Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs B.G. Suma And Ors. on 16 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: I(2003)ACC287, 2004ACJ883, 2002(6)ALT465
Author: Ramesh Madhav Bapat
Bench: Ramesh Madhav Bapat
JUDGMENT Ramesh Madhav Bapat, J.
1. This appeal is filed by New India Assurance Co. Ltd. aggrieved by the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-First Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy at L.B Nagar, Hyderabad.
2. It appears that claimants-respondent Nos. 1 to 4 herein had filed O.P. No. 216 of 2000 before the said Tribunal claiming compensation of Rs. 10,00,000 on the death of one Badrinarayana, who died in the motor accident which took place on 10.1.2000 at about 10.30 p.m. As far as the incident is concerned, there is no dispute. On recording the evidence, the Tribunal was pleased to award compensation of Rs. 10,00,000 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. There was also a direction for making fixed deposits in the names of the claimants.
3. Aggrieved by the said award, the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. has filed the present appeal on the ground that the liability for paying compensation was wrongly fastened on them. It was also contended that Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'A.P.S.R.T.C.') is liable to pay compensation.
4. The facts of the case are as follows: The hi-tech bus bearing No. AP 36-U 3126 is owned by the respondent No. 5 herein. The said vehicle was given on hire to A.P.S.R.T.C. on certain terms and conditions. The said bus caused the death of the deceased.
5. Now the short question posed before this court is as to who is liable to pay compensation?
6. It is also not in dispute about the fact that the vehicle was insured with the insurance company, i.e., appellant herein.
7. Learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein submitted at the Bar that the Tribunal wrongly fastened the liability on the appellant herein. The vehicle was given on lease to A.P.S.R.T.C. and, therefore, they are the owners of the vehicle within the meaning of Section 2 (30) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Section 2 (30) of the said Act reads as under:
"(30) 'owner' means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hirepurchase agreement, or an agreement of lease or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement."
8. As stated earlier, the vehicle was hired to A.P.S.R.T.C. The learned standing counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein pointed out a ruling of the Apex Court reported in Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corporation v. Kailash Nath Kothari, . Their Lordships of the Apex Court were dealing with the similar type of subject. Their Lordships while deciding the above case considered the definition of 'owner' and also concluded that Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short 'R.S.R.T.C.') had taken the vehicle on hire and, therefore, they were the owners within the meaning of the said Act. Their Lordships further observed in the judgment that R.S.R.T.C. had a permit to ply the bus on a route between Kekri to Jaipur. They had taken the bus bearing No.. RS. 3945 on lease from the owner named, Sanjay Kumar. The said bus was also insured with the insurance company. Their Lordships further observed in the judgment that the driver of the bus was under the control of R.S.R.T.C. He was required to ply the bus on a particular route. It was also observed by their Lordships that the conductor of the bus was an employee of R.S.R.T.C. He was collecting the bus fare from the passengers, which had met with an accident causing the death of as many as 23 passengers. Therefore, their Lordships on elaborate consideration concluded that the owner of the vehicle had no control over the route on which the bus was plying. The bus was in possession and control of R.S.R.T.C. and, therefore, they were the owners within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, held that the R.S.R.T.C. is liable to pay compensation.
9. While opposing the contention of the learned standing counsel for the appellant, learned standing counsel for A.P.S.R.T.C. pointed out a ruling reported in G. Govindan v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., . We have gone through the entire case. The facts narrated in the above case are quite different than the facts in issue. In the above case their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the effect of transfer of a vehicle by one person to the other with due intimation to the insurance company. The insurance was not transferred in the name of the new purchaser on the ground that he had not submitted the application in the proper form and, therefore, the insurance company even after transfer was held liable to pay compensation when such bus met with an accident.
10. The learned standing counsel for A.P.S.R.T.C. has also relied upon a ruling reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sheela Rani, . It is also a similar case. The question of transfer of vehicle is involved in this case. In the above case, the intimation to the insurance company regarding the transfer was given but the insurance company gave no reply. Still their Lordships were pleased to hold that if such vehicle met with an accident, the insurance company is liable to pay the compensation. Both the rulings cited by learned standing counsel for A.P.S.R.T.C. have absolutely no relevance to the present set of facts.
11. As stated earlier in a ruling reported in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sheela Rani, , [Sic. Rajasthan State Road Trans. Corporation v. Kailash Nath Kothari, ], their Lordships of the Apex Court were pleased to hold that R.S.R.T.C. is liable to pay compensation, as they are the owners within the meaning of Motor Vehicles Act. In the present case, the facts are very much identical. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the liability fastened on the insurance company is erroneous. Therefore, we allow the appeal and set aside the order directing the appellant to pay compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased. We further direct that the amount of compensation awarded is to be paid by the respondent No. 6 herein, i.e., A.P.S.R.T.C. Therefore, we direct that the compensation as awarded by the Tribunal be paid by A.P.S.R.T.C. holding them liable to pay the compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased.
12. In the result, the civil miscellaneous appeal is allowed. No costs.