Karnataka High Court
The Commissioner vs Sri Manoji John Thomas on 25 September, 2025
Author: Hanchate Sanjeevkumar
Bench: Hanchate Sanjeevkumar
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920
RFA No. 1355 of 2019
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1355 OF 2019 (DEC/INJ)
BETWEEN:
THE COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
BY ITS COMMISSIONER,
T. CHOWDAIAH ROAD,
KUMARA PARK WEST,
BENGALURU-560 020.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI. JAGADEESWARA N.R., ADVOCATE)
AND:
SRI MANOJI JOHN THOMAS
S/O LATE SRI K. JOHN THOMAS,
AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
#53 DACOSTA LAYOUT,
ST. THOMAS TOWN POST,
BENGALURU-560 084.
Digitally signed
by RAMYA D REP. BY GENERAL POWER
Location: HIGH OF ATTORNEY HOLDER
COURT OF SRI RANJAN JOHN THOMAS,
KARNATAKA
S/O LATE SRI K. JOHN THOMAS,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
#53, DACOSTA LAYOUT,
ST. THOMAS TOWN POST,
BENGALURU-560 084.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. V. LAXMI NARAYAN, SENIOR COUNSEL A/W
SRI. RAMA MOORTHY B.V., ADVOCATE)
THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 READ WITH
ORDER XLI RULE 1 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE DATED 20.01.2018 PASSED IN O.S.NO.25141/2015
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920
RFA No. 1355 of 2019
HC-KAR
ON THE FILE OF IV ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS
JUDGE, MAYOHALL UNIT, BENGALURU, DECREEING THE SUIT
FOR DECLARATION AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION.
THIS RFA HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED,
COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY,
THE COURT DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR
CAV JUDGMENT
The Regular First Appeal is filed by the appellant/defendant challenging the judgment and decree dated 20.01.2018 passed in OS.No.25141/2015 by IV Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru (CCH-21), thereby, the suit filed for declaration and permanent injunction is decreed.
2. For the sake of convenience and easy reference, the parties are referred to as per their rankings before the trial Court.
3. The plaintiff has filled the suit for declaration and permanent injunction by stating various facts and prays for declaration. The trial Court has held that the plaintiff proves that he was in lawful possession and -3- NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR enjoyment of the suit property as on the date of the suit. The defendant was trying to dispossess the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit. The trial Court after considering the evidence on record of both sides has decreed the suit. Being agreed by it, the defendant has preferred the present regular first appeal and there is a delay of 403 days in filing the appeal.
4. The respondent/plaintiff has filed the objection to the said application filed for condonation of delay.
5. Now, this Court has taken up this appeal for considering I.A.No.1/2019 filed for condonation of delay in the context of arguments canvassed by the counsels appearing for the parties and considering the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court for considering the application for condonation of delay without going into merits involved in the case. -4-
NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR
6. Heard the arguments of learned counsel appearing for both parties and perused the materials on record.
7. The point that arises for consideration before this Court is as follows:
(i) Whether the appellant/defendant, under the facts and circumstances involved in the case, deposed in the affidavit and better affidavit filed in support of applications for condonation of delay makes out sufficient ground for condoning the delay of 403 days in preferring the appeal?
8. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant submitted that there is a delay of 403 days in filing the appeal and submitted with reference to the depositions made in the affidavit that due to official transactions for taking legal opinion for preferring the appeal some delay has been caused and the delay is for bonafide reasons. Therefore, prays to condone the delay. -5-
NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR
9. Also the learned counsel with reference to the better affidavit has submitted that with detailed reference to the dates and events of moving the files for seeking legal opinion, delay has been caused. Therefore, prays to condone the delay.
10. On the other hand, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that, absolutely, there is no single ground made out for condonation of delay and the appeal filed is bonafide one. Learned Senior counsel further submitted that even in the affidavit filed initially in support of the application, absolutely, there is no deposition except some bald statements that the file was moved to various sections for seeking permission to file the appeal and to give replies; some considerable time has been lapsed. Except these reasons, there is no reason for condonation of delay.
11. Also the learned Senior counsel with reference to the depositions in the better affidavit submitted that -6- NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR there is no depositions regarding what is stated in the first and second affidavit what has happened within the period of limitation to cause delay. Therefore, submitted that when certain period is fixed for preferring the appeal and the appeal is not filed within the said period of limitation, then the delay has to be explained as to what action has been taken in that period of limitation and what are the reasons beyond control in not preferring the appeal could be stated, otherwise, it cannot be said that there is sufficient grounds for condonation of delay, but that is lacking in the explanation offered by the appellant/defendant. Therefore, prays to dismiss the appeal on the ground as bald by limitation.
12. In support of his submission, he places reliance on the following decisions:
1) The Commissioner, Bengaluru Development Authority Vs. Sri Manoji John Thomas - RFA No.1216/2019 DD. 14.07.2025
2) Shivamma (Dead) by LRs., Vs. Karnataka Housing Board and Others - Civil Appeal No.11794/2025 -7- NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR
3) Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd - AIR 1962 SC 361
4) Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another Vs. State of Gujarat - (1981) 1 SCC 495
5) State of Bihar and Others Vs. Deo Kumar Singh and Others - (2022) 16 SCC 483
6) Infosys Limited Vs. B. Raju & Others - SLP (CIVIL) DIARY NO(S).39827/2025
7) State of Uttar Pradesh and Others Vs. Satish Chand Shivhare and Brothers - 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2151
8) The Bengaluru Development Authority Vs. Sri Sanjay John Thomas - RFA No.530/2021 DD: 22.07.2025
9) The Bengaluru Development Authority Vs. Sri Ranjan John Thomas - RFA No.527/2021 DD: 22.07.2025
10) The Bengaluru Development Authority Vs. Mrs. Susamma Thomas Daniel - RFA No.982/2021 DD: 22.07.2025
13. Upon considering the depositions made in the application filed at the initial stage and in the first affidavit, the appellant has explained the delay at paragraph No.3, which reads as follows: -8-
NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR "3. I submit that immediately after the receipt of the judgment and decree along with the connected papers, the file was moved to obtain various sections for seeking permission to file appeal and in order to receive their replies some considerable time has been lapsed and hence there was a delay in obtaining the permission for filing the appeal. Since the files were moved from one section to another some considerable time has been consumed and due to the aforesaid bonafide reasons, the delay in filing the appeal is caused."
14. The above said paragraph is no more required for any discussion. Further this Court has directed to file better affidavit and therefore, the Special Land Acquisition Officer of the appellant has filed the better affidavit. It is better to extract paragraph Nos.3 and 4 in the better affidavit, which reads as follows:
"3. I further state that after the judgment and decree passed by the Hon'ble trial court, the certified copy of the same was sent to the authority by the counsel on record on 28.05.2018 with an opinion to file Appeal against the said judgment and decree and the same was received by the Land acquisition department on 23.07.2018 for further action. I further state that in furtherance to that, the same was sent to the Commissioner BDA for approval to file an Appeal against the said judgment and decree, after the approval from the Commissioner BDA, the same was entrusted to the counsel on record to prepare the Appeal and file the same before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka on 31.07.2018 and the counsel on record have received the same on 07.08.2018 which is forthcoming in the note sheet maintained by the appellant authority.-9-
NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR
4. I further state that after receiving the concerned papers from our department, the counsel on record have secured the copies of the entire evidence adduced by the parties along with connected case papers from the Hon'ble trial court by applying the same which consumed some considerable time and after securing the same, the counsel on record have prepared the draft appeal memorandum and sent the same to our department for verification and approval of the draft appeal memorandum, and after through verification, the draft was approved by our concerned department as well as the Commissioner BDA and after completion of the said proceedings, the counsel on record have filed the same before the Hon'ble Court and thereby caused considerable delay in filing the same and the cause for such delay is neither intentional nor deliberate one."
15. On plain reading of both the affidavits and statements, can it be said that there is sufficient explanation offered by the appellant to condone the delay in the background of legal principles declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in catena of decisions on this aspect is to be considered.
16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another Vs. State of Gujarat1 at paragraph No.6 observed as follows: 1
(1981) 1 SCC 495
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR "6. At the outset, it is urged by learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal, and the appeal should have been dismissed as barred by limitation. We have examined the facts carefully. It appears that initially the State Government took a decision not to file an appeal and it allowed the period of limitation to lapse. Subsequently, on certain observations made by the High Court while considering a revision petition by Bhulabhai that it was a fit case where the State Government should file an appeal and on notice being issued by the High Court to the State Government in the matter, the appeal was filed. It was filed three months after limitation had expired. A faint attempt was made to show that when the initial decision was taken not to file an appeal all the papers had not been considered by the department concerned, but we are not impressed by that allegation. The truth appears to be that the appeal was not filed at first because the State Government saw no case on the merits for an appeal, and it was filed only because the High Court had observed -- and that was long after limitation had expired -- that the case was fit for appeal by the State Government. Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay."
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited2 in the context of making interpretation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act with reference to the word "within such period" has observed at paragraph No.8 as follows:
"8. Now, what do the words "within such period" denote? It is possible that the expression "within such period" may sometimes mean during such period. But the question is : Does the context in which the expression occurs in Section 5 justify the said interpretation? If the Limitation Act or any other appropriate statute prescribes different periods of limitation either for appeals or applications to which Section 5 applies that normally means that liberty is given to the party intending to make the appeal or to file an application to act within the period prescribed in that behalf. It would not be reasonable to require a party to take the necessary action on the very first day after the cause of action accrues. In view of the period of limitation prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time and to file the appeal on any day during the said period; and so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it should be called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed. In our opinion, it would be immaterial and even irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence of parties in construing the words of Section 5. The context seems to suggest that "within such period" means within the period which ends with the last day of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling 2 AIR 1962 SC 361
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR under Section 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. To hold that the expression "within such period" means during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in the context. We would accordingly hold that the learned Judicial Commissioner was in error in taking the view that the failure of the appellant to account for its non- diligence during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal necessarily disqualified it from praying for the condonation of delay, even though the delay in question was only for one day; and that too was caused by the party's illness."
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case between Shivamma (Dead) by LRs., Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others3 were pleased to deal with exhaustively on the jurisprudence of law of limitation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court with reference to various judgments delivered earlier has interpreted "what is sufficient cause"
in Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Hon'ble Supreme 3 CIVIL APPEAL NO.11794/2025 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.10704/2019)
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR Court at paragraph Nos.123, 124, 125, 126 & 127 observed as follows:
"123. From above, it is manifest that the phrase "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is an expression of elastic import, incapable of precise definition, yet not without boundaries. Its purpose is to empower courts to advance the cause of justice by preventing genuine litigants from being shut out on account of unavoidable delays. At the same time, it is equally clear that the phrase is not a charter for indolence or a device to revive stale claims that the law of limitation otherwise extinguishes.
124. The burden to establish sufficient cause lies upon the party seeking condonation, and the court must be satisfied that the cause is real, bona fide, and free of negligence. Sufficiency of cause is to be determined contextually, on the totality of circumstances, with due regard to the conduct of the applicant and the prejudice caused to the opposite party. The inquiry is not mechanical but principled, resting on the dual pillars of bona fides and diligence.
125. The expression "sufficient cause" is not itself a loose panacea for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims. The expression is to be construed with justice-oriented flexibility so as not to punish innocent litigants for circumstances beyond their control.
126. Courts must not condone gross negligence, deliberate inaction, or casual indifference, for to do so would undermine the maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium and destabilise the certainty that limitation law seeks to secure.
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127. The expression "sufficient cause" must be construed in a manner that advances substantial justice while preserving the discipline of limitation. The courts are not to be swayed by sympathy or technical rigidity, but rather by a judicious appraisal of whether the applicant acted with reasonable diligence in pursuing the remedy. Where explanation is bona fide, plausible, and consistent with ordinary human conduct, courts have leaned towards condonation. Where negligence, want of good faith, or a casual approach is discernible, condonation has been refused."
19. Further in the very same judgment notwithstanding the case is a strong case on merits is not a case for condonation of delay. It is observed at paragraph Nos.140 and 141 as follows:
"140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether "sufficient cause" has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay.
141. Test of "sufficient cause" cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain."
20. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court discussed on this point that difference in a case where the delay was attributable to a private litigant and a case where the delay was occasioned on part of the State or its instrumentalities wherein it is observed at paragraph Nos.178, 179, 180 and 181 as follows:
"178. What can be discerned from the aforesaid is that, the position of law, as it originally stood, was that there existed a marked difference in a case where the delay was attributable to a private litigant and a case where the delay was occasioned on part of the State or its instrumentalities. This distinction was founded on the impersonal character of public authorities, where no one public officer has any vested individual interest in diligently espousing the State's cause. This resultantly rendered the actions of the State and its instrumentalities qualitatively different from those of private individuals who are motivated to act in their own cause.
179. Unlike a private litigant, where the State or any of its instrumentalities happens to be the litigant in a lis, the decision to prefer an appeal or file an application is seldom the result of a singular
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR will; rather, it emerges from a collective exercise involving procedural compliance, legal opinion, administrative authorization and responsible officers bound by rigid protocols and established hierarchies. Consequently, it was an accepted norm that unavoidable delays would inevitably arise in its litigation, not out of any want of diligence or mala fides, but as a by-product of the bureaucratic processes.
180. One another reason why this distinction assumed significances was for the reason that, if the cause espoused by the Government is non- suited merely on the ground of delay, the ultimate prejudice is not restricted just to the Government as a litigant. The real brunt of such dismissal falls upon the public at large, for it is the public exchequer and, consequently, public interest that stand to suffer. Unlike in the case of private parties, where the consequences of dismissal may remain confined to the litigants themselves, the dismissal of a proceeding initiated by the State has a cascading effect, as it directly impacts the community whose interests the State represents. Adoption of a rigid and uncompromising standard towards the State in matters of condonation of delay, would, in substance, punish the public for delays that are occasioned by systemic and institutional constraints rather than by deliberate inaction or negligence.
181. It is in light of the aforesaid, the understanding which prevailed was that, for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in cases where condonation of delay is sought by the State or any of its instrumentalities, there the courts should not apply the standard of strict scrutiny that is ordinarily applied to private parties. Instead, a pragmatic approach must be adopted that acknowledges the practical realities of governmental functioning and accords some latitude to the State, consistent with the maxim; 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia' i.e., the law does not compel the impossible. The courts ought to remain mindful of the proverbially slow pace at
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR which governmental decisions often move, weighed down by procedural encumbrances and institutional delays. A certain degree of latitude, therefore, must be extended to the State and its instrumentalities in matters concerning the condonation of delay, lest the rigidity of limitation operate to the detriment of public interest."
21. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that whether liberal approach is to be adopted in matters of condonation of delay, such indulgence cannot be extended in cases where the delay is attributable to serious latches or negligence on the part of the State, which is observed at paragraph Nos.194, 195, 196 and 197 as follows:
"194. In Amalendu Kumar Bera v. State of West Bengal reported in (2013) 4 SCC 52 this Court held that although a liberal approach is to be adopted in matters of condonation of delay, such indulgence cannot be extended in cases where the delay is attributable to serious laches or negligence on the part of the State. Delays as a result of the official business of the government requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. It held that delay should not be condoned mechanically in the absence of "sufficient cause" merely because the party happens to be the State. The relevant observations read as under: -
"9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and the learned counsel appearing for the respondent State. There is no dispute that the expression "sufficient cause" should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR rather than the technical detection of "sufficient cause" for explaining every day's delay. However, it is equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India v. Nripen Sarma [(2013) 4 SCC 57 : AIR 2011 SC 1237] the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the appellant Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation.
10. In the instant case as noticed above, admittedly earlier objection filed by the respondent State under Section 47 of the Code was dismissed on 17-8-2010. Instead of challenging the said order the respondent State after about one year filed another objection on 15-9-2011 under Section 47 of the Code which was finally rejected by the executing court. It was only after a writ of attachment was issued by the executing court that the respondent preferred a civil revision against the first order dated 17-8-2010 along with a petition for condonation of delay. Curiously enough in the application for condonation of delay no sufficient cause has been shown which would entitle the respondent to get a favourable order for condonation of delay. True it is, that
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR courts should always take liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay, particularly when the appellant is the State but in a case where there are serious laches and negligence on the part of the State in challenging the decree passed in the suit and affirmed in appeal, the State cannot be allowed to wait to file objection under Section 47 till the decree-holder puts the decree in execution. As noticed above, the decree passed in the year 1967 was in respect of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the respondent State from interfering with the possession of the suit property of the appellant-plaintiff. It is evident that when the State tried to interfere with possession the decree-holder had no alternative but to levy the execution case for execution of the decree with regard to interference with possession. In our opinion their delay in filing the execution case cannot be a ground to condone the delay in filing the revision against the order refusing to entertain objection under Section 47 CPC. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court while deciding the petition for condoning the delay. Merely because the respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in the absence of "sufficient cause" delay shall not be condoned."
(Emphasis supplied)
195. The view taken in the decision of Postmaster General (supra) also came to be endorsed and followed by this Court in State of U.P. v. Amar Nath Yadav reported in (2014) 2 SCC
422.
196. In State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Bherulal reported in (2020) 10 SCC 654 this Court expressed its deep anguish over the routine manner in which the State and its instrumentalities continue to seek condonation of delay on the pretext of
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR bureaucratic inefficiencies. It held that the earlier decisions that had afforded a degree of leeway for such inefficiencies no longer reflects the correct position of law insofar as condonation of delay is concerned. This Court held that in view of the decision of Postmaster General (supra), any delay as a result of unavailability of the documents or the process of arranging for them through bureaucratic process works is no longer an acceptable reason or excuse to condone such delay. The relevant observations read as under: -
"2. We are constrained to pen down a detailed order as it appears that all our counselling to the Government and government authorities has fallen on deaf ears i.e. the Supreme Court of India cannot be a place for the Governments to walk in when they choose ignoring the period of limitation prescribed. We have raised the issue that if the government machinery is so inefficient and incapable of filing appeals/petitions in time, the solution may lie in requesting the legislature to expand the time period for filing limitation for government authorities because of their gross incompetence. That is not so. Till the statute subsists, the appeals/petitions have to be filed as per the statutes prescribed.
3. No doubt, some leeway is given for the government inefficiencies but the sad part is that the authorities keep on relying on judicial pronouncements for a period of time when technology had not advanced and a greater leeway was given to the Government [LAO v. Katiji]. This position is more than elucidated by the judgment of this Court in Postmaster General v. Living Media (India) Ltd. [...]
4. A reading of the aforesaid application shows that the reason for such an inordinate delay is stated to be only "due to unavailability of the documents and the process of arranging the documents". In para 4, a reference has been
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR made to "bureaucratic process works, it is inadvertent that delay occurs".
xxx xxx xxx
6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as "certificate cases". The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible for the same bears the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the counsel appear to address on merits without referring even to the aspect of limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation.
(Emphasis supplied)
197. This Court in Bherulal (supra) further cautioned that where any public authority persists in approaching the courts for condonation of delay on such feeble and untenable grounds would not only be denied the indulgence of condonation but would also be imposed with costs for wastage of judicial time. The relevant observations read as under: -
7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage of judicial time which
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible."
(Emphasis supplied)
22. Further the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe at paragraph Nos.261, 262, 263 and 264 as follows:
"261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned order of the High Court deserves to be set aside. Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it appropriate to make it abundantly clear that administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we want to convey an emphatic message to all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State- machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or its instrumentalities, and should remain extra cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State-authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until sufficient cause exists, as by
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR doing so the courts only add insult to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what worries us is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very threshold, because, say if a party litigating against the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse the process of law."
23. Based on the above principles of law laid down, the explanations offered in the present case is to be considered. At the initial stage, when the affidavit is filed, explanation is that after receipt of judgment and decree along with connected papers, the file was moved to various sections to obtain permission to file the appeal and in order to receive their reply some considerable time has
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR been lapsed and therefore, there was delay in obtaining permission for filing the appeal.
24. It is the only explanation that the files were moving from one section to another section, hence delay is caused. This is more elaborated in better affidavit just for mentioning few dates of events that the file was moved on such and such date to this section and that section and even in better affidavit also, there is no sufficient cause shown to condone the delay. If there is any delay in filing the appeal, the reasons should be within the prescribed period of limitation what is the reason in not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period has to be stated clearly. The explanations offered after completion of limited period in all the circumstances cannot be said to be sufficient cause. Here there is no explanation by the appellant within the limitation period as to what was the impediment and what is the genuine reason in not preferring the appeal is not stated. Except bald statements
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR in the depositions, there was no sufficient explanation offered by the appellant.
25. It is true that the appellant being a Government entity, quite naturally, some delay might have been occurred, but such delay must be explained sufficiently. Absolutely, there is no explanation soon after receipt of certified copy of decree and till the time of completion of limited period, if there was genuine attempt made, then what are the circumstances beyond control of the Department in not preferring the appeal is absolutely not explained. Even after completion of limitation period, it is only stated that the files were moving from one section to another section for seeking opinion and not more than that. Further where there is a delay, the merits of the matter cannot be discussed. Therefore, for the reasons as above discussed, the appellant/defendant has not made out sufficient cause to condone the delay.
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR
26. Also the learned Senior counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that the appellant has adopted the method of pick and choose to prefer the appeal where several cases are standing on the same platform. In some cases, the Appellate Authority is filing appeal and in some other cases, not choosing to prefer the appeal causing discrimination for the best reasons known to the appellant. Therefore, submitted that the Appellate Authority is showing one of such attitude by adopting pick and choose method in preferring the appeal. Considering the length of period of delay and explanation offered in the affidavit, I find force in the submission made by the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent/plaintiff.
27. In the present case, the subject matter of the suit site is in Survey No.36/2 at Hennur Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. There was several sites were formed and converted into litigations in one or other way. The site holders in the said Survey No.36/2 have filed
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR various suits before the City Civil Court and also all the suits were decreed in favour of the site owners. The BDA has filed the appeals, but the said appeals were dismissed as it is barred by limitation and also the BDA has preferred the appeal against the judgment and decree suffered by BDA in other cases. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel has filed the list of said cases along with the judgments, which are as under:
SOME OF THE SUIT/APPEALS IN RESPECT OF THE PROPERTY BEARING SY.NO.36/2 OF HENNUR VILLAGE, MEASURING 1 ACRE 36 GUNTAS SL SUIT APPEALS FILED BY BDA DATE OF REASON FOR NO DISMISSAL DISMISSAL
1. OS NO.25142/2015 RFA 1216/2019 14.07.2025 365 DAYS BDA DELAY IN MANOJI JOHN THOMAS V. PREFERRING V. MANOJI JOHN THOMAS THE APPEAL BDA
2. OS NO. 25138/2015 RFA 530/2021 BDA 22.07.2025 SANJAY JOHN THOMAS V. 426 DAYS V. SANJAY JOHN THOMAS DELAY IN BDA PREFERRING THE APPEAL
3. OS NO. 27090/2011 RFA 527/2021 22.07.2025 774 DAYS RANJAN JOHN THOMAS BDA DELAY IN V. V. PREFERRING BDA RANJAN JOHN THOMAS THE APPEAL
4. OS NO.26918/2011 RFA 982/2021 22.07.2025 Dismissed for SUSAMMA T DANIEL BDA the delay of 642 V. V. DAYS IN BDA SUSAMMA T DANIEL PREFERRING THE APPEAL
5. OS NO. 25179/2015 RFA NO 526/2021 08.06.2023 DISMISSED SANJAY JOHN THOMAS BDA FOR NON V. V. PROSECUTION BDA SANJAY JOHN THOMAS
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR LIST OF CASES OF THE ADJACENT SITES IN THE SAME SURVEY NUMBER 36/2 OF HENNUR VILLAGE, WHERE APPELLANT BDA HAS NOT PREFERRED APPEAL AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE, SUFFERED BY BDA Sl.No. SUIT DETAILS OF APPEAL DATE OF JUDGMENT AND DECREE
1. OS NO.25428/2015 APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN 08.12.2017 PREFERRED BY BDA RANJAN JOHN THOMAS V. BDA
2. OS NO.26917/2011 APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN 23.03.2018 PREFERRED OOMEN VARGHESE V. BDA
3. OS NO. 26158/2016 APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN 04.12.2018 PREFERRED RANJAN JOHN THOMAS V. BDA
4. OS NO. 26962/2011 APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN 11.12.2015 PREFERRED P. DANIEL VARGHESE V. BDA
5. OS NO. 26508/2011 APPEAL HAS NOT BEEN 02.05.2015 VENUS SUITES PREFERRED VS The commissioner BDA
28. Therefore, the learned Senior counsel for the respondent/plaintiff submitted that it fortified the fact that the appellant-BDA has adopted the method of pick and choose, which shows the functioning style of the Appellant
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR Authority and also wherever appeals are filed by the appellant-BDA, those appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay and latches.
29. This Court in the case of The Commissioner, Bengaluru Development Authority reported in RFA.No.1216/2019 in respect of the very same facts and circumstances involved, where the suit is filed in respect of other allottees of sites when the Civil Court has decreed the suit and the appeal filed with a delay of 364 days, but the same is dismissed. Therefore, submitted that in respect of other site holders, the appeal filed by the appellant-BDA where there is a delay the appeals were dismissed on the ground of delay and latches. Therefore, in the present case also, the respondent is standing on the same footing as that of the respondent in other cases.
30. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, the Appellate Authority has failed to make out sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. Accordingly, I answer
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NC: 2025:KHC:38920 RFA No. 1355 of 2019 HC-KAR point No.(i) in negative. Therefore, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as having barred by limitation. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.
Sd/-
(HANCHATE SANJEEVKUMAR) JUDGE PB List No.: 1 Sl No.: 70