Central Administrative Tribunal - Jodhpur
Bharatiya Rail Vidyut Karmachari ... vs Shri M. Ravindra, Chairman, Railway ... on 22 September, 1998
JUDGMENT
Gopal Krishna, Vice Chairman
1. Petitioners named above have filed this Contempt Petition under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, the Act), praying for initiating proceedings of Contempt of Court against the respondents for non-compliance of the order of Ihe Tribunal passed in Original Applications Nos. 460/91, 1 15/ 94 and 116/94 on 9.5.96.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have carefully perused the records.
3. It is pertinent to note at the very outset that the Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi, vide No. PB/6/2/98-R dated 10.9.98 has circulated a copy of the judgment of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad dated 17.8.1998 in Writ Petition No. 34841 /1997 and Contempt Case No. 1054/1998 (Government of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Anantha Reddy and 7 Ors.) wherein a Division Bench of the Hon'bie High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad has held as follows:--
"(1) that in view of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. (supra), Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, no more survives.
(2) that consequently, the Administrative Tribunals set up under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can not exercise the contempt jurisdiction under Section 17 of the said Act, as the same had become non est under law;
(3) the contempt proceedings in Contempt Application No. 562 of 1996 on the file of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal are set aside as being devoid of jurisdiction. But, this will not preclude the respondents 1 to 6 in the Writ Petition No. 34841 of 1997 from approaching this Court for punishing the contempt of A.P. Administrative Tribunal relating to the decision rendered in O.A. No. 35574 of 1991 by following the procedure as applicable to the contempts of Subordinate Courts provided under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the rules made thereunder by the Andhra Pradesh High Court; and (4) that similarly, the petitioner in CC No. 1054 of 1998 has to approach this Court only by following the procedure as applicable to the contempts of Subordinate Courts provided under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and the rules made thereunder by the Andhra Pradesh High Court and not directly."
4. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that Section 17 of the Act owes its origin to and derives its strength from Article 323-A (2) (b) and (g) of the Constitution of India and since it has a constitutional sanction, the statutory provisions contained therein still operate and cannot be said to have become otiose or inoperative. It is further contended by the petitioners that the power of the Administrative Tribunals to resort to contempt proceedings for wilful disobedience of its orders and directions still exist notwithstanding the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and Ors., reported in AIR 1997 Supreme Court 1125. It is strongly urged that Parliament is hot precluded from framing laws vesting other Courts and Tribunals with the power to initiate proceedings of Contempt of Court to enable them to function as effective judicial forums and if Section 17 of the Act is rendered non est, the efficacy of legal remedy provided by the Tribunal may be lost. The petitioners have relied on AIR 1985 Supreme Court 218, Amar Nath Om Prakash and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors., wherein their Lordships of Hon'bie the Supreme Court have made the following observations:--
"We consider it proper to say as we have already said in other cases that judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for Judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes: their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. In London Graving Dock Company Limited v. Horton, 1951 Act 737 at p. 761 Lord Mac Dermot observed:
"The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima verba of Willes, J'.... as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by the most distinguished Judge."
In Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. (1970) 2 All ER 294, Lord Reid said. "Lord Atkin's speech....... is not to be treated as if it was a statutory definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances." Megarry J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: "One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russel L. J. as if it were an Act of Parliament." And in Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537 Lord Morris said:
"There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances are made in the setting of the facts of particular case."
5. However, in view of the decision of the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad referred to above, this Tribunal cannot proceed any further in this matter of Contempt of Court. Therefore, the Contempt Petition as moved by the petitioners is submitted to the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur for proceeding in accordance with law. Follow up action be taken by the Registry.