Madras High Court
S. Krishnamurthy, Joint Family Manager ... vs Thakkar K.G. Krishnaswamy (Deceased) ... on 17 August, 2001
ORDER K. Sampath, J.
1. The petitioner seeks review of the judgment of David Christian, J. (as the learned Judge then was) in S.A. No. 1573 of 1987. The grounds urged for review are as follows:
It has been found by the Courts below that the plaintiff's grandfather and father were performing the services in the temple from the year 1922. Still they chose to dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff for a permanent injunction preventing the defendants from interfering otherwise than by due process of law. Having observed that the plaintiff questioned the title of the temple to the suit lands, the learned Judge ought to have found that the plaintiff and his father were prima facie entitled to ryotwari patta under the provisions of the Minor Inams Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act, 1963. In the submission of the learned Counsel, the description of the plaintiff's father as the temporary oczhiandar for the time being in the proceedings of the Settlement Tahsilder under Exs.A-1 and A-A2 was only incidental to the grant of ryotwari patta and made in a summary manner. The learned Judge erred in taking into consideration that the family of the original grantee became extinct and that prior to the appointment of the plaintiff's grandfather, service holders came from different families. The learned Judge ought to have considered the title independently, notwithstanding the orders passed under Exs.A-1 and A-2. There is also no evidence to show that the plaintiff's elder brother late Sri Ramachandra Sastri obtained the consent of his father or any other male member of the family before deposing before the Settlement Tahsilder. The learned Judge erred in ignoring the plaintiffs legitimate expectation to continue in service. In the light of the Supreme Court decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam, the learned Judge ought to have held that the plaintiff was entitled to seek a permanent injunction to protect his long possession against interference from the defendants otherwise than by due process of law.
2. The suit came to be filed for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the enjoyment and possession of the suit property by the plaintiff alleging as follows:
Originally the suit property was granted as inam in favour of one Sesha Shastri and after him, it devolved in favour of his heir Subramania Shastri. Subrarmania Shastri died issueless and the family became extinct. The grant was made in favour of the persons who were to do the said oozhiam or service to the temple. After Subramania Shastri's death, one Subbaraya Iyer was appointed to' perform the said services. After a few years he also stopped doing the services. In 1922 the paternal grandfather of the plaintiff by name Raju Shastri was appointed to do the said oozhiam. He was doing the oozhiam till 1932 and retired due to old age. From 1932 the plaintiff's father Easwara Shastri was appointed as oozhiamdar. At the time he was made oozhiamdar, the properties had been encumbered to third parties by the previous inamdars. The plaintiff's father gave a petition to Revenue Authorities and obtained an order of resumption of lands in 1945. Thereafter, the properties were resumed by the plaintiff's father and were in his possession and enjoyment. During settlement proceedings also ryotwari patta was granted in favour of the plaintiff's father. He had put up a house in the suit schedule property and he was raising crops in the rest of the lands by installing a motor pumpset in the well. Only if the oozhiamdar died without any issue or legal heirs, the temple could appoint another person. But, the plaintiff being the son of Easwara Shastri and was doing service for 12 years after the father became old and the lands having been endowed for the purpose of performing services to the temple, the lands could not be utilised for any other purpose by the temple. The temple had no right to lease out the lands to third parties. At the instigation of the enemies of the plaintiff, the temple authorities issued a notice to the plaintiff on 1-5-1986 calling upon him to surrender the property to the temple. Due to the old age of the plaintiff's father, the plaintiff was managing the affairs of the family as Kartha and joint family manager. The plaintiff came to understand that the defendants were trying to take possession of the suit properties from the plaintiff and his father. They had also given a publication on 26.3.1986 stating that the suit lands were proposed to be leased in public auction. As the plaintiff's father had become old and incapacitated and since he could not manage the family, the plaintiff had filed the suit for the reliefs already mentioned.
3. The second defendant, the Executive Officer of the Tirukoil, filed a written statement and the same was adopted by the first defendant, who was the Thakkar and Trustee of the Tirukoil. The plaintiff as joint family manager, had nothing to do with the suit properties. He could not claim any hereditary right. He could not claim to be the manager. Neither the plaintiff's father nor his grandfather was ever appointed hereditarily as oozhiamdars. Their appointments were only temporary. No doubt, the plaintiff's father and grandfather were permitted to enjoy the suit properties, which had been granted as inam for performing certain services to the temple. The plaintiff's father himself had filed suits before the District Munsif, Dharapuram, in O.S. Nos. 305 and 307 of 1947 and he also preferred petitions before the District Collector, Coimbatore, and even though in the settlement period he had admitted that they were appointed by the temple authorities as trustees and they never claimed any hereditary right to, continue in service. It was also not true to say that the plaintiff was performing the services for the past 12 years. As the plaintiff's father had become old and bedridden, he was relieved of his duties. After that he had no right to claim possession of the suit properties or to enjoy the same. The defendants had taken possession of all the lands except the house after the plaintiff's father stopped performing services to the temple. In the public auction held by the second defendant, leasehold rights in respect of the suit properties were auctioned in favour of one Thambanna Gounder and he also took possession. The suit was liable to be dismissed.
4. The learned District Munsif found that the plaintiff could not claim to be a hereditary oozhiamdar, that his father and grandfather were appointed only individually for doing the services, that none of the persons was the descendant of the original inamdar, that the suit properties had been settled in favour of the temple in the Inam Settlement, that even in the previous suits, the title of the defendant temple to the suit properties had been upheld and in fact, the plaintiff's father himself had conceded that the suit properties were the absolute properties of the temple and ryotwari patta had been issued in favour of the temple. Holding that the plaintiff could not claim any hereditary right for performing the services and that he had never been appointed by the temple authorities to do services, the learned District Munsif dismissed the suit.
5. The appeal filed by the plaintiff in A.S. No. 28 of 1987 to the Sub Court, Dharapuram, was also dismissed. As against that, the second appeal came to be filed and on the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission, the learned Judge held that merely because the plaintiff's family had performed the oozhiam services and had possession of the suit properties, they were not entitled to a decree for permanent injunction and that the learned Subordinate Judge was not in error in going into the plaintiff's hereditary right to do Oozhiam services when the suit was only for a permanent injunction and merely on the basis of the plaintiff's possession on the date of suit, he was not entitled to a decree for permanent injunction.
6. The learned counsel for the review petitioner submitted that this is a case where the provisions of Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure are fully attracted, that the learned Judge has made very many major and minor errors while dismissing the second appeal and the petitioner is entitled to a review of the decision. The learned counsel took me through the judgment of the learned Judge and pointed the portions, which, according to him, are the major and minor errors attributable to the learned Judge. The learned counsel also cited a number of decisions in support of his contention that the judgment has got to be reviewed. I will refer to the various judgments in the course of the order.
7. Per contra, the learned Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 4, contended that no major or minor error apparent on the face of the record has been committed by the learned Judge and that under Ex.B-16, the plaintiff's father had applied for grant of patta and the same was rejected and no appeal had been filed against the same. In the submission of the learned counsel, no suit for injunction was maintainable, that the suit had been filed as family manager when the father was alive and he has not been examined and rightly, the learned Judge and the lower Courts did not rely on Ex.A-6 as it was not mentioned in Ex.B-12 and Ex.B-13. Even assuming that Ex.A-6 was a true document, it was not a case of appointment. The learned counsel, in support of his contentions, relied on a number of judgments, which will be referred to in the course of the order.
8. In reply, the learned counsel for the review petitioner submitted that the judgment is per incuriam and the same could be corrected in review. According to the learned counsel, the constitutional right of the petitioner had been violated and the review petitioner was entitled to relief. According to the learned counsel, Ex.A-6 was a true document and the right of the plaintiff had been recognised.
9. Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for review and it runs as follows:
"Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himself aggrieved - (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by this Code, or
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by this Code, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order, and the Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit."
Substantive provision is contained in Order 47 Rule 1 which runs as follows;
"(I) Any person considering himself aggrieved -
(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,
(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.
(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.
Explanation; The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment."
The explanation came to be introduced by C.P.C. Amendment Act, 1976.
10. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., AIR 1954 SC 526 it has been held that, "a judgment is defective on the face of it, if it does not effectively deal with and detennine an important issue in the case on which depended the title of the plaintiffs and the maintainability of the suit. This is certainly an error apparent on the face of the record.
The words "any other sufficient reason" has been interpreted to mean "a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule"."
In that judgment, the Supreme Court took the view that the majority judgments appealed against were defective on the face of them, in that they did not effectively deal with and determine an important issue in the case on which depended the title of the plaintiffs on the maintainability of the suit. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, it was certainly an error apparent on the face of the record.
11. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors. the Supreme Court after posing the question, when does an error cease to be mere error and become an error apparent on the face of the record? answered that the test that no error can be said to be apparent on the face of the record if it is not self-evident and if it requires an examination or argument to establish it, may afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. But, there must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self-evident may not be so considered by another. The fact is that what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case. The decision of the Supreme Court arose under Article 226 of the Constitution.
12. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd, v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh STC,. the Supreme Court observed that, "...... There is a distinction which is real, though it might not always be capable of exposition, between a mere erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised as vitiated by "error apparent". A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. ....... It would suffice for us to say that where without any elaborate argument one could point to the error and say here is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of error apparent on the face of the record would be made out."
13. In Devaraju Pillai v. Settayya Pillai, a two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held that, "If a party was aggrieved by the judgment of the single Judge sitting in second appeal, the appropriate remedy for the party is to file an appeal against that judgment. A remedy by way of an application for review is entirely misconceived and if a single Judge entertains the application for review then he totally exceeds his jurisdiction-in allowing the review, merely because it takes a different view on construction of the document."
In that case, the question arose as to whether a certain document of title was a Deed of Settlement or a Will. The learned single Judge of the High Court sitting in second appeal considered the document and held that it was a Deed of Settlement. He noticed that, apart from the deed being styled as a Deed of Settlement and registered as such, one of the recitals in the document was that the disposition was irrevocable. On an application being filed for review of the judgment of the learned single Judge, another learned single Judge of the High Court - the Judge who heard the second appeal not being available , virtually sitting in judgment over 'the decision of the learned Judge who decided the second appeal construed, the document differently and held that it was a Will and not a Deed of Settlement. This the learned single Judge was not entitled to do and the remedy for the party was to file a further appeal to the Supreme Court.
14. Even at this stage, it has to be noticed that the Supreme Court has observed that a case decided by a learned single Judge should not be reviewed by another learned single Judge.
15. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., , no doubt, it has been held that, "no man should suffer because of the mistake of the Court and that rules of procedures are the hand maids of justice and not the mistress of the justice. The Court must do justice to him and if a man has been wronged so long as it lies within the human machinery of administration of justice that wrong must be remedied."
It has been further observed in that decision as follows:
"An irregular order of a Court of unlimited jurisdiction can be set aside by it on application being made to that Court either under the rules of Court dealing expressly with setting aside orders for irregularity or ex debito justitiae if the circumstances warrant. The irregularity committed by the Constitution Bench in giving the impugned decision has to be corrected not on construction or misconstruction of a statute, but because of non-perception of certain provisions and certain authorities, which would amount to derogation of the constitutional rights of the citizen. It is proper for the Court to act ex debito justitiae in favour of the appellant whose fundamental rights are infringed."
16. It goes without saying that the review petitioner has to make out a case to bring it with in the formula laid down by the Supreme Court. He has to show that his fundamental right has been infringed by reason of the judgment.
17. In Devidayal Rotting Mills v. Prakash Chimanlal Parikh and Ors., it has been held that, "there is no question of acquiescence, waiver or estoppel against a party where the error is committed by the Court, itself and the Court is under a bounder, duty to correct its own mistake."
18. Again, in S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp. (4) SCC 595 it has been held that, "justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither the rules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way. The order of the Court should not be prejudicial to anyone......
Even the law bends before justice......
If the Court finds that the order was passed under a mistake and it would not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneous assumption which, in fact, did not exist and its perpetration shall result in miscarriage of justice, then it cannot on any principle be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistake is accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Difference lies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification depending on if it is fact of law."
19. Dealing with the scope of power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C., the Supreme Court in Meera Bhakja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, observed as follows:
"The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. The review petition has to be entertained only on the ground of error apparent on the fact of the record and not on any other ground. An error apparent on the face of record must be such as error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions. The limitation of powers of Court under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. is similar to the jurisdiction available to the High Court while seeking review of the orders under Article 226."
20. In Md. Ashraf Ali v. Debraj Wadhera, 1995 Supp.(2) SCC 654, it has been held that the arena of facts 'was outside the scope of second appeal and more so in the case of review.
21. In Baskaran v. The Commissioner of College Education and two others, , a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Srinivasan, J. and AR. Lakshmanan, J. (as the learned Judges then were) has observed that, "violation of principles of natural justice will enable Court to act suo motu ex debito justitiae and review decision and that review power can be exercised to avoid abuse of process of miscarriage of justice and power of review can be exercised to correct error apparent on face of record or where there are serious irregularities in proceedings or violation of principles of natural justice or mistake committed on erroneous assumption of fact resulting in miscarriage of justice."
22. It has been said in Parsion Devi and Ors. v. Sumitri Devi and Ors., , "it is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the ambit and scope of Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. Under Order 47, Rule 1, C.P.C. a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error-apparent on the fact of the record. An error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record justifying the court to exercise its power or review under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47, Rule 1, CPC. it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to 'be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. There is a clear distinction between an erroneous decision and an error apparent on the fact of the record. While the first can be corrected by the higher forum, the latter can be corrected. Only by exercise of the review jurisdiction.
23. In Avijit Tea Company Private Ltd. v. Terai Tea Co. and Ors., , suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale was dismissed but the alternative relief of refund of the amount deposited with interest was granted by the Division Bench of the High Court. In review, the single Judge, the other Judge having retired, held that since the amount came to be deposited in another suit but not in relation to the suit for specific performance, the decree for refund was not valid in law. The Supreme Court held that at best it would be a case for an appeal against the judgment of the Division Bench but no appeal having been filed, the single Judge erred in reviewing the order of the Division Bench.
24. In Managing Director, Hindustan Photo Films Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. H.B. Vinobha and Ors., AIR 1998 Mad. 358 Sathasivam, J. has held that, "the power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the person seeking the review or could not be produced by him at the time when the order was made, it may be exercised where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous ground, It may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits since that would be the province of Court of Appeal and the same cannot be a ground for review. Where the very same objections were raised in review which were earlier raised and considered on the fact of information furnished by both sides while disposing of the writ petitions, the review applications would be liable to be dismissed."
25. In M.M. Thomas v. State of Kerala and Anr., 2000 (1) Supreme Today 1 dealing with Article 215 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court observed as follows:
"High Court as a Court of Record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A Court of Record envelopes all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual, memorial and testimony. A Court of Record is undoubtedly a superior Court, which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as Court of Record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders passed by it, the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court's power in that regard is plenary. If such power of correcting its own record is denied to the High Court, when it notices the apparent errors its consequence is that the superior status of the High Court will dwindle down. Therefore, it is only proper to think that the plenary powers of the High Court would include the power of review relating to errors apparent on the face of record."
26. It has been pointed out in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors., that review under Order 47 Rule 1 C.P.C. is not an appeal in disguise and that there is a real distinction between a merely erroneous decision and. a decision which can be characterised as vitiated by error apparent.
27. In Lily Thomas Etc. v. Union of India, and Ors. 2000 (3) L.W. 371 it has been held that, "the power of review can be exercised for correction of a mistake and not to substitute a view. Such power car; be exercised within the limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of power. The review cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review."
28. In Mani Janagarajan v. Kammavar Sangam Etc., Raviraja Pandian, J. has observed that, "if there is mistake or error apparent on face of record, which is not self evident and has to be deducted by process of reasoning, it cannot be said to be such error justifying Court to exercise power of review and that power of review cannot be availed to rehear and correct erroneous decision."
29. In a lecture on "Court Management" by Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas, Judge, Supreme Court of India, which is reported in 2000(2) L.W. 11 (J.S.) it has been observed as follows:-
"Whether it is an inherent weakness or the weakness of the person conducting the case, you have to dispense with justice finally and you are the final arbiter. You cannot afford to decide a case only on the basis of any error committed by a human while giving evidence in Court."
30. In an Article in the Hindu dated November 14, 2000 "Justices and Justicing" by Mr. Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, former Judge, Supreme Court of India, it is stated:
"When the Court commits a tragic error, the remedy for the maledy is a review by the Bench because Judges have no big ego and small minds, but rise to reverse themselves once they realise their egregiousness, i.e. the greatness of judicial office."
31. The salient features relating to review emerging from the various decisions, lecture and article cited at the Bar and also looked up by me may be summarised as follows:
(a) There must be an error apparent on the face of the record; e.g. if the Court does not effectively deal with and determine an important issue in the case on which depended the title of the plaintiff and the maintainability of the suit, that would be an error apparent on the face of the record.
(b) A misconception by the Court of a concession made by the Advocate or of the attitude taken (up) by the party must be regarded as sufficient reason analogous to an error on the face of the record and it can furnish a ground for review though it will not generally appear on the record, but will have to be brought before the Court by way of an affidavit and this can be done only by way of review.
(c) To decide against a party on matters which do not come within the issues on which the parties went to trial clearly amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record. It is futile to speculate as to the effect these matters had on the mind of the Court in comparison with the effect of the other points.
(d) No error can be an error apparent on the face of the record if it is not self evident and if it requires an examination or argument to establish it, may afford a satisfactory basis for decision in the majority of cases. There must be cases in which even this test might break down, because judicial opinions also differ and an error that might be considered by one Judge as self evident may not be so considered by another. Thus what is an error apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts of each case.
(e) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but lies only for patent error. Where without any elaborate argument or long-drawn process of reasoning, one could point to the error and say there is a substantial point of law which stares one in the face and there could reasonably be no two opinions entertained about it, a clear case of an error apparent on the face of record is made out. There cannot be a reappraisal of the entire evidence on record for finding the error. If there is reappraisal, it would amount to exercise of appellate jurisdiction, which is not permissible.
(f) Judgment by one single Judge review by another is not maintainable and the proper remedy is an appeal.
(g) Court's inherent powers can be exercised to remedy a mistake. Injustice done should be corrected by applying the principle actus curiae neminem gravabit -an act of the Court shall prejudice no one. The person aggrieved must spell out the injustice done to him.
(h) The Court has a bounden duty to correct its own error. Acquiescence, waiver or estoppel is inapplicable.
(i) Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers....... Even the law bends before justice. The order of the Court should not prejudice anyone.
(j) Violation of principles of natural justice will enable Court to act suo motu ex debito justitiae and review decision. Review power can be exercised to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of justice. It can be exercised where there are serious irregularities in proceedings or violation of principles of natural justice or mistake committed on erroneous assumption of fact resulting in miscarriage of justice.
32. Bearing the above principles in mind, if we look at the case on hand, in my considered view, none of the criteria is satisfied in the instant case. The learned counsel was not able to show that there was an error apparent on the face of the record nor was he able to show that there was any concession made by the Advocate. Even after elaborate arguments, the learned counsel was not able to point out any egregious blunder that could be attributed to the contents of the judgment of the learned Judge. The learned counsel attempted to reargue the whole appeal, which was not permissible. The learned Counsel was not able to show as to how there had been violation of any principles of natural justice. It is not possible to substitute a different view. I am satisfied that absolutely no case is made out for review in the present case.
33. Views expressed in lectures and articles by eminent jurists by themselves are not binding though they may have some persuasive value. Even then, I fail to see what the learned counsel wanted to rely on in the lecture by His Lordship Mr. Justice Thomas. If the reference was to the learned senior counsel, who conducted the case for the petitioner, then, it is not a mere veiled insinuation, but disingenuous, derogatory to the core and highly deplorable. If the reference was to the alleged mistake committed by the plaintiff's brother Ramachandran when giving evidence in the settlement enquiry, the court cannot do anything about it. This aspect has been considered by the learned Judge and a conclusion reached and there is no case made out for review on this account. We cannot enlarge the scope of review. The Article of Mr. Justice Krishna Iyer also does not in any way help the case of the review petitioner. The learned counsel has not been able to substantiate what the tragic error the learned Judge has committed to justify a review.
34. Let me refer to certain other aspects put forward by the learned Counsel for the review petitioner. This I am doing more for the sake of completeness. According to the learned Counsel, there was non-perception of authorities under the Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, in particular, the ratios of the decision in State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, and the other decisions, viz. T.K. Ramanuja Kavirayar and Ors. v. Srilasri Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi Avargal, Thiruvaduthurai Adheenam, 1988 (1) LW 513; Srinivasan and Six others v. Sri Madhyarjuneswaraswami Etc., ; Society of St. Josephs's College v. A. Doraisami (died) and Ors., and Ramalingam and Ors. v. The Idol of Sri Thayumanasamy Etc., .
35. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Swamigal Madam, it has been held that, "a person who was refused ryotwari patta would be entitled to protect his possessory title and long enjoyment of the land and seek an injunction preventing Government's interference otherwise than in due course of law and surely before granting such relief the Civil Court may have to adjudicate upon the real nature or character of land if the same is put in issue. The civil Court's jurisdiction is not ousted simply because finality had been accorded to the settlement proceedings."
To the same effect are the other decisions referred to. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court to consider title of parties is not ousted. The Civil Court is entitled to nullify decisions of authorities, which had been accorded finality under the Act.
36. In the instant case, the Civil Court, though recognised the possession of the plaintiff, still found' that it was at the pleasure of the defendants. In other words, the plaintiff was an appointee oozhiamdar that since he satisfied the requirements, he was appointed and not because he had any other right.
37. The learned Counsel made very elaborate arguments regarding non-perception of the Minor Inams Act and non-perception of fraud and malice. The learned Counsel also referred to certain decisions in support of his submissions. He also contended that the doctrine of legitimate expectation should be applied to the instant case and the plaintiff should have been granted the relief. We have already noticed that this is not a case for review and the proper remedy for the petitioner is to file an appeal, if so advised. I am also not adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the respondent as I am dismissing review petition on the ground that no case for review is made out.
38. Consequently, the review application is dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.