Delhi District Court
Chand Rani vs Municipal Corporation Of Delhi on 13 January, 2025
IN THE COURT OF MS. NEHA PANDEY, JSCC/ASCJ/GJ
(WEST),
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
Suit No. 1276/2022
CNR No. DLWT03-002370-2022
Chand Rani
W/o Shri Mohan Lal
R/o R-4/57, Subhash Nagar,
West Delhi,
Delhi-110027. .......Plaintiff
Versus
1. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi(West),
Through its Commissioner,
Dr. S.P.Mukerjee Civic Centre, JLN Marg,
New Delhi-110002.
2. Sub Divisional Magistrate(West),
Government of NCT of Delhi.
Plot no.3, Shivaji Place, Near West Gate Mall,
Raja Garden, New Delhi.-110027.
3. The SHO
Police Station Rajouri Garden,
Vishal Enclave, Vishal Cinema Road,
Shivaji place, Rajouri Garden
New Delhi-110027.
4. The State of NCT of Delhi ....Defendants
Date of Institution : 27.08.2022
Date of final arguments : 30.11.2024
Date of decision : 13.01.2025
JUDGMENT
1. The plaintiff has filed the present suit against the defendants for Declaration seeking declaration of the civil death and mandatory injunction.
Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 1 / 19
2. It has been averred by the plaintiff in the plaint that the husband of the plaintiff Sh. Mohan Lal is missing since 12.03.2001. She is having five children out of said wedlock i.e. two sons and three daughters.
3. It has been further averred in the plaint that plaintiff has tried her level best to trace Sh. Mohan Lal but she failed in doing the same. Thereafter, she had lodged a missing complaint in the PS Rajouri on 12.03.2001 but till date whereabouts of Sh. Mohan Lal are not known and police officials of concerned police station failed to trace the missing husband of plaintiff till date. Further, the husband of the plaintiff has neither returned to home nor anything has been heard of him till date and hence the present suit with following prayers:
a) Pass a decree of declaration in favour of the plaimiff and against the defendants thereby declaration that the husband of the plaimifi Mr. Mohan Lal is no more alive and not in existence or civil death.
b) Mandatory injunction directing the defendants to make enter in their records that Mr. Mohan Lal S/o. Mr. Kashi Ram is no more alive and SDM/MCD be directed to issue a death certificate, and
c) Any other relief deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may be granted in favour of the Plaintiff and against the defendants.
4. Summons of the present suit were issued to the defendants. After service of summons, the defendant no.1/MCD had put their Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 2 / 19 appearance on 10.10.2022. Defendant no.1 has filed its written statement and has taken various preliminary objections like that suit is not maintainable for want of service of the statutory notice U/s 477/478 of DMC Act, suit is devoid of any cause of action and liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, plaintiff has not claimed any relief against defendant no.2 in the prayer clause, suit of the plaintiff is defective.
5. In the instant case, defendant no. 2 & 3 had neither appeared nor filed the written statement & defendant no.2 was proceeded ex-parte vide order dated 13.12.2022.
6. On the pleadings of the parties, following issue was framed for trial on 13.12.2022:-
i) "Whether the suit is barred under section 477/478 of DMC Act for want of statutory notice?OPD-1
ii) "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of mandatory injunction, as prayed for ? OPP.
iii) "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree of
declaration, as prayed for ?OPP
iv) Relief.
7. In plaintiff evidence, the plaintiff has examined herself as PW-1 who tendered her affidavit in evidence Ex. PW1/A. PW-1 relied on the following documents:-
1. Aadhar Card-Ex. PW-1/1 (OSR).
2. Missing photo Mark-A.
3.Voter Id. card of missing person Ex.PW1/2(OSR).
4. Ration card Ex.PW1/3(OSR).
Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 3 / 19
5. Statement issued by PS Rajouri Garden Mark-B.
6. Missing advertisement - Mark C.
7. Untrace report dated 28.01.2013-Ex.PW1/4 (OSR)(colly).
8. Police statement dated 19.03.2022-Ex.PW1/5 (OSR).
9. Legal notice Ex.PW1/6.
10. Postal receipt Ex.PW1/7.
11. Tracking report - Ex.PW1/8 (colly).
12. Affidavit under Section 65B Ex.PW1/9.
13. Authority letter of legal heirs - Ex.PW1/10.
8. Plaintiff has also examined HC Ajit Singh as PW2/A who stated that the summoned record of DD No. 23 dated 12.03.2021 and28.01.2013 has been destroyed. The said copy of order Mark- A. No other witness was examined andPE was closed on 15.05.2024.Also, no evidence was laead on behalf of MCD and the DE was closed 28.08.2024.
9. I have heard ld. Counsel for the plaintiff and have carefully gone through the record.
My issues wise findings are as follows:
Issue No. i) "Whether the suit is barred under section 477/478 of DMC Act for want of statutory notice?OPD-1.
The onus to prove the same is upon defendnat no.1/MCD. The objection as taken in written statement by defendant No.1/MCD that the present suit is barred under sections 477/478 of DMC Act for want of statutory notice. The objection is not Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 4 / 19 legally tenable. The basic object of sections 477/478 of DMC Act is to prevent matters from coming to court and once the matter has reached the court and is contested, the suit ought not be dismissed on technical grounds. In this regard, reliance can be had to the report of Col. A. B. Singh (through LRs) v. Shri Chunnilal Sawhney and Others, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 4289, wherein it was observed:
" In any case, this issue is no longer res integra in as much as, it has been held by a Division Bench judgment of this court in the case of Yashoda Kumari v. MCD13 that once there is a contest to the suit, the suit cannot be held to be barred for not giving of the notice under Section 53B inasmuch as the basic object of Section 53B, like Section 80 CPC is to prevent the matters from coming to court and once the matter reach the court and are contested, the suit should not be dismissed on such technical grounds. The relevant observations of the Division Bench of this court in the decision of the case Yashoda Kumari (supra) are as under:-
7. Section 80, CPC affords two options to the plaintiff. He may either file a suit against the Government or the public officer after serving two months notice under subsection 1 or he may file it without serving the notice and for this seek the leave of the Court under subsection 2 on satisfying it that an immediate and urgent relief was required in the facts and circumstances of the case. He can do this by filing an accompanying application to show the urgency which is to be considered and disposed of by the Court. In the event it is rejected, the Court has to return the Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 5 / 19 plaint to the plaintiff who could refile it after service of two months notice under the proviso of Section 80.
8. The object of Section 80 notice is to afford the Government or the public officer an opportunity to examine the nature of the claim to settle it, if so advised and to avoid any futile litigation and to save the public money and time which would be otherwise wasted on unnecessary litigation.
9. The Supreme Court in Raghunath Das v. Union of India, holding this:
"The object of the notice contemplated by Section 80, CPC is to give to the concerned Government and public officers opportunity to reconsider the legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if so advised without litigation. The legislative intention behind that section is that public money and time should not be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable litigation. The purpose of law is advancement of justice.
The provisions in Section 80 are not intended to be used as booby trap against ignorant and illiterate persons."
Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 6 / 19
11. Apart from this, we find that the appellant's suit was already registered by the Court first and ex parte interim order was also passed in this. It was thereafter transferred to District Court along with the application for grant of leave. From this it could also be easily presumed that the Court had impliedly granted the leave to institute the suit or that the notice stood waived in the facts and circumstances of the case. This aspect seems to have gone totally unnoticed with Trial Court proceedings mechanically in the matter to dismiss the suit for want of notice under Section 80, CPC.
14. But this apart taking in regard that this Court had registered the suit and granted the stay order and that respondents had contested it all through, even notice under Section 53B should be deemed waived in the facts and circumstances of the case.
After all the purpose of notice under Section 53B of DDA Act is the same as that of Section 80, CPC i.e. to bring the claim to the authority's notice so that it may concede or contest it.
Once the authority had contested it on merits even at preliminary stage, it could not complain of non-
Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 7 / 19 service of notice under Section 53B now. Nor could it be held fatal to justify the dismissal of the suit.
15 Viewed this, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned dismissal order.
Technically this would revive appellant's suit for consideration of appellant's application for grant or refusal of leave but we feel that much water had flowed down since and doing so would be an exercise in futility because parties have already contested the suit on merit all through and all these years. It would be ridiculous and hypertechnical to take them back to square one for a fresh debate on service of two months' notice under Section 80, CPC or Section 53B of DDA Act. Both notices shall, therefore, be deemed waived in the facts and circumstances of the case and appellant's suit No. 316 shall be revived and disposed of under law on merit.
Therefore, once defendant No.1/MCD has contested the present suit, it cannot be dismissed by recourse to section 477 and 478 of DMC Act. The present suit is held to be maintainable and said issues is decided in favour of plaintiff and against defendant no.1.
Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 8 / 19
10. Issue no.ii) "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of mandatory injunction, as prayed got ? OPP. and Issue no.iii) "Whether the palintiff is entitled to decree of declaration, as prayed for ?OPP Issue no.2 and 3 are taken up together. The onus to prove These issue no.2 and 3 was upon the plaintiff. The jurisdiction of a civil court to grant declaratory relief flows from section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963. Section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 reads as under:
" 34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right.- Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
Explanation.--A trustee of property is a "person interested to deny" a title adverse to the title of some one who is not in existence, and whom, if in existence, he would be a trustee."
Strictly speaking, the relief as to declaration of civil death does not fall withing the purview of section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963, since generally neither it relates to the legal character or right as to property of the person seeking such declaration nor can the civic authorities be said to be interested to deny such character or right. Moreover, Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 9 / 19 such declaration is generally sought without seeking any further relief. However, it is no more res integra that section 34 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 is not exhaustive of all kinds of declaratory reliefs and that a declaratory suit can still be maintained which may not fall within its purview. In Vemareddi Ramaraghava Reddy v. Konduru Seshu Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 436, It was observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court:
"The legal position is also well-established that the worshipper of a Hindu temple is entitled, in certain circumstances, to bring a suit for declaration that the alienation of the temple properties by the de jure Shebait is invalid and not binding upon the temple. if a Shebait has improperly alienated trust property a suit can be brought by any person interested for a declaration that such alienation is not binding upon the deity but no decree for recovery of possession can be made in such a suit unless the plaintiff in the suit has the present right to the possession. Worshippers of temples are in the position of cestuui que trustent or beneficiaries in a spiritual sense (See Vidhyapurna Thirthaswami v. Vidhyanidhi Thirthanswami). Since the worshippers do. not exercise the deity's power of suing to protect its own interests, they are not entitled to recover possession of the property improperly alienated by the Shebait, but they can be granted a declaratory decree that the alienation is not binding on the deity (See for example, Kalyana Venkataramana Ayyangar v. Kasturiranga Ayyangar(4) and Chidambaranatha Thambiran v. Nallasiva Mudaliar). It has also been decided by the Judicial Committee in Abdur Rahim v. Mahomed Barkat Ali that a suit for a declaration that property belongs to a wakf can be maintained by Mahomedans interested in the wakf without the sanction of the Advocate-General, and a declaration can be given in such a suit that the plaintiff is not bound by the compromise decree relating to wakf properties. In our opinion, s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the section. It follows, therefore, in the present case that the suit of the plaintiff for a Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 10 / 19 declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity is maintainable as falling outside the purview of s. 42 of the Specific Relief Act."
It was further observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court that declaratory reliefs falling outside Specific Relief Act may fall under the general provisions of Civil Procedure Code, like section 9 or Order VII Rule 7 CPC. This was reiterated in General Films Exchange Ltd. v. H.H. Maharaja Sir Brijnath Singhji Deo, AIR 1975 SC 1810, wherein it was observed by Hon'ble Apex Court:
" In Sheoparsan Singh & Ors. case (supra), what was really held by the Privy Council was that a grant of probate under the Probate and Administration Act (V of 1881), which operated as a judgment in rem, could not be collaterally assailed by a suit for a declaration brought by reversioners seeking to question the will. Sir Lawrence Jenkins who had, incidentally, decided Deokali Koer's case (supra) too said (at p.
97):
It is not suggested that in this litigation the testamentary jurisdiction is, or can be, invoked, and yet there can be no doubt that this suit is an attempt to evade or annul the adjudication in the testamentary suit, and nothing more."
We think that the decision in this case also does not assist the appellant much.
In Bai Shri Vaktuba's case (supra), the Bombay High Court held that a Talukdar plaintiff could bring a suit for a declaration and an injunction to restrain the defendant from claiming that he was the plaintiff's son. Learned Counsel for the appellant, however, Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 11 / 19 relied upon the following passage from it (at p. 650):
"It has long been established that the general power vested in the Courts in India under the Civil Procedure Code to entertain all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which cognizance is barred by any enactment for the time being in force, does not carry with it the general power of making declarations except in so far as such power is expressly conferred by statute."
Kishori Lal's case (supra) was cited to show that declaratory decrees falling outside S ection 42 of the Specific Relief Act are not permissible because Section 42 Specific Relief Act is exhaustive on this subject. This view must be held to have been rejected by this Court when it declared in Veruareddi Rmaranghava Reddy & Ors. v. Konduru Seshu Reddy & ors (1) (at p. 277) In our opinion, S. 42 of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the section It follows, therefore, in the present case that the suit of the plaintiff for a declaration that the compromise decree is not binding on the deity is maintainable as falling outside the purview of S.. 42 of the Specific Relief Act".
The result is that Section 42 merely gives statutory recognition to a well-recognised type of declaratory relief and subjects it to a limitation, but it cannot be deemed to exhaust every kind of declaratory relief or to circumscribe Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 12 / 19 the jurisdiction of Courts to give declarations of right in appropriate cases falling outside Section 42."
Therefore, section 34 of Specific Relief Act cannot be not held to be the sole repository of the cases in which declaratory decrees may be made and the Courts have the power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the section, and such declarations can be granted even though no consequential relief is capable of being granted.
Further, there are judicial precedents to hold that a suit for declaration of civil death of a person unheard of for more than seven years is maintainable. In Swati & Others V.s Abhay & Others, MANU/MH/0334/2016, Hon'ble Bombay High Court has held such a suit to be maintainable. The relevant observation are as under:
" 7. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court as above, I am of the firm opinion that the Civil Court acting under Section 9, has inherent powers in its plenary jurisdiction de hors with reference to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act to grant relief qua Section 108 of the Evidence Act. Therefore, the reason that Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was required to be called in aid does not appear to be sound."
In Alka Sharma v. Union of India & Others MANU/UP/0209/2020, the plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration of civil death of her husband. The Trial Court as well as the first appellate Court had dismissed the suit. Hon'ble Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 13 / 19 Allahabad High Court, while passing decree in second appeal, held as under :
"16 In the light of the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there is no hesitation in my mind to hold that the courts below have failed to act judiciously and in accordance with the provisions of law and have unnecessarily entered into those grey areas which are not subject matter of any dispute and in regard to which no dispute was raised depicting limited extent of their judicial knowledge and capability to appreciate and deal with the facts of the case. Since, Union of India was a party, it was represented through out, and it was not the case of the Union that any objection was filed by any of the relatives of Sri Govind Prasad Sharma so to the claim put-forth by the applicant or to the effect that she was not entitled to the residence allotted to Sri Govind Prasad Sharma in her official capacity, there was sufficient plethora of evidence to the effect that the presumption should have been drawn as to the civil death of Sri Govind Prasad Sharma as twin requirements of law as laid down in Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act about declaration of a civil death were fulfilled. There is no requirement of final report from the police to draw a presumption under Sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act. As far as final report is concerned, Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with report of police officer on completion of investigation. Section 173(2) does not prescribed any time limit for completion of investigation and further Section 173(8) only provides for further investigation in respect of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate. Further, the law prescribes that in case the Magistrate is inclined to accept the final report and decides to drop the charges against the accused, then only notice to the complainant is necessary. In case, cognizance is taken by the Magistrate on a report submitted by the police under Section 173 (2) of Cr.P.C., then no notice is required to be served on the complainant. In case of Pramod Behl vs. State of Jharkhand, Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 14 / 19 2004 Crl. L. J NOC 362 (Jhar), though it has been held that where the police after investigation files final report, copy of final report would be given to the informant and opportunity of hearing shall also be given to him.
17. In the light of the above discussion, the courts below committed serious error in law, which has resulted into miscarriage of justice to the appellant and which is corrected now.
18. In view of the aforesaid, the substantial question of law framed in this appeal is answered in negative and it is held that submission of the final report by the police is not mandatory inasmuch as police investigation is in the domain of criminal law and that is neither influenced by the plaintiff claiming such declaration nor is within the authority and control of the plaintiff seeking such declaration. Once the factum of lodging a report and not hearing about that person for seven years or more is proved and admitted by the defendant employer of the husband in regard to whom declaration is being sought, is sufficient to hold that requirement of Section 108 of the Evidence Act has been fulfilled. It has been arbitrarily held by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) that the plaintiff was oblige to seek any other declaration in regard to claim of service benefits in addition to the declaration of civil death.
In Vijaya Shrikant Revale v. Shirish Shrikant Revale & Ors., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 1898, It was held by that a civil court has the power to grant declaratory relief of civil death. It was observed by Hon'ble Bombay High Court as under :
"10. It is true that only Civil Court has power to give suresh relief of declaration in such matters. The inquiry under section 372 of the Act is limited. However, the Court which conducts the inquiry under Section 372 of the Act is a civil Court and therefore the said Court is Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 15 / 19 competent to decide the issue of declaration of death of Shrikant Vishnupant Revale."
Lastly, Hon'ble Supreme Court in LIC of India Vs. Anuradha, AIR 2004 SC 2070, held as under:
" On the basis of the above said authorities, we unhesitatingly arrive at a conclusion which were sum up in the following words. The law as to presumption of death remains the same whether in Common Law of England or in the statutory provisions contained in Sections 107 and 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the scheme of Evidence Act, though Sections 107 and 108 are drafted as two Sections, in effect, Section 108 is an exception to the rule enacted in Section 107. The human life shown to be in existence, at a given point of time which according to Section 107 ought to be a point within 30 years calculated backwards from the date when the question arises, is presumed to continue to be living. The rule is subject to a proviso or exception as contained in Section 108. If the persons, who would have naturally and in the ordinary course of human affairs heard of the person in question, have not so heard of him for seven years the presumption raised under Section 107 ceases to operate. Section 107 has the effect of shifting the burden of proving that the person is dead on him who affirms the fact. Section 108 subject to its applicability being attracted, has the effect of shifting the burden of proof back on the on the sa.18.16 one who asserts the fact of that person being Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 16 / 19 alive. The presumption raised under Section 108 is a limited presumption confined only to presuming the factum of death of the person who's life or death is in issue. Though it will be presumed that the person is dead but there is no presumption as to the date or time of death. There is no presumption as to the facts and circumstances under which the person may have died. The presumption as to death by reference to Section 108 would arise only on lapse of seven years and would not by applying any logic or reasoning be permitted to be raised on expiry of 6 years and 364 days or at any time short of it. An occasion for raising the presumption would arise only when the question is raised in a Court, Tribunal or before an authority who is called upon to decide as to whether a person is alive or dead. So long as the dispute is not raised before any forum and in any legal proceedings the occasion for raising does not arise".
11. The grant of decree of declaration of civil death of a person is founded on the presumption envisaged in Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1972. The said provision propounds that if a person has not been heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if he had been alive, the burden of proving that he is alive is shifted upon the person who affirms it. The presumption raised under Section 108 is a limited presumption confined only to presuming the factum of death of the person whose life or death is in issue. Though, it will be presumed that the person is dead but there is no presumption as to the date or time of death. In Narbada v. Ram Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 17 / 19 Dayal, AIR 1968 Raj. 48, it was held that under Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, presumption about the death of a person is to be drawn when the dispute is brought to the Court and death can be presumed on the date on which the suit was filed and it cannot be given a further retrospective effect.
The plaintiff has proved the documents in her evidence affidavit Ex. PW1/A in original i.e. Photocopy of missing complaint vide DD No.23 dated 12.03.2001 Mark-B, voter I-card of missing person-Ex. PW-1/2 (OSR). Photocopy of ration card Ex.PW1/3(OSR), Photocopy of Aadhar card of plaintiff Ex. PW1/1.
During cross examination by by Ld. Counsel for MCD that nothing ws asked to dispute case of plaintiff.There is nothing on record to discreed the testimony of PW-1. The plaintiff has proved her Aadhar card, election I card and ration card and same not been disputed by MCD. In natural course of events, it can be reasonably expected that a wife of a person would hear from her husband. In these circumstances, a presumption as to civil death of Mohan Lal can be raised. Defendant MCD not been able to rebut presumption.
12. Accordingly, plaintiff has been successful in proving the issue No.iii is her favour and she is held entitled to a declaration that Mohan Lal be declared as presumed dead. The declaration of civil death of Mohan Lal shall be effective from the date of filing of the suit in the light of judgment of Narbada v. Ram Dayal (supra).
13. As far as the prayer for issuance of death certificate is concerned, nothing has been brought on record by defendant Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 18 / 19 No.1/MCD that death certificate cannot be granted without specific date of death being mentioned in such cases where a declaration of civil death has been sought from the court. Thus, said issue No.ii is also decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants.
Relief
14. In view of my aforesaid findings, the suit of the plaintiff is decreed and Mohan Lal s/o Late Shri Kashi Ram is declared as dead from the date of filing of the present suit i.e. 27.08.2022. Defendant No.1/MCD shall issue death certificate in respect of Mohan Lal Late Shri Kashi Ram and his date of death shall be taken to be the date of filing of the present suit i.e. 27.08.2022.
15. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.
16. File be consigned to Record Room.
Pronounced in the open court (Neha Pandey) on 13th January 2025 JSCC/ASCJ/GJ (WEST) Tis Hazri, Delhi :
Suit No. 1276 /22 Chand Rani Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi Ors 19 / 19