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Central Administrative Tribunal - Allahabad

Amar Pal Singh vs Chief Post Master General Up Circle on 5 February, 2026

                                                        Reserved on 21.01.2026
          Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad
                            This the 05th day of February, 2026
                   Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (J)
                       Hon'ble Mr. Mohan Pyare, Member (A)

                      Original Application No. 1461 of 2015

         Amar Pal Singh, aged about 57 years, S/o Sri Khoob Singh, R/O V-
         Pokargarhi P. - Barauli (Rao), District - Aligarh, Ex- S.P. M. Somna,
         Aligarh.

                                                        ........... APPLICANT

         By Advocate: Shri S.K. Kushwaha

                                         Versus
        1. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Communication,
           Deptt. Of Postal, Dak Bhawan Sanshad Marg, New Delhi.

        2. Director General (Posts), Dak Bhawan, New Delhi.

        3. Chief Post Master General, U.P. Circle, Lucknow.

        4. Director of Postal Services o/o PMG, Agra Region, Agra.

        5. S.S.P.O's Aligarh Division, Aligarh.

                                                      ..........RESPONDENTS

         By Advocate: Shri Mahendra Prasad Mishra
                                        ORDER

(By Hon'ble Mr. Justice Om Prakash VII, Member (Judicial) Shri S K Kushwaha, learned counsel for the applicant and Shri M P Mishra, learned counsel for the respondents, were present at the time of hearing.

2. The instant original application has been filed by the applicant seeking following relief:

"(i) To issue directions / orders/ writs in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated RITU RAJ SINGH
1|Page 23.10.2008, 20.09.2004 and 28.10.2003 passed by respondent no. 3, 4 & 5 (Annex. A-1, A-2 & A-3) respectively, especially in view of the order dated 07.04.2015 passed in the criminal appeal, honorably acquitting the applicant in the same charges.
(ii) To consider for issuing orders or directions / writ, in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to immediately reinstate the applicant as if the penalty orders have not been passed, with all pay and allowances, increments and other consequential benefits to the applicant. (Annexure A-4)
(iii) To consider any other relief which the Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.
(iv) To award the cost of the application throughout."

3. The instant original application has been filed by the applicant challenging the order dated 23.10.2008, 20.09.2004 and 28.10.2003 passed by the respondent no 3, 4 and 5 respectively. Vide order dated 28.10.2003, the respondent no 5 / disciplinary authority has imposed penalty of removal from service upon the applicant. Vide order dated 20.09.2004, the respondent no 4 / appellate authority has dismissed the appeal of the applicant preferred against the order dated 28.10.2003. Vide order dated 23.10.2008, the respondent no 3 / revision authority has dismissed the revision application of the applicant. Through this OA, the applicant has contended that the aforesaid orders have been passed by the respondents' authorities in complete violation of the extant rules and provisions as stated in the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. The applicant has also alleged that the respondents have imposed the harsh punishment of removal from service upon the applicant solely on the basis that the applicant was under judicial trial in a case in which the applicant has already been honourably acquitted and exonerated of all the charges leveled against him.

RITU RAJ SINGH

2|Page Facts of the case as stated in the OA are that the applicant is a permanent employee of the respondents' department and has always performed his duties to the best satisfaction of the competent authority and without any complaint whatsoever. It has been alleged in the OA by the applicant that due to some misunderstanding and conspiracy, he was abruptly suspended and on 18.04.2001, disciplinary proceedings were contemplated by the respondents. On behalf of the respondent no 5, the SDI lodged FIR on 20.04.2001, against the applicant for irregular payments of money order and negligence of duty under Section 409 and 420 of IPC. The applicant further alleges that he was sent to jail in the month of June 2001 under the influence of the respondents and was released in July 2001 but he was not reinstated in service. Respondents served charge sheet through memo dated 12.09.2001 upon the applicant. The applicant denied charges but proceedings were held against him in violation of principles of natural justice and without following the procedure prescribed under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 that too in ex-parte manner without any prosecution evidence against the applicant and further the inquiry report was submitted on 16.09.2003. The OA further narrates that the prosecution documents P-1 to P-27 as exhibits were placed in the proceedings but they were neither corroborated nor proved by the prosecution in any way and there is no documentary evidence supporting the respondents' allegations and thus the prosecution witnesses suffer from contradiction in statements and the cross examination was also not allowed. It has also been contended that the defence witnesses were allowed to abnegate the allegations and statements of prosecution witnesses and the written brief of the defence was also not considered by the IO. Allegations are also made in the OA that the CO was not self examined and the provision of Rule 14(18) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was not followed by the IO resulting in serious prejudice to the applicant and vitiating the departmental proceedings. Contention has also been made in the OA that the disciplinary authority has imposed the RITU penalty on 28.10.2003 without considering the representation dated RAJ SINGH

3|Page 07.10.2003 of the applicant against the inquiry report and the aforesaid order has been passed without any application of mind. Even in the appellate order dated 20.09.2004, the submissions made by the applicant in his appeal dated 03.12.2003 have not been considered. Similar contentions have been made regarding the order passed on the revision petition of the applicant claiming that the punishment imposed was disproportionate to the offence alleged in the order. Applicant has alleged that the punishment was disproportionate as there was no complaint about any non payment from the payee and the Gram Pradhan had confirmed the address and proprietor of the firm as Sri Raj Kumar and the said Raj Kumar was not summoned by the IO resulting in the allegations being unfounded and without any evidence. Applicant has claimed that he was on half day CL on 18.04.2001 which cannot be a ground for removal from service. Contention has also been made that even the revising authority in its order has observed that the CO was attending criminal case in the court of law relating to present case and thus, it clearly indicates that the punishment was made due to pending criminal case wherein the applicant has already been honourably acquitted vide order dated 07.04.2015 passed by the District and Session Judge, Aligarh in the said criminal appeal and exonerated the applicant of all the charges. The OA also alleges that the respondents / prosecution could not produce the owner of the firm relating to alleged payment and there was no complaint. As such, there is no loss to the department as payment.

By way of this OA, the applicant has sought the quashing of the aforesaid orders with a direction to the respondents to immediately reinstate the applicant with all consequential benefits.

Counter has been filed by the respondents wherein it has been stated that serious allegations regarding misappropriation of government money were leveled against the applicant after which the inquiry was initiated. The said inquiry was conducted in accordance with the extant rules and statutory provisions and no illegality or infirmity can RITU RAJ SINGH

4|Page be attributed to it. After taking into consideration every aspect of the case, the punishment was awarded by the disciplinary authority. The orders passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revision authority do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records.

5. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that allegations leveled against the applicant are not proved. Opinion formed by the inquiry officer, by the disciplinary authority and by the appellate authority are perverse and incorrect. Revisional authority has also not taken into consideration the facts disclosed in the revision memo. Mandatory provision provided under Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has not been followed. In the revision memo, it was clearly stated that fair opportunity of hearing has not been given to the applicant to defend his case. Although specific terminology of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was not disclosed in the revision memo but in the OA in para no. 4.6, it has been made. Since the applicant has taken the plea before the appellate authority as well as the revisional authority regarding non-providing of the fair opportunity to defend the case and specific plea in para no 4.6 of the OA has been taken regarding the non compliance of the Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, entire inquiry proceeding is vitiated. Since applicant has not examined in this matter, thus, it was incumbent upon the inquiry officer to interrogate the applicant under Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules. It is also argued that a criminal proceeding was also started against the applicant in which although by the Trial Court, the applicant was convicted for offence under section 409 and 420 of IPC but in criminal appeal preferred against the same, the learned Session Judge concerned acquitted the applicant from all the charges. A representation had been moved before the competent authority to exonerate the applicant in the disciplinary proceedings also but this has not been considered.

RITU RAJ SINGH

5|Page Learned counsel appearing for the applicant has placed reliance upon the following case laws:

i. Judgment dated 04.12.2023 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No 7935 of 2023 titled Ram Lal Vs State of Rajasthan & Ors.
ii. Judgment dated 19.08.2025 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No 6599 of 2025 titled K Prabhakar Hegde Vs Bank of Baroda.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that fair inquiry was conducted in the matter. Applicant participated in the inquiry and he has also examined the witnesses in his defence. Findings arrived at in the impugned orders establishing the guilt of the applicant and punishment imposed upon him are based on evidence collected during inquiry. Applicant has not raised the issue of non compliance of the provision of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules before the disciplinary authority nor the appellate authority. First time he is raising this plea in the OA and he has not established that why he did not raise this issue in the disciplinary proceedings and thus submission raised on behalf of the applicant in this respect and explanation offered are not sufficient. The applicant cannot take benefit of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of K Prabhakar Hegde (supra). It is also argued that although the applicant has been exonerated in criminal charges yet in the judgment passed in the criminal appeal No 39/2013 on 07.04.2015 in para no 16, it is clearly mentioned that charges leveled against the applicant for the offence under section 420 IPC is not proved and in this respect if there was any dereliction of duty on the part of the applicant, disciplinary proceeding can be initiated. To substantiate this argument, learned counsel for the respondents referred to para no 16 of the aforesaid judgment and further argued that since punishment has been imposed in the disciplinary proceedings after conducting the full fledged inquiry affording opportunity to the applicant thus the applicant cannot be exonerated RITU from the liability in disciplinary proceedings only on the ground of RAJ SINGH

6|Page acquittal in the criminal proceedings. Thus, argued to dismiss the OA.

7. Before discussing the submissions raised across the bar, it will be useful to quote the relevant paragraphs of the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant. Relying upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal (supra), the applicant's counsel has placed reliance upon the following portion:

"25. Expressions like "benefit of doubt" and "honorably acquitted", used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. In the present case, the Appellate Judge has recorded that Exh. P-3, the original marksheet carries the date of birth as 21.04.1972 and the same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. The conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. The court in judicial review is obliged to examine the substance of the judgment and not go by the form of expression used."

Similarly, relying upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakar Hegde (supra), reliance upon the following portion has been made by the applicant's counsel:

"55. We, therefore, unhesitatingly hold that the Inquiry Officer by not generally questioning the appellant on the circumstances available in the evidence, which were unfavourable or adverse to such officer, failed to perform a mandatory duty. Any such circumstance, which was unfavourable or adverse to the appellant, should have been excluded from the Inquiry Officer's consideration. It would not commend acceptance that though the Inquiry Officer acted in derogation of the 1981 Regulations, nevertheless, his action must to be upheld on the specious ground that the appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. Neither Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) nor Alok Kumar (supra) examined the issue from our standpoint and in view of the trio - the Constitution Bench decisions in Tulsiram Patel (supra), Olga Tellis (supra) and A.R. Antulay (supra) - which were rendered after Sunil Kumar Banerjee RITU RAJ SINGH
7|Page (supra) and were not noticed in Alok Kumar (supra), the ratio of the latter decisions may not bind us. Alok Kumar (supra) relied on Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja30 . In Ram Prakash Singh (supra), we have considered the entire issue of the prejudice theory threadbare and articulated, as per our understanding, how incomplete reading of the Constitution Bench decision in B. Karunakar (supra) has resulted in dilution of its ratio. True it is, the High Court was bound by Sunil Kumar Banerjee (supra) and Alok Kumar (supra) but, in our opinion, the said decisions cannot come to the aid of the respondent.
56. We have considered the reasoning of the High Court that the appellant was extended an opportunity by the Inquiry Officer to make his submissions before the evidence was closed. However, such an opportunity does not really match the nature of duty cast on the Inquiry Officer under Regulation 6(17). Such regulation requires the Inquiry Officer to question the charged officer, if he has not examined himself in defence, on the circumstances appearing in the evidence that are unfavourable or adverse to him. The purpose thereof is to extend an opportunity to the charged officer to explain away such unfavourable or adverse circumstances. This is one of the several procedural safeguards that the 1981 Regulations envisages. The duty cast and the opportunity extended are not equivalent. The inquiry under Regulation 6 being quasijudicial in nature, Regulation 6(17) places an onerous duty on the Inquiry Officer (who is generally untrained in law) to seriously apply his mind to the evidence on record and to indicate to the charged officer, as part of the process of his decision making, that circumstances exist which could weigh in his mind while arriving at the final findings in the report of inquiry. Once indicated, the charged officer may or may not explain away the circumstances but to offer an opportunity to have his say recorded without indication of the circumstances existing does not and would not amount to substantial compliance of Regulation 6(17)
57. Having said that, we cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellant did not raise any effective objection as to the failure of the Inquiry Officer to strictly adhere to Regulation 6(17) at any stage prior to invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. There being a failure of the Inquiry Officer to question the charged officer, the appellant ought to have raised the same before the disciplinary authority at the first instance; and, even if he did not so raise, he ought to have raised such objection before the appellate authority while he presented his appeal. If RITU such an objection is not raised at any of the two tiers and the omission to RAJ SINGH
8|Page do so is not explained in the writ petition, the court may infer that the charged officer was not seriously affected by non-adherence to Regulation 6(17) and it would be open to it to pass an appropriate order based on the inference drawn.
58. In the present case, the appellant did not raise any objection in this behalf before the disciplinary authority but raised the point, generally, of non-adherence to Regulation 6 before the appellate authority.

Unfortunately, the issue was missed and not addressed because, as we propose to elaborately refer in the following paragraphs, the appellate authority devoted its attention more to deal with another significant objection raised by the appellant and negatived it by assigning lengthy reasons which, however, do not appeal to us to be convincing. Be that as it may, the appellant is justified in voicing a grievance before us that he had not been extended fair, reasonable and adequate opportunity to defend himself in terms of Regulation 6 which, in turn, infringed his right protected by Article 14 of the Constitution"

8. We have minutely analysed the submissions raised across the Bar in light of the settled legal position. In this matter, as is evident from the record, major penalty chargesheet was issued against the applicant. He participated in the inquiry and was given adequate opportunity supplying the copy of the inquiry report to file the reply. On submission of reply, the disciplinary authority proposed the punishment as follows:

"ORDER I, H.P. Singh Sr Supdt. Of Post Offices Aligarh Dn. In exercise of powers under Rule 12(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 award a penalty of removal from service, which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under Govt., as specified under Rule II (viii) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965."

Thereafter, appeal was preferred. Although the copy of the memo has not been filed but in the appellate order, grounds taken by the appellant have been mentioned. Appeal was also dismissed upholding the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. In the revision memo, applicant has taken specific plea regarding not providing to him the fair opportunity to defend the case. Although, revisional authority has also dismissed the revision petition affirming RITU RAJ SINGH

9|Page the order passed by the appellate order as well as disciplinary authority, yet no discussion at all regarding providing of fair opportunity to the applicant and compliance of the mandatory provision provided under Rule for conducting inquiry has been made. The applicant has taken specific plea as disclosed hereinabove in the OA regarding non compliance of the provision of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

9. Before discussing other issues, it is clarified that in the judgment passed by the Ld. Session Judge in Criminal Appeal, it has specifically been mentioned that a disciplinary proceeding can be started on the strength of allegations leveled against the applicant but not the criminal proceedings. If this fact is taken into consideration, the applicant himself is relying on the said judgment. Thus, submissions raised on behalf of the applicant to exonerate him on the basis of acquittal in the criminal case cannot be accepted. It is clarified that we have not entered into the issues as to whether acquittal in the criminal case is of complete exoneration or only on the ground of benefit of doubt.

10. Applicant has also taken plea in the OA that mandatory provision provided under Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules has not been followed and the evidence considered by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority as well as revisional authority and also in the inquiry report on which basis the applicant has been removed from service shall be excluded. Hon'ble Supreme Court considering the judgment rendered in the case of Sunil Kumar Banerjee (reported in 1980 3 SCC 304) and Alok Kumar (reported in 2010 5 SCC 349) has clearly held that provision of Regulation 6(17) of 1981 Regulations is mandatory. It is clarified that provision of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules is analogous provision to the provision of Regulation 6(17) of the 1981 Regulation. Thus, no manner of doubt remains as to whether provision provided under Rule 14 (18) of CCS (CCA) Rules is mandatory or not. Admittedly in the present case, the charged official has examined some witnesses in his defence but he RITU RAJ SINGH 10 | P a g e has not examined himself. Provision of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules clearly speaks that if Charged Official has not examined himself in the inquiry thus, it is incumbent upon the inquiry officer to place all the incriminating material collected during the inquiry before the charged official for his stand. Although the copy of the memo of the appeal has not been filed nor it is clear as to whether the applicant has raised this issue before the disciplinary authority or not, but in revision memo, he has pleaded that fair opportunity to defend the case has not been given to him. In the OA, non adherence to the provision of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules as disclosed hereinabove has been taken in para 4.6. Submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant is that what mandate is required by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K Prabhakar Hegde (supra) to take the plea regarding non compliance of the mandatory provision of Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules has been complied with by the applicant. Since mandatory provision has not been followed, thus, the prejudice has occasioned to the applicant as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K Prabhakar Hegde (supra) case. In that scenario, the inquiry proceedings from that stage will be vitiated. It is pertinent to mention here that mere dealing of other issues by the appellate authority and revisional authority, not discussing the issue of compliance of the mandatory provision will not sustain the plea of the respondents. Since mandatory provision provided under Rule 14 (18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 has not been followed, a prejudice has occasioned to the applicant, fair opportunity to defend the case has not been given to him in view of the law laid down in the case of K Prabhakar Hegde (supra). Furthermore, it is also pertinent to record here that upon the exclusion of all the incriminating evidence which was not placed before the charged official for examination, all the evidence left as a residue is not sufficient to award the punishment as awarded to the applicant in this case.

11. Thus, in view of the aforesaid discussions and analysis, we are of the view that inquiry proceedings from the stage of interrogation RITU RAJ SINGH 11 | P a g e of the charged official / applicant under Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules are vitiated. Therefore, order passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority are liable to be set aside and OA is liable to be allowed in this regard. Accordingly, the original application is allowed and impugned orders dated 23.10.2008, 20.09.2004 and 28.10.2003 are hereby quashed and set aside. Respondents are hereby directed to grant all the consequential benefits to the applicant as would have accrued had the aforesaid orders never been passed in the first place. This exercise must be completed within three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of the order, without fail. In case respondents deem fit, they are free to re-conduct the inquiry afresh from the stage of interrogation of the charged official / applicant under Rule 14(18) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 in accordance with the stipulated rules and provisions and as per the observations made in this judgment.

12. All associated MAs stand disposed of. No costs.

            (Mohan Pyare)                       (Justice Om Prakash VII)
         Member (Administrative)                    Member (Judicial)

        (Ritu Raj)




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