Gujarat High Court
Dilipbhai vs Shreyash on 14 November, 2011
Author: M.R. Shah
Bench: M.R. Shah
Gujarat High Court Case Information System
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AO/202/2011 18/ 18 JUDGMENT
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
APPEAL
FROM ORDER No. 202 of 2011
With
CIVIL
APPLICATION No. 6158 of 2011
In
APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 202 of
2011
For
Approval and Signature:
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE M.R. SHAH
=========================================
1.
Whether
Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
No
2.
To
be referred to the Reporter or not ?
No
3.
Whether
their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ?
No
4.
Whether
this case involves a substantial question of law as to the
interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order
made thereunder ?
No
5.
Whether
it is to be circulated to the civil judge ?
No
=========================================
DILIPBHAI
AMBALAL BHATIYA HUF SATTELLITE TENNIS CLUB - Appellant(s)
Versus
SHREYASH
PRATISTHAN YANE SHREYASH FOUDATION SANTHA, CHA - Respondent(s)
=========================================
Appearance
:
MR DD VYAS,
SR. ADVOCATE with MR BHARAT JANI
for Appellant(s) : 1,
MR
MIHIR THAKORE with MR AMAR N BHATT for Respondent(s) :
1,
=========================================
CORAM
:
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE M.R. SHAH
Date
: 24/08/2011
C.A.V.
JUDGMENT
[1.0] Present Appeal From Order under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "CPC") has been preferred by the appellant herein - original plaintiff to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 28.04.2011 passed by the learned Chamber Judge, Court No.16, City Civil Court, Ahmedabad below Notice of Motion Exh.6/7 in Civil Suit No.476/2011, by which the application submitted by the appellant for interim injunction, to restrain the defendant, its trustees, agents and servants from taking law in their hands and from taking forcible possession of the tennis ground housed in Bajrang Maidan (of Shreyas Foundation) and further to restrain the defendant, its agents and servants from creating hurdles, obstructions, in the use of parking facilities and from creating hurdles in the use of ancillary (toilet) facilities available at the said tennis ground situated in the Bajrang Maidan, has been rejected.
[2.0] That the appellant herein - original plaintiff has instituted a Civil Suit No.476/2011 in the City Civil Court, at Ahmedabad for permanent injunction and declaration that the defendant, its agents and servants and/or trustees have no right to take law in their hands and take the possession of the disputed ground and/or disturb the possession of the plaintiff which is being used by the plaintiff as a tennis ground as tenant. In the said suit the plaintiff has also prayed for permanent injunction permanently restraining the defendant, its agents and servants from creating hurdles and/or obstruction in the use of parking facilities and from creating hurdles in the use of ancillary (toilet) facilities available at the said tennis ground. It was the case on behalf of the plaintiff that plaintiff is in possession of the suit premises/ground since 2005 as tenant. That in the year 2005, rent was fixed at Rs.6,000/- and thereafter rent was increased to Rs.15,000/- from June 2007 and it was further increased to Rs.26,250/-. That initially the playground was given to one Keyur Bhatiya who formed Satellite Tennis Club and thereafter the HUF was formed and the plaintiff HUF was accepted as a tenant and the rent etc. was paid by the HUF from its bank account. It was alleged that thereafter the dispute started with respect to increase in the rent which was objected by the plaintiff and thereafter the defendant was threatening the plaintiff to dispossess him from the suit property and therefore, to protect the possession, the plaintiff had instituted the aforesaid suit. That in the said suit, the plaintiff took out Notice of Motion for interim injunction. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is a tenant of the suit premises/ground and therefore, they cannot be dispossessed without following due procedure of law as they cannot be termed as trespasser. The interim injunction application/Notice of Motion was opposed by the defendant by filing the reply. It was the specific case on behalf of the defendant that as such there was no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. It was the case on behalf of the defendant that playground was given to Keyur Bhatiya in his individual capacity as a tennis coach, as a licensee and not as a lessee. It was also the specific case on behalf of the defendant that plaintiff was never in exclusive possession of the playground in question and was permitted to use the said playground as a tennis coach for limited hours between 6.30 to 10.30. It was specific case on behalf of the defendant that plaintiff was never accepted as a tenant. Therefore, it was the case on behalf of the defendant that as the said Keyur Bhatiya was only a licensee to use the playground for limited hours, it was requested to dismiss the interim injunction application / Notice of Motion.
[2.1] That on appreciation of evidence and correspondence between the parties, the learned Judge, City Civil Court accepted the case on behalf of the defendant and by impugned order has dismissed the Notice of Motion and has refused to grant interim injunction as prayed for. Hence, the appellant - original plaintiff has preferred the present Appeal From Order.
[3.0] Shri D.D. Vyas, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has vehemently submitted that learned Judge has committed an error and/or illegality in not granting the injunction as prayed for. It is submitted that the Satellite Tennis Club which was being run by member of the joint Hindu family - Keyur Bhatiya who is the lessee and the rent has been recovered from the original plaintiff HUF and which has been accepted by the defendant without raising any objection, thereby accepting the HUF as a tenant and therefore, the plaintiffs cannot be evicted and/or dispossessed without following due procedure of law.
[3.1] It is further submitted that there were number of documentary evidences produced on record that the plaintiff HUF was the tenant of the disputed plot in question and that the rent has been accepted by them and therefore, subsequently it is not open for the defendant to dispute the tenancy rights of the plaintiff - HUF.
[3.2] It is further submitted that every month an amount of Rs.6,000/- was paid to the defendant which has been stated to be maintenance charges though, infact, it was a rent since the plaintiff was the tenant.
[3.3] It is further submitted by Shri Vyas, learned Senior Advocate that even subsequently the rent was increased to Rs.15,000/- p.m. and thereafter to Rs.16,500/- p.m. which was further increased upto Rs.18,750/- p.m. which has been paid to the defendant regularly. It is further submitted that even thereafter the rent was increased to Rs.25,320/- with retrospective effect from June 2009 and even the difference was also recovered from the plaintiff. It is further submitted that even the receipts have been issued by the defendant which have been produced on record and despite these voluminous record available, the learned Judge has refused to grant injunction which deserves to be quashed and set aside.
[3.4] It is further submitted by Shri Vyas, learned Senior Advocate that even two rooms adjacent to the play ground which were being used by the plaintiff for tennis ground are in possession of the plaintiff and the goods lying are also belonging to them. Therefore, it can be said that they are in exclusive possession of the covered up portion alongwith rooms, toilets and passage for access from the entrance gate.
[3.5] Shri Vyas, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has heavily relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (Dead) by LRs. & Anr. reported in (2004)1 SCC 769 as well as the decision in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot v. Baldev Dass reported in AIR 2005 SC 104 in support of his submission that as the appellant is in "settled possession", they cannot be dispossessed without recourse to law.
[3.6] It is further submitted by Shri Vyas, learned Senior Advocate that even if the case on behalf of the defendant that of a licensee is accepted in that case also, the license is irrevocable in view of Section 16(b) of the Easements Act inasmuch as the licensee acting upon the license has executed work of permanent character and incurred expenses in the execution. In support of his submission, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by LRs. v. Bishun Narain Inter College and others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1242. By making above submissions and relying upon above decisions, it is requested to allow the present Appeal from Order and allow the Notice of Motion taken out by the appellant and grant interim injunction as prayed for.
[4.0] Appeal from Order is opposed by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent - original defendant. It is submitted that as such the original plaintiff - appellant was never the tenant and/or licensee of the disputed plot in question. It is submitted that one Keyur Bhatiya approached the Shreyas Foundation, which is a public charitable trust in the year 2005, stating that he was interested in starting lawn tennis activity in the defendant foundation as an instructor and considering the same and alongwith other activities by the defendant Shreyas Foundation, the said Keyur Bhatiya was permitted to use the plot in question only for tennis coaching and that too for few hours in the morning and he was being charged maintenance charges. It is submitted that as such at the time when the offer from the said Keyur Bhatiya was accepted even the plaintiff HUF was not in existence at all. It is submitted that merely because subsequently the maintenance charges have been paid from the bank account of the plaintiff HUF, it cannot be said that the defendant has accepted the same as a licensee and/or tenant. Therefore, it is submitted that as such there is no privity between the plaintiff and the defendant and therefore, the suit at the instance of the plaintiff is not maintainable and the learned Judge has rightly refused to grant injunction.
[4.1] It is submitted by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the defendant that said Keyur Bhatiya was never in exclusive possession of the plot in question which was used for tennis coaching. It is submitted that initially the plot in question was permitted to be used by said Keyur Bhatiya for some hours in the morning and looking to the increase in number of students, he requested by written application to increase the timings which came to be accepted and was permitted to use the plot in question for tennis coaching for few hours more. It is further submitted that even subsequently Keyur Bhatiya by application dated 01.03.2008 requested on behalf of the Satellite Tennis Club which was run by him for certain facilities namely (1) water to be provided for tennis courts for 3 to 4 days in a week, (2) one room, (3) as the football enters the tennis courts, inspite of the net having been tied between tennis courts and football ground, appropriate arrangement be made so that football could not enter tennis courts, (4) to clean terrace of bathrooms. It is submitted that the request was again reiterated by the said Keyur Bhatiya. It is submitted that thereafter the request of Shri Keyur Bhatiya was accepted and the maintenance charge was increased. It is submitted that neither the said Keyur Bhatiya nor even the plaintiff are ever been accepted as a tenant and that there is no landlord - tenant relationship between the plaintiff and defendant as alleged.
[4.2] It is further submitted by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent - defendant that it was Keyur Bhatiya alone who was the tennis coach, was permitted to use said ground to run tennis coaching classes between morning 6 to 10.30 and evening 4 to 7.30 and there is absolutely no relation between plaintiff HUF and defendant foundation. It is further submitted that license cannot be transferred by Keyur Bhatiya to the plaintiff HUF. Therefore, it is submitted that plaintiff has no cause of action to file the present suit.
[4.3] It is further submitted by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate that from the correspondences on record, it will be evident that no exclusive possession of the premises was given to Keyur Bhatiya and that he was only permitted to run coaching classes limited to tennis and that too for a limited period/hours in the morning and evening. It is further submitted that whenever any additional facilities is required, there was continuous interaction including for converting the clay courts to hard courts. It is submitted that if he was in exclusive possession, he would not be required to seek such permission. It is submitted that even for change of timings, he sought permission of defendant. It is submitted that if a document gives a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a license. It is further submitted that in determining whether the agreement creates a license, test of exclusive possession is significant. It is submitted that in the present case, the premises are part of large premises of the defendant which are enclosed by a wall and therefore, there is no question of any exclusive possession of even Keyur Bhatiya much less the plaintiff. Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent - original defendant has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor reported in AIR 1959 SC 1262 (Para 27); in the case of M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb reported in AIR 1965 SC 610 (Para 11-12) and in the case of Sohanlal Narayandas v. Laxmidas Raghunath Kavith reported in (1971)1 SCC 276 in support of his above submissions.
[4.4] It is further submitted by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant that mere use of the word "rent" in some correspondences or otherwise does not imply that said Keyur Bhatiya was the tenant and not the licensee. In support of his above submissions, he has also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.N. Clubwala (Supra) and another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Konchada Ramamurty Subudhi (dead) by his legal representatives v. Gopinath Naik and Ors. reported in AIR 1968 SC 919 (Para 11).
[4.5] Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that the licensee cannot be considered to be in settled possession as he enters the premises as a permissive user and on license being terminated becomes trespasser inter-meddling with the property. In support of his above submissions, he has relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Chandulal v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi reported in AIR 1978 Delhi 174 as well as in the case of Mahadev & Co. & Ors. v.
Agriculture Produce Marketing Committee and Anr. reported in ILR (2007) II Delhi 1022 as well as the decision of this Court in the case of Harshadkumar Sunderlal Dalai & Ors. v. Hasmukhben wd/o. Chimanlal Bhogilal Desai & Ors. reported in 1983 G.L.H. 774.
[4.6] It is further submitted by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate that even if said Keyur Bhatiya and/or the plaintiff is considered to be in settled possession, such person has no right of possession against the true owner. In support of his above submission, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sopan Sukhdeo Sable and Ors. v. Assistant Charity Commissioner & Ors. reported in (2004)3 SCC 137 (Para 24-26) and in the case of Rame Gowda (dead) By LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (dead) by LRs. & Anr. reported in (2004)1 SCC 769.
[4.7] Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff with respect to the irrevocable license under Section 16(b) of the Easements Act is concerned, Shri Thakore, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that it was never the case on behalf of the plaintiff before the learned trial Court that even if it is considered to be a license, it is an irrevocable license. It is submitted that plaintiff cannot be permitted to change his stand at a belated stage much less in Appeal from Order. It is submitted that having claimed the tenancy, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to claim irrevocable license under Section 16(b) of the Easements Act on the premise that he has executed the work of permanent character. In support of his above submissions, he has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chevalier I.I. Iyyappan & Anr. v. The Dharmodayam Co., Trichur reported in AIR 1966 SC 1017 (Para 8).
[4.8] It is further submitted by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate that even otherwise the work alleged to have been done by the said Keyur Bhatiya cannot be said to be a work of permanent character under Section 16(b) of the Easements Act. In support of his above submission, he has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Jagannath Govind Shetty v. Jayantilal Purshottamdas Patel reported in AIR 1980 Gujarat 41 (Para
10).
[4.9] It is submitted that as the defendant is not a legal entity, no suit is maintainable unless all the trustees are impleaded as defendants.
[4.10] Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent - original defendant has submitted that in view of the above and when the plaintiff has failed to establish prima facie case and considering the fact that notice was given on 03.12.2010 that tennis facilities would not be available from April 2011 and the balance of convenience is also not in favour of the plaintiff, he has requested to dismiss the present Appeal from Order by submitting that no illegality has been committed by the learned trial Court. He has also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Wander Ltd. v. Antox India P. Ltd. reported in (1990) Supp. SCC 727 by submitting that the learned trial Court has exercised the discretion judiciously and the same is not required to be interfered by this Court in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, it is requested to dismiss the present appeal from order.
[5.0] Heard the learned advocates appearing for respective parties at length. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the appellant herein - original plaintiff has instituted the suit claiming to be a tenant, contending inter-alia that they cannot be evicted and/or dispossessed without following due process of law. Therefore, before considering the case on merits, it is required to be considered first, whether the original plaintiff is the tenant of the premises in question as alleged. From the evidence on record, it appears that one Keyur Bhatiya claiming to be the international tennis coach, approached the defendant Shreyas Foundation permitting him to use the premises in question/plot for tennis coaching and his application came to be considered. It is to be noted that at the relevant time even the plaintiff HUF was not in existence and admittedly it came into existence in the year 2006 and the premises in question was permitted to be used by Keyur Bhatiya in the year 2005. It is the case on behalf of the plaintiff that as subsequently the rent has been paid by the Trust which has been accepted from the HUF, the defendant has accepted the HUF as tenant. Merely because in some of the subsequent receipts, the receipt has been issued in favour of the HUF - plaintiff, it cannot be said that the defendant has accepted the plaintiff as tenant/licensee. Even subsequent correspondence also shows that all throughout the said Keyur Bhatiya who is running Satellite Tennis Club has entered into correspondences with the defendant. Therefore, the case on behalf of the plaintiff - HUF that they are the tenant of the premises in question, prima facie, cannot be accepted. Therefore, it prima facie appears that as such there is no privity between the plaintiff - HUF and the defendant.
[5.1] Now, so far as the case/claim on behalf of the plaintiff that they are in exclusive settled possession of the premises in question and therefore, they cannot be evicted without following due process of law is concerned, it is to be noted that it is clear from the correspondences between Keyur Bhatiya and the defendant that he was permitted to use the premises in question for tennis coaching for few hours only i.e. morning 6 to 10.30 and 4 to 7.30 in the evening. It is also required to be noted that as and when the hours are to be increased and/or some other facilities are needed, the said Keyur Bhatiya had sought the permission which has been considered. If the said Keyur Bhatiya was in exclusive settled possession of the premises in question in that case he would not have sought permission at different times. It is required to be noted that premises in question which was permitted to be used for tennis coaching is small portion of the entire premises owned by the defendant and various other activities are also going on. It is also required to be noted that even when some fencing was to be done so as to see that football does not enter the premises in question which was used as tennis court, permission was sought which was granted. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that even the said Keyur Bhatiya and/or even the plaintiff can be said to be in settled possession. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the decision relied upon by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant - original plaintiff in the case of Rame Gowda (dead) by LRs. (Supra) and decision in the case of Maharwal Khewaji Trust (Regd.), Faridkot (Supra) would not be of any assistance to the plaintiff. It is also required to be noted at this stage that in the month of December 2010 itself the said Keyur Bhatiya was informed by notice that there shall not be any tennis coaching activity from April 2011. Therefore, well in advance the plaintiff/Keyur Bhatiya was informed and given notice.
[5.2] From the correspondences produced on record, it prima facie appears that the said Keyur Bhatiya, the tennis coach was only permitted to run the coaching classes only limited to tennis and that too for a limited period from morning 6 to 10.30 and evening 4 to 7.30. Therefore, at the most he can be said to be a licensee and he can never be said to be a lessee. In the case of Associated Hotels and India Ltd. (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the distinction between lease and license. In para 27, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a license. It is further observed that legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the license is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose, but for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property. In the case of Sohanlal Naraindas (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that license confers right to do or continue to do something in or upon immovable property of grantor which but for the grant of right may be unlawful, but it creates no estate or interest in the immovable property of a grantor. It is further observed that the lease on other hand creates the interest in the property at the most. Considering the aforesaid two decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as correspondences between parties and the fact that the said Keyur Bhatiya was permitted to use the premises in question for tennis coaching classes for few hours, he cannot be said to be in exclusive settled possession and/or there was any lease in his favour. Therefore, it appears that there was no lease between the said Keyur Bhatiya and the defendant.
[5.3] Now, so far as the contention on behalf of the plaintiff that as they are in exclusive settled possession of the premises in question, they cannot be evicted and/or dispossessed without following due process of law is concerned, at the outset it is required to be noted and as observed herein above, it prima facie appears to the Court that neither the plaintiff nor Shri Keyur Bhatiya can be said to be in exclusive settled possession of the premises in question and the said Keyur Bhatiya was permitted to use the premises in question for tennis coaching classes for few hours in a day and that too at the most as a licensee and therefore, as such no injunction can be granted against the true owner i.e. defendant. As stated herein above, whatever was being paid by the said Keyur Bhatiya was the maintenance charge which has been increased from time to time looking to the services provided by the defendant. As stated herein above, even in the month of December 2010, said Keyur Bhatiya was specifically informed by notice that from April 2011, there shall not be any tennis coaching classes. Under the circumstances and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the learned Judge has committed any error and/or illegality in refusing to grant interim injunction as prayed for. It appears to the Court that neither there is any prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff nor the balance of convenience in his favour and/or the plaintiff would suffer any irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money (as the plaintiff/Keyur Bhatiya were already informed in December 2010 that from April 2011, there shall not be any tennis coaching classes in the premises in question).
[5.4] It appears to the Court that learned Judge has exercised discretion judiciously which is not required to be interfered by this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. At this stage, the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramdev Food Products Pvt. Ltd. v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel & Ors. reported in (2006)8 SCC 726 is required to be referred to.
In the case of Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. (Supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court in paras 125 to 127 has observed and held as under:
"125.
We are not oblivious that normally the appellate court would be slow to interfere with the discretionary jurisdiction of the trial court.
126. The grant of an interlocutory injunction is in exercise of discretionary power and hence, the appellate courts will usually not interfere with it. However, the appellate courts will substitute their discretion if they find that discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the court has ignored the settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. This principle has been stated by this Court time and time again. [See for example Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah and Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai]
127. The appellate court may not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below if the one reached by that court was reasonably possible on the material. The appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion."
[5.5] Now, so far as the contention on behalf of the plaintiff with respect to irrevocable license under Section 16(b) of the Easements Act is concerned, at the outset it is required to be noted that as such such a contention was never raised before the trial Court. Even there are no pleadings in the plaint and/or Notice of Motion to that extent. Even otherwise whatever the improvement was done by said Keyur Bhatiya, it cannot be said to be of permanent character. By putting some fencing so as to see that the football may not enter the tennis court, it cannot be said to be permitting to put up a construction of a permanent character so as to attract section 16(b) of the Easements Act.
[6.0] In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, it cannot be said that the learned Judge of the City Civil Court has committed any error and/or illegality in not granting the injunction as prayed for which calls for interference of this Court in exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, present Appeal from Order fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed.
[6.1] In view of the dismissal of appeal from order, Civil Application for interim injunction also deserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed. Ad-interim relief, if any, stands vacated forthwith.
(M.R. Shah, J.) FURTHER ORDER At this stage, Shri Bharat Jani, learned advocate appearing for the appellant has requested to continue the ad-interim relief of status-quo granted earlier so as to enable them to approach the Higher Forum. The prayer is opposed by Shri Mihir Thakore, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the original defendant. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, ad-interim relief granted earlier is directed to be continued till 19th September 2011.
(M.R. Shah, J.) *menon Top