Karnataka High Court
T.J. Mariyappa vs Chief Secretary To Government Of ... on 17 March, 1995
Equivalent citations: ILR1995KAR1394, 1995(3)KARLJ427
ORDER Krishna Murthy, J.
1. The petitioner was appointed as Munsiff on 4.1.1971 in Karnataka Judicial Department and he was promoted as Civil Judge in the year 1980 and further promoted to the post of District and Sessions Judge in the year 1980, in the scale of Rs. 4550-5600. He took charge of the part of District and Sessions Judge on 20.6.1990. He had worked in various capacities as Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Kolar, District Judge Member, Karnataka Appellate Tribunal and Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bangalore, etc., and retired from service on 31.12.1994.
2. It is alleged by the petitioner that the post of Munsiff and Civil Judges carry uniform scale of pay. The post of District Judges also carried uniform pay scale of Rs. 4550-5600 upto 1.6.1989. Thereafter, as per the Government order dated 1.6.1989, 10 posts of District Judges were created in the higher scale of pay of Rs. 5600-6300. The method of appointment to these posts was also prescribed by the Government Notification dated 28.7.1989 which is produced as Annexure 'A' and these posts are called as District Judges (Supertime Scale). Thereafter 10 more posts of District Judges were upgraded to Supertime Scale of Rs. 5600-6300 by Government Notification dated 13.8.1993 evidence by Annexure 'B'. The pay scale attached to the post of District Judges was revised from Rs. 4550-5600 to Rs. 4700-6400 and the pay scale of Supertime District Judges is revised from Rs. 5600-6300 to Rs. 5825-6800 as per the revised Rules of 1984. It is alleged by the petitioner that the duties, responsibilities and functions of the District Judges are similar and identical. Both of them are being posted as Principal District and Sessions Judges. The Principal District Judge may be in the Supertime Scale but the work performed by him and the Additional District Judge in the non-Supertime Scale are identical. It is alleged by the petitioner that the work done by both types of District Judges are same. The qualifications, service conditions, responsibilities, functions and status of the District Judges are the same irrespective of the pay scales assigned to them and accordingly, there cannot be any disparity in the scale of pay of the District Judges in the two categories. It is further submitted by the petitioner that, while working as District and Sessions Judge, he has discharged the same duties, responsibilities, functions and exercised jurisdiction, discharged by the District Judges in the higher scale of pay called as Supertime Scale of pay, but he has been paid in the scale of pay. Accordingly to the petitioner, it is discriminatory and the petitioner is also entitled to the same scale of pay given to the District Judges in the Supertime Scale of pay. It is the case of the petitioner that the principle of "Equal Pay for Equal Work" has to be applied to his case and the denial of the Supertime Scale of pay to the petitioner is discriminatory and accordingly, he has to filed this Writ Petition, for a direction directing the respondents to fix the pay of the petitioner, in the scale of Rs. 5600-6300 with effect from 20.6.1990 as revised from time to time and pay all arrears of salary and other allowances attached to that pay scale.
3. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at the Preliminary stage itself elaborately.
4. The main contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the fixation of two scales of pay for the District Judges who are discharging same functions and responsibilities is discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as also against the principle of "Equal Pay for Equal Work". Great stress was laid by the petitioner on the observations contained in a Division Bench Judgment of the Delhi High Court reported in Delhi Judicial Service Association and another v. Delhi Administration Etc. 1994(1) SLR 546 in which it is stated as follows :
"The various Courts in the Delhi Higher Judicial Service except that of the District & Sessions Judge, can be and are manned by different officers from time to time. At regular intervals these officers are transferred from one Court to the order irrespective of the pay which is drawn by them. Whereas some officers may be working as Additional Sessions Judge while other work as Additional District Judge, after a period of time they may, and do, interchange their places. In other words the nature and duties of all the members of the Delhi High Judicial Service, except that of the District & Sessions Judge, are identical. They have the same judicial powers and deal with the same type of cases, from time to time. Under these circumstances it is not possible to comprehend as to how the members of the same service can be placed in two different scales of pay. It is not necessary to go into the question as to whether the Selection Grade granted is by way of promotion or not, though it may be petitioner to note that in somewhat similar case arising from State of Maharashtra the Supreme Court in 1984 S.C. 850 had observed that the Selection Grade is granted more or less as a matter of right and was merely a part of the scale of pay. Be that as it may, when all the members of DHJS are performing similar or identical duties and functions, exercising similar jurisdiction, there is absolutely no justification for proving different scales of pay for them. The nature of work of the members of the DHJS performed by different officers is similar."
On going through the aforesaid Decision and on going through the Decisions of the Supreme Court, to which reference will be made hereafter, and taking into account the mode of appointment of Supertime Scale District Judges, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
5. Annexure 'A' is the Notification by which post of District Judges (Supertime Scale) was created. The method of recruitment is by promotion and selection from the cadre of District Judges by the High Court of Karanataka, Bangalore and it further provides that, in order to be promoted as District Judge (Supertime Scale) a person must have put in atleast 5 years of service as a District Judge. It can thus be seen that it is not, as if, that any District Judge can be appointed as a District Judge in the Supertime Scale. It is a promotion post by selection and a minimum experience of 5 year is also prescribed under the Rules for being qualified to be appointed as a Supertime Scale District Judge. From the Rule, it is clear that a difference is made in respect of the Supertime Scale District Judge on the basis of their experience and merit. Whether in such circumstances, fixing of a different pay scale will be discriminatory has been considered by the Supreme Court in State of U.P. and Others v. J. P. Chaurasia and Ors. AIR 1989 SC 19.
6. It was held in that case that the classification of officers in two groups with different scale of pay based either on academic qualifications or experience or length of service is sustainable. So also different pay scale on the basis of merit is also permissible. It is apposite to quote the observations of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid Decision at this stage. At page 28, it reads thus :
"In matters of employment the Government of Socialist State must protect the weaker sections. It must be ensure that there is no exploitation of poor and ignorant. It is the duty of the State to see that the under privileged or weaker sections get their dues. Even if they have voluntarily accepted the employment on unequal terms, the State should not deny their basic rights of equal treatment. It is against this background that the principle of "equal pay for equal work" has to be construed in the first place. Second, this principle has no mechanical application in every case of similar work. It has to be read into Article 14 of the Constitution. Article 14 permits reasonable classification founded on different basis. It is now well established that the qualification can be based on some qualities or characteristics of persons grouped together and not in others who are left out. Those qualities or characteristics must, of course, have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merits or experience could be the proper basis for classification to promote efficiency in administration. He or she learns also by experience as much as by other means. It cannot be denied that the quality of work performed by persons of longer experience is superior than the work of newcomers. Even in Randhir Sigh's case , this principle has been recognised. O. Chinappa Reddy, J. observed that the classification of officers into two grades with different scales to pay based either on academic qualification or experience on length of service is sustainable. Apart from that, pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is very common in career service. There is selection grade for District Judges. There is senior time scale in India Administrative Service. There is supertime scale in other like services. The entitlement to these higher pay scales depends upon seniority-cum-merit or merit-cum-seniority. The differentiation so made in the same cadre will not amount to discrimination. The classification based on experience is a reasonable classification. It has a rational nexus with the object thereof. To hold otherwise, it would be detrimental to the interest of the service itself."
This decision was quoted with approved in a later Decision of the Supreme Court in Jaghnath v. Union of India & Anr. in which it was observed.
"Experience itself is merit and can be a valid basis for classification."
7. From the aforesaid two Decisions of the Supreme Court, it is clear that there can be a discrimination based on merit and experience. By that itself, it cannot be said that, treating such Officers on a different par is discriminatory. As stated earlier, appointment of Supertime Scale District Judges is not automatic and the promotion is by selection based on merit and experience. A differentiation made on the basis of merit and experience cannot be said to be discriminatory. These aspects were not considered by the Divisions Bench of the Delhi High Court nor the aforesaid Decisions of the Supreme Court considered. Their Lordships proceed solely on the basis that both type of District Judges are doing the same type of work which alone is not sufficient to infer discrimination. In that view of the matter, I find myself unable to extend the principles laid down by the Delhi High Court to the case on hand.
In view of what is stated above, I do not find any ground to interfere and accordingly, I dismiss the Writ Petition in limine.