Patna High Court
Indra Deo Tiwary vs Sahdeo Rai And Ors. on 20 December, 1977
Equivalent citations: 1977(25)BLJR367
JUDGMENT Madan Mohan Prasad, J.
1. This is an application in revision directed against an order by which the court of appeal below disagreeing with the trial court has held that a suit has not abated.
2. The plaintiff instituted a suit for confirmation of possession and partition alleging that his father and the defendants' ancestor who happened to be his father's brother, had become tenants of certain lands. It is said that there was a proceeding under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure between the plaintiff and defendant first party which was decided against him. Hence he filed a suit for a declaration that he and defendants first party both were in possession of the lands and were entitled to equal shares, and further he prayed for a partition of the lands accordingly. It appears that one of the defendants, defendant No. 7, died on the 13th of June, 1966, the date alleged by the petitioner who is defendant No. 5. On the 19th of August, 1966, the plaintiff made an application to the court drawing its attention to the fact defendant No. 7 was dead and intimating that his heirs, namely, his sons, were already on the record and that the fact be noted. It appears that the defendants appeared in September, 1966 and filed written statement. Thereafter issues were settled and the suit could not be taken up for hearing for some time. When it was taken up the plaintiff adduced evidence and the plaintiff's evidence was closed. Thereafter the defendants started examining their witnesses. During the course of the hearing thus on the 24th of February, 1971, the defendants filed a petition that the suit had abated on the ground that defendant No. 7 Sheonandan Tewari had died leaving behind not only the sons who were on the record but also four daughters who were not impleaded. The plaintiff denied the existence of the daughters which led to an enquiry and ultimately a finding that he had left four daughters as stated by the defendants. The trial Court thus held that the suit had abated on account of their not being impleaded as parties. The appallate court reversed the findings. Hence this application.
3. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that from the circumstances of the present case it appears that the plaintiff had deliberately omitted to implead the daughters in the place of their deceased father and as such the doctrine of representation which has been applied to the facts of the present case by the lower appellate court Could not apply and thus the suit must be deemed to have abated. In this connection counsel has placed reliance on a finding of the trial court wherein the learned Munsif says that it appears that the plaintiff had deliberately omitted to implead the daughters. The lower appellate court has not gone into this point. Counsel for the opposite party has, however, urged that the finding is on the face of it erroneous because there is no evidence in the case to show that they knew about the existence of these daughters and yet falsely alleged about their non-existence. The question arises whether the denial of the existence of daughters could be said to be false to the knowledge of the plaintiff. Question further arises whether the plaintiff could have got any benefit by denying the existence of the daughters. He would make a deliberate denial only when he could get any advantage thereof. The present suit was one for declaration that the defendant first party and the plaintiff both are entitled to the property and for partition of the lands between them as such. The suit is not meant for dividing the lands between the defendants inter se. In other words, in the present suit whether the daughters are there or not, the point to be decided is common between them and their brothers who are already on record. In other words, there is no special case which the daughters could have made out which cannot be considered in their absence, though their brothers are on record. Next, there does not appear to be any reason to say that the plaintiff would get any benefit out of the non-impleading of the daughters. He claims only half share in their property and the other half is to go the defendants admittedly. The question as to whether the daughters would be entitled to any share in the latter is not a matter which is going to be decided in the suit. The plaintiff can get at best his Half share or at the worst nothing. There does not at all appear any good reason for saying that he had deliberately not impleaded the daughters knowing fully well about their existence.
4. There is another aspect of the matter which has to be considered. It has been laid down in Mahablr Prasad v. Jage Ram and Ors. if the estate of the deceased is represented by some of the heirs on record, the non-impleading of the other heirs will not result in the abatement of the suit. This principle is subject to the rider that unless the plaintiff's conduct shows that he is guilty of fraud and collusion it would be so. (See Harihar Prasad Singh and Ors. v. Balmiki Prasad Singh and Ors. .) It has been observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Harihar Prasad Singh (supra) that "the fraud contemplated is a fraud or collusion between the parties on the record to the detriment of the legal representative who has not been brought on record." The trial court has not given any such finding and in fact there could be no such finding in the present case. It is obvious that in the present case the shares of the daughters were not in question. Therefore, neither their brothers nor the plaintiff could have any motive for keeping them out of this case. There could not thus be any collusion between the plaintiff and the sons of deceased defendant No. 7 to the detriment of the four daughters. The trial court had thus wrongly held that the suit had abated because of the deliberate omission to implead the daughters.
5. The circumstances of this case must be taken note of in order to find out whether the omission was deliberate. As stated earlier, the defendants had appeared as far back as September, 1966. According to their own statement, defendant No. 7 had died on 13th June, 1966. They never raised the question of the daughters not being impleaded until after the evidence of the plaintiff had been closed and their own evidence had started being taken. The plaintiff on his part had already taken steps even before the appearance of the defendants for substitution of the sons in place of their father, defendant No. 7. The denial of the existence of daughters by the plaintiff in the year 1971 could not be said to prove that he had deliberately ommitted to bring them on the record in the year 1966. I can understand that the denial at this stage was in order to meet the argument that the suit had abated. That cannot be related back to the date of their petition in the year 1966. There does not appear to be any good reason in the circumstances of the present case that in the year 1966, when the plaintiff had filed the petition for substitution, he knew that these daughters existed. It had been stated at the Bar that all the daughters are married and live at different places and their existence thus may not have been known to the plaintiff. Be that as it may, there is no circumstance in the present case which would suggest that when the plaintiff had taken steps to implead the sons of defendant No. 7. within the time allowed by law, he had deliberately omitted to implead the daughters. On the other hand, the conduct of the defendants itself appears to be unfair. If they knew about the existence of the daughters, it was for them to raise the objection at the earliest, but they sat tight over the matter for five years and that too until the evidence of the plaintiff had been closed.
6. The trial court committed an error of law in saying that the interest of the daughters could not be represented by the sons and for that reason there had been an abatement. The correct approach in law is to find out whether the estate of the deceased has been represented sufficiently. It is not the estate which has come into the hands of the different heirs which has to be represented. If that were so, the estate of X could not be represented by Y who got another share and which became his own estate. If the estate of the deceased is sufficiently represented by one or more of his heirs, then even in the absence of the heirs who have not been impleaded, the estate would be deemed to have been represented and that is the purport of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Mahabir Prasad (supra). The court of appeal has rightly applied the principle laid down therein and thus come to be a correct conclusion.
7. In the result, there is no merit in this application. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 32/- only.