Allahabad High Court
Ved Nath And Anr. vs Indra Vikram Alias Chhote Singh And Anr. on 19 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: AIR2003ALL198, AIR 2003 ALLAHABAD 198, 2003 ALL. L. J. 1702 (2003) 3 LANDLR 573, (2003) 3 LANDLR 573
Author: Kamal Kishore
Bench: Kamal Kishore
JUDGMENT Kamal Kishore, J.
1. This is the second civil appeal against the judgment and decree passed by Sri R. N. Sircar, the then learned Additional District Judge, Hardoi in Civil Appeal No. 163 of 1982 setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court.
The following legal questions have been framed in this appeal :--
1. Whether the agreement dated 30-11-1981 which was registered on 18-1-1982 is void?
2. Whether the specific performance of contract itself implies the prayer for cancellation of the impugned sale deed?
2. I have heard the arguments of the parties counsel and have gone through the record.
3. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the plaintiffs are said to have entered into an agreement with Indra Vikram Singh for sale of 'Bhurnidhar' plots with regard to 1/4th of his share and for this Rs. 1200/- were given by the plaintiffs-appellants to Indra Vikram Singh (defendant No. 1) in the village itself and Rs.2800/- were given by the plaintiffs appellants to defendant No. 1 on 6-1-1982 when an agreement for execution of the sale deed was got registered. It is alleged that the plots were agreed to be sold by the plaintiffs-appellants to the defendant No. 1 for Rs. 8000/- and the plaintiffs appellants had paid in all Rs. 4000/- in advance to the defendant No. 1. It is alleged that the plaintiffs-appellants had always been ready and willing to perform their part of contract but the defendant No. 1 executed the sale deed of the said plots in favour of the respondent-defendant No. 2 who had knowledge of the prior agreement in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants themselves and so it is alleged that the sale deed executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of the defendant No. 2 is void and illegal and does not cast any ill effect upon the agreement entered into between the plaintiffs appellants and defendant No. 1.
4. Defendant No. 1 Indra Vikram Singh, who did not file any appeal against the judgment and decree of the learned trial court, denied the execution of any agreement in favour of the plaintiffs appellants with regard, to his 1/4th share in the plots and also denied passing of any consideration of the agreement for sale of the plots to the plaintiffs-appellants for Rs. 8000/-.
5. He denied the execution of any agreement dated 6-1-1982 in favour of the plaintiffs-appellants. On the other hand, he alleged that it was on 30-11-1981 he had entered into an agreement with the respondent defendant No. 2 for sale of the plots in suit and that it could not be registered that day and thereafter as his daughter had fallen ill and he had gone to his 'Sasural' in Mauza Alipur, P. S. Kasimpur, district Hardoi, it was after about a month that this agreement was got registered. He also alleged that he had very intimate terms with Ram Nath (plaintiff-appellant No. 2) and he used to offer him liquor and 'Bhang' and was under control and so when he had come along with the plaintiffs-appellants to see picture at district Hardoi and he was given intoxicants by the plaintiffs-appellants and at that time they got his signatures as a witness in one agreement set up by the plaintiffs-appellants and in that capacity he also signed before the Sub-Registrar. He also alleged that no such agreement dated 6-1-1982 was entered into by him with the plaintiffs-appellants and it is fraudulent. He also alleged that the plaintiffs-appellants had full knowledge of the agreement dated 30-11-1981 having been executed by him in favour of the respondent defendant No. 2.
6. The respondent-defendant No. 2 in his written statement alleged that the defendant No. 1 did not execute agreement dated 6-1-1982 in a normal condition as he was got intoxicated by the plaintiffs-appellants and alleged that agreement dated 31-11-1981 entered into by defendant No. 1 in his favour could not be got registered due to delay and as thereafter defendant No. 1 had gone to his 'Sasural' and had returned after about a month that the same was got registered on 18-1-1982 and thereafter sale deed with regard to the plots in suit was executed in his favour by defendant No. 1 on 1-2-1982.
7. It has to be seen as has been contended on behalf of the respondent as to whether the agreement dated 30-11-1981 which was got registered on 18-1-1982 will commence to operate from 30-11-1981 as has been contended by the him or from the date of registration itself i.e. from 18-1-1982. For this contention, the learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon Section 47 of the Registration Act which may be quoted as below :-
"A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made and not from the time of its registration."
8. In view of the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, it is well settled that a document on subsequent registration will take effect from the time when it was executed and not from the time of its registration. Where two documents are executed on the same day, the time of their execution would determine the priority irrespective of the time of their registration. The one which is executed earlier in time will prevail over the other executed subsequently as has been held in the ruling reported in 2002 (93) R. D. 280 : (AIR 2002 SC 959), Gurbax Singh v. Kartar Singh. Both the legal questions formulated above are answered in negative.
9. The findings recorded by the learned lower appellate court is based on evidence on record and the same do not call for any interference by this Court. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the ruling reported in (1999)3 SCC 722 : (AIR 1999 SC 2213) Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar that if first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be regarded as suffering from an error either of law or procedure requiring interference in second appeal.
10. The appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate court are maintained.