Delhi District Court
State vs Manje on 23 March, 2026
IN THE COURT OF JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS-02,
SOUTH- EAST, SAKET COURTS,
NEW DELHI
Presided over by- Akansha Gautam , DJS
Cr. Case No. - 261307/2010
:
Unique Case ID No. - DLSE02002474
: 2006
FIR No. - 582/2004
:
Police Station - Okhla Industrial
: Area
Section(s) - 279/304A IPC
:
In the matter of -
STATE
VS.
MANJE .... Accused
1.Name of Complainant : HC Phool Singh 2. Name of Accused : Manje 3. Offence complained of or proved : 279/304A IPC 4. Plea of Accused : Not guilty 5. Date of registration of FIR : 17.08.2004 6. Date of filing of chargesheet : 14.02.2006 7. Date of Reserving Order : 16.02.2026 8. Date of Pronouncement : 23.02.2026 9. Final Order : Acquitted Argued by: Sh. Rohit Lohia, Ld. APP for the State. Digitally signed by Ms. Yogendari Dagar, Ld. Counsel for the accused. Akhansha Akhansha Gautam Gautam Date: 2026.03.23 15:50:43 +0530 1 / 12 BRIEF STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR THE DECISION-: A. FACTUAL MATRIX:
1. The case of the prosecution is that on 17.08.2004 at about 08:15 AM, in front of Tata Steel factory, OIA-I, the accused was driving a truck bearing number DL1G1174 in a rash or negligent manner so as to endanger human life and while doing so the accused hit a cyclist namely, Kamlesh Singh, and the offending vehicle ran over the cycle due to which the injured sustained injures and was taken to AIIMS by the PCR where he received his treatment and later on succumed to injuries. Thereby, the accused is alleged to have committed offence punishable u/s 279/304A IPC.
INVESTIGATION AND APPEARANCE OF ACCUSED -
2. After registration of the FIR, the Investigating Officer (hereinafter, "IO") undertook investigation and on culmination of the same, charge-sheet against the accused was filed. After taking cognizance of the offence, the accused was summoned to face trial on 14.02.2006.
3. On his appearance, a copy of charge-sheet was supplied to the accused in terms of Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, "CrPC"). On finding a prima facie case against the accused, notice under Sections 279/304A & 174A IPC was served upon the accused on 20.08.2023 to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. PROSECUTION EVIDENCE -
4. During the trial, prosecution led the following oral and documentary evidence against the accused to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt-: Digitally signed Akhansha by Akhansha Gautam Gautam Date: 2026.03.23 2 / 12 15:50:46 +0530 ORAL EVIDENCE PW-1 : HC Mukut Bihari PW-2 : Sh. Devender Jit Singh PW-3 : Sh. Skhilesh Singh PW-4 : SI Phool Singh PW-5 : Retd. SI Ram Vir Singh DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE Ex. PW-1/A : Seizure memo of accidental vehicle Ex. PW-1/B : Seizure memo of offending vehicle Ex. PW-2/A : Reply to noice Ex. PW-2/B : Seizure memo of DL of the accused Ex. PW-2/C : Arrest memo Ex. PW-2/D : Personal search memo Ex. PW-2/E : Superdari Applicaiton for release of offending vehicle Ex. PW-3/A : Statement u/s 161 CrPC of PW3 Ex. PW-3/B : Receipt of dead body memo Ex. PW-4/A : MLC of injured Ex. PW-4/B : Rukka Ex. PW-5/A : Site Plan Ex. PW-5/B : Notice served to owner Report of mechanical inspection of offending Ex. PW-5/C :
vehicle Ex. PW-5/D : Statement of Ram Bharan Singh Ex. P1 & P2 : Photographs of the vehicles STATEMENT OF ACCUSED AND DEFENCE EVIDENCE -
5. Thereafter, before the start of defence evidence, in order to allow the accused to personally explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence against him, the statement of the accused was recorded without oath under Section 281 read with Section 313 CrPC on 05.07.2025. He stated that he has been falsely implicated in the present case at the instance of the complainant since the complainant is himself the culprit. Pursuant thereto, he stated that he does not wish to lead any defence evidence.Digitally signed by Akhansha Gautam
3 / 12 Akhansha Date:
Gautam 2026.03.23
15:50:49
+0530
FINAL ARGUMENTS -
6. I have heard the learned APP for the State and learned counsel for the accused at length. I have also given my thoughtful consideration to the material appearing on record.
7. It is argued by the learned APP for the State that all the ingredients of the offence are fulfilled in the present case. He has argued that the formal witness to the incident has categorically deposed about the rash and negligent manner in which the accused was driving the offending vehicle. The factum of accident is proved. As such, it is prayed that the accused be punished for the said offences.
8. Per contra, learned counsel for the accused has argued that the State has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Learned counsel has argued that there is no eyewitness to the incident. Further, PW-2 has not furnished any record to prove that accused was driving the vehicle. There is no CCTV footage on record, as admitted by PW-4. The IO has not placed on record any CDR to show that the accused was at the spot on time of incident. Ld. Counsel has argued that the accused had resigned three months before and was no longer working as a driver. She has further submitted that the IO has falsely implicated the accused. It is argued that the prosecution has failed to discharge the burden cast upon it. As such, it is prayed that the accused be acquitted for the said offences.
INGREDIENTS OF THE OFFENCE -
9. The accused has been charged for the offences of rash driving on public way (under section 279 IPC) and causing death by a rash or negligent act (under section 304A IPC) in the present case. While under Section 279 IPC, the factum of rash or negligent driving likely to endanger human life or cause hurt Digitally signed 4 / 12 Akhansha by Akhansha Gautam Gautam Date: 2026.03.23 15:50:52 +0530 etc. is in itself the offence, under Section 304A IPC, death of the victim should be caused in pursuance of such rash or negligent act of the accused. In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to prove that the accused was driving the offending in a rash or negligent manner, and due to such driving of the accused, the victim suffered injuries which led to his death. The act should not amount to culpable homicide.
10. Thus, the gravamen of the offences under section 279/304A IPC is the act of the accused, done with "rashness" or "negligence". The IPC does not define either of these terms. However, the ambit of these terms has now been settled by judicial pronouncements of superior Courts. In Empress of India v. Idu Beg ILR (1881) 3 All 776 the term "rashness" was interpreted to mean commission of an act with indifference or recklessness towards the consequences of such act. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rathnashalvan v. State of Karnataka (2007) 3 SCC 474 has observed, inter alia, as under-:
"7. .... Culpable negligence lies in the failure to exercise reasonable and proper care and the extent of its reasonableness will always depend upon the circumstances of each case. Rashness means doing an act with the consciousness of a risk that evil consequences will follow but with the hope that it will not. Negligence is a breach of duty imposed by law. In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are determining factors. A question whether the accused's conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case. Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is dangerous or wanton and the further knowledge that it may cause injury but done without any intention to cause injury or knowledge that it would probably be caused.
8. As noted above, "rashness" consists in hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury. The criminality lies in such a case in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence on the other hand, is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge has arisen it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted."
Digitally signed by Akhansha Akhansha Gautam Gautam Date:
2026.03.23 5 / 12 15:50:54 +0530
11. Similar observations were made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushil Ansal v. CBI (2014) 6 SCC 173. The standard of negligence was discussed in the said case, by observing, inter alia, as under-:
"58. In the case of "negligence" the courts have favoured a meaning which implies a gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally or to an individual which having regard to all the circumstances out of which the charge arises, it may be the imperative duty of the accused to have adopted. Negligence has been understood to be an omission to do something which a reasonable man guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable person would not do. Unlike rashness, where the imputability arises from acting despite the consciousness, negligence implies acting without such consciousness, but in circumstances which show that the actor has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him. The imputability in the case of negligence arises from the neglect of the civil duty of circumspection."
12. Thus, rashness implies doing an act despite the consciousness that it might result in injuries. Negligence, on the other hand, means lack of reasonable care that a person placed in the fact situation ought to take, in order to avoid injuries.
13. Needless to mention, in criminal law, the burden of proof on the prosecution is that of beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence of the accused must be rebutted by the prosecution by adducing cogent evidence that points towards the guilt of the accused. The evidence in the present case is to be weighed keeping in view the above legal standards.
14. The star witness of the prosecution and the only eyewitness cited is Sh.Bhagwan Das. However, there is discrepancy on the fact whether there was an eye-witness to the accident or not. The chargesheet categorically records that despite search, no eye-witness could be found of the accident. It is pertinent to note that the name of PW is nowhere mentioned in the FIR or chargesheet. In fact, the chargesheet specifically records that no eyewitness could be found at the spot. The same naturally raises a question mark upon the presence of the witness at the scene of crime. Contrary to the same, PW-4 has deposed that when he Digitally signed by Akhansha 6 / 12 Akhansha Gautam Gautam Date:
2026.03.23 15:50:57 +0530 reached at the spot at 8:20 a.m., no eye-witness was present. PW-5/ IO Retired SI Ram Singh has deposed on 02.06.2025 that he searched for eye-witness and found PW Bhagwan Dass and also recorded his statement. PW-1/ Mukat Bihari who was accompanying the IO, has also deposed that eye-witness Bhagwan Dass appeared (on the spot) and IO recorded his statement. He has narrated about the incident as seen by him. His narration in his statement under section 161 Cr.P.C. is on record. However, the said witness was deceased and accordingly, dropped from the list of witnesses on 22.01.2024. Even if he was the eye-witness to the accident, he could never appear before the Court on account of his demise. Thereafter, there is no identification of accused done or proof of him driving the tanker in rash or negligent manner.
15. The factum of the accident is not in dispute as well as death of the victim.
16. Regarding the accident, the onus is on the prosecution to prove three facts. The first is that the accident took place by the offending vehicle. The second is that the offending vehicle was being driven by the accused. The third is that offending vehicle was being driven by the accused in a rash or negligent manner. From the material on record, the fact that the accident happened by the offending vehicle is not in dispute as the said tanker was found on the spot itself.
But whether the accused was driving the vehicle has not been proven. The only manner in which the IO has implicated the accused is by calling the owner of the tanker i.e. PW-2/ Sh. Devender Jeet Singh who then produced the accused on 18.08.2004 in the police station as driver of the offending vehicle on the given date. He deposed that the tanker was in exclusive possession of his driver Manje/ accused. Apart from his oral testimony, PW-2/ Devender Jeet Singh did npt produce a single document to show that the accused Manje was in fact driving the offending vehicle/ water tanker as he himself admitted that there are 5-6 water Digitally signed by Akhansha 7 / 12 Akhansha Gautam Date: Gautam 2026.03.23 15:51:00 +0530 tankers owned by his company and each water tanker has a deputed driver. When the company is engaged in commercial business, it is hard to believe that there is not a single document that can prove that the accused Manje was in fact the driver of water tanker on the day of incident. On specific query during cross- examination, PW-2 has said that he does not have any written document to show the same. Accused has suggested in the cross-examination that some other driver was driving the said water tanker who fled away from the spot and the owner of the tanker brough him to police station to discharge his onus. It appears to be a major loophole in the prosecution's story. Therefore, the accused has been successful in disputing that the offending vehicle was being driven by the accused.
17. Further, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the factum of the offending vehicle being driven in rash and negligent manner as well. Apart from the fact that not a single eye-witness has come on record to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner, the mechanical inspection report of the offending vehicle on record as Ex.PW-5/C is completely silent on any damages inflicted. Even the mechanical inspector has not come forth as a prosecution witness. In fact, the report states none. Even if it is assumed that the majority of the damages would have been inflicted on the cycle, there is no way to find out as the IO did not get any mechanical inspection conducted of the cycle in question. There are no photographs of the cycle at all. There is no manner in which this Court can assess the rashness or negligence of the offending vehicle. No determination of speed or manner in which the vehicle was being driven, has been brought by the prosecution.
18. The case of the prosecution is that the offending vehicle was being driven in a negligent manner and in a "very high speed". However, none of the witnesses have deposed as to what is meant by "high speed". There is no Digitally signed by Akhansha Akhansha Gautam 8 / 12 Gautam Date:
2026.03.23 15:51:03 +0530 approximation of the speed of the offending vehicle. Even otherwise, mere fact that the vehicle was being driven at high speed does not imply rashness or negligence. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ravi Kapur v. State of Rajasthan (2012) 9 SCC 284 that the speed cannot be a determinative factor for coming to a conclusion that the person was driving rashly or negligently. Further, it was observed in State of Karnataka vs. Satish (1998) 8 SCC 493, as under -
"4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur"."
19. Further, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Abdul Subhan v. State (N.C.T. of Delhi) 133 (2006) DLT 562 held that mere allegation of high speed does not tantamount to rashness or negligence:
The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court make it more than clear that a mere allegation of high-speed would not tantamount to rashness or negligence. In the present case also, I find that apart from the allegation that the truck was being driven at a very high-speed there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner acted in a manner which could be regarded as rash or negligent. In any event there is no description or approximation of what was the speed at which the truck was being driven. The expression "high-speed" could range from 30 km per hour to over 100 km per hour. It is not even known as to what the speed limit on Mathura Road was and whether the petitioner was exceeding that speed limit. Therefore, in the absence of material facts it cannot be said, merely because there is an allegation that the petitioner was driving the truck at a high-speed, that the petitioner is guilty of a rash or negligent act. Clearly the petitioner cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of PW 3 which itself suffers from various ambiguities.
20. Therefore, the testimony that the offending vehicle was being driven at a high speed in a negligent manner is not sufficient to convict the accused. There is no elaboration on the approximation of the speed at which the offending vehicle was being driven or the surrounding circumstances. No tyre Digitally signed by Akhansha Akhansha Gautam 9 / 12 Gautam Date:
2026.03.23 15:51:06 +0530 skid marks have been collected or produced. IO has not gotten the spot photographed. This is a material deficiency in the investigation which cannot be ignored. It is pertinent to note that specific directions have been passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that in accident cases, the spot should be photographed for effective adjudication. In this regard, reliance can be placed upon the following extract from Abdul Subhan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2006 SCC OnLine Del 1132:
7. At the outset I would like to observe that I am appalled by the investigation, or shall I say the lack of it, that was carried out in this particular case. I may also note that I am of the view that the testimony of PW 3 head constable Munim Dutt, even if taken to be entirely true only leads to the conclusion that the vehicle driven by the present petitioner was being driven at a high-speed. This in itself does not mean that the petitioner was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently. Furthermore, the testimony of PW 3 leads to ambiguities and doubts and, I am afraid, my conscience does not permit me to convict a person under section 279/304A IPC on the nature and degree of evidence that is on record in this case. There are so many questions which remain unanswered. What is meant by high-speed? Were the traffic lights working or not? Why was the investigating officer not examined? Why were photographs not taken? Why is there no evidence with regard to tyre skid marks?
Why was the site plan not exhibited? There are questions which remain unanswered pertaining to the motorcyclist who unfortunately lost his life in this incident. Was the motorcyclist on Mathura Road? What was his direction of movement? Was he coming from Sher Shah Road and turning towards Mathura road? Or, was he on Mathura Road turning towards Sher Shah road? What was the speed of the motorcyclist? Did the motorcyclist suddenly curve into the path of the petitioner's truck? A host of other questions remain unanswered purely because the degree of investigation carried out and the quality of investigation carried out is quite unsatisfactory. It is well known in criminal cases that it is for the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, in the present case I find that the prosecution has failed to achieve this standard. On the other hand there are grave doubts that the petitioner is at all guilty of the offences for which he has been convicted and sentenced. 13.3. As a rule, photographs ought to be taken not only of the vehicles involved in the collision but also of the site and surrounding areas so that the exact topography can be easily discerned by courts.
21. Further, in accident cases, the site plan assumes significance in understanding the surrounding circumstances, inter-se position of the parties on the road etc. The site plan Ex. PW5/A in this case only depicts point A as the point at which the accident happened. However, it does not mention the distance between the position of the eyewitness/PW Bhagwan Dass and the spot of Digitally signed 10 / 12 Akhansha by Akhansha Gautam Gautam Date: 2026.03.23 15:51:09 +0530 accident. In fact, the position of the eyewitness is not at all mentioned in the site plan. The position of the eyewitness ought to have been mentioned in the site plan to establish his presence at the spot and to assist the court in ascertaining whether the eyewitness was in a position to view the occurrence properly. Further, the position at which the offending vehicle finally came to rest after the collision has not been marked in the site plan. The said omission on behalf of the IO is substantial and is in direction contravention of the directions passed by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Abdul Subhan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2006 SCC OnLine Del 1132:
13.1. In most cases I find that the site plans are not produced. Even the site plan that is produced is of a very unsatisfactory nature. It is, therefore, imperative that the investigating officer should be provided with maps of the roads drawn to scale so that accurate site plans can be produced in evidence for the appreciation of courts. The exact point of impact as well as tyre skid marks and the point at which the vehicles come to rest after the collision should be demarcated clearly. The observations with regard to the length of the tyre skid marks of the vehicles involved in the impact go a long way in indicating the speeds at which the vehicles were travelling. This would enable the courts to examine the evidence in a much more objective manner and the courts would not be faced with vague and subjective expressions such as "highspeed".
22. Therefore, failure of the IO to take photographs of the spot and to prepare proper site plan is a serious defect in the investigation.
23. Based on the aforesaid discussion and the material on record, the commission of the offences and its essential ingredients cannot be proved. The doubtful testimony of the sole eyewitness has not proved the offences beyond reasonable doubt.
CONCLUSION -
24. To recapitulate the above discussion, to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution was required to prove the offences under Section 279/304-A of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt. The basis of the offences charged in the present case is rash or negligent driving of the accused. There is no eye-
Digitally signed 11 / 12 by Akhansha Gautam Akhansha Date: Gautam 2026.03.23 15:51:11
witness testimony to prove the essential ingredients of the offence. Further, there are material defects in the investigation and hence, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. Qua offence u/s 174A IPC, the predecessor of this court has already passed order on sentence on 08.07.2023.
25. Resultantly, the accused Manje is hereby found not guilty. He is ACQUITTED of the offences under Section 279/304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Pronounced in open court on 23.03.2026 in presence of the accused. This judgement contains 12 pages, and each page has been signed by the undersigned.
(AKANSHA GAUTAM) JMFC-02/SE/Saket/ND 23.03.2026 Akhansha Gautam Digitally signed by Akhansha Gautam Date: 2026.03.23 15:51:15 +0530 12 / 12