Punjab-Haryana High Court
Narender Singh Kadian vs Dhanpati And Ors. on 13 July, 1998
Equivalent citations: I(1999)ACC20, 2000ACJ51, AIR1999P&H88, (1998)120PLR592, AIR 1999 PUNJAB AND HARYANA 88, (1998) 120 PUN LR 592, (1999) 1 CIVLJ 423, (1999) 1 TAC 554, (1999) 1 ACC 20, (1999) 1 ICC 301, (1998) 4 RECCIVR 562, (2000) 1 ACJ 51
Author: T.H.B. Chalapathi
Bench: T.H.B. Chalapathi
ORDER T.H.B. Chalapathi, J.
1. The respondent obtained an award in a claim petition filed under the Motor Vehicles Act. As the amount awarded in the claim petition has not been paid, the claimants applied for the arrest of the judgment-debtor. Notice was given to the judgment-debtor, but he remained absent. Therefore, the learned Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal directed the detention of the judgment-debtor Narender Singh, the petitioner herein for a period of two months in civil prison. Aggrieved by the same the petitioner filed this revision petition.
2. The only contention raised by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained Code and the provisions of Order 21, Rule 37 of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable and, therefore, no warrant of arrest can be issued in execution of the award passed by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. According to him Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides for implementation of the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and the only remedy available to the claimants is to recover the amount awarded as an arrear of land revenue.
3. In order to appreciate the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, it is necessary to see the Scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act and in particular the effect of Section 174 and Rule 220 framed by the Haryana Government in exercise of powers conferred on it under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Motor Vehicles Act provided for, among other things, for the adjudication of the claims preferred by the victims of the motor vehicle accidents. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals (in short 'Tribunals') have been established for the purposes of adjudicating these claims and the Tribunals have been given power of enquiring into the claim and making an award determining the amount of compensation for the victims.
Section 174 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 reads as follows :--
"Where any amount is due from any person under an award, the Claims Tribunal may, on an application made to it, by the person entitled to the amount, issue a certificate for the amount to the Collector and the Collector shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue."
4. It is to be noted that the Government of Haryana framed rules in exercise of the powers conferred on it under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows :--
"A Slate Government may makes rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Sections 165 to 174 and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely :--
(a) the form, of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications;
(b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter;
(c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal;
(d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and
(e) any other matter which is to be, or may be prescribed.
5. This section corresponds to Section 111-A of the 1939 Act. The Section confers powers on the State Governments to make rules relating to matters covered by Chapter XII.
6. The application of the provisions of the C.P.C. including Order XXI relating to execution of decrees to proceedings under the Act is within the rule making power of the State Government.
7. Thus Clause (b) of Section 176 empowers the State Government to frame rules in regard to the procedure to be followed by the Claims Tribunal and also confers the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by the Claims Tribunal. In exercise of the said power conferred under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act, Rule 220 has been framed under which the provisions of Order 21 of C.P.C. are made applicable to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act which confers powers on the Claims Tribunal to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount awarded as an arrear of land revenue does not debar the State Govt. from making rules under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
8. Thus while Section 174 empowered the Tribunal that on application made to it to issue a certificate for the recovery of the amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue, Rule 220 of Rules framed by the Haryana Government in exercise its powers conferred under Section 176 of the Act, provides an alternative mode for enforcing the award. The claimants have been given a right to proceed under the Code of Civil Procedure for recovery of the amount. While enacting Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which empowered the State Government to confer the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by the Claims Tribunals, the intention of the Legislature is clearly to empower the State Govt. to frame rules to supplement the power of execution of the award under Section 174 of the Act. Further Clause (e) of Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 also empowered the State Government to make rules in relation to any other matter which to be or may be prescribed. This intention of the Legislature while enacting Section 176 is clear that it empowers the State Government to frame rules which would supplement the power of execution conferred on the Collector by realising the amount of the award as arrears of land revenue. The purpose underlying Section 174 of the Act is to facilitate recovery of the money. Under Section 176 the State Government is empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of Chapter XII. The State Government is, therefore, competent to frame Rule 220 in the form in which it has been framed. Since the statute itself contemplates the making of and authorises the framing pf supplementary provisions in the form of rules facilitating the implementation of an award underlying Section 174, any supplementary rule framed by the Haryana Government like Rule 220 in exercise of its power under Section 176 of the Act cannot be held to be inconsistent with Section 174 of the Act. That means it must be taken that it is never the intention of the Parliament to exhaustively provide for the method and manner of execution by enacting Section 174.
The clear intention of the Parliament as evidenced by Section 176 is that the procedure provided for by Section 174 can be added to and supplemented by the rules that might be made by the State Government out of felt necessity of the local situation.
9. There cannot be any dispute that the rule of construction is that a Court construing a provision of law should presume that the intention of the authority making it was not to exceed its power and to enact validly as held by the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dadabhoy's New Chirmiri Ponri Hill Colliery Co. Pvt. Ltd., (1972) 1 SCC 298 : (AIR 1972 SC 614). Where two constructions of rules are possible, one leading to its invalidity and another sustaining it as a valid piece of legislation, the Court must lean to that interpretation which upholds its validity. It has also been held in Tej Kumar Balakrishna Ruja , A.K. Menon, (1997) 9 SCC 123 : (AIR 1997 SC 442) that Courts must interpret the law as it reads and that while a purposive interpretation is permissible where two interpretations are possible, the purposive interpretation must be such as preserves the constitutionality of the provision. There cannot be any dispute nor doubt that the Motor Vehicles Act is a benevolent piece of legislation providing a speedy remedy to the victims of the accidents caused by the use of motor vehicles on public roads. When the State Government framed a rule which provides for execution of the award by the Court itself without recourse to recover the same as an arrear of land revenue, it cannot be said that the State Government exceeded its power. The rule made by the State Government conferring the power of Civil Court under Order 21, C.P.C. on the Claims Tribunal cannot be said to be invalid. It is only supplement and in addition to Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
10. In this view of the matter, I do not find any ground warranting interference with the order of the trial Court.
11. The revision petition, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed.