Delhi District Court
Smt. Gursharan Kaur vs Sh. Harbans Singh on 8 January, 2016
IN THE COURT OF DR. T. R. NAVAL, DISTRICT & SESSIONS
JUDGE/RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL, DISTRICT SHAHDARA,
KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
RCA No. 09/2015
Unique Identification No. 02402C0057272015
Smt. Gursharan Kaur
W/o Sh. Guriqbal Singh
R/o 3, Shanti Vihar
New Delhi - 110 092 . . . Appellant
VERSUS
Sh. Harbans Singh
S/o Sh. Anant Singh
R/o 25, Shivpuri
Delhi - 110 051 . . . Respondent
Date of Institution : 19/02/2015
Date of arguments : 10/12/2015
Date of judgment : 08/01/2016
Appeal U/s 38 of Delhi Rent Control Act
ORDER
This order will dispose off an appeal U/s 38 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, herein-after referred to as "the Act", against the judgment dated 14/01/2015 passed by Sh. Naresh Kumar Laka, Ld. SCJ-Cum-RC, Shahdara, Delhi in case bearing No. E-10/12, titled as Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh.
2. I have heard arguments of Ld. Counsels for parties and perused file.
RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 1 of 153. On perusal of file, I find that vide impugned judgment Ld. Rent Controller dismissed the eviction petition of the appellant/petitioner by observing that:
"It is a settled preposition of law that mere use by other person is not parting with possession so long as the tenant retains the legal possession himself or, in other words, there must be vesting of possession by the tenant in another person by divesting himself not only of physical possession but also of the right to possession. So long as the tenant retains the right to claim possession from his guest at any time, he cannot be said to have parted with possession of his guest at any time, he cannot be said to have parted with the possession of the tenancy premises. The mere fact that the tenant himself is not in physical possession of the tenancy premises for any period of time would not amount to parting with the possession so long as, during his absence, tenant has a right to return to the premises and be in possession thereof. A mere privilege or licence can be terminated at the sweet will and pleasure of the tenant to use the whole or a part of the demised premises which privilege or licence at any time would not amount to "parting with possession". The divestment or abandonment of right to possession is necessary in order to invoke the clause of parting with possession."
4. Having aggrieved of that order, the appellant/petitioner preferred present appeal.
5. The impugned order has been assailed on the grounds, inter alia, that Ld. Trial court committed an error of law in not considering the evidence of parties; he also erred in not considering the entire documents Ex. DW1/1; he has failed to consider that more than five years, the respondent did not have any control over the business which was to be carried in the tenanted premises; he has failed to consider the entire evidence of PW1 and PW2 and incorrectly held that legal possession of the tenanted premises was retained by the respondent; respondent has failed to produce any income tax return, ledger book, etc, and that was RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 2 of 15 not considered by trial court; he committed grave error of law by holding that Amrik Singh was doing the job work as employee of the respondent; he failed to appreciate that it was admitted by the witnesses of the respondent that possession of the tenanted premises was not with him and it was with the alleged sub-tenant; he failed to appreciate that the entire evidence go to suggest that respondent sub-let, assigned or parted with the tenanted premises to the alleged tenant; the impugned order suffers from illegality or infirmity and it is liable to be set aside. It has been prayed that the impugned order may be set aside and eviction petition may be allowed and eviction order in respect of tenanted premises may be passed.
6. In support of his arguments, Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner relied on a case Amar Singh Trilochan Singh v. Smt. Jasoti, 105 (2003) DLT 499, wherein Delhi High Court held that:
"12. On a broader principle, protection of the Rent Control Act is meant for personal use of those to whom tenancy is granted. It is the original guarantee alone who is entitled to this protection of law. Such protection is not to be abused. Using the premises for self use is one thing, but making a monetary gain by allowing its use by another is quite a different thing. If the tenant does not need the premises, he must restore it to the landlord. He cannot allow the use of the premises or any part thereof by another while himself remaining there only in name. The monetary gain in such a situation is a matter of place inference from the combination of these facts; (a) that a third person is using it; (b) that the tenant himself is not exclusively using it; and (c) that the premises have a monthly usurfruct (for reteable value) which far exceeds the rent which is payable to the landlord. Law comes down heavily against those who try to abuse Rent Control protection in this manner. On the plain fact, an inference of sub-letting would follow and is sufficient but here on record there is much more".
[Emphasis is supplied] RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 3 of 15
7. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner further relied on a case Celina Coelho Pereira & Ors v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar & Ors, AIR 2010 SC 603, wherein Apex Court observed that:
"28. The legal position that emerges from the aforesaid decisions can be summarised thus:
(i) In order to prove mischief of sub-letting as a ground for eviction under rent control laws, two ingredients have to be established (one) parting with possession of tenancy or part of it by tenant in favour of a third party with exclusive right of possession, and (two) that such parting with possession has been done without the consent of the landlord and in lieu of compensation or rent."
[Emphasis is supplied]
8. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner further relied on a case Subhash Khanna v. Chatar Lal (Order dated 11/03/2010 passed by Delhi High Court in CM(M) 12/2010), wherein it was held that:
"8. In a case of sub-tenancy there is an agreement between the subtenant and the tenant which is entered into without the knowledge of landlord and in secrecy. Thus the landlord cannot be expected to prove the sub-tenancy by proving an agreement between the subtenant and the tenant. The onus of landlord is to prove that the shop was in exclusive possession of someone, other than the tenant. Once the landlord proves this, the onus shifts on the tenant to show that the person in occupation of shop was not a subtenant. The trial court in this case had considered the evidence produced by the tenant. The tenant had taken the plea that respondent no. 2 Mr. Hari was an employee and accounts were being maintained but he failed to produce the account books nor proved attendance register or salary register in the Court. There were contradictions on the quantum of salary in statements of witnesses. There were contradictions about supervision of shop/business in the statements of two witnesses. In view of the testimony led before the trial court and the fact that the tenant did not lead any cogent evidence to show that the respondent no. 2 Hari was his employee, both the courts below come to a concurrent finding that Mr. Hari was a subtenant." [Emphasis is supplied] RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 4 of 15
9. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner further relied on a case Kailash Kumar & Ors v. Dr. R.P. Kapur, 54 (1994) DLT 342, wherein Delhi High Court observed that:
"43. As already mentioned by me, the question whether subletting or parting with possession has taken place would depend on the peculiar facts of each case. No two cases can be similar. The basic principles enunciated by the Supreme Court are that once it is proved that a particular portion of the demised premises has been given in exclusive possession to a stranger then the onus shifts on the tenant to show that in what capacity that stranger is in exclusive possession of that portion and on the failure of the tenant to explain the presence of such person in exclusive possession of the portion of the demises premises, would lead to presumption that the said portion has been sublet or parted with possession in favour of the stranger by the tenant.
44. In Jagan Nath (supra) same principles have been enunciated. In the said case the father had retired from the business and the sons who had been working with the father had continued to work in the shop and in such facts it was held that if the father had a right to displace the possession of his sons it cannot be said that the father-tenant had parted with possession.***
51. Section 14(4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act lays down that for the purpose of Clause (b) of proviso to Sub-section (1), any premises which has been let for being used for the purposes of business or profession shall be deemed to have been sublet by the tenant if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord as after the 16th day of August 1958 allowed any person to occupy the whole or any part of the premises ostensibly on the ground that such person is a partner of the tenant in the business or profession but actually for the purpose of subletting such premises to any person.***
53. It was held in Dharam Chand v. Kasturi Lal, 1977(2) RCJ 276, that it is very difficult for a landlord to be able to obtain any direct evidence to prove the subletting and he could only bring on record the substantial evidence and attending circumstances to show that in fact, a particular portion of the demised premises has been sublet. Subletting is obviously resorted to by the unscrupulous tenants in such manner that it should not become evident to the landlord and some direct evidence may not be available to the landlord.***" [Emphasis is supplied] RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 5 of 15
10. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner further relied on a case Gobind Parshad Jagdish Parshad v. Shri Hari Shanker & Ors, 136 (2007) DLT 259, wherein Delhi High Court held that:
18. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant referred to another judgment of learned Single Judge of this Court in M/s Nath Oil Company v. Kailash Rani Kapoor, 82 (1999) DLT 936=2000 (1) RCR 59, where it has been held that in a case of alleged sub-letting when a person other than the tenant is occupying a shop and the plea is that the occupant is an employee of the tenant, the income-tax records and other records that he is an employee are extremely material and non-
production of the said records would definitely lead to the conclusion that the records have not been produced as they would go against the appellant."
[Emphasis is supplied]
11. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner further relied on a case Prestige Engineering (INDIA) Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. The Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, Etc. Etc., JT 1994(5) S.C 514, wherein Apex Court held that:
"17. Now, what does the expression 'job work' mean? On this question, the Explanation is not of much assistance. The Concise Oxford Dictionary assigns several meanings to the expression 'job' but the relevant meaning having regard to the present context is "a piece of work especially one done for hire or profit". The expression 'job work' is assigned the following meaning: "work done and paid for the job". The Notification, it is evident, was conceived in the interest of small manufacturers undertaking job-works. The idea behind the Notification was to help the job-workers - persons who contributed mainly their labour and skill, though done with the help of tools, gadgets or machinery, as the case may be. The Notification was not intended to benefit those who contributed their own material to the articles supplied by the customer and manufactured different goods. We must hasten to add that addition or application of minor items by the job-worker would not detract from the nature and character of his work. For example, a tailor entrusted with a cloth piece and asked to stitch a shirt, a pant or a suit piece may add his own thread, buttons and lining cloth. Similarly, a factory may be supplied the shoe uppers, soles, etc by the customers RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 6 of 15 and the factory applies its own thread or bonding material and manufactures shoes therefrom and supplies them back to the customer, charging only for its work. The nature of its work does not cease to be job-work, Indeed, this aspect has been stressed in all the decisions of High Courts referred to hereinbefore."
12. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner further relied on the definition of 'employee' as given in the Black Law Dictionary, which runs as under:
"It is understood to mean some permanent employment or position."
13. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner further relied on definition of employee as given in the Employee Provident Fund Act, which runs as under:
"employee" means any person who is employed for wages in any kind or work, manual or otherwise, in or in connection with the work of an establishment and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer, and includes any person."
14. On the other hand, it has been argued by Ld. Counsel for defendant that present appeal is not maintainable as it is defective. The contents of appeal has not been verified. The affidavit attached with the appeal is not in accordance with the High Court rules as it has not been mentioned in the affidavit that contents of the affidavit were explained to the maker of the affidavit in vernacular language. Sh. Harbans Singh is aged about 79 years. He does not have any son. His three daughters have already been married. Sh. Amrik Singh and Satnam Singh are relative of Harbans Singh. Amrik Singh is nephew and Satnam Singh is younger brother. It has been emphasized on the point that they were employees of Harbans Singh and they were doing the work on job basis. Legal possession has already been with Harbans Singh. It was never parted with to any third person. Mere handing over key to the employee is RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 7 of 15 not sufficient to prove parting of possession to them. He further submitted that impugned order passed by Ld. RC is just and proper. There is no illegality therein. TIN number is not necessary for job work.
15. In support of his case, Ld. Counsel for the respondent relied on definition of sub-let, assigned and parting with possession as laid down in the Act. It runs as under:
"14. Protection of tenant against eviction - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-- ***
(b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9 th day of June, 1952, sub-
let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord; ***"
16. Ld. Counsel for the respondent further relied on a case Bhagwan P. Sajnani v. Ranbir Singh, 29 (1986) DLT 45, wherein Delhi High Court held that:
"7. This is essentially a question of law and not of fact. This Court has repeatedly held that clause (b) of proviso to Section 14(1) uses three expressions, namely, sublet, assigned, and otherwise parted with possession. These three expression deal with different concepts and apply to different circumstances. In subletting there exists the relationship of landlord and tenant as between the tenant and his sub- tenant and all the incidents of letting of tenancy have to be found namely, the transfer of an interest in the estate, payment of rent, and the right to possession as against the tenant in respect of the premises sublet. In assignment the tenant has to divest himself of all the rights that he has RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 8 of 15 as a tenant. The expression parted with possession undoubtedly postulates parting with legal possession. Parting with possession means giving possession to persons other than those to whom possession has been given by lease and parting with possession must have been by the tenant. The mere user by other persons is no parting with possession so long as the tenant retains the legal possession himself on in other words there must be vesting of possession of the tenant in another person by divesting himself not only of physical possession but also of the right to possession. The divestment or abandonment of the right to possession is necessary in order to invoke the clause of parting with possession. ***
9. It is well-settled that a tenant cannot be said to part with possession of any part of the premises unless his agreement with his licensee wholly ousts him from the legal possession of that part. In the present case, it was never disputed by the respondent that the appellant continued to occupy the premises and retained the legal possession over the premises. The appellant appeared as his own witness and it was not even suggested that he had parted with possession and was no mere in legal possession of the part of the premises. The case of the respondent that three clerks were working in the premises was also not put to the appellant when he appeared as his own witness. Considering the circumstances of the case, it has to be held that Mr. V.P. Sajnani had only given the address of the premises for the purpose of correspondence and nothing else. This by itself cannot amount to subletting."
[Emphasis is supplied]
17. Ld. Counsel for respondent further relied on a case Hira Lal and others v. Banarsi Dass, AIRCJ 1979 (1) 145, wherein Delhi High Court held as under:
"6. *** This conclusion of the Courts below appears to me to suffer from a serious infirmity. If parting with possession is not a physical concept but involves parting with legal possession, a proposition which was not contested on behalf of the landlord, it is difficult to justify the further conclusion that there was parting with legal possession on the plea that it was a case of joint tenancy. Such a reasoning ignores the fact that all the brothers and the legal representatives of the deceased brother were parties to the proceedings and whatever may have been the plea raised by the tenant they are all bound by the conclusion of the Court with regard to that plea that the other brothers had no right of tenancy as it RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 9 of 15 was a case of exclusive tenancy in favour of Hira Lal. The tenant and the other occupants in whose favour there is alleged to have been parting with possession are real brothers or members of the family of a brother, who has since died. All the brothers were carrying on business in partnership at the material time even though it is alleged that one of them was not shown as a case that the tenant had surrendered legal possession to his brothers or the members of their family merely by the act of physical withdrawal from the premises. The requirement of parting with legal possession do not appear to have been satisfied even on the admitted hypothesis and it is, therefore, not possible to justify the conclusion of the Courts below on this aspect of the case. It was not disputed that even though Hira Lal had withdrawn from the physical possession of the premises the rent receipts were nevertheless throughout been in his favour and according to landlord himself he alone continued to be the exclusive tenant. This circumstance would be further destructive of any possibly hypothesis of parting with legal possession. The tenant was, therefore, not liable to be evicted on the ground under Section 14(1)(b)of the Act."
[Emphasis is supplied]
18. Ld. Counsel for respondent further relied on a case United Bank of India v. Cooks and Kelvey Properties (P) Ltd, AIR 1995 SC 380, wherein the Apex Court observed as under:
"11. From the evidence, it is clear that though the appellant had inducted the trade union into the premises for carrying on the trade union activities. It is elicited in the cross examination of the President of the trade union that the bank had retained its power to call upon the union to vacate the premises at any time and they had undertaken to vacate the premises. It is also elicited in the cross examination that the bank has been maintaining the premises at its own expenses and also paying the electricity charges consumed by the trade union for using the demised premises. Under these circumstances, the inference that could be drawn is that the appellant had retained its legal control of the possession and let the trade union to occupy the premises for its trade union activities. Therefore, for its conclusion that could be reached is that though exclusive possession of the demised premises was given to the trade union, the possession must be deemed to be constructive possession held by it on behalf of the bank for using the premises for trade union activities so-long as the union used the premises for trade union RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 10 of 15 activities. The Bank retains its control over the trade union whose membership is only confined to the employees of the bank. Under these circumstances, the inevitable conclusion is, that there is no transfer of right to enjoy the premises by the trade union exclusively, for consideration. Thereby, the existence of consideration an ingredient of the subletting has not been present to hold that the respondent had sublet as would make it liable for eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Tenancy Act. The appeal is accordingly allowed."
[Emphasis is supplied]
19. Ld. Counsel for respondent further relied on a case Om Parkash v. Jugal Kishe and others, 1971 AIRCJ 873, wherein P&H High Court observed that:
"3. *** The use of premises by a brother can be inconsistent with the theory of subletting because a brother may out of love and affection and to help his brother allow him the use of the shop without any rent or without actually parting with the possession of the shop or any part thereof."
[Emphasis is supplied]
20. Ld. Counsel for respondent further relied on a case V.N. Puri and others v. Bishan Lal Agarwal, 1972 AIRCJ 703, wherein Allahabad High Court held that:
"10. In the instant case there is no document. The case of the defendant- appellant No. 1 was that he had kept his brother-in-law and his sister in the premises and he was occupying the same and he continues to occupy the premises though he may have shifted to another premises and they are living there as his licensees. The mere fact that from a particular date ever since he has shifted to the new premises, defendants 2 and 3 have been exclusively occupying the premises of which defendant No. 1 was the tenant, in view of the nature of relationship between them does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the premises had been sublet by defendant No. 1 to defendants 2 and 3. Defendant No. 1 alone continues to be the tenant of the premises and defendants 2 and 3 are not his sub-tenants. The finding of the Additional District Judge, therefore, that simply because defendants 2 and 3 were living in the premises they became the sub-tenants of the chief-tenant is not correct and defendants 2 and 3 cannot be said to be RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 11 of 15 the sub-tenants of defendant No. 1 who still continues to be the tenant. Hence this is not a case of sub-letting."
[Emphasis is supplied]
21. Ld. Counsel for appellant/petitioner in rebuttal argued that there was no necessity for verification and appeal even can be filed by Ld. Counsel without signatures of appellant. In support of his case, he relied on provisions of Order XLI of the Code and Rule 1 of Part B, regarding General Procedure of Appellate Courts as mentioned in Delhi High Court Rules.
22. On perusal of provisions of Order XLI of the Code and above referred Rule, I find that verification is not necessary by the appellant. Therefore, it is held that there is no defect in the appeal. This arguments of Ld. Counsel for the respondent is, accordingly, not tenable.
23. On considering the rival contentions of Ld. Counsel for parties, I come to the conclusion that there is no merit in the appeal and there is no infirmity or illegality or impropriety or mistake in the impugned judgment. The reasons which support my decision are firstly that Ld. SCJ- Cum-Rent Controller has given just, appropriate and convincing reasons for arriving on conclusion that there was no sub-letting of the tenanted premises. I concur with his findings.
24. Secondly, Ld. Counsel for appellant emphasized on the point that in the cross-examination, RW2 admitted that he was having key of the tenanted premises. The respondent has failed to prove the reasons for presence of Sh. Amrik Singh and Sh. Harbans Singh and therefore it RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 12 of 15 should be inferred that they were the sub-tenant of the tenant Sh. Harbans Singh. This arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant is not tenable because RW2 Sh. Amrik Singh after admitting the fact of having key of the tenanted shop explained that the key was given to him by Sh. Harbans Singh for opening and closing of the shop. In his cross- examination, RW1/tenant admitted that key of the shop was with Sh. Amrik Singh and he opens or shuts the shop but he explained that he was also having a key of the shop. He denied the suggestion that he was not having the key of the shop. He admitted that Sh. Satnam Singh and Sh. Amrik Singh are his relatives. The evidence on record thus established that Sh. Amrik Singh and Sh. Satnam Singh are the relatives of the tenant/respondent Sh. Harbans Singh. Sh. Amrik Singh is his nephew and Sh. Satnam Singh is his younger brother. Presence of these two persons in the shop does not amount to sub-letting. My findings in this regard finds support of principles of law laid down in Om Parkash v. Jugal Kishe and others (supra) relied on by Ld. Counsel for the respondent.
25. Thirdly, the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant that Ld. ACJ-Cum-RC did not consider the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the petitioner/appellant that respondent did not have control over the business carried out in the tenanted premises is not convincing. Non-filing of income tax return or ledger book neither show that the respondent/tenant has withheld material evidence nor it is convincing that non-explanation of income earned in the tenanted premises by Sh. Amrik Singh and Satnam Singh shows that the respondent/tenant did not have control, legal or physical, over the tenanted premises.
RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 13 of 1526. Fourthly, the principles of law laid down in cases Amar Singh Trilochan Singh v. Smt. Jasoti (supra), Celina Coelho Pereira & Ors v. Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar & Ors (supra), Subhash Khanna v. Chatar Lal (supra), Kailash Kumar & Ors v. Dr. R.P. Kapur (supra), Gobind Parshad Jagdish Parshad v. Shri Hari Shanker & Ors (supra) and Prestige Engineering (INDIA) Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. The Collector of Central Excise, Meerut, Etc. Etc (supra) relied on by Ld. Counsel for the appellant/petitioner will not provide any benefit to the appellant/petitioner because on applying the principles of law laid down in these cases, it could not be established that there was sub-letting, assigning or parting with the tenanted premises in favour of Sh. Amrik Singh and Sh. Satnam Singh.
27. Fifthly, the principles of law laid down in cases Bhagwan P. Sajnani v. Ranbir Singh (supra), Hira Lal and others v. Banarsi Dass (supra), United Bank of India v. Cooks and Kelvey Properties (P) Ltd (supra) and V.N. Puri and others v. Bishan Lal Agarwal (supra) relied on by Ld. Counsel for the respondent provide benefit to the respondent/tenant as in the almost similar circumstances, it was held that there was no sub-letting, assigning or parting with the possession.
28. Sixthly, the tenant/RW1 was cross-examined in length but nothing came out to establish, presume or suggest that he sub-let or parted with or assigned the possession of the tenanted premises either to Sh. Amrik Singh or to Sh. Satnam Singh. In cross-examination RW1 specifically denied the suggestion that he sub-let the shop to Sh. Amrik Singh or otherwise parted with the possession of the tenanted shop to RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 14 of 15 him or that Sh. Amrik Singh and Sh. Satnam Singh were in exclusive possession of the tenanted shop.
29. Seventhly, Sh. Satnam Singh was also examined as RW3. He was also cross-examined at length but in his cross-examination nothing could come out which could established or even suggested that the respondent/tenant had sub-let or assigned or parted with the possession of the tenanted premises to him.
30. Consequent upon the above reasons and discussion, it is held that there is no merit in the appeal and there is no illegality, infirmity or inaccuracy or mistake in the impugned judgment. Resultantly, impugned order is upheld and appeal is dismissed with cost.
TCR be returned with copy of this order.
Appeal file be consigned to Record Room.
Announced in open court (Dr. T. R. NAVAL)
on this 08.01.2016 District & Sessions Judge/
Rent Control Tribunal
Shahdara, KKD Courts, Delhi
RCA No. 09/2015 Smt. Gursharan Kaur v. Harbans Singh 08.01.2016 Page 15 of 15