Delhi District Court
S. Manpreet Singh vs Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh on 20 January, 2022
IN THE COURT OF MS. SNIGDHA SARVARIA,
ACJ-cum-CCJ-cum-ARC, SHAHDARA DISTRICT,
KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI.
ARC No : 444/2018
S. Manpreet Singh
S/o Late S. Sunder Singh
R/o House No. F-16/13, 4th Floor,
Krishna Nagar,
Delhi-110051 ......... Petitioner
Versus.
Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh
of M/s Crown Dresses
Shop no. 7061, Ahuja Market,
Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar,
Delhi-110031 ......... Respondent
Order on application under S. 25 (B) of The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 seeking leave to defend
1. Vide this order I shall decide the application under S. 25 (B) of The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act) seeking leave to defend filed by the respondent.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner has filed the present eviction petition under S. 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act on the grounds that late S. Sunder Singh was the owner of the shop no. 2, in property no. IX/7018, Old no. 720-A, Plot no. 529, Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 who let out the same to respondent. After the death of Sh. Murari Lal, the tenancy was changed in the name of the respondent who was paying the rent to late S. Sunder Singh against rent receipts. S. Sunder Singh also expired on 06.10.2016 leaving behind his widow Smt. Harbans Kaur, his son Manpreet Singh, the present petitioner and four married daughters namely Smt. Arvinder Kaur, Smt. Tajinder Kaur, Smt. Surjeet Kaur and Smt. Manjeet Kaur. All of them have inherited the tenanted shop as co-sharers after he death of lae S. Sunder Singh. Smt. Harbans Kaur, mother of the petitioner and his four married sisters have already Digitally ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh signed by SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA 1 of 23 SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:38:52 +0530 execued a relinquishment deed in favour of the petitioner on 17.01.2018 vide registration no. 461 in book no. 1, Vol. No. 1331 on pages 180 to 184 registered on 18.01.2018 before the office of Sub Registrar VI, Nand Nagri, Delhi. Now petitioner is the only owner/landlord of shop in question which is under the tenancy of respondent, so there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties in respect of the shop in question. S. Sunder Singh was the owner of about 126 sq. yds. of land of property 720-A (old) and IX/7018 (New), Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031. S. Sunder Singh constructed the said plot in the year 1965-1966 and construced seven shops in the said property. It is stated that the petitioner is the owner of shop nos. 1 and 2 only and all other shops have already been sold to different persons. Neither the petitioner nor his other family members have any legal concern or in possession of other shops except shop nos. 1 and
2. It is stated that the family of the petitioner consists of himself aged about 46, his wife Smt. Amarjeet Kaur aged about 38 years and three children namely Ms. Pahulreet Kaur aged about 13 yeas, student of class IXth, Ms. Arshreet Kaur aged about 11 years, student of class Vith and Master Gursimar Singh aged about 8 years, student of IVth class, besides ailing and old mother. The petitioner or his other family members has no independent source of income from any business or otherwise. The petitioner and his other family members are totally dependent upon his mother Smt. Harbans Kaur financially or otherwise. The petitioner is also residing in a rented house in property no. F-16/13, Krishna Nagar, Delhi-110051 which is belonging to Smt. Suman Sharma w/o Sh. Vishwa Bandhu Sharma who is receiving rent from the petitioner @Rs.33,000/- per month besides water and electricity charges, since 01.06.2018. The petitioner has lot of liabilities of arrears of rent as well as education charges of his children, medical treatment of his old mother and other household expenses each and every day. It is stated that four married sisters along with their respective husbands and children also used to come and stay occasionally in property no. F-16/13, Krishna Nagar, Delhi to meet their old and ailing mother as well as the petitioner and his other family members. The petitioner is facing lot of financial difficulties now-a-days without any job or work. The tenanted shop is thus bonafidely and urgently required by the petitioner for running his own business of readymade garments. The petitioner has no other commercial property in his own name in Delhi or anywhere else. The petitioner has no other alternative commercial accommodation in his possession and control for running his own Digitally signed by ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA 2 of 23 SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:39:15 +0530 business. The shop in question is most suitable for running readymade business because the same is situated in the Asia's Biggest Readymade Garment Market in Delhi. The petitioner has also filed another eviction petition in respect of shop no. 2 against the another tenant Shri Jagjit Singh and Sukhbir Singh on the ground of personal bonafide necessity. The petitioner wants to start his own business in shop nos. 1 and 2 and further want to construct his residential house on the same. It is further stated that the petitioner is now not in a position to pay huge amount of rent and meet other expenses every month. The respondent is a very rich person and running a very good business and earning a lot from property no. IX/7057, Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi which is his own property situated just opposite and near the tenanted premises. It is prayed that eviction order may be passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent qua the aforesaid premises.
3. The respondent was summoned vide order dated 16.11.2018 and was served with the summons of this petition on 06.12.2018, thereafter, affidavit seeking leave to defend under S. 25 B of the DRC Act was filed by the respondent on 12.12.2018 and the petitioner filed reply to it on 23.02.2019.
4. In the affidavit seeking leave to defend under S. 25 B of the DRC Act, the respondent has stated that the petitioner is not the exclusive owner of the property in dispute and as such the petitioner is liable to be dismissed. It is stated that father of petitioner late Sh. Sunder Singh has filed a petition u/s 14(i)(e) DRC Act against the respondent for bonafide requirement of himself with respect to tenanted shop wherein the Ld. ARC granted leave to defend to respondent. During trial, father of petitioner has died and ultimately the bonafide need alleged in the said petition came to an end and he case was dismissed/abated by Ld. ARC on 08.03.2017. It is stated that the site plan filed by petitioner along with petition is not correct as per the site and respondent reserve his right to file correct site plan. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, the respondent never attorned the petitioner as his landlord/owner at any point of time. Even otherwise, the alleged relinquishment deed filed by petitioner along with the petition is false and frivolous. The petitioner has already terminated the tenancy of the respondent as alleged in legal notice dated 21.08.2018 so petitioner has no remedy under ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh Digitally signed by 3 of 23 SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:39:34 +0530 DRC Act to file present petition. It is stated that petitioner has no stated in the petition that what work he did or is doing till filing of present petition. It is stated that the petitioner and his family members including his mother were residing at first and second floor of property no. 3 and 4, Mahila Colony, Delhi and has only shifted from the said residence only after abating of the earlier petition under Section 14(i)(e) DRC Act after 08.03.2017. The said property is a very big property and the only motive for shifting is to make false and frivolous grounds for filing the present petition against the respondent.
The petitioner has not stated even a single word in the petition that when he is not doing any work at the time of filing of the present petition then how he is eligible to make payment of the rent for Krishna Nagar property. It is stated that the present petition is pre-mature, as per the contents of the petition, the petitioner became absolute owner on 12.01.2018 by way of alleged relinquishment deed dated 12.01.2018 and the present petition has been filed in the month of October, 2018 and the same is not maintainable as there is a bar under Section 14(6) of DRC Act for filing the present petition. It is stated that as soon as father of petitioner died, the said shop no. 3 came in exclusive possession of the petitioner and his family members, that there is a vacant portion on the just back of shop no. 3 which is lying vacant and was in possession of the father of petitioner and after his death the same is in possession of the petitioner and his family members.
5. The petitioner in his reply to application for leave to defend denied the averments made in the affidavit seeking leave to defend under S. 25 B of the DRC Act of the respondent. It is denied that the site plan filed by the petitioner along with eviction petition is not correct. The details of incorrectness of the site plan have not been disclosed by respondent. It is stated that earlier the petitioner was running a motor workshop in part of property no. 3 and 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi which was closed due to various notices issued by MCD being a polluting work.
6. The respondent denied the averments of the petitioner, in reply of the petitioner, in his rejoinder and reiterated the averments of his application for leave to defend.
7. I have heard counsel for the parties, perused the record and have gone through the relevant provisions of the law. Digitally signed by SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 4 of 23 12:39:51 +0530
8. The Supreme Court had in "Inderjeet Kaur Vs. Nirpal Singh", [2000]Supp 5 SCR 707, laid down the following guidelines to be followed by the Courts while deciding the applications for leave to contest filed by the tenants under Section 25(4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,1958:-
"11. As is evident from Section 25B(4) & (5) of the Act, burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed by him discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground specified in Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act, with which we are concerned in this case, are good enough to grant leave to defend.
12................................"
13. We are of the considered view that at a stage when the tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. It would not be right approach to say that unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as would non-suit the landlord leave to defend should not be granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25B(5). A leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter IIIA of the Act, Leave to defend cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of a landlord to recover possession of the premises from a tenant under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub- section (1) of Section 14, when as a matter of fact the requirement may not be bona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction. At the stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits in support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter-assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one way or the other unless there is a strong and acceptable evidence available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by the tenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable or most unreasonable. Take a case when a possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his need and not his mere desire. The ground under Clause (e) of the proviso to Sub- section (1) of Section 14 enables a landlord to recover possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of his bona fide requirement. This being an enabling provision, essentially the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. In short and substance wholly frivolous and totally untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend but when a triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the Rent Controller by the statute itself to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave the real test should be whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filed seeking leave to defend prima facie show that the landlord would be disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction and not whether at the end defence may fail. It is well to remember that when a leave to defend is refused, serious consequences of eviction shall follow and the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of the averments made in the eviction petition by cross-examination. It may also be noted that even in cases where leave is granted provisions are made in this very Chapter for expeditious disposal of eviction petitions. Section 25B(6) states that where leave is granted to a tenant to contest the eviction application, the Controller shall commence the hearing of the application as early as practicable. Section 25B(7) speaks of the procedure to be followed in such cases. Section 25B(8) bars the appeals against an order of recovery of possession except a provision of revision to the High Court. Thus a combined effect of Section 25B(6), (7) and (8) would lead to expeditious disposal of eviction petitions so that a landlord need not wait and suffer for long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having regard to competing claims. "14. This Court in Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand (1983)1SCC301 while ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh Digitally signed by SNIGDHA 5 of 23 SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:40:10 +0530 dealing with the question in the matter of granting leave to defend to contest the eviction petition filed on the ground of personal requirement, in para 5 has stated thus:
"5. What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought for? There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought for, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action (see Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh). At the stage of granting the leave parties rely in support of their rival contentions on affidavits and assertions and counter- assertions on affidavits may not afford such incontrovertible evidence to lead to an affirmative conclusion one way or the other. Conceding that when possession is sought for on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. If as it appears in this case, the landlord is staying at Pathankot, that a house is purchased, may be in the name of his sons and daughters, but there may not be an apparent need to return to Delhi in his old age, a triable issue would come into existence and that was sufficient in our opinion to grant leave to defend in this case."
15. In the same judgment, in para 7 it is further observed:
"7. The genesis of our procedural laws is to be traced to principles of natural justice, the principal amongst them being that no one shall suffer civil or evil or pecuniary consequence at his back without giving him an adequate and effective opportunity to participate to disprove the case against him and provide his own case. Summary procedure does not clothe an authority with power to enjoy summary dismissal. Undoubtedly wholly frivolous defence may not entitle a person leave to defend. But equally a triable issue raised, enjoins a duty to grant leave: May be in the end the defence may fail. It is necessary to bear in mind that when leave to defend is refused the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of the averments of the opposite party by cross-examination and rival affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for concluding the point one way or the other. It is not for a moment suggested that leave to defend must be granted on mere asking but it is equally improper to refuse to grant leave though triable issues are raised and the controversy can be properly adjudicated after ascertainment of truth through cross- examination of witnesses who have filed their affidavits........................................................."
9. Same view has been reiterated by the Supreme Court in a judgment in "Rachpal Singh and Ors.Vs. Gurmit Kaur and Ors.", (2009)15 SCC 88, in para no.12 which is re-produced below:-
"12. If some triable issues are raised then the controversy can be properly adjudicated after ascertainment of truth through cross-examination of witnesses who have filed their affidavits and other material documents. Burden is on the landlord to prove his requirements and his assertion is required..........................."
10. Proviso (e) to Section 14(1) is a special provision which has been enacted by the legislature for the class of landlords who require the premises genuinely and their requirement is bona-fide and they do not have any suitable accommodation. The essential ingredients for attracting the proviso (e) of the Section 14(1) are : -
a) there exists landlord tenant relationship;
b) the premises were let out for residential or commercial purpose;
c)The said premises are bona-fide required by the landlord either for himself or ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh Digitally signed by 6 of 23 SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:40:28 +0530 for his dependant family member.
d) The landlord or the dependant family member has no other reasonable suitable accommodation.
11. The thresholds hereinabove are to be satisfied conjunctively in order to attract the provisions of Section 14(1)(e) and the absence of even one of the said ingredients clearly makes the said provision inapplicable.
12. For the purposes of leave to defend, the respondent had to show some defence which would disentitle the petitioner of the relief claimed.
13. The case of the petitioner is that the the respondent was inducted as a tenant in shop in question in 1973 by Late S. Sunder Singh, father of the petitioner. he stated that after the death of the father of the petitioner on 6.10.2016, the other LR's of his father i.e. 4 married sisters and mother of the petitioner executed a registered relinquishment deed dated 17.01.2018 in favour of the petitioner & thus he is now the owner and landlord of the premises in question. The said registered relinquishment deed in favour of the petitioner has also been placed on record. On the other hand, the respondent has not assailed that Late S. Sunder Singh was the owner and the landlord of the premises but has stated that the petitioner is not the exclusive owner of the property in question and so the present petition is liable to be dismissed.
14. In this behalf, the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Plasti Chemicals Company vs Ashit Chadha & Anr. - 114 (2004) DLT 408, 2004 (76) DRJ 654 says that if a landlord is able to show by producing a document of his ownership on record, landlord is deemed to have discharged his burden of ownership vis-a-vis the Rent Control Act and such a document can at best be challenged by the heirs of the owner and not by the tenant.
15. The fact that in the case herein the petitioner is claiming his ownership and thus landlordship of the tenanted premises in question by virtue of the registered relinquishment deed the respondent herein cannot assail now that petitioner is not the landlord. Also, the LRs of the deceased father of the petitioner have not assailed/filed Digitally ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh signed by SNIGDHA 7 of 23 SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:40:46 +0530 objections. Also, it has not been stated by the respondent that if the petitioner is not the owner/landlord then who is the owner/landlord of the tenanted premises in question. The respondent is estopped under S. 116 of the Indian Evidence Act from assailing the title of the landlord.
16. In Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi reported as 157 (2009) DLT 450 the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi held:
".......... The imperfectness of the title of the premises cannot stand in the way an eviction petition under section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act, neither the tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperect title or title not vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act creates estoppels against such a tenant. A tenant can challenge the title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent acts dishonestly........."
17. Furthermore, since the rent had been paid by the respondent to the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioner then he is now estopped from denying the title of the petitioner under Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Bansraj Laltaprasad Mishra v. Stanley Parker Jones (2006) 3 SCC 91 held that:
".....13. The underlying policy of section 116 is that where a person has been brought into possession as a tenant by the landlord and if that tenant is permitted to question the title of the landlord at the time of the settlement, then that will give rise to extreme confusion in the matter of relationship of the landlord and tenant and so the equitable principle of estoppel has been incorporated by the legislature in the said section.
14. The principle of estoppel arising from the contract of tenancy is based upon a healthy and salutary principle of law and justice that a tenant who could not have got possession but for his contract of tenancy admitting the right of the landlord situation taking undue advantage of the possession that he got and any probable defect in the title of his landlord. It is on account of such a contract of tenancy and as a result of the tenant's entry into possession on the admission of the landlord's title that the principle of estoppel is attracted.
15. Section 116 enumerates the principle of estoppel which is merely an extension of the principle that no person is allowed to approbate and reprobate at the same time......."
18. In another case titled as Atyam Veerraju v. Pechetti Venkanna (1996) 1 SCR 831, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted with approval the judgment of the Privy Counsel in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranjit Singh, wherein it was observed as follows:
" A tenant who has been let into possession cannot deny his landlords title, however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly restored possession by surrender to his landlord."
19. The principle attracted herein is once a tenant always a tenant. The tenant cannot dispute the title of his landlord or his successor-in-interest. Since the predecessor-in- interest of the petitioner had inducted the predecessor-in-interest of the respondent as a Digitally ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh signed by SNIGDHA 8 of 23 SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:41:03 +0530 tenant, the respondent is estopped from challenging the title of the petitioner, in view of the provisions of section 116 of the Evidence Act. Further, if the transfer of the landlord's title is valid, and even if the tenancy is not attorned in favour of the transferee, the lease continues. Thus, a transferee of the landlord's rights, steps into the shoes of the landlord with all the rights and liabilities of the transferor landlord in respect of the subsisting tenancy. Attornment by the tenant is unnecessary to confer validity to the transfer of the landlord's rights and there is no such statutory requirement. Reference may be made to the case of Hajee K. Assainar vs. Chacku Joseph AIR 1984 Ker 113. In the case of Mahendra Raghunathdas Gupta vs. Vishvanath Bhikaji Mogul AIR 1997 SC 2437, it was held that attornment by tenant is not necessary though it is desirable. Mere non-payment of rent by tenant even for a considerably long period does not extinguish the landlord-tenant relationship. The possession of a tenant cannot be adverse to his landlord. The petitioner is therefore, the landlord and owner of the tenanted premises.
20. Thus, the petitioner is the owner of the tenanted premises and that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent herein in respect of the tenanted premises for the purpose of section 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act.
21. It is stated by the respondent that the present petition is barred by S. 14 (6) of the DRC Act as the petitioner became the owner of the premises in question vide registered relinquishment deed dated 17.01.2018 and the present petition filed on 15.11.2018 is filed within 5 years of the execution of the said deed. Firstly, the property in question devolved upon the petitioner by virtue of his succession rights after the death of his father and secondly, the petition is not barred by S. 14 (6) of the DRC Act since the petitioner did not acquire interest in the tenanted premises only on the date of the relinquishment deed. He was already co-owner of the tenanted premises and it cannot be said that he became its owner only on the date of the relinquishment deed.
22. It is stated by the respondent that the site plan is wrong as per the site but it has not been stated how the said site plan is wrong. In the present case the respondent-tenant has not filed any site plan of his own. This plea is of no Digitally signed by ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA 9 of 23 SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:41:20 +0530 assistance to the respondent and does not raise any traible issue. Furthermore, it has been held in Rishal Singh Vs. Bohat Ram (2014) 144 DRJ 633 that when the tenant controverts the accuracy of the site plan filed by the landlord, he is required to file a copy of the site plan he believes to be correct so as to guide the Court in finding the discrepancies of the site plan filed by the landlord; without such site plan filed, mere contentions raised to this effect will be considered meritless. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Satish Kumar Vs. Subhash Chand Agarwal 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4447 (SLP (C) No.27431/2012 preferred where against was dismissed vide order dated 15th October, 2012) held that if a tenant does not file his site plan showing that the plan filed by the owner is incorrect, then, the site plan filed by the owner would be assumed to be correct. Reference can also be made to R.K. Bhatnagar Vs. Sushila Bhargava ILR (1987) II Delhi 607 and Ghanshyam Vs. Vijender 2014 SCC OnLine Del 3983 (SLP (C) No.3654/2015 preferred where plea was dismissed vide order dated 27th February, 2015), to the same effect. Thus, the respondent tenant, without filing a site plan of his own, cannot dispute the site plan of the landlord. (See: Anil Bhasin vs Imarti Devi decided on 6 November, 2017 by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Crl Rev 266/2017.)
23. In order to evaluate whether the need of the petitioner is bonafide or not, let us understand the legislative and judicial connotation of the term, ' bonafide'. In landmark case Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, (2001) 5 SCC 705 wherein the Supreme Court observed thus:
"The Legislature in enacting the provision has taken ample care to avoid any arbitrary or whimsical action of a landlord to evict his tenant. The statutory mandate is that there must be first a requirement by the landlord which means that it is not a mere whim or a fanciful desire by him; further, such requirement must be bonafide which is intended to avoid the mere whim or desire. The 'bonafide requirement' must be in presenti and must be manifested in actual need which would evidence the Court that it is not a mere fanciful or whimsical desire. The legislative intent is made further clear by making the provision that the landlord has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. This requirement lays stress that the need is pressing and there is no reasonably suitable alternative for the landlord but to get the tenant evicted from the accommodation. Similar statutory provision is made in subsection (e) of Section ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh Digitally signed by 10 of 23 SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:41:52 +0530 12(1) of the Act in respect of accommodation let for residential purposes. Thus, the legislative mandate being clear and unambiguous, the Court is dutybound to examine not merely the requirement of the landlord as pleaded in the eviction petition but also whether any other reasonably suitable nonresidential accommodation in his occupation in the city/town is available. The judgment/order of the court/authority for eviction of a tenant which does not show that the court/authority has applied its mind to these statutory requirements cannot be sustained and the superior court will be justified in upsetting such judgment/order in appeal/second appeal/revision. Bonafide requirement, on a first look, appears to be a question of fact. But in recording a finding on the question the court has to bear in mind that statutory mandate incorporated in Section 12(1)(f). If it is found that the court has not applied the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective then the finding regarding bonafide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact, for such erroneous finding illegally arrived at would vitiate the entire judgment."
Chambers 20th Century Dictionary defines bona fide to mean "in good faith and genuine". Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bonafide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. A requirement in the sense of felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, on the part of the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any member of the family would entitle him to seek ejectment of the tenant. Looked at from this angle, any setting of the facts and circumstances protruding the need of the landlord and its bonafides would be capable of successfully withstanding the test of objective determination by the court. In short, the concept of bonafide need or genuine requirement needs a practical approach instructed by the realities of life. It is no concern of the Courts to dictate to the landlord how, and in what manner, he should live or to prescribe for him a residential standard of their own.
The meaning of "bonafide" in the context appears to be in two folds.
(a) the need of the landlord must be a genuine one and not a frivolous one. (b) landlord is not motivated by extraneous considerations in trying to recover the possession from the tenant with a view to let it out again to another tenant at a higher rent.
24. The Apex Court in the case of Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta reported in SCFBRC 1999 Page 330, has observed as under:
"In Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan, 1996 (5) SCC 353, this Court has held that in considering the availability of alternative accommodation, not availability merely but also whether the landlord has the legal right to such accommodation has to be considered. Reverting back to the case at hand, the landlord has been living on the ground floor of the Defence Colony house. It was conceded at the Bar that as on the day the family of the landlord consists of the landlord himself (a practicing doctor), his son (again a practicing doctor), the daughter-in-law and two grand children who are gradually growing in their age. Looking at the size of the family, available of three bed rooms in the premises in which the landlord may live, is a requirement which is natural and consistent with the sense of decency-not to talk of comfort and convenience. There is nothing unreasonable in a family with two practicing doctors as members Digitally ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh signed by SNIGDHA 11 of 23 SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:42:13 +0530 thereof needing a room or two or a room with a verandah to be used as a residential-clinic divided into a consultation room and a waiting place for the patients. A drawing room, a kitchen, a living room and a garage are bare necessities for a comfortable living. The landlord has been living in Defence Colony locality for more than 35 years. The first floor which was let out to the tenant in the year 1978 as being an accommodation surplus with the landlord has with the lapse of time become a necessity for occupation by the landlord and his family members. More than ten years by now have been lost in litigation. The death of the wife of the landlord and the death of landlord's mother-in-law, are events which have hardly any bearing on the case of felt need of the landlord, The need as pleaded and proved by the landlord is undoubtedly natural sincere and honest and hence a bona fide need. There is no material available on record to doubt the genuineness of such need. It continues to subsist inspite of the two deaths. It is not the case of the tenant-appellant that while seeking eviction of the tenant the landlord is moved by any ulterior motive or is guided by some other thing in his mind. It will be most unreasonable to suggest that the landlord may continue to five on the ground floor of the Defence Colony house and some members of the family may move to Sarvodaya Enclave House if the whole family cannot be conveniently and comfortably accommodated as one unit in the Defence Colony house. It would be equally unreasonable to suggest that the entire family must shift to Sarvodaya Enclave House which is admittedly situated at a distance of about 7-8 kms. from Defence Colony. The landlord and his family are used to living in Defence Colony where they have developed friends and acquaintances, also familiarity with the neighbourhood and the environment. The patients usually visiting or likely to visit the residential clinic know where their doctor would be available. Shri Arun Jaitley, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent, has very rightly submitted that it could not have been the intendment of the Rent Control Law to compel the landlord in such facts an circumstances to shift to a different house and locality so to permit the tenant to continue to live in the tenanted premises. If the landlord wishes to live with comfort in a house of his own, the law does not command or compel him to squeeze himself rightly into lesser premises protecting the tenant's occupancy."
25. Further, in another landmark case of "Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported as AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 100", whereby it was held that :
".....The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bonafides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself....".
26. As per the petitioner, at present the family of the Petitioner consists of himself ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh Digitally signed by SNIGDHA 12 of 23 SARVARIA SNIGDHA Date:
SARVARIA 2022.01.20 12:42:30 +0530 aged about 46, his wife Smt.Amarjeet Kaur aged about 38 years and three children namely Ms.Pahulreet Kaur aged about 13 years student of Class IXth, Ms. Arshreet Kaur aged about 11 years student of class VIth and Master Gursimar Singh aged about 8 years student of IVth class, besides ailing and old mother. The Petitioner or his other family members has no independent source of income from any business or otherwise. The Petitioner and his other family members are totally dependent upon his mother Smt. Harbans Kaur financially or otherwise. The Petitioner is also residing on rent @ Rs, 33,000/- per month besides water and electricity charges since 01.06.2018 in property No.F-16/13, Krishna Nagar, Delhi110051 which is belonging to Smt Suman Sharma w/o Shri Vishwa Bandhu Sharma. Earlier he was residing in property No.24, Sharad Vihar, Delhi-l10092 as a tenant. It is stated that the petitioner has lot of liabilities of arrears of rent as well as education charges of his children, medical treatment of his old mother and other house-hold expenses each and every day. Four married sisters alongwith husbands and children also used to come there and stay occasionally in property No.F-16/13, Krishnaa Nagar, Delhi to meet their old and ailing mother as well as Petitioner and his other family the members. The Petitioner is facing lot of financial difficulties now-a-days without any job or work. In the reply to the leave to defend application he has stated that since MCD was not allowing the petitioner to run his business of denting and painting shop in Mahila colony, Gandhi Nagar property owned by his mother as it was a polluting unit so since he has closed the said business he is not earning anything. There is no material on record to show anything to the contrary to show that the said averments of the petitioner are false. Obviously, when the petitioner owns shop in question and adjacent shop no.2 then why would he take a shop on rent to start his business. Furthermore, the shop in question is in Asia's biggest cloth market which best suits his business of readymade garments, which he wishes to start. Also, there is nothing on record to show any other property or source of income of the petitioner to counter the plea of the petitioner. clearly, mother of the petitioner alone is having rental income from which the expenses of the household of the petitioner are being run. The petitioner obviously has to earn his own livelihood and stand on his own feet to run his household. Thus, there is nothing on record to show that the requirement of the petitioner is not bonafide.Digitally signed by SNIGDHA
SNIGDHA SARVARIA
SARVARIA Date: 2022.01.20
12:42:48 +0530
ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh 13 of 23
27. As regards the bonafide requirement the case of the petitioner is that he wants to run his business of readymade garments and construct his own house over shop no. 1 i.e. premises in question and shop no. 2 adjacent to it. The respondent has assailed the bonafide requirement of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner is running denting, painting, insurance claim, repairing work business in the name and style of M/s Tegh Motors on the ground floor of property no. 3 & 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi, which is co-owned by the petitioner. In this regard the petitioner has filed copies of MCD challan to show that he was compelled to close his said shop/business.
Admittedly, the petitioner is not running the said business anymore thus, the plea of the respondent that the requirement of the petitioner is not bonafide is without any merits. Merely because the petitioner now wants to run a readymade garments business which is different from his earlier business of denting and painting does not mean his requirement is not bonafide.
28. The plea of the respondent that there is no bonafide requirement of the petitioner as even the father of the petitioner used to file frivolous cases against the respondent herein and a previous petition under S. 14 (1) ( e) of DRC Act was dismissed as abated vide order dated 08.03.2017 is of no use as it is well settled as held by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in M/S Moti Mahal Delux vs Kiran Dutta & Ors decided on 9 January, 2015 in CM(M) 2/2015 and CM No.43/2014 that the cause of action for eviction on the bona fide ground, that is, under S. 14 (1) (e) DRC Act is a recurring cause of action.
29. In Surajmal Vs. Radhey Shyam reported (1988) 3 Supreme Court Cases page 18, it was held that the bar of res judicata will not operate when the nature of requirement pleaded in the earlier suit was different from that in the present suit.
30. The contention of the counsel for the respondent that on one hand the petitioner pleads that he wants the premises in question for running his own business and in para 17 of the petition he has stated that the premises are in a dilapidated condition but the petitioner cannot travel on two boats is without any merits as merely because the status of the existing structure is mentioned in the petition does not mean that the need or requirement of the petitioner, as mentioned in this case, is not bonafide and does not Digitally signed by SNIGDHA ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
14 of 23 2022.01.20 12:43:07 +0530 mean that the petitioner is seeking eviction for reconstruction.
31. The plea that the tenancy of the petitioner is already terminated vide legal notice dated 21.08.2018 and thus this petition is not maintainable is of no use as the respondent is still a month-to-month tenant.
32. It is stated by the petitioner that there is no other vacant and suitable accommodation available to the petitioner except the tenanted premises, in possession of the respondent, for himself to start his business. The respondent has failed to bring anything to the contrary on record.
33. As regards alternate accommodation in Sarwan Dass Bange vs Ram Prakash 2010 IV AD (Delhi) 252, observations made by Supreme Court in Baldev Singh Bajwa V Monish Saini MANU/SC/1239/2005 (2005) 12SCC 778, have been quoted as under :
It was held that the legislative intent is of expeditious disposal of the application for ejectment of tenant filed on the ground of requirement by the landlord of the premises for his own occupation; a special category of landlords requiring the premises for their own use has been created; if there is any breach by the landlord, the tenant is given right of restoration of possession; the landlord who evicts the tenant on the ground of his own requirement is not only prohibited from letting out the premises or disposing of the same but also required to use the same for his own residence only. It was held that these restrictions and conditions inculcate inbuilt strong presumption that the need of the landlord is genuine;the restrictions and conditions imposed on the landlord make it virtually improbable for the landlord to approach the court for ejectment of tenant unless his need is bonafide no unscrupulous landlord in all probability, under this section, would approach the court for ejectment of the tenant considering the onerous conditions imposed on him. It was further held that his inbuilt protection in the Act for the tenants implies that whenever the landlord would approach the court his requirement shall be presumed to be genuine and bonafide. It was further held that a heavy burden lies on the tenant to prove that the requirement is not genuine. The tenant is required to give all necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the affidavit itself so that the controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bonafide requirement of the landlord; a mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine.
34. In Adarsh Electricals and others vs Dinesh Dayal - MANU/DE/2782/2010, it was held that " the concept of alternate accommodation means that accommodation which is reasonably suitable for the landlord, and the court would not expect the landlord to sacrifice on his own comforts ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh Digitally 15 of 23 signed by SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:43:25 +0530 and requirements merely on the ground that the premises is with a tenant . The problem had to be approached from the point of view of a reasonable man and not that of a whimsical landlord. The court would permit the landlord to satisfy the proven need by choosing the accommodation which the landlord feels would be most suited for the purpose; the court would not in such a case thrust its own wisdom upon the choice of the landlord by holding that not one but the other accommodation must be accepted by the landlord to satisfy his such need."
35. Landlord is the best judge of his needs. It is well settled that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises.
36. The case of the petitioner is that his father S. Sunder Singh was the owner of about 126 sq yds of land of property no. 720-A (old) and IX/7018 (New) Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 and he raised construction therein in 1965-1966 and constructed 7 shops. He stated that the shop nos. 6 & 7 were sold prior to the year 2000 by S. Sunder Singh to Shri Kashyap Traders and Kashyap Garments and they are now occupants in the said shops. This is not disputed by the respondent.
37. He stated that S. Sunder Singh agreed to sell shop nos. 4 & 5 in the year 2002 to Shri Praveen Kumar Gupta, who could not perform his part of the contract and thereafter litigation started between Parveen Kumar Gupta & Late S. Sunder Singh. The said shops were in very dilapidated condition and fell down or partly demolished for the reconstruction in the year 2002 but the respondent had not allowed to reconstruct shops by lodging various police reports as well as by obtaining stay order from the Civil Court, Delhi. Later on, the said shops were transferred by late S.Sunder Singh in favour of his daughter Smt. Arvinder Kaur by executing transferred deeds and Smt. Arvinder Kaur also agreed to sell the above said property to Shri Yatinder Gupta, the real brother of Shri Parveeen Kumar in October, 2008. Shri Yatinder Gupta also failed to perform his part of contract and thereafter started litigation between Smt.Arvinder Kaur and Shri Yatinder Gupta and ultimately, the said court cases were settled through Mediation Cell and vacant land of Shop No.5 was transferred by Smt.Arvinder Kaur in favour of Shri Yatinder Gupta vide sale deed dated 26.12.2016. That Smt.Arvinder Kaur also sold vacant land Shop No.4 to M/s.Rahul Collection Pvt.Ltd in the said property by executing registered sale deed dated 29.12.2017. In support thereof the petitioner has filed copy of Digitally signed by SNIGDHA ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
16 of 23 2022.01.20 12:43:43 +0530 regd. GPA, agreement to sell, affidavit, receipt, possession letter all dated 01.06.2002 executed by S. Sunder Singh in favour of Arvinder Kaur qua shop nos. 4 & 5 of IX/7018, Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Shahdara, Delhi; regd. Will dated 01.06.2002 executed by S. Sunder Singh in favour of Arvinder Kaur qua shop nos. 4 & 5 of IX/7018, Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Shahdara, Delhi mediation report dated 26.11.2016 in case no. 2464/2016 titled Parveen Kumar & Anr, vs Sunder Singh Makkar and case no. 1806/2016 titled Yatinder Kumar Gupta vs Arvinder Kaur; compromise decree dated 02.09.2005 in case no. 2464/2016 titled Parveen Kumar & Anr, vs Sunder Singh Makkar & compromise order dated 09.01.2017 in case no. 1806/2016 titled Yatinder Kumar Gupta vs Arvinder Kaur.
38. Also, as per oral partition & settlement between the legal heirs of S.Sunder Singh, shop no. 3 partly built in front side and partly portion vacant was also sold by Smt. Arvinder Kaur and by the petitioner Manjeet Singh to M/s.Rahul Collection Pvt.Ltd. by executing sale deed dated 14.02.2018 which was also later on registered in the office of Sub-Registrar VI, Nand Nagri, Delhi. Sale Proceed of Shop No.3 was distributed between all the legal heirs of late S.Sunder Singh, as per mutual and oral settlement.
39. The Petitioner is the owner of Shops No.1 and 2 only and all other shops have already been sold to different persons as stated above. In this regard regd. relinquishment deed dated 17.01.2018 executed by Harbans Kaur, Arvinder Kaur, tajinder Kaur, Gurjeet Kaur and Manjeet Kaur Narula in favour of Manpreet Singh has also been placed on record.
40. It is further submitted that the mother of the Petitioner Smt. Harbans Kaur is the Owner/ landlady of property Nos. 3. & 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 by virtue of registered sale deed in respect of property No.4 and by way family of settlement in respect of property No.3. There are other CO-sharers in property No.3 as per the sale deed of the said property. The said property is now under the control and possession of the tenants and Smt.Harbans Kaur is receiving the rent against the said property. In this regard the petitioner has filed copy of regd sale deed dated 13.09.1974 executed by Smt Savitri Devi in favour of Smt. Harbans Kaur qua Q.No. 4, mahila Digitally ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh signed by SNIGDHA 17 of 23 SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:44:02 +0530 Colony, Shahdara, Delhi and copy of regd. Sale deed dated 22.04.1988 executed by Maya Devi in favour of S. Sunder Singh, Tarinderjit Kaur, Ranjit Kaur and Inderjit Singh Kaur qua Q.No. 3, mahila Colony, Shahdara, Delhi; mediation report dated 07.07.2018 qua Q.No. 3, mahila Colony, Shahdara, Delhi in CS no. 212/2018 in Harbans Kaur vs Manpreet Singh & Ors. And compromise order in CS no. 212/2018 in Harbans Kaur vs Manpreet Singh & Ors.
41. It is stated by the respondent that the present petition is liable to be dismissed as the petitioner has concealed material facts in his petition viz. that the father of the petitioner used to file frivolous cases against the respondent herein and a previous petition under S. 14 (1) ( e) of DRC Act was dismissed as abated vide order dated 08.03.2017; the petitioner is the co-owner of property no. 3 & 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi; the petitioner is running his business on the ground floor of property no. 3 & 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi and deliberately closed his business to create scarcity of accommodation; the petitioner is earning rental income from the said ground floor of property no. 3 & 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi; the petitioner and his family with his mother were residing on the first and second floor of property no. 3 & 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi and after abatement order dated 08.03.2017 shifted from the said premises into a rented accommodation in Krishna Nagar. It is well settled that that once the facts which are alleged to have been concealed have come before the Court and the Court has had occasion to consider the same and after considering the same finds in favour of the landlord, the petition for eviction cannot be dismissed on the ground of concealment. The Hon'ble High court of Delhi in Sunil Kumar Goyal vs Harbans Singh decided on 18 July, 2017 in RC.REV. 300/2017 it was held as under:
It cannot be lost sight of that according to the tenant also, on the date of institution of the petition for eviction, the other shop was in occupation of another tenant. It is thus not as if the other shop already stood vacated and was concealed from the petition for eviction. The question for adjudication is whether in such facts, the concealment was such so as to warrant dismissal of the petition for eviction or grant of leave to defend to the petitioner. Supreme Court in Bhairab Chandra Nandan Vs Ranadhir Chandra Dutta (1988) 1 SCC 383 held that once the facts which are alleged to have been concealed have come before the Court and the Court has had occasion to consider the same and after considering the same finds in favour of the landlord, the petition for eviction cannot be dismissed on the ground of concealment. Similarly, in M.L. Prabhakar Vs. Rajiv Singhal (2001) 2 SCC 355, qua the plea of ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh 18 of 23 Digitally signed by SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:44:22 +0530 concealment / suppression, it was held that the fact that the landlord has another accommodation would not be fatal to the eviction proceedings if both the parties understood the case and placed materials before the Court and case of neither party was prejudiced. Accordingly, it was held that though the landlord in that case had not mentioned about the other premises but the material in respect of the other two premises had come before the Rent Controller as well as before the High Court and no prejudice had been caused and the parties had squarely dealt with the question. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi also in Harbant Singh Vs. Vinod Sikari 189 (2012) DLT 215 held that unless there is concealment of fact which is so vital to the bearing of the petition in issue, it would not amount to concealment. It was reiterated that concealment of accommodation which was not available or suitable cannot be a ground for non-suiting the landlord or granting leave to defend.
42. It is stated by the respondent that the relinquishment deed is a sham document and all the co-owners should have been made a party in this petition and this petition is bad for non-joinder of parties. There is nothing on record to show that the regd relinquishment deed as mentioned above is a sham document. It is well settled that the respondent has to bring on record relevant material to show that a triable issue is raised and mere bald averments are of no help to the respondent. Even otherwise if the plea of the respondent is believed, then also by virtue of being son of the erstwhile owner, the petitioner is atleast a co-owner in the tenanted premises. A co-owner can also institute a petition seeking eviction of the tenant under the DRC Act. In this regard reference can be made to Kanta Goel vs B. P. Pathak: AIR 1977 SC 1599 and Pal Singh vs Sunder Singh : AIR 1989 SC 758. Thus even being a co-owner, the petitioner is complete owner in respect of the entire property and he is competent to file the present eviction petition against the tenant without joining the other alleged co-owners and he is to be considered as an owner for the purposes of S. 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act. There is nothing on record to show that other alleged co-owners have objected to the filing of the present petition.
43. The contention of the respondent that it is unbelievable and unimaginary that the petitioner wants to shift his residence from Krishna Nagar to Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, which is a highly congested area because of Asia's biggest garment market is without any merits as petitioner is the best judge of his requirement and also any prudent man would opt to live and run his business in his own owned premises rather than in a rented premises especially when the difference in rent paid by the petitioner is manifold than what he is earning from the tenanted premises and when he has no other alternate accommodation. Furthermore, Gandhi Nagar is a residential - cum - commercial area.
Digitally ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh signed by SNIGDHA 19 of 23 SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:44:48 +0530 The shop in question being in the Asia's biggest cloth market is best suited for the petitioner to run his own business of readymade garments.
44. The contention of the respondent that the petitioner has not filed details of the tenants of property nos. 3 & 4, Mahila Colony, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi is of no assistance as the petitioner has already produced on record copy of regd sale deed dated 13.09.1974 executed by Smt Savitri Devi in favour of Smt. Harbans Kaur qua Q.No. 4, mahila Colony, Shahdara, Delhi and copy of regd. Sale deed dated 22.04.1988 executed by Maya Devi in favour of S. Sunder Singh, Tarinderjit Kaur, Ranjit Kaur and Inderjit Singh Kaur qua Q.No. 3, mahila Colony, Shahdara, Delhi; mediation report dated 07.07.2018 qua Q.No. 3, mahila Colony, Shahdara, Delhi in CS no. 212/2018 in Harbans Kaur vs Manpreet Singh & Ors. And compromise order in CS no. 212/2018 in Harbans Kaur vs Manpreet Singh & Ors. to show that he has no rights in the said property so question of furnishing details of tenants and rental income of said property does not arise.
45. The submissions qua sub-tenancy created by the respondent in favour of Sh.
Gurvinder Singh and other properties available with the respondent and respondent running his business from shop in Ahuja Market are irrelevant for the purpose of the present petition and hence are not being dealt with herein.
46. The plea regarding creation of scarcity of accommodation by the respondent is without any merits it is shown by placing on record by the petitioner MCD challans to show that he was compelled to close his business of denting and painting. The fact that the petitioner was running a pollution emitting business due to which he was challaned by MCD is also not disputed by the respondent. The change of residence from Mahila colony to rented accommodation in Krishna Nagar as per copy of rent agreement dated 04.06.2018 placed on record by the petitioner after death of father of the petitioner due to death of one of the earning members of the family and resultant financial difficulties which also lead to selling of shop no. 3 have already been explained by the petitioner hereinabove, therefore, the plea of creation of scarcity of accommodation of the respondent is without any merits.
47. The respondent has raised the plea that the petitioner has alternative suitable Digitally signed by ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA 20 of 23 SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:45:05 +0530 premises and thus this petition is not maintainable is without any merits as neither the respondent has brought forth any material to show an alternative suitable accommodation nor details of such alternative suitable accommodation is given. Clearly, this is a sham defence. It is well settled that the tenant is required to give all necessary facts and particulars supported by documentary evidence if available to prove his plea in the affidavit itself so that the controller will be in a position to adjudicate and decide the question of genuine or bonafide requirement of the landlord; a mere assertion on the part of the tenant would not be sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord's favour that his requirement of occupation of the premises is real and genuine. (See: Sarwan Dass Bange V. Ram Prakash 2010 IV AD (Delhi) 252).
48. It is contended by the respondent that in the earlier petition the petitioner's father Late Shri Sunder Singh had sought the bonafide requirement of Shop No. 1 & 2 and he alleged in the petition that he is in possession of Shop No. 3 which is just adjacent to the Shop No. 2 & 1 and further alleged that he had started garment business in Shop No. 3 under the name and style of "M/s Top Lovely Garments" and has also taken electricity connection in the same. It has been further stated in the said petition that he wanted to do readymade garments business after getting possession of shop No. 1 & 2 for enhancement of his business. As soon as the father of the petitioner died, the said shop No. 3 came in exclusive possession of the petitioner and his family members. It is further submitted that there is a vacant portion on the just back of shop No. 3 which is lying vacant and was in possession of the father of the petitioner and after his death the same is in possession of the petitioner and his family members. It is very strange that when the petitioner was having any bonafide requirement of the shop then why the petitioner had sold out the said Shop No. 3 along with the vacant back portion of the same to the prospective buyers in 2018. The allegations in Para VI of the petition clearly reflects about the same. This contention is without any merits as it has been stated by the petitioner that due to financial crises LR's of Sunder Singh had to sell of shop nos. 3 to 5.
This fact is further strengthened by the fact that to earn better rental income they even had to move out of Mahila Colony property, which even as per the respondent is fetching better rent to the mother of the petitioner. Also, it is stated in his reply by the respondent that the condition of shop no. 3 was very bad as flooring was down by about 1.5 ft from Digitally ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh signed by SNIGDHA 21 of 23 SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 12:45:30 +0530 the road level, condition of roof was very bad and it used to leak in rainy season and was not good and proper for running a business meaning thereby that it required a lot of expenses. Also, it is stated that respondent would not allow repairs in shop no. 3 and would create hurdles so ultimately shop no. 3 had to be sold. The respondent has not brought any cogent material to the contrary and thus no triable issue is made out in this regard.
49. The petitioner has made a false and frivolous ground of mutual and oral partition / settlement between the legal heirs of Shri Sunder Singh. The entire family of the petitioner is one and unite and only false allegations have been made with respect to the mutual settlement. The petitioner and his family members including mother are getting huge rent after letting out the property No. 3 & 4 Mahila Colony in entirety and are also selling out the shops one by one in property No. IX/7018, Ashok Gali Gandhi Nagar, Delhi and are earning crores of rupees from the same. The plea qua rental income of the petitioner out of Mahila Colony property is without any merits in view of the property documents and court orders and settlements, as discussed hereinabove, placed on record by the petitioner. As regards not believing oral partition between mother and 4 married sisters of the petitioner and the petitioner there is nothing on record to disbelieve it.
50. The contention of the respondent that the roof of the tenanted shop is also part of the tenancy as the tenanted premises is a single storey property and the present petition has been filed only for the shop in question, thus, the petition is not maintainable is without any merits as in the absence of any material document placed on record said submission is of no help to the respondent.
51. The contention of the respondent that the father of the petitioner was also not doing any business in the shop no. 3 and had only hung the sign board of Top Lovely Garments and the present petition is motivated to evict the respondent and even respondent will not do any business is of no assistance to the respondent as the conduct of the father of the petitioner is not to be looked into in this petition and mere bald averments of the respondent in this regard are of no use to the respondent.
Digitally signed by SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA ARC No : 444/2018 S. Manpreet Singh Vs. Jagjit Singh Sukhbir Singh SARVARIA Date:
2022.01.20 22 of 23 12:45:47 +0530
52. The decisions in Sri Prakash Gupta vs Dharmanand Pandey decided by Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 04.11.2011 in RC Rev no. 88/2011 & CM no. 6181/2011; Vinod Ahuja vs Anil Bajaj - 194 (2012) DLT 203; Satpal vs Sahi Ram decided by Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 27.05.2011 in RC Rev no. 25/2010; Pradeep Kumar Sethi vs Rajender Kumar Sethi decided by Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 18.07.2011 in RC Rev no. 127/2010; Jawahar Lal vs Ravinder Kumar Khanna:195 (2012) DLT 239; Deena Nath vs Pooran Lal: AIR 2001 SC 2655; Rajbir Pal vs Kanwar Pratap Singh decided by Hon'ble Delhi High Court on 12.10.2011 in RC Rev no. 209/2010 relied upon by the respondents is of no assistance to the respondents as it has been decided on different fact situation and cannot be applied like a Euclid's theorem.
53. In view of the above discussion and the documents filed by the parties, there is no triable issue between the parties which entitles the respondents for leave to contest the present application for eviction. The applications for leave to contest are without merits.
54. Conclusion:
In these circumstances, the respondent is liable to be evicted from the tenanted premises i.e. shop no. 2 in property no. IX/7018, old no. 720-A, plot no. 529, Ashok Gali, Gandhi Nagar, Delhi-110031 as shown in red colour in the site plan (now exhibited as Ex P1) filed with the present petition. Accordingly, the petition filed by the petitioner u/s 14 (1) (e) r/w S. 25B of the DRC Act is allowed, subject to provisions u/s 19 of the DRC Act. However, the petitioner would not be entitled to initiate execution proceedings for recovery of possession of the tenanted premises before expiration of six months from today in view of provisions given in Section 14 (7) of the Act. No orders as to costs. Digitally signed by SNIGDHA SNIGDHA SARVARIA SARVARIA Date: 2022.01.20 12:46:02 +0530 Announced through VC (SNIGDHA SARVARIA) on 20th Day of January, 2022. ACJ/ARC/CCJ [This judgment contains 23 pages.] (SHAHDARA) KKD, DELHI.
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