Madras High Court
V.Nagaraj (Deceased) vs The Secretary To Government
Author: Mohammed Shaffiq
Bench: Mohammed Shaffiq
W.P. No.6802 of 2020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Order reserved on : 29.08.2025
Order pronounced on: 27.10.2025
CORAM
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE MOHAMMED SHAFFIQ
W.P. No.6802 of 2020
and W.M.P.No.8099 of 2020
1. V.Nagaraj (deceased)
2.Kuttammal
3.Hemalatha
4.N.Janani
5.N.Dharun Krishna ... Petitioners
(P2 to P5 substituted as LRs of deceased sole petitioner vide order dated dt
21/01/2021 made in WMP.18546/2020 in WP.6802/2020 by NSSJ)
Vs.
1. The Secretary to Government,
Public Works Department,
Secretariat, Fort St.George,
Chennai 600 009.
2. The District Collector,
Coimbatore District,
Coimbatore.
3. The District Revenue Officer,
Collectorate Complex,
1/50
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm )
W.P. No.6802 of 2020
Coimbatore – 18.
4. The Revenue Divisional Officer,
Collectorate Complex,
Coimbatore – 18.
5. The Special Tahsildar (LA),
National Highways, Collectorate Complex,
Coimbatore – 18.
6. The Tahsildar,
Sulur Taluk,
Coimbatore District.
7. The Project Director,
NHAI Coimbatore PIU,
15-A, Kongu Nagar East,
Trichy Road, Ramanathapuram,
Kongu Nagar, Kallimadai,
Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu 641 045.
... Respondents
(R7 Suo Motu Impleaded vide Order Dated 18.08.2025 made in
W.P.No.6802/2020 by MSQJ)
PRAYER: Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
praying to issue a Writ of Declaration, declaring the entire acquisition
proceedings initiated by the respondents 1 and 5 under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, in respect of lands belonging to the petitioner comprised in S.No.183/1 of
an extent of acre 3.36 cents, situated in Pattanam Village, Coimbatore District,
become lapsed, by virtue of operation of the provisions contained in Section
2/50
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm )
W.P. No.6802 of 2020
24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (Act 30 of 2013).
For Petitioner(s) : Mr.Abdul Saleem,
Senior Counsel for
Mr.A.Maheshnath
For R1 to R6 : Mr.J.Ravindran,
Additional Advocate General
assisted by Mr.A.Selvendran,
Special Government Pleader
For R7 : Mr.V.Ashok Kumar
for Mr.Su.Srinivasan,
Standing Counsel
ORDER
The present Writ Petition is filed to declare the acquisition proceedings initiated by respondents under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as “1894 Act”), in respect of land comprised in Survey No.183/1 measuring an extent of 3.36 Acres situated at Pattanam Village, Coimbatore District, as having lapsed in terms of sub-section (2) to Section 24 of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, (Act 30 of 2013) (hereinafter referred to as “2013 Act”).
1.1. Challenge is primarily on the premise that under the impugned acquisition proceedings State has neither taken possession nor paid 3/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 compensation to the petitioners/land owners, thus by virtue of Section 24(2) of "2013 Act", acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to lapse.
2. Brief facts:
2.1. Land comprised in Survey No.183/1 measuring an extent of 4.06 acres situated at Pattanam Village, Coimbatore District, was originally owned and possessed by one Late Ramasamy and his brother Kalimuthu. While Late Ramasamy owned an extent of 3.56 acres, his brother Kalimuthu owned about 50 cents, in all 4.06 acres. Though the property comprised in S.No.183/1 measures an extent of 4.06 acres, the present writ petition is confined to the portion of the property which originally belonged to Late Ramasamy measuring an extent of 3.56 acres comprised in S.No.183/1, situated at Pattanam Village, Coimbatore District (hereinafter referred to as “subject property”).
2.2. Sometime during 1974, subject property was sought to be acquired by first respondent for formation of Outer Ring Road in NH47. A notification under Section 4(1) of the “1894 Act”, came to be issued vide G.O. R.T.No.2491 dated 11.09.1974. Above notification was followed by a declaration under Section 6 of the “1894 Act” vide G.O. R.T. No.502 dated 21.02.1976. Respondent authorities claim to have issued notice to Late Ramasamy on 22.03.1976 for enquiry fixing the date of enquiry as 24.04.1976 at 11.00 a.m. Thereafter Land Acquisition 4/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 Officer (LAO), is stated to have approached Late Ramasamy and other land owners covered under the said acquisition to obtain their consent in respect of a portion of the land covered by notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the “1894 Act”, as the same was required urgently for formation of road, after undertaking/assuring the land owners/person interested that appropriate compensation would be paid. Relying on the above promise Late Ramasamy gave his consent and prior permission in respect of land measuring 21 cents comprised in Survey No.183/1. Kalimuthu consented in respect of his land measuring an extent of 50 cents comprised in Survey No.183/1. In other words, out of 4.06 acres comprised in Survey No.183/1, 71 cents was urgently acquired for the purpose of formation of road of which an extent of 21 cents belonged to Late Ramasamy while the remaining 50 cents was owned by Kaliamuthu. It is stated that 71 cents was utilised for formation of Outer Ring Road.
2.3. It is stated that acquisition proceedings were not completed in respect of 21 cents urgently acquired inasmuch as compensation to Late Ramasamy and other land owners was not paid. Importantly, in respect of the portion of the land remaining after leaving out the land measuring an extent of 21 cents of the subject property, no further action was taken/proceeded with under "1894 Act".
Compensation was not paid for any portion of the land i.e., 4.06 acres including the 71 cents urgently acquired after getting prior permission. 5/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 2.4. While so, Late Ramasamy died on 29.08.2019 leaving behind a Will dated 15.11.2018, wherein 3.36 Acres of land of subject property belonging to Late Ramasamy was bequeathed in favour of 1st petitioner. Recitals in the Will would suggest that Late Ramasamy's wife Chinnammal had abandoned him 30 years back and they had no children out of their wedlock. That 1st petitioner provided Late Ramasamy food, shelter and took care of his needs during the last years of his life, following which it is stated that Late Ramasamy executed a Will bequeathing the subject property in favour of 1st petitioner.
2.5. 1st petitioner has challenged the acquisition proceedings on the premise that neither compensation was paid nor possession taken in respect of the subject property and thus in terms of sub-section (2) to Section 24 of the "2013 Act", the acquisition proceedings must be deemed to lapse. 1st petitioner died intestate leaving behind petitioners 2 to 5 as his legal heirs.
3. Case of the petitioners:
3.1. Land owners/ persons interested i.e., Late Ramasamy, Late V.Nagarajan nor petitioners 2 to 5 were aware of the award dated 20.01.1978 until the counter affidavit came to be filed by the fourth respondent which inter alia contained an averment relating to Award No.2/78 dated 20.01.1978. Petitioners thereafter obtained a copy of the said award from the respondents and filed the 6/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 same along with Additional Typed Set of papers before this Court.
3.2. That though counter affidavit states that notices were served on land owners as well as interested persons under sub-section (2) to Section 12 of "1894 Act", no particulars/details is set out in the counter nor was any records produced to demonstrate/establish the same.
3.3. That though an award dated 20.01.1978 is stated to have been passed in respect of the entire extent of land covered in S.No.183/1, however, compensation has not been paid nor possession taken.
3.4. 1st petitioner submitted a representation dated 19.02.2020 wherein it was inter alia stated that respondents had not furnished particulars of Award stated to have been passed. Further despite acquisition proceeding having lapsed in view of the fiction under subsection (2) to Section 24 of the "2013 Act", petitioners are unable to develop the subject property in view of the objections by various authorities citing pendency of the acquisition proceedings.
3.5. That this Court has directed production of original records on more than one occasion to demonstrate that compensation was paid and possession was taken, while observing that failure to produce documents/files would necessitate drawing adverse inference. However, no material/ files/ records is produced despite repeated directions by this Court to show that compensation was paid and possession taken by drawing a Panchanama thereby complying 7/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 with requirement of Section 16 of the "1894 Act" as laid down by the Supreme Court in a catena of cases and affirmed by the Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority1, instead the requisitioning body has come up with a preposterous submission that petitioners are trying to take advantage of the State's failure to produce the relevant records.
3.6. That neither compensation was paid nor was possession taken under the acquisition proceedings, thus entire land acquisition proceedings would lapse in terms of the deeming contained in sub-section (2) to Section 24 of the "2013 Act".
4. Case of the Respondents:
4.1. Learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 6 would submit that the writ petition filed for declaration of acquisition proceedings as having lapsed under Section 24(2) of the "2013 Act", in terms of the deeming contained therein is without merit and liable to be rejected. While reiterating the aspects raised in the counter would primarily place reliance upon the fact that there was a mismatch in the age between death certificate of Late Ramasamy dated 03.09.2019 (age is shown as '92' ) and Will dated 15.11.2018 (age is shown as '88' ) executed by Late Ramasamy in favour
1. Indore Development Authority (LAPSE-5 J.) vs. Manoharlal, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129 8/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 of 1st petitioner.
4.2. That apart learned Additional Advocate General would submit that based on the request by Divisional Engineer (NH), Coimbatore, to acquire lands measuring an extent of 21.22 acres situated at Patnam village, Palladam Taluk, Coimbatore District for formation of Coimbatore Bypass Road on NH 47, acquisition proceedings were initiated in the year 1974 under the "1894 Act". Notification under Section 4 of "1894 Act" was published in the Government Gazette dated 13.11.1974. After enquiry under Section 5A of "1894 Act" on issuing notices to land owners/person interested declaration under Section 6 of "1894 Act" was published in the Gazette dated 17.03.1976. Direction under Section 7 of "1894 Act" was approved and published in the Gazette dated 17.03.1976. Award enquiry was conducted by LAO on 24.04.1976. That the procedures provided under "1894 Act" were complied and award came to be passed in Award No.2 of 1978 dated 20.01.1978. Compensation with regard to lands owned by Ramasamy Konar was determined and a sum of Rs.5,117.50/- was arrived at after apportionment. Pursuant to the award, notices under Section 12(2) of “1894 Act” were served on the land owners as well as person interested, thereafter, possession of property covered under the said Award was handed over to Divisional Engineer, National Highways. That out of the total extent comprised in Survey No.183/1, an extent of 71 cents has been utilised in road 9/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 formation and remaining 3.36 acres is kept vacant. With regard to compensation, it was stated that the same was arrived at and apportioned in the award proceedings and steps were being taken to pay compensation in respect of 3.36 acres forming the subject matter of the present writ petition. Reliance was also placed on the Status Report filed pursuant to the orders of this Court by the 2 nd respondent wherein explanation was sought to be offered with regard to the Land Acquisition files relating to the acquisition proceedings which have gone missing.
4.3. Learned counsel for 7th respondent has filed a counter inter alia stating that the writ petition is hit by delay and latches. That disputed questions of fact such as whether compensation was paid, whether notices were issued, objections submitted are all matters which would require appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and thus appropriate forum for adjudicating the above issues would only be a competent Civil Court. That revenue records have been mutated and reflects the subject property as Government Land. That 71 Cents out of 4.06 acres have been utilised for formation of Coimbatore Bypass Road on NH 47. The remaining lands are also required for road widening and development work. Thus the subject property is vested with the Government and remains so.
10/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020
5. Having heard both sides and keeping in view the earlier orders of this court, it appears to me that there is merit in the submission of the petitioners for the following reasons:
6. Earlier orders – Failure of Respondents to comply with directions of this Court:
6.1. During the course of hearing this writ petition, this Court had periodically directed the State to produce the records to show possession was taken and compensation paid to ensure that the acquisition proceedings do not attract sub-section (2) to Section 24 of "2013 Act", which provides for deemed lapsing. The relevant portions of various orders of this Court in the present writ petition are extracted hereunder:
i) Order dated 08.03.2021 by Mr.Justice N.Seshasayee :-
“The respondents are now required to make a statement as to :
a) when and how the possession was taken?
b) when and how the compensation was paid?
2. Post the matter for orders on 16.03.2021.”
ii) Order dated 24.07.2024 by Mr.Justice J.Sathya Narayana Prasad:
“Heard both sides.
2. The learned Government Advocate Pleader appearing for 11/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 respondents 1 to 6 is directed to produce the copy of the Panchnama as a proof of taking possession of the property belongs to the petitioner by way of typeset of papers and also to get written instructions whether the extent of 3.33 cents which according to the counter affidavit filed in the year 2021, is kept vacant as on date and whether the compensation is paid or not. If paid, date of deposit of compensation amount and in which treasury.”
iii) Order dated 27.02.2025 by Mr.Justice N.Anand Venkatesh:
“The learned Additional Government Pleader seeks for some more time to file the additional counter affidavit and to produce the relevant original records. The query that was posed by this Court is as to whether the possession was taken in line with Paragraph 16 of the judgement in Saraswathi case and /or compensation was paid in line with Paragraph 30 of the Saraswathi case. If either of this requirement has not been satisfied, this Court has to necessarily declare that the acquisition proceedings has lapsed. This shall be kept in mind by the respondents.
2. Post this case under the caption for “Part heard cases” on 05.03.2025.” (emphasis supplied)
iv) Order dated 21.03.2025 by Mr.Justice N.Anand Venkatesh:
“Pursuant to the earlier order passed by this Court, an affidavit has been filed by the District Collector, Coimbatore. The affidavit is bereft of details and there are absolutely no particulars given as to when the file was brought to this Court and which officer had brought it and when it went missing. The affidavit has been prepared in a slipshod manner and this Court is not convinced with the affidavit. When this 12/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 Court expressed its mind, the learned Special Government Pleader seeks for some time to file a better affidavit.
2. Post this case finally under the same caption on 25.03.2025.”
v) Order dated 25.03.2025 by Mr.Justice N.Anand Venkatesh:
“Pursuant to earlier order passed on 21.03.2025, an affidavit has been filed today, which has been signed by the District Collector, Coimbatore. In this affidavit, an explanation is sought to be given as to how original files went missing and steps that are being taken to restore the files.
2. The learned counsel for petitioners submitted that, broadly only two reliefs can be considered by this Court in the present writ petition. It can be either to declare the proceedings as lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 or on the alternative to direct the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioners. The learned counsel for petitioners submitted that the petitioners will be satisfied, if atleast compensation amount is paid to them.
3. In reply to the above submission, learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the compensation amount has been paid as early as in the year 1981 itself and there is no question of paying any compensation to the petitioners.
4. In the considered view of this Court a final decision in this case will require verification of original records. This Court had heard this case substantially and what is required to be seen is original records. The affidavit filed by the District Collector seeks for three months time to restore the files. The apprehension raised on the side of petitioners is that the matter is being endlessly adjourned and if it is once again adjourned 13/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 for three months, this case will not see the light of the day.
5. Considering the grievance expressed on the side of the petitioners and considering the fact that this Court has substantially heard this matter and what was awaited is only additional counter affidavit along with original records, post this writ petition for final hearing on 09.06.2025.
6. The learned counsel appearing on either side submitted that in the event of any change in portfolio, they will circulate a letter to the Registry to be placed before Hon'ble Chief Justice for posting the matter before me for final hearing. This submission sufficiently takes care of the apprehension raised on the side of petitioners and that, at the best, the matter will get postponed till the month of June 2025.” (emphasis supplied) 6.2. From a reading of the above orders of this Court, it would be evident that this Court (3 different Judges viz., Mr.Justice N.Sheshasayee, Mr.Justice J.
Sathyanarayana Prasad and Mr.Justice N.Anand Venkatesh), made it clear on more than one occasion that the State ought to demonstrate on the basis of material evidence by producing relevant files that possession was taken and compensation paid in respect of the subject property. Importantly, vide order dated 27.02.2025, this Court made it clear that if the original records were not furnished, this Court would have to necessarily declare acquisition proceedings as having lapsed. Thereafter, an affidavit was filed by 2 nd respondent explaining how the file went missing. The explanation offered in the said Affidavit was found by this Court vide order dated 21.03.2025 as bereft of particulars. Again 14/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 on 25.03.2025, the District Collector sought 3 months time to restore the files, which would show the mode of taking possession and also payment of compensation with material evidence. Importantly, this Court also recorded that petitioners had submitted that they would be satisfied if compensation was paid. The matter was adjourned to 09.06.2025.
6.3. Thereafter, the matter was listed for hearing on the following dates viz., 13.08.2025, 22.08.2025, 25.08.2025 and 29.08.2025. The learned counsel for respondents requested for time to file/produce records on the above dates. However, no documents/files were furnished by respondents to either show that possession was taken nor compensation paid in respect of the subject property towards compulsory acquisition by the State. It may be relevant to note that none of the above orders of this Court directing the State to produce files have been challenged, instead it was consistently pleaded/requested by the State only for time to produce the record. Such request were made commencing from 21.01.2021 and the last of such request was on 18.08.2025. However, even on the last date i.e., on 18.08.2025 no records were furnished.
6.4. It is relevant to note that 2nd respondent has filed two undated Status Report. In one of the Status Report it is stated that file was in fact available and brought to the Government Pleaders office for the purpose of the present writ petition and has then gone missing. This, to put it mildly, I find startling. The 15/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 relevant portion of the Status Report reads as under:
“6. ...... The Additional Government Pleader after going through the Land Acquisition files, asked his Office Assistant Mr. Perumal to receive the files and keep them at records on 22.03.2021 and hence it was handed over, but the acknowledgement for its receipt was refused to be given. After the Tamil Nadu Assembly Election, the Additional Government Pleader was transferred and when enquired the successor, it was told that the files could be taken when the next date of hearing was listed. In the mean time, the above Thiru. Sivabalan met Thiru. Perumal, office assistant,several times and he was told that he is still searching the files.
7. It is further submitted, in view of the several attempts to trace out the Land Acquisition Files, upon instructions by the 2nd respondent and also on the directions issued by the Additional Government Pleader, departmental action has been initiated against Thiru. Sivabalan, who is at present working as the Deputy Tahsildar, (Election) in Perur Taluk, calling for his explanation about the missing Land Acquisition files in this office Na.Ka No.3065/2009/A2 Dated, 17.03.2025. Further the respondents are in search to find out the relevant registers and records relating to the deposit of the compensation in respect of the remaining 3.33 acres in S.F.No.183/1, and the Tahsildar, Sulur Taluk hasbeen directed to take steps to get the Court Records according utmost importance.
8. I state that the Divisional Engineer, National Highways, Coimbatore has been addressed on 17.03.2025 to send the files relating to the deposit of the above compensation amount to this office, with reference to the interim order passed in this case by this Hon'ble Court on 24.07.2024, communicating the direction issued on the Writ 16/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 Miscellaneous Petition No. 8099/2020. The Divisional Engineer, National Highways, Coimbatore has already in his letter dated 12.03.2025, stated that the widening of By pass road on National Highways 47 from K.M 141/0 to K.M 171/200 from the existing 2 lanes to 6 lanes under Debenture Redemption Reserve works is pending for completion and the widening work is soon to be taken up and that the land acquired cannot be parted with as claimed by the petitioner.” 6.5. The Status Report further states that National Highways Coimbatore has been addressed to produce the files relating to deposit of compensation in relation to subject acquisition. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
“8. I state that the Divisional Engineer, National Highways, Coimbatore has been addressed on 17.03.2025 to send the files relating to the deposit of the above compensation amount to this office, with reference to the interim order passed in this case by this Hon'ble Court on 24.07.2024, communicating the direction issued on the Writ Miscellaneous Petition No. 8099/2020. ...........
9. I state that the 2nd respondent has issued necessary instructions to the respondents 3 to 6 to take action on a war footing basis so as to enable to produce the missing files before this Hon'ble Court without fail, the record rooms of Taluk office(North), Revenue Divisional Office(South) and District Archives have been searched and non-
traceability certificate submitted by relevant offices. Further action is taken to trace in the Government Pleaders Office, Chennai and whether the compensation has been withdrawn by the petitioner in the LAOP case No 55/81 and LAOP no 58/81 at Sub Court Tiruppur.” 17/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 6.6. The 7th respondent in response has in its counter and written submission stated that the records relating to subject acquisition are not available with them. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
“1. It is respectfully submitted that the answering respondent does not possess records relating to the said acquisition since the proceedings pertain to more than four decades earlier. It appears that the entire acquisition proceedings were carried out under the Provisions of Land Acquisition Act 1894 hence, this despondent is not aware of any of the assertions of the petitioner. Whatever submissions are made herein are based on the counter filed by the State Government. The petitioner cannot take advantage of the unavailability of old records to raise speculative or presumptive claims.” (emphasis supplied) 6.7. This appears to be a case where different departments are trying to pass the buck rather recriminating each other a conduct which this court does not approve. The submissions of the respondent authorities appear to be a bundle of contradictions inasmuch as on the one hand, it is urged that the files relating to subject acquisitions are not traceable, however, their counter and the status report would show that the files were in fact available and brought to the Office of Government Pleader even for the purpose of this Writ Petition and has thereafter strangely gone missing.
6.8. The above contention of files not being available and gone missing after being produced with the Government Pleader office are mutually 18/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 destructive. The fact that records/files were brought to the Government Pleader's office after the writ petition has been filed and thereafter having gone missing only reflects negligence, careless and lethargic attitude of the officers. In this regard it may do well to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment in Indore Development Authority wherein it was held that "2013 Act" aims at and frowns upon the lethargy of the officials to complete the requisites within 5 years. The relevant portion is extracted hereunder:
“113. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is, in our opinion, a penal provision - to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the 2013 Act in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression "where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall continue" used in Section 24(1)(b) under the provisions of the 1894 Act means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in Section 24(2).
.....
321. ..... The 2013 Act does not confer the benefit on unscrupulous litigants, but it aims at and frowns upon the lethargy of the officials to complete the requisites within five years.” 6.9. It may also be relevant to refer to order of this Court in the case of K.Saraswathi and another v. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in 2020 SCC OnLine 19/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 Mad 2475, wherein while dealing with a similar facts viz., missing records it was held as under:
“37..... Since the original records have gone missing, this Court is not able to get any particulars from the State with regard to the taking of possession or payment of compensation and this Court does not have the advantage of looking into the records due to the fact that it is not available. It is not known as to whether the records are intentionally concealed in order to prevent this Court from taking cognizance of some very material facts. This Court is forced to make such an observation since it is nothing but recklessness on the part of the officials to come and state before a High Court that the records are missing, more particularly, when it is claimed that the project is being undertaken in a phased manner from the year 1995 onwards.
38. Section 24[2] of the Act was brought into force in order to meet those cases where the authorities have failed, due to their inaction, to take possession and to pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force. The Constitution Bench, in more than one place categorically states that Section 24[2] of the Act is a penal provision to punish the Acquiring Authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the 2013 Act. This observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has a lot of significance in the facts of the present case. In the present case, the respondents have not only shown recklessness when it came to not taking possession in the manner known to law and not paying/tendering compensation in the manner known to law, but also it continues till date when they come and tell this Court that the entire original records has gone missing. Such an 20/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 attitude on the part of the respondents really requires penal consequences as provided under Section 24[2] of the Act.
39. Section 24[2] of the Act provides for a deemed lapse of the entire acquisition proceedings where the conditions stipulated therein are fulfilled. Such a deemed lapse happens by operation of law. In other words, it does not require a specific declaration by the Court to declare that the acquisition proceedings has become bad unless the situation warrants. The Statute has created such a provision contemplating deemed lapse on the coming into force of the 2013 Act where the conditions stipulated under Section 24[2] of the Act are fulfilled, viz., not taking possession and non payment of compensation. In the present case, this Court has already held that the possession has not been taken and compensation has not been paid in the manner known to law. At the risk of repetition, this Court again reiterates that this court is not trying to pin point some mistakes committed by the authorities while taking possession or paying/tendering compensation. This Court is holding that the possession which has to be taken in a particular mode and the payment of compensation which has be tendered/deposited in a particular mode, has not been done in the facts of the present case and therefore, there is no taking of possession and payment/tendering of compensation in the eye of law. Therefore, the deeming provision under Section 24[2] of the Act automatically comes into play in favour of petitioners by operation of law.” 6.10. In the circumstances, it appears doubtful if it would even lie in the mouth of the State to contend anything on merits unless and until records relating to taking over of possession by the State and payment of compensation 21/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 was produced by the State. Having failed to do so that by itself, without anything more, may be adequate to reject the plea of the State.
7. Having said that, I would think the petitioners may have to succeed in the writ petition even otherwise for the following reasons:
7.1. Laches and Delay:
7.1.1 An objection has been raised by the 7th respondent that the writ petition suffers from laches and thus ought not to be entertained. The 7 th respondent is requisitioning body and thus more a formal party. In any view Right to Fair Compensation is a right which inheres in Article 300A of the Constitution which deals with right to property. Before proceeding further, it may be relevant to note that while it is true that after the 44th Constitutional Amendment [the Constitution (44th Amendment) Act, 1978], right to property drifted from Part III to Part XII of the Constitution, however there continues to be a potent safety net against arbitrary acquisitions, hasty decision-making and unfair redressal mechanisms. Despite its spatial placement, Article 300A of the Constitution declares that “no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”. Article 300A of the Constitution is a reflection/recognition of both constitutional and human right viz., Right to Property. The constitutional discourse on compulsory acquisitions, has hitherto, rooted itself within the “power of eminent domain”. Even within that articulation, the twin conditions of 22/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 the acquisition being for a public purpose and subjecting the divestiture to the payment of compensation in lieu of acquisition were mandated. Although not explicitly contained in Article 300A of the Constitution, these twin requirements have been read in and inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory deprivation to afford protection to the individuals who are being divested of property. Keeping in view the above position with regard to the purport of Article 300A of the Constitution, this Court finds that in the present case the original owner of subject property Late Ramasamy had executed a Will in favour of the 1st petitioner bequeathing the subject property only in 2018. Writ petitions have been filed by the 1st petitioner in 18.03.2020. If the petitioners right is found to flow from the Will, this Court would think that the plea of laches set up by the 7th respondent is without merit. It is necessary to bear in mind Hon'ble Supreme Court in the context of acquisition proceedings have consistently taken a liberal view on delay and laches viz., a view which protects citizens from deprivation of property with the State evading its Constitutional/Statutory obligation/duty by not complying with the procedure or paying lawful compensation to the loser of the property. In this regard it may be relevant to refer to the following judgments:
a) Vidya Devi v. State of H.P., (2020) 2 SCC 569 – with a delay of 42 years:23/50
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 “12.12. The contention advanced by the State of delay and laches of the appellant in moving the Court is also liable to be rejected. Delay and laches cannot be raised in a case of a continuing cause of action, or if the circumstances shock the judicial conscience of the Court. Condonation of delay is a matter of judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and reasonably in the facts and circumstances of a case. It will depend upon the breach of fundamental rights, and the remedy claimed, and when and how the delay arose. There is no period of limitation prescribed for the courts to exercise their constitutional jurisdiction to do substantial justice.”
b) Sukh Dutt Ratra v. State of H.P., (2022) 7 SCC 508 – with a delay of 38 years:
“16. Given the important protection extended to an individual vis- à-vis their private property (embodied earlier in Article 31, and now as a constitutional right in Article 300-A), and the high threshold the State must meet while acquiring land, the question remains — can the State, merely on the ground of delay and laches, evade its legal responsibility towards those from whom private property has been expropriated? In these facts and circumstances, we find this conclusion to be unacceptable, and warranting intervention on the grounds of equity and fairness.”
c) Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54 :
“11. .......“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where 24/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.”
d) Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1974) 1 SCC 317 – with a delay of more than 10 or 12 years:
“10....... There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110, 116 :25/50
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 (1969) 2 SCR 824] “is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit .... It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”.
7.1.2. Keeping the above principles on delay/laches, particularly in the context of Article 300A of the Constitution, this Court finds that contention regarding laches and delay urged by 7th respondent a formal party is devoid of merit.
7.2. Scope of Section 24(2) of "2013 Act":
7.2.1. To resolve the controversy arising in the present writ petition, it may be necessary to understand the scope and purport of Section 24(2) of "2013 Act".
The said Section reads as under:
“Section 24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1984 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.
.....
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894),where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed 26/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:
“Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of the majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with provisions of this Act.” 7.2.2. The scope of Section 24(2) of "2013 Act" has been examined by a Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (LAPSE-5 J.) vs. Manoharlal, reported in (2020) 8 SCC 129, wherein while examining the correct interpretation of Section 24 of "2013 Act", in view of the fact that a two Judge Bench of Supreme Court in the case of Yogesh Neema doubted the correctness of the decision in Sri Balaji Nagar Residential Association, and on examining various issues arising out of Section 24 of "2013 Act", arrived at the following conclusions:
“366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:
366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.27/50
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.
366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.
366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.
28/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.
366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).
366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).
366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years.
366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow 29/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.” 7.3. Award - when made under "1894 Act":
7.3.1. Having examined the scope of sub-section (2) to Section 24 of the "2013 Act", this Court shall now examine the aspect of failure/deficiency to serve/in service of the award dated 20.01.1978 and its impact on the issues raised in the present writ petition.
7.3.2. While sub-section (1) to Section 24 of "2013 Act" provides that if award is not “made” under Section 11 of "1894 Act", compensation would be determined under "2013 Act". Sub-section (2) to Section 24 of "2013 Act"
provides that if award is made within 5 years prior to commencement of "2013 Act" but possession is not taken and compensation not paid then acquisition proceedings under "1894 Act" shall be deemed as lapsed. While it is the case of petitioners that the award is never served on them and thus not “made”, the learned counsel for respondent in their counter stated that the award dated 20.01.1978 was served and thus made. The petitioners had in its rejoinder submitted that they were made aware of the fact that award was made only through the averment contained in the counter. That takes us to the question as to 30/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 when award under Section 11 of "1894 Act" can be held/found to have been “made”. To answer the above question, it may be necessary to refer to Section 12 of "1894 Act", which reads as under:
“12. Award of Collector when to be final. -
(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and the appointment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.” 7.3.3. A reading of the above provision would show that Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of "1894 Act", makes it clear that in order that an award becomes final and conclusive the award is to be filed in the office of the Collector. In other words, there can be finality of the award when it is filed in the Collector's office and notice under Section 12(2) of the "1894 Act" is given to the persons interested who were not present on the date of the award2. So, mere signing of the award is not enough and has not the binding effect. It must be filed and so it becomes part of the official records of the office of the Collector and then it
2. Kooverbhai Sorabji v. Assistant Collector, 22 Bom LR 1136 31/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 becomes final and conclusive evidence between the Government and the parties interested.
7.3.4. Award before it is filed in the Collector's office even if signed is to be treated as proposal, in order to assume the character of award and become final and conclusive, it has to be filed in Collector's office and then it becomes an award that is final and conclusive as between the Collector and the persons interested3.. The above provision has come up for consideration before various Courts including the Apex Court and it has been found that signing of an award does not make it binding or final, thus, award cannot be treated as having been “made” on being signed by the competent authority. In this regard it may be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in AIR 1961 SC 1500. The relevant paragraph is extracted hereunder:
“7. In this connection it is material to recall the fact that under Section 12(2) it is obligatory on the Collector to give immediate notice of the award to the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made. This requirement itself postulates the necessity of the communication of the award to the party concerned. The legislature recognised that the making of the award under Section 11 followed by its filing under Section 12(1) would not meet the requirements of justice before bringing the award into force. It thought that the communication of the award to the party concerned was also
3. Madho Ram v. Collector, AIR 1962 J&K 37 32/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 necessary, and so by the use of the mandatory words an obligation is placed on the Collector to communicate the award immediately to the person concerned. It is significant that the section requires the Collector to give notice of the award immediately after making it. This provision lends support to the view which we have taken about the construction of the expression “from the date of the Collector's award” in the proviso to Section 18. It is because communication of the order is regarded by the legislature as necessary that Section 12(2) has imposed an obligation on the Collector and if the relevant clause in the proviso is read in the light of this statutory requirement it tends to show that the literal and mechanical construction of the said clause would be wholly inappropriate. It would indeed be a very curious result that the failure of the Collector to discharge his obligation under Section 12(2) should directly tend to make ineffective the right of the party to make an application under Section 18, and this result could not possibly have been intended by the legislature.” (emphasis supplied) 7.4. It is the case of the petitioner that the award was not filed as provided under Section 12 of "1894 Act" nor was petitioner served (or) intimated of the award having been made under "1894 Act", though State would submit that award was in fact made within the time limit under Section 11A of the "1894 Act" i.e., on 20.01.1978, however the State has not produced any file/record to show that the award was actually filed in Collector’s office as contemplated under Section 12 of "1894 Act" nor notice issued under sub-section (2) to 33/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 Section 12 of "1894 Act".
7.4.1. To a pointed question even on the date of pronouncing this judgment as to whether there is any material to show that award was filed in the Collector's office in terms of sub-section (1) to Section 12 of "1894 Act", respondents would submit that files are not available/traceable.
7.4.2. It is trite that burden of showing that award was filed with the Collector's Office, and notice was issued under sub-section (2) to Section 12 of "1894 Act", was on the State for it is an act performed in discharge of its statutory duty/obligation cast on it under Section 12 of "1894 Act" and also a fact within the exclusive knowledge of the State. Failure to produce the records would thus necessitate drawing adverse inference against the State.
7.4.3. In view thereof, I am of the view that award not made in terms of "1894 Act", as a sequitur two consequences may follow viz.,
a) Proceedings would lapse under Section 11 A of the "1894 Act", which provides that the Collector shall make an award under Section 11 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of "1894 Act".
b) Alternatively, even if one assumes the award dated 20.01.1978 as having been made, it may then become necessary to examine if subject acquisition proceedings would fall within the mischief of sub section (2) to 34/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 Section 24 of the “2013 Act” and thus shall be deemed to lapse. This is independent of the position that the subject acquisition proceeding appear to lapse even in terms of Section 11A of 1894 Act.
7.4.4. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to remind ourselves that petitioners claims their right/title over the subject property on the basis of the Will executed by Late Ramasamy. It is trite that Will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous disposition of the estate of testator directing distribution of his estate upon his death. It is undisputed that the subject Will satisfies the essentials and formalities for a valid Will in terms of the Indian Succession Act. It may also be relevant to note that it is trite that Will need not be registered.4.
8. I shall now proceed to examine the contentions urged in the present case in relation to the Will.
8.1. Genuiness of the Will:
8.1.1. The Learned Additional Advocate General would urge during the course of the hearing that Will dated 15.11.2018, may not be genuine inasmuch as the Will dated 15.11.2018 discloses the age of Late Ramasamy as 88 years, while Death Certificate dated 03.09.2019 shows the age as 92 years. He would
4. Periyadurai v. District Registrar and another, 2023 SCC Online Mad 591; Varadhammal v. The Sub-Registrar, W.P.No.16999 of 2020, S.Sakunthala v. The Inspector General of Registration, W.P.No.7700 of 2025 35/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 submit that there is a mismatch in the age. On the above basis, the Learned Additional Advocate General would submit that there is doubt as to the genuineness of Will.
8.1.2. Firstly, it appears doubtful rather inappropriate for respondent authorities under the Land Acquisition Act to go into the genuineness of Will.
For it appears that Genuineness of Will cannot be questioned by a Statutory authority. In this regard it may be relevant to refer to the following judgment:
i) Suraj Bhan and others v. Financial Commissioner, reported in (2007) 6 SCC 186 :
“7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. We have also perused the relevant record. From the record, it is clear that the main question relates to genuineness or otherwise of will dated 14-4-1989 said to have been executed by Ratni Devi in favour of Respondent 5. The validity and genuineness of the will can only be decided by a competent civil court. A suit had already been instituted in a civil court and though it was dismissed, the order is subject-matter of appeal pending in the appellate court. It is, therefore, neither desirable nor advisable to express any opinion on that question and as and when the matter will come up for hearing, it will be decided on its own merits by the High Court where it is pending.” 8.1.3. Secondly it appears that enquiry into genuineness of a Will may not fall within the authority of statutory body but ought to be decided by a competent Civil Court for even assuming there is a dispute with regard to title that would not enable the State to wriggle out of its obligation to pay compensation for the lands acquired in exercise of its power of eminent domain but may only have to deposit the same in terms of the procedure contemplated under the Act. In this 36/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 regard it may be relevant to refer the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Devanathan and 2 others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others, reported in 2024 (1) CWC 136. The relevant portion reads as under:
“9.4. Secondly, we have to consider whether any one of the twin exceptions are made out so as to save the land acquisition proceedings from the operation of Section 24(2) of the New Act. As far as taking physical possession is concerned, once again a similar handing over possession letter dated 09.12.1994 is the only material relied upon. For the detailed reasons stated by us supra, in the absence of any actual physical possession or taking possession by a panchnama or a memorandum from the landowner, the appellants have miserably failed to establish that they have taken physical possession.
9.5. Coming to the question of compensation, the appellants again rely upon a communication dated 08.07.1994 addressed to the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore, to contend that the award amount has been deposited into Court. As held by us supra it has been verified by us that no such amount was deposited into Court. No such amount is lying in Court deposit. No L.A.O.P has been numbered or pending. In spite of grant of time, the appellants are unable to produce any record to show that the amount has been debited from their treasury or other accounts and credited to the Court account. Even the endorsement of return made by the learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Coimbatore is there in the form produced by the Appellants. Though there is endorsement for representation, the only categorical conclusion which can be arrived at by the Court the papers were returned again and no steps whatsoever was taken by the State to deposit any amount before Court. In regard to the dispute of title raised by the learned Advocate 37/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 General, the learned Single Judge has found that at least in respect of some of the revenue records, there is a confusion as to which Narayanasamy is the owner of the property. Even accepting the said contention to be a valid justification under Section 31 of the Repealed Act to deposit the same before the concerned Court, when the State Authorities have miserably failed to do so, they cannot raise the said objection for the purpose of deciding as to whether the land acquisition proceedings stood lapsed under Section 24(2) of the New Act. The dispute that whether the petitioner is the owner of the property or the legal heirs of some other Narayanaswamy are the owners of the property, will not in any way come to the aid of the appellants to contend that the land acquisition proceedings have not lapsed under Section 24(2) of the New Act. The rigor of Section 24(2) is that when in exercise of the power of eminent domain lands have been acquired, the same has to be put into use by taking possession and the owner has to be paid the compensation and if there is any dispute, the compensation has to be deposited in Court. In the absence thereof, by merely raising a question of title, the appellants cannot save the land acquisition from the mischief of Section 24(2) of the New Act.
9.6. Accordingly, we uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge 28.10.2021 in W.P.No.3640 of 2001 inasmuch as it holds that the land acquisition proceedings stood lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the New Act. In the result, Writ Appeal in W.A.No.463 of 2022 is partly allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge, dated 28.10.2021 passed in W.P.No.3640 of 2001 is modified by allowing the Writ Petition declaring that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the lands claimed by the petitioner in S.F.Nos.411/1 and 411/2 in Vilankurichi village, Coimbatore covered by Award No.2 of 1994, dated 23.05.1994 38/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 stood lapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the New Act.” (emphasis supplied) 8.1.4. Keeping in view the above limitations on the power of the authorities under Acquisition Act, the only reason put forth by the State to doubt the Will is the mismatch in the date of birth between the death certificate and date of the Will. While dealing with this contention it is necessary to bear in mind that one who alleges fraud, fabrication has to prove the same.5.I would think the State has failed to discharge the burden of showing fabrication of the Will. The State may have to fail for not discharging the burden.
8.1.5. It appears to me that the mismatch in age the reason which forms the basis for the State to suspect the Will is itself nebulous, weak and shaky rather appears to be a fantasy of a doubting mind and not real, or germane. I say so, for the reason it is not uncommon that during the 1950's and until a portion of 1970's or may be even thereafter, there were no credible nor conclusive records as to the date of birth. Legislature conscious of the practice prevalent had in the context of service law upheld the competence of the State to refix the date of birth even though a different date was accepted by the Government at the time of appointment. In this regard it may be relevant to refer to the following judgment:
i) R.S. Kallolimath v. State of Mysore, reported in (1977) 3 SCC 425:
5. Ramesh Chand (D) Thr. Lrs. v. Suresh Chand and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1879 39/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 “14. ..... Although in view of the decision of this Court in State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei' it can no longer be disputed that the State is not precluded merely because of the acceptance of the date of birth of its employee, in the service register from holding an enquiry if there exist sufficient reasons for holding such enquiry and refixing his date of birth, it passes our comprehension as to why after granting an extension of service to the appellant presumably in terms of its Memorandum dated August 14, 1958, the Government retraced its steps and suddenly terminated the services of the appellant on March 31, 1959.” 8.1.6. Again Apex court in the case of High Court of Andhra Pradesh v.
N.Sanyasi Rao, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 674, while dealing with 2 date of birth of a judicial officer in the service register and the Secondary School Leaving Certificate held that the correct date of birth would have to be determined by conducting an enquiry. The following portions are relevant :
“14. Strangely, in the present case, no determination of the judicial officer's date of birth was made as contemplated and required in Rule 2 of the 1984 Rules. The District Judge, Visakhapatnam on opening the service register of the judicial officer mentioned both the dates, namely, 29-3-1953 based on the decree and also 1-7-1949 based on the secondary school-leaving certificate. Nothing has been shown to us by the learned counsel for the appellant about the firm date of birth recorded in the service record of the judicial officer. As a matter of fact, there has been no determination of the date of birth of the judicial officer at all and, therefore, the Division Bench, in the impugned order observed and, in our 40/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 view rightly, that the judicial officer had not asked for any alteration in the date of birth but his prayer had been for recording correct date of birth in the relevant service record.” 8.1.7. Though the above judgments are rendered in the context of service jurisprudence this Court has referred to the same only to show that the attempt by the State to question the genuineness of Will only on the ground of mismatch in the date of birth in the Will vis-a-vis in the death certificate is weak and shaky if not preposterous and thus lack merit. As found supra State having failed to discharge the burden to show fabrication of Will may have to fail.
9. Burden on State to establish payment of compensation
9.1. It is true that State in exercise of its power of eminent domain shall have the power to acquire property for public purposes without owners consent. However, it must be borne in mind that right to property though may no longer be a fundamental right, it still remains a constitutional right recognised and declared in Article 300A of Constitution which provides that “No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law”. The above Article leaves no room for doubt that provisions of any Act resulting in compulsory divesting a person of his rights and property ought to be strictly complied. The expression “save by authority of law” is a safeguard against arbitrary acquisitions, hasty 41/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 decision making and unfair redressal mechanism. Any divestiture of property in view of acquisition while permissible is subject to payment of compensation in lieu of acquisition. In this regard, it may be relevant to refer to the following judgments:
i) Kolkata Municipal Corpn. v. Bimal Kumar Shah, reported in (2024) 10 SCC 533 :
“29. The constitutional discourse on compulsory acquisitions, has hitherto, rooted itself within the “power of eminent domain”. Even within that articulation, the twin conditions of the acquisition being for a public purpose and subjecting the divestiture to the payment of compensation in lieu of acquisition were mandated [State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh, (1952) 1 SCC 528] . Although not explicitly contained in Article 300-A, these twin requirements have been read in and inferred as necessary conditions for compulsory deprivation to afford protection to the individuals who are being divested of property [Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai, (2005) 7 SCC 627; K.T. Plantation (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 9 SCC 1 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 414] .”
ii) D.B. Basnett (Dead) through Lrs. v. Collector, East District, Gangtok, Sikkim and another, reported in (2020) 4 SCC 572 :
“14. We may note that even though rights in land are no more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right under Article 42/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 300-A of the Constitution of India, and the provisions of any Act seeking to divest any person from the rights in property have to be strictly followed [N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517]” 9.2. From a reading of above judgments it is clear that acquisition without payment of compensation in accordance with law would fall foul of Article 300A of Constitution. In the present case, while petitioner has made it clear that no compensation was paid by the State in respect of the subject property assuming the acquisition to be valid, the State while defending the legality of the acquisition, had not produced any record/file which would show that compensation was paid either to Late Ramasamy, Late V.Nagarajan or petitioners 2 to 5.
9.3. Instead the State in its counter dated 15.02.2021, had stated steps are being taken to pay the compensation which clearly shows compensation was not paid. The relevant portion of the counter of 4 th respondent is extracted hereunder:
“7. ... The compensation amount with regard to the lands owned by Thiru. Ramasamy Konar was determined was determined and a sum of Rs.5117.50 was arrived at after apportionment.
.....
9. ... In so far as the lands owned by Thiru. Ramasamy Kenar of an extent of Acre 3.56 Cents, the compensation amount was determined and 43/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 apportioned in his name and the same was recorded in the award proceedings.
.....
11. ... With regard to the lands owned by the above said Ramasamy, i.e. an extent of Acre 3.56 Cents, the compensation amount was arrived at apportioned in the award proceedings itself and necessary steps are taken after the passing of the award to pay the compensation amount to him. Out of the total extent of the lands i.e. Acre 4.06 Cents, an extent of Acre 0.73 Cents was already utilised for the formation of road and the remaining extent is retained by the Highways Department."
(emphasis supplied) 9.4. Having stated so in the counter dated 15.02.2021, 2nd respondent has in its Status report while stating that compensation has been deposited, proceeds to state that National Highways Coimbatore has been addressed to produce the files relating to deposit of compensation in relation to subject acquisition, in turn the 7th respondent in the counter filed stated that files showing payment of compensation is not available with them. I had already dealt with non-production of files despite repeated directions to show that compensation was paid. This is a matter of concern moreso, when as found supra the Status Report of 2 nd respondent states that the files were brought to the office of the Government for the purpose of the present writ petition before it went missing. I had already expressed that this Court is appalled at the casual and lethargic attitude of the respondents hence may not have anything more to add except to state the non- 44/50
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 production of files/records available and brought to the office of Government Pleader even after filing of the writ petition while calling for strict action against erring official would prove fatal to the case of the State.
10. Possession not taken by State:
10.1. Now coming to possession not having been taken by the State, it is necessary to keep in view that it is only when possession has been taken, that title to the property would vest with the State in terms of Section 16 of the “1894 Act”. Petitioners submits that they continue to remain in possession and State had not taken possession pursuant to acquisition proceedings. Burden of proving of taking over possession is on the State. This Court has made it clear vide order dated 27.02.2025, if records are not produced relating to taking over possession and payment of compensation Court would be compelled to draw adverse inference. Despite which no records have been produced till date by the State to show that possession was taken over by the State by drawing of panchanama as explained by the Constitution Bench of Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority, wherein it was held as under:
“366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no 45/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).” 10.2. In the absence of records to show that possession was taken over by the State and compensation was paid, this Court is compelled to draw an adverse inference more so when admittedly the files were available until recently i.e., even after filing of the Writ Petition. In this regard it may be relevant to refer to the following judgment:
(i) State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri, reported in (2006) 7 SCC 172:
“18. It is now well settled that when a document being in possession of a public functionary, who is under a statutory obligation to produce the same before the court of law, fails and/or neglects to produce the same, an adverse inference may be drawn against him. The learned Special Judge in the aforementioned situation was enjoined with a duty to draw an adverse inference. He did not consider the question from the point of view of statutory requirements, but took into consideration factors, which were not germane.”
(ii) Union of India v. Ibrahim Uddin and another, reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148:
“12. Generally, it is the duty of the party to lead the best evidence in his possession, which could throw light on the issue in controversy and in case such material evidence is withheld, the court may draw adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act notwithstanding, that the onus of proof did not lie on such party and it was not called upon to produce the said evidence.” 46/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 10.3. The records relating to acquisition are in the State's possession, failure to produce the same would necessitate drawing of adverse inference. This Court having found that the State has failed to discharge its burden to show that either possession was taken (or) compensation paid, is compelled to find that acquisition proceedings are deemed to have lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of "2013 Act".
10.4.Under similar circumstance the Apex Court in the case of The Tamil Nadu Housing Board and Another v. Poovatha and Others, in Civil Appeal Nos.13256 and 13257 of 2024, held as under :
“24. ..... we direct that the respondents shall be entitled to compensation as on 01.01.2014 along with all the statutory benefits under the 2013 Act.
25. However, wherever the State Government Housing Board are of the view that any particular parcel of land is not required for the notified public purpose or will not serve such purpose, they shall be at liberty to release the land and an appropriate decision to this effect shall be taken within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order”
11. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court it is open to the State to reconsider whether the subject property is required for the notified public purpose, if so, petitioners shall be entitled to compensation in terms of 47/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 "2013 Act", if the State is of the view that the subject property will not serve notified purpose the State shall be at liberty to release the subject property. An appropriate decision shall be taken within a period of three months from the date of uploading of order copy without waiting for the receipt of certified copy.
12. Accordingly, the writ petition stands disposed of. No costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
27.10.2025 Speaking (or) Non Speaking Order Index : Yes/ No Neutral Citation: Yes/No spp/mka 48/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 To:
1. The Secretary to Government, Public Works Department, Secretariat, Fort St.George, Chennai 600 009.
2. The District Collector, Coimbatore District, Coimbatore.
3. The District Revenue Officer, Collecotrate Complex, Coimbatore – 18.
4. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Collectorate Complex, Coimbatore – 18.
5. The Special Tahsildar (LA), National Highways, Collectorate Complex, Coimbatore – 18.
6. The Tahsildar, Sulur Taluk, Coimbatore District.
7. The Project Director, NHAI Coimbatore PIU, 15-A, Kongu Nagar East, Trichy Road, Ramanathapuram, Kongu Nagar, Kallimadai, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu 641 045.
49/50
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm ) W.P. No.6802 of 2020 MOHAMMED SHAFFIQ, J.
spp/mka W.P. No.6802 of 2020 27.10.2025 50/50 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 07/11/2025 07:48:42 pm )