Tripura High Court
Sri Ratendra @ Rahul Reang vs The State Of Tripura on 19 January, 2017
Author: S. Talapatra
Bench: S. Talapatra
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL. A (J). NO.17 OF 2016
Sri Ratendra @ Rahul Reang,
son of Smarendra Reang,
resident of Lalcharra (BLK Para),
P.S. Chailenta, District: Dhalai Tripura
..................... Appellant
- Vs -
The State of Tripura
...............Respondent
BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. TALAPATRA For the appellant : Mr. R. Dutta, Advocate For the respondent : Mr. R.C. Debnath, Addl. P.P. Date of hearing : 09.12.2016 Date of judgment & order : 19.01.2017 Yes No Whether fit for reporting :
√ JUDGMENT & ORDER This is an appeal under Section 374 of the Cr.P.C. on questioning the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 03.03.2016 delivered in ST/T-1/0000004/2015 by the Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar, convicting the appellant under Sections 417 and 420 of the IPC and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year with fine of Rs.10,000 under Section 417 of the IPC with default CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 1 of 20 2 imprisonment and rigorous imprisonment for 7(seven) years with fine of Rs.30,000/- for offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC with default imprisonment.
02. The genesis of the prosecution case is rooted in the written ejahar filed by the victim [PW-1], whose name is withheld for protecting her identity. In the said written ejahar, filed on 10.08.2014, the victim disclosed that through the acquaintance of her sister the appellant proposed her and they were engaged in a love-affair. The appellant promised to marry the victim and they had pre-marital sexual intercourse on 'promise of marriage' on several occasions within the period from March 14 to June 26, 2014. Even the appellant started behaving like a son-in-law to her parents. The appellant made the victim to shun her studies, as she would be the wife of a Government Engineer, she need not have more qualification. The appellant identified him as Rahul and impressed her parents to call back her brother Solomon who was working as a Private Security Guard at Bengaluru as he assured that he would provide him a license for carrying on business of the contract works under the PWD department inasmuch as he enjoyed a cordial relation with the Chief Engineer. Moreover, he had impressed her parents that under his control there were sufficient building materials like brick, cement, rod and sand etc. and he would construct two storied building in their house with a limited budget of Rs.3,00,000/- and impressed upon them for another sum of Rs.90,000/- for obtaining a clerical job for her CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 2 of 20 3 brother, Solomon. The appellant induced and realised a sum of Rs.3,55,000/- from the victim's parents. On 26.06.2014, the appellant had the last sexual intercourse with her and left their house on assurance that he would return on 17.07.2014 with recruitment letter of her brother, Solomon. Later on, he had stated that for ensuing Panchayat Election, the recruitment for the time being was kept in abeyance. He had assured that he would arrive on 23.07.2014 and on the next date i.e. 24.07.2014, he would proceed to Agartala with her brother for joining the government job. On 23.07.2014 and 24.07.2014, the victim and her family members waited for return of the appellant but all were in vain. Then they started inquiring about Rahul Reang and got to know he was not an Engineer and even he is not a permanent resident of Laxmicherra near Bhaikhora P.S. which he had disclosed as his place of residence. They also discovered that his name was Rathindra Reang @ Rahul Reang.
03. On the basis of the said written ejahar, Kanchanpur P.S. Case No.66 of 2014 under Sections 417/376/420 of the IPC was registered and taken up for investigation. On completion of the investigation, the final police report was filed charge-sheeting the appellant and on taking cognizance, the charge was framed on 05.06.2015 by the Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar separately under Sections 376(1)/417 and 420 of the IPC to which the appellant pleaded innocence and claimed to face the trial.
CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 3 of 20 4
04. To substantiate the charge, the prosecution adduced as many as 12(twelve) witnesses including the victim and her inmates, her parents and brother Solomon. Even 9(nine) documentary evidence [Exbts.1-11] including the written ejahar [Exbt.1-5] and the medical examination report of the victim [Exbt.11]. Thereafter, the appellant was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. to have his response to the incriminating materials those surfaced in the evidence. The appellant pleaded innocence again and stated that he had been falsely implicated in the case.
05. Mr. R. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that there is no ingredient of cheating at all and as such the conviction under Sections 417 and 420 is bound to fall through on proper scrutiny of the evidence. He has categorically submitted that there was no dishonest intention at the time of making promise. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating. It is essentially required to show that the person making promise had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise. There is no evidence, as stated, of the dishonest intention. Mr. Dutta, has succinctly pointed out that the appellant never refused to marry the victim. On assumption that the appellant would not marry the victim, the said written ejahar was alleged in Kanchanpur police station and on the purported investigation the said chargesheet was filed. To buttress his submission Mr. Dutta, learned counsel CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 4 of 20 5 has referred a decision of the apex court in Hridaya Ranjan Pd. Verma & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr. reported in AIR 2000 SC 2341. 'Cheating' is defined in Section 415 of the Cr.P.C. as "Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat". It is explained further in the said section that a dishonest concealment of fact is a deception within the meaning of this section.
The section requires:
(1) Deception of any person, (2) (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person-(i) to
deliver any property to any person; or (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property; or
(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.
CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 5 of 20 6 The apex court in Hridaya Ranjan (supra) has observed as under:
"15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time to inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed.
16. Judged on the touchstone of the principles noted above, the present case, in our considered view warrants interference inasmuch as the ingredients of the offence of cheating punishable under section 420 IPC and its allied offences under sections 418 and 423 has not been made out. So far as the offences under sections 469, 504 and 120B are concerned even the basic allegations making out a case thereunder are not contained in the complaint. That being the position the case comes within the first category of cases enumerated in State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. (Supra) and as such warrants interference by the Court. Reading the avernments in the complaint in entirety and accepting the allegations to be true, the ingredients of intentional deception on the part of the accused right at the beginning of the negotiations for the transaction has neither been expressly stated nor indirectly suggested in complaint. All that the respondent No. 2 has alleged against the appellants is that they did not disclose to him that one of their brothers had filed a partition suit which was pending. The requirement that the information was not disclosed by the appellants intentionally in order to make the respondent No. 2 part with property is not alleged expressly or even impliedly in the complaint. Therefore the core postulate of dishonest intention in order to deceive the complainant-respondent no.2 is not made out even accepting all the averments in the complaint on their face value. In such a situation continuing the criminal proceeding against the accused will be, in our considered view, an abuse of process of the court. The High Court was not right in declining to quash the complaint and the proceeding initiated on the basis of the same."
06. Mr. Dutta, learned counsel has also relied on another decision of the apex court in Deelip Singh alias Dilip Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2005 SC 203 where the apex CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 6 of 20 7 court after dilating the legal position in defining 'consent' within the meaning of Section 30 of the IPC has observed as under:
"The failure to keep the promise at a future uncertain date due to reasons not very clear on the evidence does not always amount to a misconception of fact at the inception of the act itself. In order to come within the meaning of misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance. The matter would have been different if the consent was obtained by creating a belief that they were already married. In such a case the consent could be said to result from a misconception of fact. But here the fact alleged is a promise to marry we do not know when. If a full grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact. S. 90 IPC cannot be called in aid in such a case to pardon the act of the girl and fasten criminal liability on the other, unless the Court can be assured that from the very inception the accused never really intended to marry her."
07. Mr. Dutta, learned counsel appearing for the appellant has contended based on the said decision of the apex court that there is no evidence at all that the appellant refused to marry the victim, rather the victim filed the criminal action against the appellant on unsubstantiated 'comprehension'. Mr. Dutta, learned counsel has further relied on a decision of this court in Durjoy Chakraborty vs. State of Tripura reported in (2012) 6 GLR 653, where it has been held that when there is no evidence that on a misconception of fact the prosecutrix had the intercourse with the accused and in absence of the evidence that the accused did not intend to marry the victim from the very beginning when he made the purported false promise to have intercourse with her, no conviction under Section 417 of the IPC can be returned. In another decision [Jintu Das vs. State of Assam reported in (2002) 3 GLR 633] the Gauhati High Court had occasion to hold CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 7 of 20 8 that when the victim attended the age of consent, had the sexual intercourse and in the trial she has categorically stated that she had been in love with the accused appellant, the irresistible conclusion that has to be drawn is that the sexual intercourse was with her consent. If a full grown woman consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant, it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact. In Jintu Das (supra), a decision in Jayanti Rani Panda vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1984 Cri.L.J. 1535 has been approvingly referred, as it has been observed in that report as under:
"The failure to keep the promise at a future uncertain date due to reasons not very clear on the evidence does not always amount to a misconception of fact at the inception of the act itself. In order to come within the meaning of misconception of fact, the fact must have an immediate relevance. The matter would have been different if the consent was obtained by creating a belief that they were already married. In such a case the consent could be said to result from a misconception of fact. But here the fact alleged is a promise to marry we do not know when. If a full grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact. S. 90 IPC cannot be called in aid in such a case to pardon the act of the girl and fasten criminal liability ......"
08. From the other side, Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P. appearing for the respondent has vehemently submitted that 'inducement' is clear and manifest in the evidence. He has submitted that the 'first instance' which is relevant for purpose of locating 'consent' or for construing the fact which would demonstrate a consent that was given on misconception. As the CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 8 of 20 9 appellant promised the victim to marry her, even he had been behaving like a husband of the victim by addressing the victim's parents as father and mother and as an act of furtherance he had sexual intercourse with the victim. Moreover, the appellant had concealed his real identity for purpose of deceiving the victim and her family. After taking the money from the parents of victim, the appellant did not only stop contacting with the victim or her family but his mobile number was found all the time switched off. Even on inquiry, it was found that he had similar antecedents. According to Mr. Debnath, learned Addl. P.P. this is a case where the prosecution has established beyond any shred of doubt the charge of cheating under Sections 417 and 420 of the IPC for committing harm to the mind and reputation of the victim and other for taking away the valuable property. He has firmly urged this court that the decision as relied by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant is distinguishable in the context of the case and as such those will have no application whatsoever.
09. For appreciating the rival contentions it would be apposite to revisit the evidence as led by the prosecution inasmuch as from the defence no evidence was adduced. The victim [PW-1] was also examined under Section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. where she had stated to the Magistrate who recorded such statement that sue and the appellant came to know each other and the appellant gained confidence of her and her family members. He introduced him as Rahul Reang. But subsequently it CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 9 of 20 10 revealed that his real name was Rathindra Reang of Lalcherra, Chailenta. On several promises made by him to marry her in front of her father, mother, brother and sister the victim had sex with him. The appellant promised her father and mother of providing a job to her brother namely Solomon and for that purpose he took Rs.3,55,000/- fraudulently in two instalments, which statement is different from the statement made in the written ejahar [Exbt.1]. When she made the statement under Section 164(5), it was asserted that the appellant was absconding after cheating her and her family members. She has stated further that the appellant had cheated her and spoilt her life. The appellant had also cheated her family. The victim deposed in the trial as PW-1 and stated that the appellant proposed to her sister that he would marry her. Her sister conveyed his proposal to her and gave her mobile number to the appellant. The appellant wanted to meet her at her house at Kanchanpur. Her parents also agreed. Thereafter, the appellant came to their house at Kanchanpur and stayed for some time. He continued to visit the victim's house. He proposed to her father that he would construct their house at a low cost of Rs.3,00,000/- and he would arrange a job for her brother for which another sum of Rs.90,000/- would be required. On 30.05.2014, her father gave him a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- as he reposed faith on him. On 26.06.2014, her father gave him another sum of Rs.1,50,000/-. On the following day, the appellant left their house. Before leaving he promised that on 17.07.2014 CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 10 of 20 11 he would come back with the license for her father to work as the contractor. She has further stated that he developed the physical relation with her 'on assurance of marrying her'. On such assurance she consented to sexual intercourse for about 2-3 months. After he left their house on 26.06.2014, he never came back and on a search it was found that the appellant was not a resident of Laxmicherra as he revealed to be. Thus the appellant misrepresented to them. The appellant was found to be the resident of Lalcherra under Dhalai district. In the cross- examination, the defence tried to extract that the parents of the victim did not have that amount of money to part with the appellant. In the examination-in-chief, however, the victim has stated that the appellant started calling her father as 'baba' and mother as 'maa'.
10. PW-2, the elder sister of the victim, Kakchanti Reang has stated how she got acquainted with the appellant. She has stated that she introduced the appellant to her family members. The appellant introduced him as Rahul Reang and as an Engineer by occupation. He started frequently visiting their house and 'mesmerized' the members of her family. He had asserted that he hailed from a rich family with huge property. He developed a relation with her sister and that relation rolled into pre-marital sexual intercourse. The appellant used to give them costly gifts during his visit. He used to travel by motor bike or car. She has further stated that her parents saved money for constructing a CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 11 of 20 12 house. The appellant told them that he would build a low cost house for her parents because he had raw materials like cement, rod etc under his disposal as an Engineer. Her younger brother Solomon was then working in a company in Bangalore. The appellant asked her parents to bring him back to Kanchanpur as he would be managing a job for her brother. On 30.05.2014, her parents gave him a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- and subsequently in the month of June, they paid another sum of Rs.1,50,000/-. Even Solomon was brought back from Bangalore. The appellant fixed a date for giving him a job. On that day, he did not come and that incident made them apprehending that he had cheated them. Later on, it revealed that the appellant was not a resident of Laxmicherra as he revealed. He was a resident of Chailengta. Her father visited his house and came to know that he was not Rahul and his actual name was Rathindra Reang and he was not an Engineer. In the cross-examination, she has stated that she did not bring her sister to the rented house for introducing her to the appellant. Rather, she took the appellant to their house for such introduction. Her father is a Government Teacher. She has further stated that she did not see the appellant in the college where she was reading. She has candidly admitted that she could not say whether her parents asked him to live in their house and to prove his competence of marrying her sister. She has further admitted that 'Thereafter, we refused to get my sister married to the accused.' CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 12 of 20 13
11. PW-3, Sri Ramchandra Reang, the father of the victim and PW-2 had corroborated that the appellant started calling him and his wife as 'baba' and 'maa'. The appellant introduced him as an Engineer by occupation. He assured him that he would construct a house for him at a low cost and arrange a job for his son Solomon. He paid him Rs.3,50,000/- in all for constructing their house and managing a job for his son. During his stay in their house, the appellant used to live with their daughter. He has stated that they allowed him because he assured to marry his daughter. He left their house on 27th June and he did not come back. Even he neither refunded his money nor married his daughter. He later on came to know as he stated in the cross- examination that the appellant's real name was Rathindra Reang, not Rahul Reang with which name he introduced himself. He has however stated that there is no such custom in their family called 'Damang'.
12. PW-4, Sri Dhaneswar Reang, is the brother-in-law of PW-3. He met the appellant in the house of Ramchandra Reang [PW-3]. At that time, the appellant told him that he had connection with influential persons and there were vacancies in his office for giving job to his son, Abel Reang. He demanded Rs.1,20,000/- for managing a job for his son. He gave a sum of Rs.1,20,000/- in cash in the month of May, 2014. The appellant neither gave a job to his son nor refunded his money. In the cross-examination, he has stated that he did not verify whether CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 13 of 20 14 the appellant was an engineer of the Public Works Department or not. He has asserted that he informed the matter to the police.
13. PW-5, Suparung Reang, is the mother of PW-1 and PW-2. She has stated that the appellant developed intimacy with her younger daughter. Initially they did not accept such intimacy between them because they were poor and he was such a rich man. But subsequently their relation became deeper and under his influence her daughter dropped her studies. She has also corroborated that they brought back their son from Bangalore on assurance that the appellant would arrange a job for him. They also gave Rs.3,55,000/- for making their house and providing a job to himself. She has also stated that from the bank account of her husband, they paid that money to the appellant.
14. PW-6, Gantirai Reang has stated that he met Rahul in the house of Ramchandra Reang. Rahul introduced him as an Engineer by occupation coming from a village called Laxmicherra under Bhaikhora police station. He also proposed to him that if his son was interested, he could manage a job for his son and he negotiated the price with him. Later on, he paid Rs.90,000/- to the appellant on 08.06.2014 for procuring job to his son Rajani Kanta Reang. He had assured that he would come with the offer of job on 17.07.2014, but he did not return. In the cross- examination, he could not find out any statement to the effect that the money on 08.06.2014 as stated in the cross-examination was paid to the appellant.
CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 14 of 20 15
15. PW-7, Parbati Rani Nath was posted as the Women Constable in the Kanchanpur police station. She recorded the statement of Kalukti Reang as the Kokborok knowing person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. in presence of the I.O.
16. PW-8, Bhabatosh Talukdar was the Officer-in-Charge of Kanchanpur police station on 10.08.2014. On that day, he received the written complaint of Kalukti Reang at the police station and registered the Kanchanpur P.S. case No.66 of 2014 under Section 417, 376, 420 and 406 of the IPC. He had endorsed the case for investigation to Shakti Sadhan Jamatia [PW-9] for investigation.
17. PW-9, Shakti Sadhan Jamatia has narrated briefly how he conducted the investigation by recording the statements of the witnesses and taking the victim to the Magistrate for recording her statement under Section 164(5) of the Cr.P.C. He had also arranged for medical examination of the victim. He had also prepared the site map for purpose of clarifying the place of occurrence vis-a-vis the other place or the relevant positions. He seized the birth certificate of victim on preparing the seizure memo [Exbt.8]. He arrested the appellant on 12.08.2014. He had categorically stated that the appellant used to study in Dharmanagar Govt. Degree College. He developed intimacy with the elder sister of the victim when he was studying in the Dharmanagar Degree College. They were known to each other from long before the occurrence. But he has candidly admitted CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 15 of 20 16 that he did not visit the house of the appellant. He has stated further that he met the Chief Engineer of PWD who told him there was no such engineer in his department by the name of Rahul Reang.
18. PW-10, Dr. Anup Goswami had carried out the potency test to ascertain whether the appellant was capable of sexual intercourse or not. He has identified his reports [Exbt-9 and 10] in the trial.
19. PW-11, Sri Solomon Reang has stated that the victim is her younger sister. He knew the appellant. He left Bangalore as the appellant called him over phone and promised to give him a job in PWD in Tripura. Following his assurance he returned home. He met him in their house at Kanchanpur. His father gave him Rs.3,55,000/-. In June, 2014, he left forever. Thereafter, he never returned to their house. But his statements were not found in the previous statement as recorded by the Police Officer. But those were not taken for confirmation to establish the contradiction from the statement of PW-11 by the prosecution.
20. PW-12, Dr. Pallab Kanti Kar is the Medical Officer who carried on the medical examination of the victim in connection with Kanchanpur P.S. case No.66 of 2014 and when he found the signs of sexual intercourse in her genital organ. Her hymen was found torn but she had normal menstruation as before. There was no sign of violent sexual intercourse. He collected her vaginal CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 16 of 20 17 swab for further study and handed over the samples to the police. He identified his report [Exbt.11]. In the cross-examination, he has stated that academically, hymen of a woman, may be ruptured for various other reasons except sexual intercourse.
21. From appreciation of the evidence as recorded in the trial, what has appeared before this court is that between the victim and the appellant there developed an intimate relation and they had occasional consensual sex. The question is whether from the circumstances it can be gathered that such sexual intercourse occurred on the promise of marriage. The victim was living in their house and in the sight of all family members. Even though PW-1, PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 have categorically stated that the sexual intercourse could take place on assurance of marriage. But PW-2 had projected a deeper light on the circumstances. She has stated that the appellant charmed all the inmates and he impressed her younger sister and they got engaged in a love affair and even they entered in a sexual relationship. In the cross- examination, she had made a statement that the appellant denied to marry her younger sister. That apart, in view of the decision of the apex court in Deelip Singh (supra) that when the fact alleged is a promise to marry and when the court does not know if a full grown girl consents to the act of sexual intercourse on a promise of marriage and continues to indulge in such activity until she becomes pregnant, it is an act of promiscuity on her part and not an act induced by misconception of fact.
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22. In this case also from the circumstances it appears that it was an act of 'promiscuity' or consensual sex out of the said intimate relation. As such, this court is of the considered view that the element of cheating within the purview of Section 417 of the IPC has not been proved. But inducement for purpose of cheating the parent and the brother of the victim is apparent on the face of the evidence. The appellant after receipt of money did not deliver the assured property or service, rather he had questioned the fact of receiving such money. Inducement was there from the very beginning, as the appellant concealed his identity. As such the conviction under Section 420 is well- founded in the evidence, inasmuch as the appellant had dishonestly induced to deliver the property worth of Rs.3,55,000/- with knowledge that he would not be able to deliver the goods that he promised as it had revealed that he was not an engineer of Public Works Department. That apart, thus he cheated from the inception. The offence of cheating is made of two broad ingredients. Deception of any person and fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to that person or any person or to consent that the said person shall retain the property. To put it differently, ingredients of the offence are that the person so deceived delivers to someone or any one a valuable security or property and that the person so deceived was induced to do so and that such person acted on such inducement in consequence of having been deceived by the accused and that, CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 18 of 20 19 the accused acted fraudulently or dishonestly when so inducing the person. To constitute the offence of cheating, it is not necessary that the deception should be preferably by express words, but it may be derived from the conduct or by implication from the transaction itself.
23. Thus, this court does not find any infirmity in the conviction of the appellant under Section 420 of the IPC as on assessment of the evidence this court is inclined to rely on the testimonies of PWs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 11 in particular. However, the sentence does not appear conforming to proportionality. The sentence is therefore reduced to rigorous imprisonment for 3(three) years and to pay a fine of Rs.30,000/- and in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for another 6(six) months under Section 420 of the IPC.
24. Having held that the victim had consensual sex openly, the appellant is acquitted from the charge under Section 417 of the IPC. But his conviction under Section 420 of the IPC stands confirmed for inducing to deliver up the sum of Rs.3,50,000.00/- and for cheating the parents of the victim in the manner as borne in the evidence as discussed above, with the modification in the sentence as stated.
25. In the result, the appeal stands partly allowed. The appellant shall surrender in the court of the Sessions Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar forthwith. If the appellant does not CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 19 of 20 20 surrender within a period of 3(three) months from today, the trial court shall take all coercive measures to ensure that the appellant suffered the sentence as recorded above.
Send down the LCRs forthwith.
JUDGE Moumita CRL A(J) No.17 of 2016 Page 20 of 20