Allahabad High Court
Ram Abhilakh vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation ... on 3 April, 2025
Author: Saurabh Lavania
Bench: Saurabh Lavania
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:18672 Court No. - 7 Case :- WRIT - B No. - 229 of 2024 Petitioner :- Ram Abhilakh Respondent :- Deputy Director Of Consolidation Sultanpur And 18 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Om Prakash Pandey Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,Jay Prakash,Mohan Singh,Satya Prakash Mishra Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.
1. Rejoinder affidavit filed today is taken on record.
2. Heard Shri Om Prakash Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State Counsel, Shri Satya Prakash Mishra, Advocate along with Shri Jay Prakash, Advocate, who appeared for private respondents and perused the material available on record.
3. The petitioner has approached this Court by means of the present petition seeking following main relief(s):-
"(i) to issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari for quashing of the impugned judgment and order dated 25.09.2023, annexed as Annexure No.1 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation Sultanpur, herein opposite party no.1, in Revision No.24 of 2023, Computerized Case No.2020530468000596, Case No.0596/2020 (Ram Lakhan Vs. Ram Abhilakh) and also maintain/confirm the judgment and order dated 11.05.1987 passed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation Sultanpur in Appeal No.2762/934/1275 and judgment and order dated 09.08.1984 passed in Case No.51, 52 and 53, Consolidation Officer, final Record Gabhariya Sultanpur."
4. Vide impugned order dated 25.09.2023 passed by opposite party no.1- Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sultanpur (in short 'DDC') in the case instituted under Section 48(1) of U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act, 1953 (in short 'Act 1953') bearing Case No.0596 of 2020, Computerized Case No.2020530468000596, (Ram Lakhan Vs. Ram Abhilakh), interfered in the orders passed by Consolidation Officer (in short 'C.O.') dated 09.08.1984 passed in Case No.51/52/53 (Musammat Subraji Vs. State (Mahdei)), under Section 12 of the Act, 1953, as also the order dated 11.05.1987 passed by Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Sultanpur, in Appeal No.2762/93/1275, under Section 11(1) of Act 1953, filed by Ram Lakhan s/o Sarju, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party nos.4 to 18.
5. It would be apt to indicate here at this stage that vide order dated 09.08.1984 the C.O. allowed the claim of the petitioner based upon the unregistered 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 and rejected the objection of Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party nos.4 to 18, and also of others.
6. It would not be out of place to indicate here that the order of C.O. was challenged by Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party nos.4 to 18, before the S.O.C. in appeal, detailed above, which was also dismissed on 11.05.1987 and thereby the order of C.O. dated 09.08.1984 was affirmed.
7. Brief facts of the case which are relevant for adjudication of the present case are as under.
(i) Indisputably, the petitioner-Ram Abhilakh is real nephew of Mehdei who executed the unregistered 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 in favour of petitioner- Ram Abhilakh.
(ii) It is also not in dispute that Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party nos.4 to 18, is real uncle of petitioner and real brother-in-law (devar) of Mehdei (testatrix), who died leaving behind two daughters.
(iii) In the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, favourable to the petitioner, the reasons for exclusion of daughters have not been indicated.
(iv) The 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 was signed by two witnesses namely Ram Bali and Prithvi Pal. Ram Bali put his thumb impression and Prithvi Pal put his signature over the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979.
(v) In the 'Will' it has been indicated by the testatrix that she has no legal heir.
(vi) Mehdei, the testatrix, also put her thumb impression over the 'Will'.
(vii) Based upon the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 the petitioner- Ram Abhilakh pleaded its case on 16.12.1981 before the C.O. claiming his rights over the property belonging to Mehdei (testatrix).
(viii) To prove the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, the attesting witnesses' namely Ram Bali and Prithvi Pal were examined before the C.O.
(ix) The relevant portion of the cross-examination of Ram Bali, as available on record, is extracted hereinunder:-
"वसीयतनामा राम अभिलाख के दरवाजे पर 10, 11 बजे दिन में लिखा गया। लेखनी चन्द्र मुहर्रिर कादीपुर के थे नाम नहीं जानता। वसीयत की दिन या तारीख नहीं जानता। महीना जाड़े का था। लिखे दो ढाई साल हुआ है मुहर्रिर ने लिखने के बाद पढ़कर सुनाया था मैंने भी सुना था सुना चुकने के बाद पहिला अंगूठा महदेई का लगा मुहर्रिर ने महदेई का अंगूठा कागज पर लगाया। अंगूठा लगाने के बाद मुहर्रिर ने महदेई का अंगूठा निशान लिखा। महदेई के बाद गवाही में मेरा अंगूठा लगा। मुहर्रिर ने मेरे भी अंगूठा निशान की पहिचान लिखा मेरे बाद राम अभिलाख ने वसीयत पर दस्तखत किया। बहुत पहिले राम अभिलाख अंगूठा लगाते थे अब दो, चार, 6 साल (not legible) से दस्तखत करते (not legible) पर मुहर्रिर ने कितना जगह अंगूठा लगाया मुझे याद नहीं है। मैं यह नहीं कह सकता हूँ कि मुहर्रिर ने एक जगह अंगूठा लगाया या दो तीन जगह लगाया। महदेई को मरे 2, 2 1/2 साल के लगभग हो गया। महदेई ने गया जगन्नाथ मरने के जरूर दो साल पहिले किया था सही याद नहीं है। मुहर्रिर ने वसीयत लिखने के बाद वसीयत की इबारत की आखीरी पर महदेई का अंगूठा लिया कि नहीं मुझे याद नहीं है। लिखते समय मुहर्रिर महदेई राम अभिलाख के अलावा और लोग थे जिनका नाम याद नहीं है। वहाँ पर लिखा पढ़ा आदमी कोई नहीं था बच्चे थे। महदेई रामलखन की सगी भौजाई थी। महदेई जब जीवित थी तो राम अभिलाख के साथ रहती थी और राम अभिलाख ही उनकी जमीन जोतते बोते थे। मैं नहीं बता सकता कि महदेई अपनी जमीन (not legible) थी या नहीं। मैंने (not legible) कागज था। मैनें महदेई को (not legible) था कि उनके दौ लडकियां लड़कियां मेरे सामने आती जाती है। वसीयतनामा में लड़कियों को महदेई ने कुछ नहीं दिया। महदेई ने यह नहीं बताया कि लड़कियों को क्यों नहीं दे रही है। मुझे याद नहीं है कि महदेई ने मरने के कितना दिन पहिले मुझे बताया कि मेरे लड़कियां है। वसीयत लिखते समय महदेई की उम्र कम से कम 60 साल थी। महदेई को मेरे 21/3 तीन साल हुआ मरते समय उनकी क्या उम्र थी मैं नहीं बता सकता। क्योंकि मैं पढ़ा लिखा नहीं हूँ। चकबंदी के पहिले आराजी निजाई सब की शामिल शरीक मुस्तर्का थी मैंने दावा भी दायर किया था। यह कहना गलत है कि वसीयत फर्जी है। यह भी गलत है कि महदेई के वारिस रामलखन है और उन्हीं का (not legible) है। बयान सुनकर तस्दीक किया।"
(x) Relevant portion of cross-examination of Prithvi Pal, as available on record, is extracted hereinunder:-
"वसीयतनामा (not legible) के दरवाजे लिखा गया। समय (not legible) बजे या 11.00 बजे थे। तारीख वसीयत की मुझे नहीं मालूम है। दिसम्बर का महीना वसीयत का दिन भी नहीं (not legible) सकता। वसीयत बडे दिन लिखी गई थी। सोमवार (not legible) तक कौन दिन था मुझे याद नहीं है। स्टाम्प पैड से अंगूठा लगाया गया जो अर्जी नवीस के पास थे। यह अंगूठा अर्जी नवीस स्टाम्प को स्याही लगाने के बाद पकड़ कर कागज पर लगाया। अंगूठा किस हाथ का लगाया गया मुझे याद नहीं है। अंगूठा लगने के बाद अर्जी नवीस ने अपनी कलम से नि० अंगूठा महदेई अर्जी नवीस ने नहीं लिखा। बल्कि अर्जी नवीस की कलम से मैंने निशानी अंगूठा लिखा। रामबली की निशानी अंगूठा की पहिचान अर्जी नवीस ने नहीं लिखा बल्कि मैंने लिखा। रामबली के अंगूठा लगने के बाद राम अभिलाख ने वसीयतनामें पर दस्तखत नही (not legible) रामबली ने वसीयत पर एक निशानी अंगूठा लगाया। वसीयत लिखे जाने के बाद इबारत के आखीर पर महदेई का अंगूठा नहीं लगाया गया। जिनको मैंने ऊपर बताया है उनके अतिरिक्त और कोई नहीं थ बच्चे भी वहाँ पर नहीं थे। मुझे याद नहीं है कि वसीयतनामा में महदेई ने यह लिखाया कि नहीं मेरे दो लड़कियों भी है। रामसरन के बाप का नाम नहीं जानता। (not legible) नहीं है कि वसीयतनामा दोपहर बाद दूसरे समय लिखा गया हो। अर्जी नवीस का नाम नहीं जानता। हमे नहीं याद है कि हम लोग किस पर बैठे थे मैं जमीन पर बैठा था। अर्जी नवीस कहाँ बैठे थे याद नहीं है। यह कहना गलत है कि महदेई के अंगूठे की जगह पर दुबारा अंगूठा लगा दिया गया हो। यह कहना गलत है कि वसीयतनामें पर महदेई का अंगूठा नहीं लगा है। मैं नहीं जानता कि चकबंदी में महदेई की जमीन का समझौता हुआ (not legible) यह कहना गलत है कि मेरे (not legible) के मारे जाने के बाद मैंने व रामअभिलाख व रामबली ने फर्जी वसीयत तैयार किया महदेई के चक की चौहद्दी में नहीं जानता। बयान सुनकर तस्दीक किया।"
8. The C.O. after taking note of the pleadings and evidence on record including the statements of the witnesses of 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 namely Ram Bali and Prithvi Pal decided the case in favour of the petitioner- Ram Abhilakh vide order dated 09.08.1984. The C.O. decided the case after framing three issues and taking note of pedigree placed before it. The relevant portion of the order of C.O. dated 09.08.1984 reads as under :-
"सरजू माताफेर दसई रामलखन मु० बच्ची बेवा मु० महदेई रामअभिलाख x x x x x x x x x x x उपरोक्त तर्क वितकों के तथा पत्रावली में उपलब्ध साक्ष्यों से यह विदित होता है कि रामलखन का कथन सत्यता से परे है। रामलखन द्वारा दी गई प्रार्थना पत्र में राम अभिलाख के हस्ताक्षर नहीं है उस पर केवल रामलखन के ही हस्ताक्षर है अतः इस आधार पर उनका कथन कि रामअभिलाख ने उसके साथ आवेदन किया है सही प्रतीत नहीं होता है। यह आवेदन रामलखन द्वारा दिया गया था वह रामअभिलाख का भी नाम अंकित करने के लिये स्वतंत्र था और बाद में ही व्यक्ति नाम को काटने का जिम्मेदार हो सकते है। अस्तु रामलखन का यह कथन सही साबित नहीं होता है (not legible) में इसका कोई (not legible) रामअभिलाख नहीं हो सकता है। पत्रावली में प्रतिलिपि नकल रिपोर्ट चलानी मुकदमा नम्बर 182/81 अन्तरगत धारा 107 जाप्ता फौजदारी दाखिल है। उसके आलेख में यह अंकित है कि राम अभिलाख के नाम वसीयतनामा दसई की बेवा महदेई ने लिख दिया है थाना की वह रिपोर्ट दिनांक 8.12.80 की है जबकि वसीयतनामा दिनांक 25.12.89 का है तात्पर्य यह कि वसीयत के एक वर्ष बाद ही उसके लिखे जाने की बात पक्षों की जानकारी में आता है की अस्तु यह कहना कि बाद में लिखा गया था बल प्रतीत नहीं होता है।
द्वितीय आपत्तिकर्ता के योग्य अधिवक्ता ने अपनी बहस में कहा है कि प्रथम तो मृतक की कोई सन्तान होना उन्हें स्वीकार नहीं है और यदि मान भी लिया जावे तो भी चूंकि वे विवाहित लड़कियां है अस्तु उन्हें कोई (not legible) सगे भाई की उपस्थिति में प्राप्त नहीं हो सकता है। विद्वान अधिवक्ता का यह तर्क पर्याप्त है। पक्षों को यह अस्वीकृत पही है कि मृतक की कथित पुत्रियां महदेई की मृत्यु के समय विवाहित नहीं थी फलस्वरूप जमीदारी उन्मूलन एवं भूमि (not legible) अधिनियम की धारा 171 के प्राविधानन्तरगत उन्हें सगे भाई रामलखन की उपस्थिति में वरासत का लाभ प्राप्त नहीं हो सकता है। रामलखन की ओर से यह भी बहस की गई है कि राम अभिलाख एवं उनके गवाहों ने स्वीकारा है कि मृतक की दो पुत्रियां थी किन्तु वसीयतनामा में अंकित है कि उनकी कोई संतान नहीं है फलस्वरूप यह वसीयतनामा दसई की बेवा महदेई जिसके दो पुत्रियां थी द्वारा नहीं लिखा गया है बल्कि किसी अन्य महदेई द्वारा लिखा गया है। फलस्वरूप अवैध है। जहाँ तक इस कथन का प्रश्न है विद्वान अधिवक्ता का आरोप सही प्रतीत होता है किन्तु मात्र इस आधार पर कि वसीयतनामा में यह अंकित नहीं है उसके पुत्रियां है वसीयतनामा गलत नहीं हो जाता है। वस्तुतः (not legible) श्रीमती महदेई अनपढ व्यक्ति थी उसको प्रक्रिया के सम्बंध में जानकारी नहीं थी उसने वो मात्र वसीयत लिखने की बात को बताई थी और लेखक ने अपने मन से मजमून बना दिया होगा। मात्र इस कमी के आधार पर वसीयतनामा को असत्य नहीं माना जा सकता है। श्रीमती महदेई के स्वीकृत अंगूठा निशान अनुमति प्रार्थना पत्र धारा 5क में उपलब्ध थे। वस्तुतः यदि रामलखन को उसके अंगूठा निशान पर संशय था तो उसके लिये यह (not legible) वह दोनों अंगूठा निशानों का विशेषज्ञ के माध्यम से करा लेता और (not legible) स्पष्टीकरण हो जाता। किन्तु उन्होंने ऐसा कुछ न करे परिकल्पना अपने कथन के विरूद्ध पेश कर दी (not legible)।
पत्रावली के साक्ष्यों से यह विदित होता है कि विवादित भूमि के सम्बन्ध में पक्षों में जाप्ता फौजदारी की धारा 107 के अन्तगत मुकदमा भी चल चुका है। यहां तक की दस्तावेज के गवाह पृथ्वीपाल के पिता का कतल भी रामलखन के लड़के रामजीत के द्वारा हुआ था। यह सही है कि पृथ्वीपाल ने अपनी जिरह में कहा है कि यह कतल पानी के विवाद को लेकर हुआ था किन्तु वसीयतनामा की बात (not legible) फूट चुकी थी अतः इसके पृष्ठ में भी वसीयतनामा भी की बात रही होगी। रामलखन के विद्वान अधिवक्ता ने अपनी बहस में यह भी आरोप लगाया है कि पृथ्वीपाल ने इसी रंजिशन (not legible) वसीयातनामा तैयार करने में सहयोग दिया है। किन्तु दोनों व्यक्तियों के अवलोकन से वस्तुस्थिति भिन्न दृष्टि गोचर होती है। (not legible) वसीयतनामा 25.12.79 का लिखा गया है जबकि पृथ्वीपाल के पिता का कत्ल सन 81 के लगभग बताया जाता है इससे यह स्पष्ट हो जाता है कि वसीयतनामा लिखते समय कोई रंजिश पृथ्वीपाल की नहीं थी अस्तु विद्वान अधिवक्ता का यह आरोप सत्य प्रतीत नहीं होता है वरन् इस परिपेक्ष्य में यही विदित होता है कि मूल वसीयतनामा में गवाही करने के ही कारण पृथ्वीपाल से रामलखन की रंजिश उत्पन्न हुई थी।
रामलखन के योग्य अधिवक्ता ने वसीयत के हासिया गवाहों के बयानों के विरोधात्मक स्थितियों की ओर इंगित करके कहा है कि वसीयतनामा लिखने के स्थान और समय के विषय में गवाहों में मतैक्य नहीं है। सम्पूर्ण बयानों के पढ़ने से इन गवाहों के कथन में भिन्नता प्रतीत नहीं होती। रामअभिलाख ने कहा है कि" यह वसीयतनामा मेरे दरवाजे पर लिखा गया है। "पृथ्वीपाल ने भी जिरह में कहा है कि "वसीयतनामा राम अभिलाख के दरवाजे लिखा गया। तीसरे गवाह रामबली का भी कथन है कि "वसीयतनामा दुआरे लिखा गया। राम अभिलाख के दुआरे लिखा गया फिर कहा महदेई के दुआरे लिखा गया। राम अभिलाख महदेई का एक ही घर है।" इन तीनों गवाहों द्वारा वसीयतनामा लिखने का स्थान एक ही बयान किया है। उसी भांति यह भी तीनों गवाहों ने एक ही मत से कहा है कि वसीयतनामा अर्जी नवीस ने लिखा था। इसके लिखे जाने के समय के विषय में रामबली का कथन है कि जब वसीयतनामा लिखा गया तब दूसरा टाइम था। राम अभिलाख का जिरह में कथन है कि दिन के वक्त वसीयत लिखी गई मगर शाम नही हुई थी।" पृथ्वीपाल जिरह में कहा है कि "समय 10.30 बजे या 11.00 बजे थे।" इस विषय में इन तीनों बयानों के साथ पृथ्वीपाल का बयान अन्य दोनों से भिन्न दिया है। किन्तु मात्र समय के बयान के इस व्यतिरेक के आधार पर सम्पूर्ण रूप में दस्तावेज को ठुकराया नहीं जा सकता है। इसके अतिरिक्त वसीयतनामा पर निशान अंगूठा लगाने से और उसकी पहिचान व बकलम लिखने वाले तथ्यों पर गवाहान के बयानात समान है। इन मुद्दों में गवाहों के बयानों में कोई भिन्नता नहीं पाई गई है।
रामलखन के योग्य अधिवक्ता ने अपनी बहस के अन्त में यह कहा है कि वसीयतनामा की रजिस्ट्री क्यों नहीं कराई गई इसका कोई स्पष्टीकरण नहीं दिया गया है। वैधानिकता वसीयतनामा की रजिस्ट्री अनिवार्य नहीं है। यहॉ तक कि वसीयतनामा यदि जबानी भी है तो उसे भी वैधानिक मान्यता माननीय उच्च न्यायालय द्वारा दी गई है जबकि वर्तमान वसीयतनामा लिखित रूप में है और इसको मान्यता न दिये जाने का कोई औचित्य प्रतीत नहीं होता है। सिद्धान्तः वसीयत करने वाले की अन्तिम इच्छा का घोतक है। इसीलिये सामान्य वरासत क्रम में यह दस्तावेज परिवर्तन करने में सक्षम है। यही सिद्वान्त वर्तमान विषय में भी आरोपित होता है। अतः सम्पूर्ण साक्ष्यों परिस्थितियों और वैधानिक स्थतियों के आंकलन से यही निष्कर्ष निकलता है कि श्रीमती महदेई ने वसीयतनामा दिनांक 25.12.79 राम अभिलाख के पक्ष में लिखा था वह वैध है फलस्वरूप मृतक के वही वारिस उक्त वसीयतनामा के आधार पर नियत किये जाते है। तदानुसार विषय बिन्दु संख्या 1 का निर्णय सकरात्मक 2 तथा 3 का निर्णय नकारात्मक दिया जाता है।
आदेश चक संख्या 112 पर से मु० महदेई बेवा दसई का नाम खारिज करके राम अभिलाख पुत्र माताफेर निवासी धरियामऊ का नाम बजरिये वसीयतनामा अंकित हो। तथा रामलखन एवं श्रीमती सुबराजी आदि की आपत्तियां खारिज हो। वाद अमलदरामद निर्णय दाखिल दफ्तर हो।"
9. Being aggrieved, Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party nos.4 to 18, filed the appeal and the same was dismissed affirming the order of C.O. dated 09.08.1984 vide order dated 11.05.1987 passed by S.O.C., which is extracted hereinunder.
"यह अपील दिनांक 22/8/84 को चकबंदी अधिकारी (अं०ग०) (not legible) के फैसला दि० 9/8/84 मुकदमा नं० 5 लं० 53 अन्तर्गत धारा 12 मु० सुबराजी बनाम सरकार (महादेई) के संबंध में प्रस्तुत की गई है।
वाद का संक्षिप्त विवरण इस प्रकार है कि चक सं० 112 जो०च० आकार पत्र 23 भाग (1) में मृतक महदेई बेवा दसई का नाम अंकित है। नामान्तरण के लिये 3 आपत्तियां प्रस्तुत की गई। श्रीमती सुखराजी एवं श्रीमती राजपति ने बतौर लड़कियां, रामलखन, सरजू ने मृतक के पति के सगे भाई तथा रामअभिलाख ने वसीयतनामा के आधार पर नामान्तरण चाहा। विद्वान चकबंदी अधिकारी ने वाद विन्दु बनी हुये साक्ष्योपरान्त वसीयत के आधार पर नामान्तरण उत्तरवादी में अंकित करने तथा अन्य आपत्तियां निरस्त करने के आदेश दिये है जिसके विरूद्ध यह अपील प्रस्तुत की गई है।
पक्षों के विद्वान वकीलों के तर्को को सुना गया तथा अधीनस्थ न्यायालय की पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया गया अपीलकर्ता की ओर से तर्को में कहा गया कि रामलखन दावा वरासत धारा 171 में था। रामलखन ने बयान में वंशावली दी है जो निम्न है:-
सरजू माताफेर दसई रामलखन रामअभिलाख (लड़का) मु० महदेई (मृतक) चकबंदी अधिकारी के यहाँ रामलखन ने शपथपूर्वक बयान कि (not legible) कागजी साक्ष्य में रिपोर्ट दि० 8/12/80 चालानी मु०नं० (not legible) धारा 107/116 सी०आर०पी०सी० दाखिल की थी। रामअभिलाख (not legible) जगन्नाथ व पृथ्वीपाल विपक्षी थे। दि० 29/1/80 को रजिस्ट्री आफिस में दरख्वास्त की गई उसकी प्रति तथा नकल अर्जी दावा न्यायालय मुंसिफ दक्षिणी सुल्तानपुर मु०नं0 712/55 ता० 1.11.1956 रामबली आदि बनाम राम अभिलाख आदि दाखिल की गई थी। अपीलकर्ता की ओर से तर्को में कहा गया कि रामबली जो वहाँ रामअभिलाख, मु० महदेई व रामलखन (अपीलकर्ता) पर दावा किये अब रामअभिलाख की वसीसत के गवाह है किंतु इससे यह स्पष्ट है कि हमारी इनसे पुरानी रंजिश है। इसके अतिरिक्त अन्य किसी स्वतंत्र साक्षी को वसीयतनामा के संबंध में पुष्टि कराने हेतु प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया। जो गवाह विपक्षी की ओर से प्रस्तुत किये गये थे उसमें रामबली पुत्र अलगू, पृथ्वीपाल पुत्र रामबरन व रामअभिलाख सुत माताफेर थे। कागजी साक्ष्य में वसीयतनामा दि० 25/12/81 के अतिरिक्त पर्ची जगन्नाथ जी को तथा पर्ची सिंचाई 1382F थी। दिनांक 22/5/82 को रामबली का बयान हुआ और उन्होंने अपीलकर्ता द्वारा दी गई वंशावली को (not legible) दिया। वसीसतनामा अपंजीकृत है। गवाह रामबली I व (not legible) चक का रकबा नहीं बता पाये। माताफेर व दसई की मृत्यु के संबंध में इनको जानकारी नहीं है। इससे यह सिद्ध है कि माताफेर व दसई पहले मर चुके थे और धारा 171 में (not legible) रामबली ने बयान में स्वीकार किया है कि पृथ्वीपाल के पिता रामबरन की हत्या हुई थी और अपीलकर्ता मुल्जिम था तथा बाद में माननीय हाई कोर्ट से रिहा हुये थे अतः इनसे भी दुश्मनी सिद्ध है। वसीयत लिखने के समय के संबंध में तीनों गवाहों के बयान में अंतर है। रामबली के बयानों के अनुसार रामबली के हस्ताक्षरों के बाद रामअभिलाख ने बयान (not legible) दस्तखत किया जब कि रामअभिलाख का कोई हस्ताक्षर वसीयतनामा पर नहीं है। गवाह रामबली (not legible) ने इस बात को स्वीकार किया कि वसीयतनामा लिखते समय बच्चे मौजूद थे जब कि गवाह पृथ्वीपाल ने अपने बयानों में बच्चों की उस समय उपस्थिति से इंकार किया है। रामअभिलाख ने अपनी गवाही में शजरा तस्लीम किया तथा रामलखन द्वारा रिपोर्ट किया जाना स्वीकार किया गया तथा रामलखन के लड़के रामजीत द्वारा रामबरन की हत्या की जाने की बात भी स्वीकार की और पहले वारिस व फिर वसीयत दरख्वास्त पर लिखा गया। यह वसीयत लिखने वाले का रूपरंग नहीं बता सकते। मु० महदेई के संबंध में गवाह का कथन है कि बैनामा लिखाने के लिये अनुमति ली थी किंतु खर्चा नहीं जुटा पाने की बात कही जिससे स्पष्ट है कि श्रीमती महदेई को रूपयों की आवश्यकता थी। दि० 18/9/80 से विपक्षी के साक्ष्य में थी किंतु वसीयतनामा दि० 16/12/81 को जमा किया गया और इस प्रकार बाद में फर्जी वसीयत दाखिल की गई। लड़कियों के संबंध में कहा गया कि उनकी ओर से कोई साक्ष्य नहीं आया और उनको हक नहीं बनता। वसीयत लिखने वाले को प्रस्तुत नहीं किया गया। विरोध में उत्तरवादी के विद्वान वकील ने अपने तर्को में कहा है कि अपीलकर्ता के अनुसार मु० महदेई कोई वसीयत नहीं लिखी। उनका यह भी कहना है कि विवादित सम्पत्ति दसई व सरजू की बनाई है इसको सिद्ध करने का दायित्व इन पर था जो सिद्ध नहीं किया गया। लड़कियां लड़ नहीं रही है। रामलखन स्वयं वसीयत होना स्वीकार करते है। गाँव का कोई साक्षी वसीयत के इंकार करने का व फर्जी कहने के लिये प्रस्तुत नहीं किया जा सका। विपक्षी ने अधीनस्थ न्यायालय में जो चालानी रिपोर्ट दाखिल की उसमें भी वसीयत का उल्लेख है। जो भी गवाह वसीयतनामा के संबंध में प्रस्तुत किये गये थे अनपढ़ है और उनके बयान पढ़ने से वसीयतनामा किया जाना सिद्ध होता है। केवल रामलखन के बयान मात्र से वसीयतनामा अस्वीकृत न होगा। हमारी ओर से बयान में यह कहा गया था कि यह आराजी मु० महदेई को रामबली से मिली।
पक्षों के विद्वान वकीलों के तर्को को ध्यानपूर्वक सुनने तथा अधीनस्थ न्यायालय के पत्रावली के अवलोकन के उपरांत मैं इस निष्कर्ष पर पहुँचा हूँ कि विद्वान चकबंदी अधिकारी का निर्णय विस्तृत, तथ्यात्मक व तर्क संगत है। यह सुस्पष्ट है कि मु0नं0 182/81 अन्तर्गत धारा 107/116 जाफ्ता फौजदारी में इस बात का उल्लेख आया है कि मु० महदेई ने वसीयत लिखा था। यह रिपोर्ट दि० 8/12/80 की है और वसीयतनामा दि० 25/12/79 का है। इस प्रकार चकबंदी अधिकारी का यह निष्कर्ष कि वसीयत की बात पक्षों की जानकारी (not legible) में स्वाभाविक व उचित है। यह भी निष्कर्ष उचित है कि श्रीमती महदेई का अनुमति अन्तरण के आवेदन पत्र आदि पर नि० अंगूठा उपलब्ध था। अपीलकर्ता को वसीयतनामा (not legible) पर मु० महदेई का नि०अ० नहीं है, उसको सिद्ध करने के लिये विशेषज्ञ से राय प्राप्त करने का अवसर था। इसे न कराने से वसीयतनामा मु० महदेई (मृतक) द्वारा वसीयतनामा करना मानने का पर्याप्त कारण है। जहाँ तक अनेक अन्य बिन्दुओं को अपील स्तर पर उठाया गया है उसके संबंध में यह कहना पर्याप्त होगा कि वसीयतनामा नहीं किया गया ऐसा कुछ जब सिद्ध नहीं किया गया तब उसका लाभ अपीलकर्ता को मिलने का कोई औचित्य नहीं है। "
10. Being aggrieved, Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party nos.4 to 18 filed a revision, detailed above, which was allowed by the D.D.C. vide order dated 25.09.2023 whereby reversed the findings of fact recorded by the C.O. and S.O.C. in following manner :-
"समग्र रूप से यह स्पष्ट है कि अपंजीकृत वसीयतनामा दिनांक-25-12-1979 के दोना हासिया गवाह स्वतंत्र व्यक्ति नही है। वसीयतनामा में पुत्रियो के होने का कोई उल्लेख नही है। इसमें यह लिखा है कि मेरे कोई औलाद नहीं है जबकि दो पुत्रियो का होना प्रमाणित है। हासिया बवाहान का सिर्फ नाम लिखा है। उनका पितृ नाम व पता अंकित नहीं है। सबसे ज्यादा महत्वपूर्ण तथ्य यह है कि उत्तरवादी की तरफ से एक और अपंजीकृत वसीयतनामा दिनांक- 25-12-1979 द्वारा महदेई बहक रामअभिलाख पुत्र माताफेर दिनांक-25-6-2023 को प्रार्थना पत्र के साथ इस न्यायालय में प्रस्तुत किया गया है, जो अपीलीय न्यायालय में फेहरिस्त सबूत के साथ दिनांक-23-4-1987 को दाखिल अपंजीकृत वसीयतनामा से पूरी तरह से भिन्न है। दिनांक 25-6-2023 को दाखिल अपंजीकृत वसीयतनामा में नीचे एक मोहर भी लगायी गयी है और इसमें यह नही लिखा है कि वसीयतकर्ती के कोई सन्तान है। यह उत्तरवादी का यह कृत्य न्यायालय को धोखा देने का प्रयास है।
मैं इस स्पष्ट मत का हूँ कि वसीयतनामा दिनांक- 25-12-1979 साक्ष्य से प्रमाणित नही है और उक्त अपंजीकृत वसीयतनामा के आधार पर पारित नामान्तरण आदेश कायम रखे जाने योग्य नही है। तदनुसार निगरानी स्वीकार किये जाने योग्य है।
आदेश उपरोक्त विवेचना के आधार पर प्रस्तुत निगरानी स्वीकार की जाती है। बन्दोबस्त अधिकारी चकबन्दी द्वारा पारित आदेश अपील संख्या-2762/934/1275 धारा-11 (1) तारीख फैसला 11-5-1987 एवं चकबन्दी अधिकारी अन्तिम अभिलेख गभडिया सुलतानपुर द्वारा पारित आदेश मुकदमा नम्बर-51 लगायत 53 धारा-12 तारीख फैसला 9-8-1984 निरस्त किया जाता है। चकदार संख्या-112 महदेई बेवा दसई मृतक के स्थान पर बतौर वारिस रामलखन पुत्र सरजू बादहू वारिसान रामनिहोर व छोटेलाल व शोभनाथ व रामजीत व सभापति पुत्रगण रामलखन का नाम दर्ज हो। साथ ही पुनः शोभनाथ पुत्र रामलखन के स्थान पर बतौर वारिस श्रीमती जैपाली पत्नी शोभनाथ व श्याम प्रकाश व अर्जुन सिह यादव पुत्रगण शोभनाथ व गीता पुत्री शोभनाथ का नाम दर्ज हो। छोटेलाल पुत्र रामलखन मृतक के स्थान पर रमेश यादव व सुरेश कुमार यादव पुत्रगण छोटेलाल व श्रीमती रत्ती पत्नी छोटेलाल का नाम दर्ज हो। बाद आवश्यक कार्यवाही पत्रावली राजस्व अभिलेखागार में संचित की जाये।"
In the aforesaid background, the present petition has been filed.
11. Shri Om Prakash Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner, impeaching the order dated 25.09.2023 passed by D.D.C., stated that 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 was duly proved by the witnesses which is required as per law including Section(s) 59 and 63 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 as also Section(s) 67, 68, 69 and 90 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Act 1872') and therefore the claim of the petitioner was allowed by the C.O. vide order dated 09.08.1984, affirmed vide order dated 11.05.1987 passed by S.O.C., and thus interference by the D.D.C. in these order(s) vide impugned order dated 25.09.2023 is unsustainable in law, inasmuch as in the manner it has been done, i.e. by cryptic/unreasoned order. As such the indulgence of this Court is required.
12. Shri Satya Prakash Misra, learned counsel appearing for private opposite party opposed the present petition.
13. Shri Hemant Kumar Pandey, learned State Counsel assisted the Court for coming to the conclusion in the matter.
14. Opposing the present petition, Shri Satya Prakash Mishra, learned counsel for private opposite parties submitted that 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 is suspicious and as such based upon the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, if it is taken on its face value the same was proved before the C.O., no right could be provided to the petitioner- Ram Abhilak. To establish that the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 is suspicious, Shri Mishra submitted as under.
(i) One Ram Pratap, writer of the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, was not produced before the C.O.
(ii) According to 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, Mehdei (testatrix) was issueless, though the indisputed fact is that she died leaving behind her two daughters.
(iii) Details/reasons of exclusion of the daughters have not been indicated in the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979.
(iv) The 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 favourable to petitioner -Ram Abhilakh is of 25.12.1979 and as per the entry in the parivar register Mehdei (testatrix) died on 16.12.1979.
At this stage, on being asked, Shri Mishra submitted that parivar register was not filed before the C.O. nor before the S.O.C. and it was for the first time placed on record before the D.D.C. and it was not proved by adducing appropriate evidence.
(v) At the behest of petitioner- Ram Abhilakh, the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 was written by Mehdei.
(vi) Another 'Will' was also executed by Mehdei on 25.12.1979 and the same was taken note of by the D.D.C. in the order dated 25.09.2023 and thereafter observed that the same was placed on record by petitioner - Ram Abhilakh and the 'Will' was found different.
At this stage, it would be apt to indicate that it is evident from the indisputed copy of the list of documents on record at page no.30 that the subsequent 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, considered by the D.D.C., was not filed by the petitioner - Ram Abhilakh as the same does bears his signature.
15. In rejoinder Shri Om Prakash Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that to impeach the claim of the petitioner based upon the proved 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party no.4 to 18, managed to place a different 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 on the paper book of the revision pending before the D.D.C., which could be deduced from a conjoint reading of copy of the list of documents dated 21.06.2023 (Annexure No.16) and copy of the order sheet annexed as Annexure No.17.
16. In continuation he stated that on 21.06.2023 the Advocates were abstaining from work and therefore the date was fixed for argument on 12.07.2023 and subsequent order(s) i.e. order(s) dated 12.07.2023, 09.08.2023 and 18.08.2023 indicate the document i.e. another 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 filed along with the list of documents dated 21.06.2023 not signed by petitioner - Ram Abhilakh was not taken on record by D.D.C. The orders referred are extracted hereinunder:-
"26.5.23 अधिवक्तागण के न्यायिक कार्य से विरत रहने के कारण वास्ते बहस दिनांक 9.6.23 को पेश हो।
9.6.23 पत्रावली पेश। पुकार पर पक्ष उपस्थित आये। उत्तर वादी के अधिवक्ता आज बहस हेतु तैयार नहीं है। एक अवसर दिया जाता है। वास्ते बहस दि० 21.6.23 को पेश हो।
21.6.23 अधिवक्तागण के न्यायिक कार्य से विरत रहने के कारण वास्ते बहस दिनांक 12.7.23 को पेश हो।
12.7.23 आज अधिवक्तागण के शोक प्रस्ताव पर जाने के कारण वास्ते बहस दिनांक 9.8.23 को पेश हो।
9.8.23 अधिवक्तागण के न्यायिक कार्य से विरत रहने के कारण वास्ते बहस दिनांक 18.8.23 को पेश हो।
18.8.23 आज पेश हुआ। बार-2 पुकार के बाद भी निगरानीकर्ता उपस्थित नही है। विपक्षी मय अधिवक्ता उपस्थित है। विपक्षीगण को सुना। पत्रावली वास्ते आदेश दिनांक 25.6.23 को पेश हो।"
17. Shri Pandey also stated that before the C.O. or before the S.O.C. or before the D.D.C., Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of private opposite party nos.4 to 18, had levelled vague and bald allegations in relation to the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, produced and proved by the petitioner before the C.O., as only it has been stated that the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 is forged document. To say that the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 is forged document, predecessor-in-interest of opposite party nos.4 to 18 namely Ram Lakhan, did not dispute the thumb impression of Mehdei (testatrix) or the thumb impression of Ram Bali or the signature of Prithvi Pal.
18. He also stated that the daughters of testatrix (Mehdei) namely Smt. Rajpati and Smt. Subraji, filed the objections before the C.O. but never contested the claim of the petitioner's based upon the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 and in this view of the matter not mentioning their names/existence in the 'Will' in issue or their exclusion would not render the 'Will' in issue suspicious.
19. It is lastly submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case the instant petition is liable to be allowed and the order dated 25.09.2023 passed by D.D.C. is liable to be set aside and order of C.O. and S.O.C. are liable to be restored.
20. Considered the aforesaid and perused the records.
21. The issue in the present petition revolves around the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979 executed by Mehdei of which Ram Bali and Prithvi Pal were witnesses, as such this Court finds it appropriate to first take note of the observation(s) made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kavita Kanwar Vs. Mrs. Pamela Mehta and others, AIR 2020 Supreme Court 2614, AIR Online 2020 SC 544 (2021) 11 SCC 209, referred by Shri Satya Prakash Mishra, learned counsel for the private respondents. The relevant paras are reproduced hereinunder.
"24.1. In the case of H. Venkatachala Iyengar (supra), a 3-Judge Bench of this Court traversed through the vistas of the issues related with execution and proof of Will and enunciated a few fundamental guiding principles that have consistently been followed and applied in almost all the cases involving such issues. The synthesis and exposition by this Court in paragraphs 18 to 22 of the said decision could be usefully reproduced as under:-
"18. What is the true legal position in the matter of proof of wills? It is well known that the proof of wills presents a recurring topic for decision in courts and there are a large number of judicial pronouncements on the subject. The party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, we must inevitably refer to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. S. 67 and 68, Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under S. 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Ss. 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law. Similarly, Ss. 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Section 59 provides that every person of sound mind, not being a minor, may dispose of his property by will and the three illustrations to this section indicate what is meant by the expression "a person of sound mind" in the context. Section 63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters.
19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a Court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the Court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, Courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated.
20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, Courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter.
21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English Courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical Courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word 'conscience' in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the Court is the last will of the testator, the Court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive.
22. It is obvious that for deciding material questions of fact which arise in applications for probate or in actions on wills, no hard and fast or inflexible rules can be laid down for the appreciation of the evidence. It may, however, be stated generally that a propounder of the will has to prove the due and valid execution of the will and that if there are any suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will the propounder must remove the said suspicions from the mind of the Court by cogent and satisfactory evidence. It is hardly necessary to add that the result of the application of these two general and broad principles would always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and on the nature and quality of the evidence adduced by the parties. It is quite true that, as observed by Lord Du Parcq in Harmes v. Hinkson, 50 Cal W N 895 : (AIR 1946 PC 156), "where a will is charged with suspicion, the rules enjoin a reasonable scepticism, not an obdurate persistence in disbelief. They do not demand from the Judge, even in circumstances of grave suspicion, a resolute and impenetrable incredulity. He is never required to close his mind to the truth". It would sound platitudinous to say so, but it is nevertheless true that in discovering truth even in such cases the judicial mind must always be open though vigilant, cautious and circumspect."
(Emphasis supplied) 24.2. In Rani Purnima Debi (supra), this Court referred to the aforementioned decision in H. Venkatachala Iyengar and further explained the principles which govern the proving of a Will as follows:-
"5. Before we consider the facts of this case it is well to set out the principles which govern the proving of a will. This was considered by this Court in H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B. N. Thimmajamma, (1959) Supp (1) SCR 426: AIR 1959 SC 443. It was observed in that case that the mode of proving a will did not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the will was on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the testator as required by law was sufficient to discharge the onus. Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the will could be accepted as genuine. If the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion, the onus would be on him to prove the same. Even where there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise to doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court. Further, what are suspicious circumstances was also considered in this case. The alleged signature of the testator might be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question was the signature of the testator might not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature. The condition of the testator's mind might appear to be very feeble and debilitated and evidence adduced might not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will might appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or the will might otherwise indicate that the said dispositions might not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document was accepted as the last will of the testator. Further, a propounder himself might take a prominent part in the execution of the will which conferred on him substantial benefits. If this was so it was generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder was required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. But even when where there suspicious circumstances and the propounder succeeded in removing them, the Court would grant probate, though the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations."
(Emphasis supplied) 24.3. In the case of Indu Bala Bose (supra), this Court again said,-
"7. This Court has held that the mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by Section 63 of the Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the Will as genuine. Even where circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signatures of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances, or there might be other indications in the Will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes a prominent part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the Will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations.
8. Needless to say that any and every circumstance is not a "suspicious" circumstance. A circumstance would be "suspicious" when it is not normal or is not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person."
(Emphasis supplied) 24.4. We may also usefully refer to the principles enunciated in the case of Jaswant Kaur (supra) for dealing with a Will shrouded in suspicion, as follows:-
"9. In cases where the execution of a will is shrouded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. What, generally, is an adversary proceeding becomes in such cases a matter of the court's conscience and then the true question which arises for consideration is whether the evidence led by the propounder of the will is such as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is impossible to reach such satisfaction unless the party which sets up the will offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the will."
(Emphasis supplied) 24.5. In the case of Uma Devi Nambiar (supra), this Court extensively reviewed the case law dealing with a Will, including the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the case of Shashi Kumar Banerjee and Ors. v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee and Ors.: AIR 1964 SC 529, and observed that mere exclusion of the natural heirs or giving of lesser share to them, by itself, will not be considered to be a suspicious circumstance. This Court observed, inter alia, as under:-
"15. Section 63 of the Act deals with execution of unprivileged Wills. It lays down that the testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction. It further lays down that the Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator signing or affixing his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator. Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the "Evidence Act") mandates examination of one attesting witness in proof of a Will, whether registered or not. The law relating to the manner and onus of proof and also the duty cast upon the court while dealing with a case based upon a Will has been examined in considerable detail in several decisions of this Court ....... A Constitution Bench of this Court in Shashi Kumar Banerjee's case succinctly indicated the focal position in law as follows: (AIR p. 531, para 4) "The mode of proving a Will does not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a Will by Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act. The onus of proving the Will is on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, proof of testamentary capacity and the signature of the testator as required by law is sufficient to discharge the onus. Where however there are suspicious circumstances, the onus is on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the court before the court accepts the Will as genuine. Where the caveator alleges undue influence, fraud and coercion, the onus is on him to prove the same. Even where there are no such pleas but the circumstances give rise to doubts, it is for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the court. The suspicious circumstances may be as to the genuineness of the signature of the testator, the condition of the testator's mind, the dispositions made in the Will being unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances or there might be other indications in the Will to show that the testator's mind was not free. In such a case the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicion should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last Will of the testator. If the propounder himself takes part in the execution of the Will which confers a substantial benefit on him, that is also a circumstance to be taken into account, and the propounder is required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence. If the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances the court would grant probate, even if the Will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations."
16. A Will is executed to alter the ordinary mode of succession and by the very nature of things it is bound to result in earlier reducing or depriving the share of natural heirs. If a person intends his property to pass to his natural heirs, there is no necessity at all of executing a Will. It is true that a propounder of the Will has to remove all suspicious circumstances. Suspicion means doubt, conjecture or mistrust. But the fact that natural heirs have either been excluded or a lesser share has been given to them, by itself without anything more, cannot be held to be a suspicious circumstance specially in a case where the bequest has been made in favour of an offspring. As held in P.P.K. Gopalan Nambiar v. P.P.K. Balakrishnan Nambiar and Ors.: [1995] 2 SCR 585, it is the duty of the propunder of the Will to remove all the suspected features, but there must be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not fantasy of the doubting mind. It has been held that if the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstances, the court has to give effect to the Will, even if the Will might be unnatural in the sense that it has cut off wholly or in part near relations. ..... In Rabindra Nath Mukherjee and Anr. v . Panchanan Banerjee (dead) by LRs. and Ors.: AIR 1995 SC 1684, it was observed that the circumstance of deprivation of natural heirs should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession and so, natural heirs would be debarred in every case of Will. Of course, it may be that in some cases they are fully debarred and in some cases partly."
24.6. In the case of Mahesh Kumar (supra), this Court indicated the error of approach on the part of the High Court while appreciating the evidence relating to the Will as follows:-
"44. The issue which remains to be examined is whether the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the execution of the will dated 10-2-1992 was shrouded with suspicion and the appellant failed to dispel the suspicion? At the outset, we deem it necessary to observe that the learned Single Judge misread the statement of Sobhag Chand (DW3) and recorded something which does not appear in his statement. While Sobhag Chand categorically stated that he had signed as the witness after Shri Harishankar had signed the will, the portion of his statement extracted in the impugned judgment gives an impression that the witnesses had signed even before the executant had signed the will.
45. Another patent error committed by the learned Single Judge is that he decided the issue relating to validity of the will by assuming that both the attesting witnesses were required to append their signatures simultaneously. Section 63(c) of the 1925 Act does not contain any such requirement and it is settled law that examination of one of the attesting witnesses is sufficient. Not only this, while recording an adverse finding on this issue, the learned Single Judge omitted to consider the categorical statements made by DW 3 and DW 4 that the testator had read out and signed the will in their presence and thereafter they had appended their signatures.
46. The other reasons enumerated by the learned Single Judge for holding that the execution of will was highly suspicious are based on mere surmises/conjectures. The observation of the learned Single Judge that the possibility of obtaining signatures of Shri Harishankar and attesting witnesses on blank paper and preparation of the draft by Shri S.K. Agarwal, Advocate on pre-signed papers does not find even a semblance of support from the pleadings and evidence of the parties. If Respondent 1 wanted to show that the will was drafted by the advocate after Shri Harishankar and attesting witnesses had signed blank papers, he could have examined or at least summoned Shri S.K. Agarwal, Advocate, who had represented him before the Board of Revenue. ....."
24.7. Another decision cited on behalf of the appellant in the case of Leela Rajagopal may also be referred where this Court summarised the principles that ultimately, the judicial verdict in relation to a Will and suspicious circumstances shall be on the basis of holistic view of the matter with consideration of all the unusual features and suspicious circumstances put together and not on the impact of any single feature. This Court said,-
"13. A will may have certain features and may have been executed in certain circumstances which may appear to be somewhat unnatural. Such unusual features appearing in a will or the unnatural circumstances surrounding its execution will definitely justify a close scrutiny before the same can be accepted. It is the overall assessment of the court on the basis of such scrutiny; the cumulative effect of the unusual features and circumstances which would weigh with the court in the determination required to be made by it. The judicial verdict, in the last resort, will be on the basis of a consideration of all the unusual features and suspicious circumstances put together and not on the impact of any single feature that may be found in a will or a singular circumstance that may appear from the process leading to its execution or registration. This, is the essence of the repeated pronouncements made by this Court on the subject including the decisions referred to and relied upon before us."
24.8. We need not multiply the references to all and other decisions cited at the Bar, which essentially proceed on the aforesaid principles while applying the same in the given set of facts and circumstances. Suffice would be to point out that in a recent decision in Civil Appeal No. 6076 of 2009: Shivakumar & Ors. v. Sharanabasppa & Ors., decided on 24.04.2020, this Court, after traversing through the relevant decisions, has summarised the principles governing the adjudicatory process concerning proof of a Will as follows:-
"1. Ordinarily, a Will has to be proved like any other document; the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind. Alike the principles governing the proof of other documents, in the case of Will too, the proof with mathematical accuracy is not to be insisted upon.
2. Since as per Section 63 of the Succession Act, a Will is required to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until at least one attesting witness has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive and capable of giving evidence.
3. The unique feature of a Will is that it speaks from the death of the testator and, therefore, the maker thereof is not available for deposing about the circumstances in which the same was executed. This introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is the last Will of the testator. The initial onus, naturally, lies on the propounder but the same can be taken to have been primarily discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of a Will.
4. The case in which the execution of the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stands on a different footing. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the onus heavier on the propounder and, therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the document give rise to suspicion, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last Will of the testator.
5. If a person challenging the Will alleges fabrication or alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion et cetera in regard to the execution of the Will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will may give rise to the doubt or as to whether the Will had indeed been executed by the testator and/or as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. In such eventuality, it is again a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.
6. A circumstance is "suspicious" when it is not normal or is 'not normally expected in a normal situation or is not expected of a normal person'. As put by this Court, the suspicious features must be 'real, germane and valid' and not merely the 'fantasy of the doubting mind.'
7. As to whether any particular feature or a set of features qualify as "suspicious" would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A shaky or doubtful signature; a feeble or uncertain mind of the testator; an unfair disposition of property; an unjust exclusion of the legal heirs and particularly the dependants; an active or leading part in making of the Will by the beneficiary thereunder et cetera are some of the circumstances which may give rise to suspicion. The circumstances above-noted are only illustrative and by no means exhaustive because there could be any circumstance or set of circumstances which may give rise to legitimate suspicion about the execution of the Will. On the other hand, any of the circumstance qualifying as being suspicious could be legitimately explained by the propounder. However, such suspicion or suspicions cannot be removed by mere proof of sound and disposing state of mind of the testator and his signature coupled with the proof of attestation.
8. The test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience comes into operation when a document propounded as the Will of the testator is surrounded by suspicious circumstance/s. While applying such test, the Court would address itself to the solemn questions as to whether the testator had signed the Will while being aware of its contents and after understanding the nature and effect of the dispositions in the Will?
9. In the ultimate analysis, where the execution of a Will is shrouded in suspicion, it is a matter essentially of the judicial conscience of the Court and the party which sets up the Will has to offer cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will."
x x x x x x x x x x x
27. As noticed, there has not been any question on the testamentary capacity and soundness of mind of the testatrix; and her handwriting as also signatures on the Will in question are also beyond controversy. However, the Trial Court and the High Court have concurrently found some such suspicious circumstances which are of material bearing and which have remained unexplained. Put in a nutshell, the unexplained suspicious circumstances so found are: (a) that appellant, the major beneficiary, played an active role in execution of the Will in question and attempted to conceal this fact before the Court; (b) that there had not been any plausible reason for non-inclusion of the only son and other daughter of the testatrix in the process of execution of the Will and for excluding them from the major part of the estate in question; (c) that there was no clarity about the construction supposed to be carried out by the appellant; (d) that the manner of writing and execution of the Will with technical and legal words was highly doubtful; and (e) that the attesting witnesses were unreliable and there were contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. Because of these major circumstances coupled with various supplemental factors, the Trial Court and the High Court felt dissatisfied on the root question as to whether the testatrix duly executed the Will in question after understanding its contents.
28. There is no doubt that any of the factors taken into account by the Trial Court and the High Court, by itself and standing alone, cannot operate against the validity of the propounded Will. That is to say that, the Will in question cannot be viewed with suspicion only because the appellant had played an active role in execution thereof though she is the major beneficiary; or only because the respondents were not included in the process of execution of the Will; or only because of unequal distribution of assets; or only because there is want of clarity about the construction to be carried out by the appellant; or only because one of the attesting witnesses being acquaintance of the appellant; or only because there is no evidence as to who drafted the printed part of the Will and the note for writing the opening and concluding passages by the testatrix in her own hand; or only because there is some discrepancy in the oral evidence led by the appellant; or only because of any other factor taken into account by the Courts or relied upon by the respondents. The relevant consideration would be about the quality and nature of each of these factors and then, the cumulative effect and impact of all of them upon making of the Will with free agency of the testatrix. In other words, an individual factor may not be decisive but, if after taking all the factors together, conscience of the Court is not satisfied that the Will in question truly represents the last wish and propositions of the testator, the Will cannot get the approval of the Court; and, other way round, if on a holistic view of the matter, the Court feels satisfied that the document propounded as Will indeed signifies the last free wish and desire of the testator and is duly executed in accordance with law, the Will shall not be disapproved merely for one doubtful circumstance here or another factor there.
22. Upon due consideration of the facts of the case including the statement of attesting witnesses of 'Will' namely Ram Bali and Prithvi Pal as also the observations made by Hon'ble Apex Court in the paras of the judgment passed in the case of Kavita Kanwar (supra), quoted above, and the observations made in the orders dated 09.08.1984 and 11.05.1987 favourable to the petitioner, this Court is of the view that 'Will' dated 25.12.1979, on the basis of which the orders dated 09.08.1984 and 11.05.1987 were passed which have been set aside by the impugned order dated 25.09.2023 is cryptic/unreasoned order as the 'Will' was duly proved and is not in issue. It is for the following reasons:-
(i) According to the witnesses namely Ram Bali and Prithvi Pal of 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979 the same was read over to the testatrix namely Mehdei, who thereafter put her thumb impression in presence of witnesses and writer and thereafter the witness Ram Bali put his thumb impression and then after witness Prithvi Pal put his signature over the 'Will' and further, according to these witnesses the 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979 was written in front of house of petitioner, which also establish the fact indicated in the 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979 that petitioner was taking care of testatrix, at around 10-11:00 A.M. on 25.12.1979, as witness Ram Bali stated that 'जाड़े का महीना था' and witness Prithvi Pal stated that 'वसीयत बड़े दिन लिखी गयी थी'. Thus to the view of this Court the 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979 was duly proved.
(ii) It is not the case of the opposite parties including Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of opposite party nos.4 to 18, that testatrix namely Mehdei was of unsound mind.
(iii) To justify/establish that the 'Will' is forged, the expert opinion was not sought by Ram Lakhan, predecessor-in-interest of opposite party nos.4 to 18 with regard to thumb impression(s) of testatrix and/or of witness Ram Bali and/or of the signature of witness Prithvi Pal.
(iv) The daughters of Mehdei (testatrix) namely Smt. Rajpati and Smt. Subraji after filing of the objections before the C.O. never contested the claim of the petitioner based upon the 'Will' dated 25.12.1979.
(v) The petitioner, beneficiary of the 'Will' is the real nephew of the testatrix Mehdei and he was taking care of Mehdei as is evident from the 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979 itself and accordingly it appears that in natural consequence the 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979 was executed in favour of the petitioner excluding the daughters, who after filing of the objections never contested the case set up by the petitioner on the basis of 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979, and in this view of the matter, to the view of this Court, non-mentioning of names/existence of the daughters in the 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979, which appears to be inadvertently, or their exclusion would not render the 'Will' in issue dated 25.12.1979 suspicious.
(vi) The fact that petitioner being real nephew was taking care of the testatrix Mehdei could not be impeached by the side opposite.
23. For the reasons aforesaid the instant petition for the relief(s) sought, quoted above, is accordingly allowed. Consequence shall follow. Cost made easy.
Order Date :- 03.04.2025 Anand/-