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[Cites 14, Cited by 0]

Karnataka High Court

Srinivas Tummala vs Smt. Himadeepa Karlapudi on 9 April, 2026

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                                                      NC: 2026:KHC:19954
                                                     WP No. 9321 of 2025


             HC-KAR




             IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

                      DATED THIS THE 9TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026

                                      BEFORE

             THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

                  WRIT PETITION NO. 9321 OF 2025 (GM-RES)

             BETWEEN:

             SRINIVAS TUMMALA
             S/O MR. LAKSHMANA RAO TUMMALA
             AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS,
             R/A NO.2120, CANYON PARK DRIVE
             SOUTHLAKE, TEXAS 76092,
             USA REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER AND POWER OF
             ATTORNEY HOLDER
             MR. LAKSHMANA RAO TUMMALA
             S/O RAMAKRISHNA SASTRULU
             AGED ABOUT 79 YEARS,
             PRINCIPAL DISTRICT JUDGE (RETD.)
             R/AT FLAT NO.342, ALEKHYA TOWERS,
             BAIRAMALGUDA,
Digitally
signed by    INNER RING ROAD,
CHAITHRA A   HYDERABAD, TELANGANA - 500 079.
Location:    SRNIOR CITIZEN SHIP IS NOT CLAIMED
HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA                                                   ...PETITIONER
             (BY SMT. YUKTA ANIL, ADVOCATE)

             AND:

             1.   SMT. HIMADEEPA KARLAPUDI
                  D/O RAMAKRISHNA KARLAPUDI
                  AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
                  R/A NO.3501, CARLTON STREET,
                  GRAPEVINE, TEXAS - 76092, U.S.A.

                  REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER
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                                        NC: 2026:KHC:19954
                                      WP No. 9321 of 2025


HC-KAR



    SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDER,
    SRI RAMAKRISHNA KARLAPUDI
    S/O VENKATESHWARLU,
    AGED ABOUT 72 YEARS,
    R/A NO. 8-3-898/1/A,
    NAGARJUNA NAGAR,
    SRINAGAR COLONY,
    TELANGANA, HYDERABAD-560 073.

                                            ...RESPONDENT

     THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226
AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO CALL
FOR THE RECORDS WHICH CAUSE IN PASSING THE IMPUGNED
ORDER DTD 13.12.2024 , ANNEXURE-A MADE IN FR MISC
91/2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED PRINCIPAL DIST JUDGE
BENGALURU RURAL DIST BENGALURU AND SET ASIDE THE
ORDER DTD 13.12.2024 , ANNEXURE- A. MADE IN FR MISC
91/2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED PRINCIPAL DIST JUDGE
BENGALURU RURAL BENGALURU AND CONSEQUENTLY ALLOW
FR MISC 91/2024 FILED BY THE PETITIONER HEREIN.

    THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

                      ORAL ORDER

The captioned petition is filed assailing the order dated 13.12.2024 made in FR No.Misc.91/2024 passed by the learned Principal District & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, Bengaluru, wherein the Court below has declined to entertain the appeal filed under Section 340(2) -3- NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR of Cr.P.C. on the premise that the petitioner has a remedy by way of an appeal before this Court and therefore, the appeal filed under Section 340(2) of Cr.P.C. is not maintainable. Consequently, appeal is dismissed.

2. The facts leading to the present case on hand relates to the allegations attributed against the defendant Nos.1 to 3 that they induced the appellant herein to invest the scheme framed by respondent No.1 for purchase, conversion and development of agricultural land at Bengaluru. The present appellant alleged that he transferred USD 90,000/- to the ICICI NRE Bank account of respondent No.3 at Hyderabad. Appellant also claims that respondent No.2 later transferred amount to the account of one Gopinath Naidu who is the vendor of the suit schedule property and that the suit lands were purchased in the name of respondent No.2 in the capacity of trustee of appellant herein. While respondent No.3 initiated divorce proceedings against the appellant in Texas Family Court and decree was granted by the Texas -4- NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR Family Court, the appellant filed a suit in O.S.No.1091/2021 seeking recovery of money. The appellant during the course of trial issued a notice under Order XII Rule 8 of CPC to the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent and his wife, who are arrayed as defendant Nos.1 and 2 for production of in all 8 documents including income tax returns. The appellant alleges that defendants in response to the notice chose to produce a few documents which were marked at Exs.D-9 to D-16. The appellant alleges that the affidavits to which respondent has sworn are faraway from the truth and therefore, this prompted the petitioner in lodging a complaint under Section 340(2) of Cr.P.C.

3. Petitioner's primary grievance is that the learned Judge while deciding the civil suit did not advert to the application filed under Section 340(1) of Cr.P.C., while the suit came to be disposed of. It is in this backdrop, the appellant herein approached the Principal District Court by filing an appeal under Section 340(2) of Cr.P.C. Learned -5- NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR District Judge has dismissed the appeal as not maintainable on the premise that appellant has a remedy of appeal before this Court.

4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. Perused the records. This Court has also given its anxious consideration to the judgment relied by the petitioner's counsel rendered in the case of Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another1 and also the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of The State of Punjab vs. Jasbir Singh2. The following points would arise for consideration:

(i) Whether the finding of the Court below that petitioner herein has to avail a remedy of appeal before this Court under Section 341 of Cr.P.C. suffers from perversity and warrants interference?
(ii) Whether this petition can be disposed of without issuing notice to respondent No.1?
1
(1956) 1 SCC 185 2 Criminal Appeal No.335 of 2020 -6- NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR Finding on Point No.(i):

5. Though the allegations of perjury are attributed against respondent No.1, the statutory scheme engrafted under Section 340 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, clearly delineates the procedure to be followed whenever an offence affecting the administration of justice is alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding before a Court. The provision contemplates that either on an application made by a party to the proceedings or suo motu, if the Court is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice to inquire into such offence, it shall conduct a preliminary enquiry. Upon such enquiry, if the Court records a finding that an offence referred to under Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. appears to have been committed, it may make a complaint in writing and forward the same to the Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 340 is not mechanical, but is coupled with a duty to consider the application, form an opinion on expediency, -7- NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR and thereafter proceed in terms of clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1). When allegations of perjury are brought to the notice of the very Court where such perjury is alleged to have occurred, that Court is obligated to apply its judicial mind and take a reasoned decision in accordance with the statutory mandate.

6. In the case on hand, it is not in dispute that an application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. was filed and was very much on record. The learned Judge, while being fully cognizant of the pendency of such application, proceeded to adjudicate and dispose of the suit without adverting to or passing any order on the said application. Such inaction, in the teeth of a specific statutory procedure, cannot be countenanced. Once a complaint of perjury is formally brought before the Court, it is incumbent upon the Court to either initiate proceedings under Section 340 or to decline the same by recording reasons. A complete omission to consider the application defeats the very object of the provision. In the event of refusal or failure to -8- NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR entertain such application, the statute provides a specific remedy by way of appeal under Section 341(1) Cr.P.C.

7. Section 341(1) of Cr.P.C. expressly provides that an appeal shall lie from any order made under Section 340(1) or Section 340(2), or from an order refusing to make a complaint, to the Court to which such former Court is subordinate within the meaning of Section 195(4) Cr.P.C. In the present case, the order impugned emanates from the Court of the Senior Civil Judge. Admittedly, the said Court is subordinate to the Principal District Court in the civil hierarchy. Therefore, having regard to the statutory scheme and the concept of subordination contemplated under Section 195(3) and (4) Cr.P.C., the appeal under Section 341(1) would squarely lie before the Principal District Court and not before this Court. Entertaining the appeal directly before this Court would be contrary to the legislative intent embodied in Sections 340 and 341 Cr.P.C.

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR

8. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in the case of Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra) is squarely applicable to the present case on hand. The Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with an identical situation at para 13, 19 and 20 has held as under:

"13. Other views are also possible but we do not intend to explore them. In our opinion, the matter is to be viewed thus. The first question to be asked is whether any decrees, orders or sentences of the original court are appealable at all. If they are not, and the court is a civil court, then, under Section 195(3), the appeal against the order making or refusing to make a complaint will be to the Principal Court of ordinary original civil jurisdiction. If, however, appeals from its various decrees and orders lie to different courts, then we have to see to which of them they "ordinarily" lie and select the one of lowest grade from among them.
xxxxxx
19. There are thus three forums of appeal from the Court of the Subordinate Judge depending on the nature of the suit and its value. The question is whether in each of these three classes of case the
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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR appeal can be said to lie "ordinarily" to one or other of these appellate tribunals. Applying the rule we have set out above, the appeal to the Senior Subordinate Judge cannot be termed "ordinary"

because the special appellate jurisdiction conferred by the notification is not the ordinary jurisdiction of the Senior Subordinate Judge but an additional power which can only be exercised in a certain limited class of case. It is not a power common to all Subordinate Judges nor even to all Senior Subordinate Judges. Therefore, it cannot be said that appeals from the courts of the various Subordinate Judges "ordinarily" lie to the Senior Subordinate Judge. Consequently, that court is not one of the appellate tribunals contemplated by Section 195(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code and its proviso. But appeals do "ordinarily" lie either to the District Court or the High Court; and as the District Court is the lower of these two tribunals that must be regarded as the appellate authority for the purposes of Section 476-B of the Criminal Procedure Code.

20. Now it is to be observed that this is a purely objective analysis is and is not subjective to any particular suit. In the present suit, the value of the suit was over Rs.5,000, so the appeal would have lain to the High Court, but we are not concerned with that because Section 195(3) does not say that the

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR appellate authority within the meaning of that section shall be the court to which the appeal in the particular case under consideration would ordinarily lie but generally "the court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court".

It would, however, be wrong to say that the nature of the proceedings in the case must be wholly ignored because clause (b) to the proviso to sub- section (3) states that:

"(b) where appeals lie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case or proceeding".

Therefore, to that limited extent the nature of the proceedings must be taken into account, but once the genus of the proceedings is determined, namely whether civil, criminal or revenue, the heirarchy of the superior courts for these purposes will be determined, first by the rules that apply in their special cases and next by the rule in Section 195(3) which we have just expounded and explained."

9. In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court that appeals under Section 341

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR Cr.P.C. would "ordinarily" lie either to the District Court or to the High Court, and that the District Court being the subordinate court amongst the two must be regarded as the appropriate appellate authority, the said principle squarely governs the case on hand. The test, as laid down, is objective in nature and hinges upon the ordinary appellate hierarchy of the court from which the order emanates. Since the order impugned arises from the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, whose decrees and orders ordinarily lie in appeal before the District Court, the Principal District Court alone would have the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal under Section 341(1) Cr.P.C. Any deviation from this settled position would run contrary to the statutory scheme as well as the law declared by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kuldip Singh vs. State of Punjab (supra). Consequently, the impugned order, having overlooked the binding ratio and having assumed jurisdiction contrary to law, suffers from patent illegality and perversity.

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the Affirmative.

Finding on Point No.(ii):

10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, while seeking disposal of the petition, has contended that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, issuance of notice to respondent No.1, against whom allegations of perjury are made, is not warranted at this stage. In support of the said contention, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in The State of Punjab vs. Jasbir Singh (supra). The Hon'ble Apex Court, while examining the scope and ambit of Section 340 Cr.P.C., has categorically held that the preliminary enquiry contemplated under Section 340 is between the Court and the issue as to whether it is expedient in the interests of justice to lodge a complaint. At that stage, the person against whom perjury is alleged does not have a vested right of hearing. The scheme of the provision makes it

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR clear that notice to such person is not mandatory before forming an opinion and making a written complaint. It is only after the complaint is forwarded to the jurisdictional Magistrate and the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process that the alleged offender would be brought within the fold of criminal proceedings.

11. In the present case, the application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioner has not even been entertained on merits by the Court of first instance. The refusal or inaction on the part of the said Court compelled the petitioner to invoke the appellate remedy under Section 341 Cr.P.C. At this stage, what is under consideration is merely the correctness of the order declining to act under Section 340. The proceedings have not progressed to the stage of formation of opinion leading to a written complaint, much less to the stage of cognizance by the Magistrate. Therefore, issuance of notice to respondent No.1 at this appellate stage would be wholly premature and inconsistent with the statutory

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR scheme explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In the light of the law laid down in The State of Punjab vs. Jasbir Singh (supra), this Court is of the considered view that the matter can be disposed of without issuing notice to respondent No.1.

Accordingly, Point No.(ii) is answered in the Affirmative.

12. For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds to pass the following:

ORDER
(i) The petition is allowed;
(ii) The impugned order dated 13.12.2024 made in FR Misc.No.91/2024 passed by the learned Principal District Judge, Benglauru Rural District, Bengaluru vide Annexure-A is hereby set aside;
(iii) The matter is remitted back to the learned Principal District Judge, Bengaluru Rural District, for consideration afresh;

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NC: 2026:KHC:19954 WP No. 9321 of 2025 HC-KAR

(iv) Since petitioner is represented by a counsel, without expecting any further notice, he shall appear before the designate Court on 23.04.2026 and receive further orders.

Sd/-

(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE CA List No.: 1 Sl No.: 47