Madhya Pradesh High Court
Mahadev Sailor vs Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. on 1 December, 1995
Equivalent citations: 1996(0)MPLJ386
ORDER T.S. Doabia, J.
1. The petitioner was appointed as Trainee Officer. The period of training was fixed for one year. He was to be paid a consolidated stipend of Rs. 3400/-. On successful completion of the training the petitioner would have become entitled to employment with the Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited i.e. the Authority, which had issued order, Annexure P-1, vide which the petitioner was appointed as Trainee Officer.
2. The further fact is that during the period of one year it was found that the petitioner was not performing his duties as per the standards fixed by the respondent-Corporation. It is the case of the Corporation that on a number of times the petitioner was informed about his deficiency and with regard to unsatisfactory performance. The petitioner, however, did not improve. The requisite averments are made in paragraphs 2(a), (e), (f) and (g). This can be summarised as under :-
For the period from 20th September 1992 to 6th November 1992 the petitioner was informed about those respects where he was lacking. A letter was written on 3rd December 1992. He was called upon to improve. The petitioner was posted to Delhi Airport from 4th December 1992 to 1st May 1993. No improvement was shown by the petitioner. A letter was addressed to him on 6th January 1993. A written test was also held on 29th March 1993. The petitioner secured marks below average. The petitioner was, however, again given opportunity to improve, but he failed to do so.
2A. Taking note of the above facts, the respondent issued a letter on 28th May 1992 (sic) terminating the appointment of the petitioner as trainee-officer. This is being challenged in this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the petitioner has been visited with the penal consequences. According to him, the mention of the words 'highly unsatisfactory' imposes a stigma on the petitioner.
3. The respondent has raised a preliminary objection. According to it, the letter of appointment was issued from Bombay. It is further pointed out that at no point of time the petitioner had worked at the territory of Madhya Pradesh and as such this Court would not have territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
4. On merits, it has been contended that the services of the petitioner have brought to an end within the period of probation. This has been done on the ground that the work of the petitioner was not satisfactory.
5. So far as the preliminary objection taken in this petition is concerned, I am of the view that this petition has no merit. The order by which the period of probation was brought to an end was served on the petitioner at Guna. The ill effect of this order can be said to have fallen on the petitioner within the State of Madhya Pradesh and, therefore, this Court shall have the jurisdiction. The petitioner has rightly placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court reported as 1987 MPLJ (KB.) 396 = 1987 JLJ 341, K. P. Govil v. J. N. Krishi Vishwa Vidyalaya. In para 10 of the report it has been observed as under :-
"In cases of orders impugned the cause of action would arise at a place where the order is made and also the place where its consequence fall on the person concerned.
In view of the above, this Court would have jurisdiction in this matter. The ratio of this judgment given by the Supreme Court in the case reported as 1994 (4) SCC 711, Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar and Ors. would not be attracted.
6. Coming to the merits of the case, I am of the view that the order in question does not impose any stigma. Where an order is passed terminating the tenure during the period of probation then it cannot be said that it is passed on the ground of any turpitude like misconduct. It would be apt to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case reported in Hari Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2263, in which A. N. Ray, the then Chief Justice of India speaking for the Court observed :-
'To hold that the words "unfit to be appointed" are a stigma would rob the authorities of the power to judge fitness for work or suitability to the post at the time of confirmation. Termination of services on account of inadequacy for the job or for any temperamental or other is defect not involving moral turpitude is not a stigma which can be called discharge by punishment. Fitness for the job is one of the most important reasons for confirmation."
Similar observations would be found in the case reported as AIR 1966 SC 334, Lekhraj v. Dy. Custodian, Bombay. I am accordingly of the view that the order in question does not impose any stigma on the petitioner. The use of the word "highly unsatisfactory" would not clothe the order with a character from which it could be spelled out that the order is penal in nature.
7. As a matter of fact the respondent-Corporation has been more than just in reminding the petitioner to improve. He has failed to improve. He failed even in the written test. There is no mala fide. This petition, as such, has no merit and it is accordingly dismissed.