceedings, and those tenants filed C.R.P. Nos. 2986, 2988, 2992 and 2993 of 1986. In the said revisions, this Court confirmed the findings of the authorities below, regarding the ground raised under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, by the order dated 23.10.1986. Since the said ground is applicable to all the cases in common, I have to confirm the order of the authorities below in this regard. So, the order of eviction passed by the authorities below on the ground raised under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act, is hereby confirmed.
4. The remaining grounds to be decided are wilful default in payment of rent by the tenants and acts of waste by opening the doorway in the partition wall in between the two shops.
5. In R.C.O.P. No. 24 of 1982, it is the case of the landlord that the tenant has not paid rent from October, 1981 to August, 1982. There is no dispute about the quantum of monthly rent. Though the landlord has stated in paragraph 9 of the eviction petition that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent, and such default is a wilful one, the tenant filed a counter stating that there are no arrears of rent much less any wilful default. According to the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord, the tenant has not given the details as to when he paid the rent and what is the basis for such statement. In the evidence, the tenant has deposed that there were business dealings between him and the landlord and so he adjusted the rent from the amount payable by the landlord towards the business transaction. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant has brought to my notice that summons were served in R.C.O.P. No. 24 of 1982 on the same date when a sum of Rs. 1,200 was deposited, and the receipt was marked as Ex.R-21. He has also brought to my notice that the Appellate Authority has not given any finding with respect to the wilful intention on the part of the tenant for non-payment of the rent.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has brought to my notice that the Appellate Authority has not even discussed about the case in R.C.O.P. No. 25 of 1982 in his order. According to the landlord, the tenant failed to pay four months' rent, i.e., from May, 1982 to August, 1982. In the counter, the tenant has stated that the arrears of rent has already been paid and there is no arrears of rent. But, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant has brought to my notice that the petition was 'filed on 27.9.1982 and the summons had been served on 2.11.1982. But, even before that, on 13.10.82 the said arrears had been paid under Ex.R-22. The tenant has also paid the rent for September and October, 1982 on 2.11.1982. In R.C.O.P. No. 26 of 1982, it is the case of the landlord that the tenant had committed default in payment of rent the tenant had committed default in payment of rent for three months from June to August, 1982. Here also the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner/tenant has brought to my notice that the rent was paid on 29.9.1982 and the receipt of which has been marked as Ex.R-23.
7. From the abovesaid facts it will be clear that the tenants had paid the rent even before the effective date of hearing. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondent landlord has cited a number of decisions to show that the payment of rent subsequently will not cure the defect already committed by the tenants. But, after considering all those decisions and the recent decision of the Apex Court A.R. Lakshmarian, J., in Abdul Hameed v. Sultan Abdul Kader has held as follows:
In my opinion of course the appellate authority, has failed to take into account that to constitute wilful default, the default should be intentional, deliberate and with full knowledge of the legal consequences flowing therefrom. Admittedly, the entire arrears as on the date of the petition was paid along with the counter affidavit on the very first hearing. This would show that absolutely there is no wilful default in the payment of rent.
In view of the above dictum and on the basis of the facts stated above, I have to come to the conclusion that the findings of the authorities below that the tenants had committed default in payment of rent wilfully cannot be sustained in law. So, in this regard the orders of the courts below cannot be sustained and they are hereby set aside.
8. The other remaining ground to be considered is acts of waste as alleged by the landlord. Since the facts are common in R.C.O.P. Nos. 15 of 1984 and 26 of 1982 to the two tenants, I am not referring to the same with respect to the individual facts. According to the landlord, the shops bearing door Nos. 8C and 8D are separated by a wall. Similarly the shops bearing Door Nos. 8E and 8F are separated by a wall and the tenants had pulled down a portion of the wall and put up a doorway to have access from one shop to another. According to the landlord, the act of the tenants is unauthorised and without the consent of the landlord and has weakened the strength of the wall which supports the wall of the first floor of the premises and it has also materially impaired the value and utility of the building. In the counter filed by the tenant in R.C.O.P. No. 26 of 1982 there is no denial at all with respect to the abovesaid averment. To prove the case of the landlord he examined himself as RW. 1. RW.2 is a Civil Engineer. On the side of the tenants, the tenant examined himself as R.W. 1. No document was marked on the side of the tenants. On the side of the landlord, he marked the report and plan submitted by the Advocate-Commissioner in R.C.O.R. No. 15 of 1984 as Exs.C-7 and C-8. In the other R.C.O.P. No. 15 of 1984 in reply to the averment regarding the acts of waste, the tenant in para 2 of the counter has stated that he did not demolish the middle portion of the wall as alleged and it was there when the lease was granted. According to the tenant, no acts of waste had been committed and the building's utility was not impaired materially. The Rent Controller and the appellate authority accepting the case of the landlord found that the tenants alone had made such opening and it was not there at the time of lease, and, such opening will affect the strength of the building as well of the first floor rests on the wall of the ground floor.
9. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners/tenants has submitted that the landlord has not taken any steps to appoint an Engineer to inspect the building for the purpose of assessing the fact whether such an opening would affect the strength of the building. According to them, in the absence of any such evidence, the courts below are not correct in holding that the strength of the building would be affected in view of such opening in the walk. As submitted by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent/landlord in R.C.O.P.15 of 1984 as Advocate-Commissioner has been appointed and after inspection he has submitted his report. In the said report he has specifically stated that due to such opening the wall was hanging and there was no support to the hanging wall. There is evidence available on record to show that the wall on the first floor rests on the wall in which such opening was made and so the authorities below have come to the conclusion that the same will affect the strength of the wall of the first floor. Though the engineer, P.W.2 was mostly concentrating on the repair to the corridor, he has also deposed on the basis of his inspection that such an opening would affect the strength of the building. The learned Counsel appearing for the tenants has submitted that from the evidence it can be seen that the Engineer has not gone inside the shop and inspected the wall and so his suggestion cannot be accepted. Such a submission cannot be sustained. P.W.2 has been engaged by the landlord to repair the corridor, and, before that he would have inspected the entire building because, he had to put up a beam for the purpose of strengthening the corridor. So, the evidence of P.W.2 cannot be ignored on the basis of me submission made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. As a matter of fact, the tenant in R.C.O.P. No. 26 of 1982 has not at all denied the specific averment made in the petition.
10. In Associated Traders & Engineers Ltd. v. Alamelu Ammal , Fakkir Mohammed, J., has held as follows:
As regard the ground of act of waste is concerned, it is not disputed that the tenant has not obtained the written consent of the landlady. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that after all the tenant has made an opening in the wall dividing two rooms for the purpose of easy access in using the ground floor as a godown. There is no record to prove that the tenant obtained the consent of the landlady formaking an opening in the wall, which had divided two rooms. The said act of making an opening in the main wall, which divides two rooms, without the consent of the landlady will certainly amount to an act of waste. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent herein in a storied building, like the demised building, making an opening in the wall will definitely weaken the strength of the wall and in the long run it will weaken the building.
The above decision will squarely apply to the facts of the present case.
11. Further, the Apex Court, while dealing with the acts of waste, consistently has taken the view that the acts of waste have to be agitated and determined from the point of view of the landlord and not that of the tenant or anyone else. In Gurbachan Singh v. Shivalak Rubber Industries , has held as follows:
Thus, the ground for eviction of a tenant would be available to a landlord against the tenant under Section 13(2)(iii) of the Act, if it is established that the tenant has committed such acts as are likely to diminish the quality, strength or value of the building or the rented land has considerably affected its use for some desirable purpose. The decrease or deterioration, in other words the impairment of the worth and usefulness or the value and utility of the building or rented land has to be judged and determined from the point of view of the landlord and not of the tenant or anyone else.
12. In Shanmugam v. C. Kannabiran and Anr. (1996)2 L. W. 322, S.S. Subramani, J., has held as follows:
The other ground of eviction is 'acts of waste' alleged to have been committed by the revision petitioner. Admittedly, some changes have been made by the tenant. He may plead that the changes that have been made have not impaired the utility of the building. He may also contend that what he has done has only added to its value. In this case, the evidence that has been let in is that he has put up a sun-shade, dug holes in the floor and has effected changes for making, it convenient to run a watch repairing shop. Even if it is contended that it is only temporary, a big hall has now been converted into small rooms and made use of for different purpose. While considering as to how far these changes have impaired materially the utility, and value of the building, the same has to be judged and determined from the print of view of the landlord, and not that of the tenant.
13. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the appellant authority has not at all applied his mind independently. He simply confirmed the order of the Rent Controller. In answering to this submissions, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has submitted that while confirming the order of the Rent Controller, the appellate authority need not give reasoning and so on that basis the order cannot be treated as illegal. In support of his submission, the learned Counsel has relied on the decision in Girijanandini v. Bijendra Narain , in which the Apex Court has held has follows:
It is not the duty of the appellate, court when it agrees with the view of the trial court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice.
14. Surqj Prasad v. Ram Charitar Singh , the Division Bench of Patna High Court has held as follows:
The parties are entitled to a consideration by the appellate court of the evidence on the points raised by them and judgment should contain the grounds on which the decision of the appellate court is based. It is not sufficient for the appellate court to state in general terms that it agrees with the reasoning of the Subordinate Court; although, in a judgment of affirmance, it is not necessary that the, appellate court should repeat all that has been said by the Subordinate Court, there must be a sufficient discussion to show that it has applied its own mind to the evidence. Fortunately, the point has been dealt with by the Subordinate Judge very completely and carefully, and on a perusal of the judgment as a whole, I do not think an interference is called for.
15. In view of the above, the acts of waste as found by the authorities below certainly be regarded as one involving material impairment of the premises affecting its strength and intrinsic work of the demised premises from the point of view of the respondent/landlord within the meaning of Section 10(2)(iii) of the Act. The authorities below have come to the conclusion on the basis of evidence available on record that the tenants had committed acts of waste. Since it is based on evidence, I am not inclined to interfere with such finding especially by exercising the revisional jurisdiction.
16. In view of the above, the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller is sustained under Section 10(2)(iii) of the Act. Accordingly, these revisions are dismissed. No costs.
These petitions having been posted this day for being mentioned in the presence of Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, advocate for the petitioners in all the petitions and of Mr. P. Veeraraghavan, advocate for the respondent in all the petitions, the court made the following order : At the instance of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, the above cases are posted for being mentioned.
2. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioners in so far as Civil Revision Petition No. 2990 of 1986 in concerned, this Court has confirmed the order of eviction passed by the authorities under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. On that basis, the learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the tenant is entitled for repossession after the premises is repaired. Though it has not been stated so in the order the tenant is entitled to the rights given under Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. The order is clarified on the above lines.