Uttarakhand High Court
Sudhir vs State Of Uttarakhand on 1 April, 2016
Author: U.C. Dhyani
Bench: U.C. Dhyani
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
NAINITAL
Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 2015
Sudhir ............... Appellant
versus
State of Uttarakhand ........... Respondent
with
Criminal Appeal No. 266 of 2015
Subhash and another ............... Appellants
versus
State of Uttarakhand ........... Respondent
Mr. Manish Arora, Advocate, present for the appellants.
Mr. Raman Kumar Sah, learned Deputy Advocate General, present for
the State/respondent.
Mr. Abhishek Verma, Advocate, present for the complainant.
U.C. Dhyani, J. (Oral)
1. Since both these appeals arise out of the same judgment and order, therefore, they are being decided together by this common Judgment for the sake of brevity and convenience.
2. Accused-appellant Sudhir, was convicted under Sections 308, 323/34, 325 and 506 of IPC. He was directed to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and six months along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for the 2 offence under Section 308 IPC; rigorous imprisonment for 1 year along with a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 325 IPC; simple imprisonment for six months along with a fine of Rs. 250/- for the offence under Section 323/34 IPC and simple imprisonment for three months along with a fine of Rs. 500/- for the offence under Section 506 of IPC. Likewise, appellants Subhash and Shrawan @ Pintu were convicted under Sections 323/24 and 506 of IPC and were sentenced accordingly vide judgment and order dated 16.07.2015 passed by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Roorkee, Haridwar. Aggrieved against the same, present Criminal Appeals were filed on behalf of the appellants.
3. Compounding applications (being CRMA No. 458 of 2016 and CRMA No. 460 of 2016) have been filed by the parties to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably. The compounding applications are supported by the joint compromise, duly signed by Sudhir, Subhash and Shrawan @ Pintu (accused-appellants) and Smt. Kaushalya (injured). Appellants have also filed an affidavit indicating the same. So is Smt. Kaushalya (injured) and Sushil Kumar (informant), who have not only filed the affidavit, but are also present before the Court, duly identified by their counsel Mr. Abhishek Verma, Advocate. The injured Smt. Kaushalya says that she is not interested in prosecuting the appellants, inasmuch as, the dispute between them has been 3 resolved amicably. Smt. Kaushalya prays for permitting her to compound the offences alleged and proved against Suhdir, Subhash and Shrawan @ Pintu (present appellants). She also says that the appellants be exonerated of the charges levelled and proved against them.
4. Whereas the offences punishable under Sections 323, 325 and 506 IPC are compoundable offences within the scheme of Section 320 of Cr.P.C. the offence under Section 308 IPC is not. The question is- whether the injured should be permitted to compound such offences against the convict/appellants or not?
5. Learned counsel for the parties drew the attention of this Court towards the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court on 6th December, 2012, in Transfer Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2012 Dimpey Gujral vs. Union Territory through Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.)] in which the Hon'ble Apex Court, relying upon Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, permitted the injured to compound the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC.
6. Learned counsel for the parties drew the attention of this Court towards the ruling of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, in which Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as below:
4"The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and 5 continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."
7. Taking a leaf out of the book of Hon'ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral vs. Union Territory through Administrator U.T. Chandigarh and others, [2013 (123) AIC 119 (S.C.)], and Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, this Court is of the view that the informant/injured Smt. Kaushalya should be permitted to compound the offences punishable under Section 308, 323/34, 325 and 506 IPC against the accused-appellants in the interest of justice. Otherwise also, learned counsel for the informant/injured conceded that the criminal appeals deserve to be allowed on merits also.
8. A reference may also be had to the decision of Narendra Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another, reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 in this regard.
69. It will also be useful to reproduce herein Sub-Section (5) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. as follows:
"320 (5)- When the accused has been committed for trial or when he has been convicted and an appeal is pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed without the leave of the Court to which he is committed, or, as the case may be, before which the appeal is to be heard."
10. Since the Criminal Appeals are pending before this Court against the conviction of the accused-appellants, therefore, injured is seeking leave of this Court to permit her to compound the offences, for which the accused-appellants have been convicted. Sub-Section (5) of Section 320 Cr.P.C. is meant for those offences, which are compoundable offences within the Scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C. It is true that Section 308 of IPC is a non-compoundable offence within the scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C., but the Hon'ble Apex Court has permitted compounding of such offence in the decisions of Dimpey Gujral (supra) and Gian Singh (supra) holding that Section 320 Cr.P.C. shall not come in the way of the High Court in exercising it's inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
11. The compounding applications are thus allowed.
Injured Smt. Kaushalya is permitted to compound the offences proved against the convict-appellants. As a consequence thereof, Judgment and Order dated 16.07.2015, passed by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Roorkee, Haridwar, in Sessions Trial No. 22 of 7 2010, is hereby set aside in respect of the accused- appellants only, in terms of the compromise entered into between the parties, i.e., injured and the accused- appellants. The conviction and sentences recorded by the Trial Court against present appellants are set aside. Accused-appellants stand acquitted of the charges of Sections 308, 323/34, 325 and 506 of IPC. Accused- appellants are on bail. Their bail bonds are cancelled and sureties are discharged. They need not surrender.
12. The Criminal Appeals are thus disposed of in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the court below for compliance.
(U.C. Dhyani, J.) 01.04.2016 Kaushal 8