Himachal Pradesh High Court
Court On Its Own Motion vs Of on 24 November, 2023
Bench: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, Jyotsna Rewal Dua
HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. OPC No.1/2019 .
Reserved on: 12.10.2023
Decided on: 24.11.2023
Court on its own motion .....Petitioner
Versus
of
Karam Chand & ors. ......Respondents.
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.S. Ramachandra Rao,Chief Justice.
rt The Hon'ble Ms. Justice Jyotsna Rewal Dua, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the petitioner : Ms. Anubhuti Sharma, Advocate as Amicus
Curiae.
For the respondent : Mr. Basant Pal Thakur, Advocate, for
respondents/contemnors no.2 to 4.
Respondents/contemnors no.2 and 3 in
person.
Jyotsna Rewal Dua
The allegation against the respondents is of tampering with the Court record. Pursuant to a direction issued by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 10.04.2019 while deciding CMP(M) No.971/2017 (Karam Chand & Ors. Vs. Kishore Singh & Ors.), this 1 Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? yes ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 2 suo motu criminal contempt proceeding was initiated against the respondents.
.
2. Facts leading to present proceedings:-
2(i) Sh. Karam Chand, his wife Smt. Dhanno and their two sons namely Sh. Tarsem Lal & Sh. Dayal Singh were defendants in Civil Suit No. 154/2008 instituted by S/Sh. Kishore Singh, Manohar of Singh and Raghubir Singh. The civil suit was decreed by the learned Trial Court on 27.11.2014. S/Sh. Karam Chand, Tarsem Lal, Dayal rt Singh and Smt. Dhanno filed an appeal against the said judgment and decree before the learned First Appellate Court on 27.12.2014. Their appeal was also dismissed on 23.12.2015.
2(ii) Sh. Karam Chand, his wife and their two sons instituted a Regular Second Appeal No.144/2019 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure in this Court on 17.07.2017 against the aforesaid judgments and decrees. Alongwith the appeal, an application CMP(M) No.971/2017 was moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. The application was with the averments that:- The judgment and decree was passed by the learned First Appellate Court on 23.12.2015; Certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree dated 23.12.2015 was applied on 26.12.2015;::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 3
Certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree was attested on 05.11.2016; Certified copy of impugned judgment and decree was .
supplied to the appellants on 07.11.2016.
On the basis of above dates given in the application regarding applying for the certified copy of impugned judgment & decree as well as its preparation, it was further pleaded in the of application that:- the limitation for filing the appeal had expired in April 2017; The appellants had approached their learned counsel for rt filing the appeal in the High Court in March 2017, but it transpired that they did not have complete record of the case file; The record was applied for and was made available to them in second week of July 2017.
In view of aforesaid reasons given in the application, prayer was made for condoning the delay of about 166 days in instituting the appeal on 17.07.2017.
2(iii) On being put to notice, the original plaintiffs filed reply to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 29.08.2017.
The original plaintiffs/non-applicants pleaded that:-
::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 4 The judgment and decree impugned in the second appeal was passed by the learned First Appellate Court on .
23.12.2015.
Both sides had filed their respective applications for obtaining the certified copy of the judgment and decree on 26.12.2015. The serial number of the of application moved by the plaintiffs was 11224, whereas that of the defendants/applicants was 11228. rt As per stamp of the copying agency impressed on the certified copy of the impugned judgment and decree as supplied to the plaintiffs/non-applicants, the date of attestation was 05.01.2016. The plaintiffs believed that the same date should have been mentioned in the certified copy of the judgment & decree supplied to the defendants/applicants.
The plaintiffs/non-applicants suspected that there had been interpolation/tampering in the date of attestation reflected in the certified copy of the judgment and decree annexed by the defendants/applicants alongwith the regular second appeal. The certified copy supplied to the ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 5 defendants/applicants should have carried the date 05.01.2016 as the date of attestation and not 05.11.2016.
.
The plaintiffs/non-applicants prayed in their reply to call for the record of the copying agency and also to seek explanation from the concerned officials of the First Appellate Court as to why and how 10 months time was taken for attesting the certified copy of the of judgment & decree when it was actually prepared on 05.01.2016.
2(iv) Based on the reply filed by the plaintiffs/non-applicants rt to the application moved by the defendants/applicants under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, learned Single Judge vide order dated 30.08.2017 allowed the applicants to file rejoinder to the reply within three weeks. In the meanwhile, learned First Appellate Court was directed to furnish its comments to the reply filed by the non-
applicants.
2(v) Learned First Appellate Court in its response dated 01.09.2017 apprised that application No.11224 was submitted by the counsel for the original plaintiffs/non-applicants on 26.12.2015; On this application, certified copy of the judgment and decree was prepared on 05.01.2016 and delivered on 06.01.2016. Learned First Appellate Court also furnished the information that:- Both the sides ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 6 had applied for certified copy of judgment and decree dated 23.12.2015 on 26.12.2015; Both sets of certified copy of judgment and decree .
sheet had been prepared by the same Copyist on 05.01.2016 and attested by the same Examiner on 05.01.2016; The date of preparation of the documents in both the applications was 05.01.2016; Applied for documents in application No.11224 (moved by the original plaintiffs-
of non-applicants) were delivered on 06.01.2016 and in the application No.11228 (moved by the original defendants-applicants) the documents rt were delivered on 07.01.2016. Abstract of relevant record was also made part and parcel of the response.
2(vi) On 06.12.2017, the Court granted last opportunity to the applicants to file rejoinder to the reply filed by non-applicants to the application seeking condonation of delay.
2(vii) On 18.12.2017, the defendants/applicants moved CMP No.10998/2017 under Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure for withdrawal of CMP(M) No. 971/2017 (application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act). The reason given for moving the second application was that "due to oversight, the dates for attesting and supply of the copy had been wrongly mentioned as 05.11.2016 and 07.11.2016, whereas the same were 05.01.2016 and 07.01.2016. This ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 7 had occurred due to oversight and inadvertence." The matter proceeded further before the Court. The application seeking .
condonation of delay in filing the appeal bearing CMP(M) No.971/2017 was finally heard on 02.04.2019. Vide order dated 10.04.2019, the application was dismissed. In view of dismissal of the application, the appeal was also disposed of.
of While dismissing the application, the Court observed that the interpolation/tampering rt made by the appellants (original defendants-applicants) were calculated to embarrass the Court in administering justice. Notice was directed to be issued to the appellants in Form-I of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 to show cause as to why they should not be prosecuted and punished under the Contempt of Courts Act.
3. Instant proceedings 3(i) Being put to notice, the original defendants/applicants (appellants in RSA No. 144/2019) caused their appearance in this criminal contempt petition on 07.05.2019. Henceforth they are being referred to as the respondents in Cr.OPC No.1/2019.
3(ii) The respondents four in number, filed their separate but verbatim the same affidavits tendering unconditional apology and ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 8 stating therein that they were illiterate rustic villagers and did not know intricacies of law; That they were not aware of law of limitation; That .
they had supplied the certified copy of the judgment and decree as given by their counsel who conducted their case before the learned Courts below, to the counsel in the High Court; That they were not aware of tampering of the dates in the certified copy of the judgment & of decree; They had not carried out any tampering in the record.
3(iii) The affidavits of the respondents were considered on rt 14.09.2021. Considering the fact that the allegations against the respondents were of tampering with the Court record, their apology was not accepted. Charges against all the respondents were framed on 21.09.2021. The respondents pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Ms. Anubhuti Sharma, learned Advocate, was appointed as Amicus Curiae.
3(iv) During the pendency of these proceedings, respondent No.1 died on 10.11.2021. Therefore, vide order dated 10.03.2022, contempt proceedings against him were closed as abated.
3(v) Evidence was adduced. Learned Amicus Curiae produced three witnesses i.e. RW1- the Section Officer of RSA Branch of the Registry of this Court, RW2- the Copying Agent from the office of learned First Appellate Court and Reader Grade-I (Retd.) from the ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 9 office of the learned First Appellate Court (mentioned as RW-2 in the evidence). The respondents No.2-4 appeared in the witness box and .
stated that it was deceased respondent No.1 who had pursued the case before all the Courts & that respondents No.2-4 were not aware of any tampering/interpolation in the certified copy of the judgment & decree.
4. We have heard learned counsel on both sides. We have of also considered entire case record including the evidence adduced in this petition. rt 4(a) Factual side of the contempt petition.
4(a)(i) Learned counsel for the respondents has not disputed the factual position which is evident not only from the pleadings but also in light of the evidence advanced that the certified copy of the judgment & decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court, applied for the respondents on 26.12.2015 was prepared on 05.01.2016 and delivered on 07.01.2016, however in the stamp impressed upon the certified copy of the judgment & decree appended by the respondents alongwith their appeal there were interpolation in the aforesaid two dates viz. 05.01.2016 was made to appear as 05.11.2016 and the date 07.01.2016 was made to look like 07.11.2016.
::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 104(a)(ii) Learned counsel for the respondents did not make any submission disputing the tampering in judicial record attached with .
the regular second appeal filed by the respondents. The only factual submission urged by him is that:- The respondents No.2-4 had not interpolated the judicial record; It was only respondent No.1 who had been actively pursuing the litigation; Fault if any, lay with him & not of with the other respondents; Respondent No.1 having died during the pendency of the contempt petition, this contempt proceeding was rt required to be closed. The sum & substance of the argument advanced by learned counsel for the respondents is that respondents No.2-4 had no role whatsoever to play in the interpolation/tampering in the Court record.
4(a)(iii) The above argument is to be simply rejected.
Interpolation in the Court record has been established. Sh. Inder Raj-
the Section Officer, RSA branch of this Court while deposing as RW1 stated that as per record of RSA No.144/2019, in the certified copy of the judgment & decree of the learned First Appellate Court, the attestation date has been mentioned as 05.11.2016 and 07.11.2016 as the date of delivery. RW2-Sh. Rakesh Sharma, the concerned copying agent of the learned First Appellate Court brought the relevant record.
::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 11He stated that:- Application No.11224 (Ext.RW-2/D) was received in the copying agency on 26.12.2015 through Sh. Mohan Lal Sharma-
.
Advocate. The application for certified copy was supplied on 06.01.2016; The application No.11228 (Ext.RW-2/E) was received in the copying agency through Sh. N.K. Bali, Advocate and applied for certified copy was supplied on 07.01.2016. The abstract of register was of exhibited as RW-2/A and the aforesaid entries as Ext.RW-2/B-1 , RW-
2/B-2, RW-2/C-1, RW-2/C-2. No question on these aspects has been rt put to the witnesses by the respondents.
4(a)(iv) In view of the pleadings, documents, evidence and also the stand taken by the respondents, there is no dispute that there had been tampering in the Court record. It is writ large that the date of attestation of certified copy of the judgment & decree dated 23.12.2015 passed by the learned First Appellate Court was actually 05.01.2016 but interpolated in the copy annexed with respondents' second appeal as 05.11.2016. Similarly date of supply of certified copy to the respondents was 07.01.2016 but was interpolated as 07.11.2016.
4(a)(v) A half hearted argument was raised by learned counsel for the respondents that even though there has been tampering & interpolation in the Court record but it was not done by respondents ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 12 No.2-4; It was the work of respondent No.1, who had been actively pursuing the case. We may notice here, all the respondents including .
deceased respondent No.1 were the appellants in the regular second appeal No.144/2019. Power of attorney authorizing filing of the second appeal was signed by all the respondents. CMP(M) No.971/2017 under Section 5 of the limitation Act was filed in the second appeal by all the of respondents for the benefit of all of them. The Court record more particularly the rt endorsement giving dates of applying/preparation/delivering of certified copy of the judgment & decree reflects that the certified copy of judgment & decree was applied by learned counsel for the respondents, was prepared & attested on 05.01.2016. The date 05.01.2016 was however interpolated to look like 05.11.2016. Further it was established that the certified copy of the judgment & decree was delivered on 07.01.2016, whereas by way of tampering in the impressed endorsement, the date has been made to look like 07.11.2016. It is the respondents, who would have been benefited by the interpolation and none else. Merely because the affidavit in support of the application seeking condonation of delay was that of respondent No.1, aged about 80 years, would not mean that respondents No.2-4 can be exculpated from the established tampering ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 13 of Court record. We hold accordingly. No other point on factual matrix was raised by learned counsel for the respondents.
.
4(b) Whether the acts of tampering/interpolation carried out by the respondents in the certified copy of the judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court amount to criminal contempt, is the next question to be considered.
of 4(b)(i) Criminal contempt is defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act as under:-
rt "..........2(c) "Criminal Contempt" means the publication (Whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-
(i) scandalises or tends to scanalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;"
It is well settled that a person who makes an attempt to deceive the Court, files fabricated document, tenders false affidavit in Court and interferes with the administration of justice, commits Contempt of Court.
4(b)(ii) In (1995) 3 SCC 757 (Dhananjay Sharma Vs. State of Haryana) the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under in respect of tampering of Court record and production of false document:-
::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 14"38. Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 (for short the Act) defines criminal contempt as "the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or visible representation or otherwise) of any .
matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever to (1) scandalised or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of any court; (2) prejudice or interfere or tend to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or (3) interfere or tend to interfere with, or obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner.
Thus, any conduct which has the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or the due course of judicial proceedings of amounts to the commission of criminal contempt. The swearing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings not only has the tendency of causing obstruction in the due course of judicial proceedings but has also the rt tendency to impede, obstruct and interfere with the administration of justice. The filing of false affidavits in judicial proceedings in any court of law exposes the intention of the concerned party in perverting the course of justice. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation or even while appearing as witnesses. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice by resorting to the filing of false evidence, commits criminal contempt of the court and renders himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act. Filing of false affidavits or making false statement on oath in Courts aims at striking a blow at the Rule of Law and no court can ignore such conduct which has the tendency to shake public confidence in the judicial institutions because the very structure of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned by anyone resorting to filing of false affidavits or giving of false statements and fabricating false evidence in a court of law. The stream of justice has to be kept clear and pure and anyone soiling its purity must be dealt with sternly so that the message perculates loud and clear that no one can be permitted to undermine the dignity of the court and interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings or the ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 15 administration of justice. In Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma, [1995] 1 SCC 421, the respondent produced a false and fabricated certificate to defeat the claim of the respondent for transfer of a case.
.
This action was found to be an act amounting to interference with the administration of justice.
4(b)(iii) A false or a misleading or wrong statement deliberately and willfully made by the parties to the proceedings to obtain favourable order would prejudice or interfere with due course of of judicial proceedings. Filing of fabricated documents amounts to criminal contempt of judicial process. The person doing it has no rt regard for truth. Such an action amounts to criminal contempt of judicial proceedings of the Court. [See 1996 (7) SCC 397 (Afzal & Anr vs State Of Haryana & Ors)].
4(b)(iv) [(2001) 5 SCC 501 (Re: Bineet Kumar Singh vs Unknown)], was a case where fabricated & forged order of Supreme Court was used for the purpose of conferring some benefits on group of persons. The Hon'ble Court held that nothing is more incumbent upon the Courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when the order of the Court is forged and produced to gain undue advantage.
Criminal contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) to mean interference with the administration of justice in any manner. When a ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 16 person is found to have utilized an order of a Court which he knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit, the very utilization of the .
fabricated order by the person concerned would be sufficient to hold him guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he himself is the author of fabrication.
4(b)(v) 2014 (12) SCC 11 (Ram Niranjan Roy And Others vs of State Of Bihar) was a case where the appellant was held guilty of tampering with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The rt Apex Court held the act fell within the purview of Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment read as under:-
"17................Thus, the words 'didn't shout' have replaced the word 'shouted.' When we asked for an explanation, the appellant stated that there is no tampering, but it is merely a typing error. We refuse to accept this explanation. In this case, by replacing the word 'shouted' by the words 'didn't shout' the appellant has changed the entire meaning of the sentence to suit his case that he did not shout in the court. Thus, he is guilty of tampering with the High Court's order and filing it in this Court. This would, in our opinion, be criminal contempt as defined by Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. There is abundance of judgments of this Court on this issue. This Court has taken a strict view of such conduct.
18. We may usefully refer to Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma where in a transfer petition the contemnor had filed a forged experience certificate purportedly issued by the Principal of a college from Nagpur. The Principal filed affidavit stating that the said certificate is forged.::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 17
This Court observed that an act which interferes or tends to interfere or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice would be criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts .
Act, 1971. This Court further observed that if recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice and would prevent the courts from performing their legal duties as they are supposed to do. The contemnor was, therefore, suitably sentenced.
19. In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh a forged/fabricated order of this court of was used for the purpose of conferring some benefits on a group of persons. This Court took a strict view of the matter and observed as under:
rt "6. The law of contempt of court is essentially meant for keeping the administration of justice pure and undefiled. It is difficult to rigidly define contempt. While on the one hand, the dignity of the court has to be maintained at all costs, it must also be borne in mind that the contempt jurisdiction is of a special nature and should be sparingly used. The Supreme Court is the highest court of record and it is charged with the duties and responsibilities of protecting the dignity of the court. To discharge its obligation as the custodian of the administration of justice in the country and as the highest court imbued with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the lower courts and tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have been entrusted with the power to see that the stream of justice in the country remains pure, that its course is not hindered or obstructed in any manner, that justice is delivered without fear or favour. To discharge this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognizance of the deviation from the path of justice. The sole object of the court wielding its power to punish for contempt is always for the course of administration of justice. Nothing is more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented, nor is there anything more pernicious when the order of the court is forged and ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 18 produced to gain undue advantage. Criminal contempt has been defined in Section 2(c) to mean interference with the administration of justice in any manner. A false or misleading or .
a wrong statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to the proceedings to obtain a favourable order would undoubtedly tantamount to interference with the due course of judicial proceedings. When a person is found to have utilised an order of a court which he or she knows to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the fabricated order by the person concerned of would be sufficient to hold him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is rt the author of fabrication."
We respectfully concur with these observations.
20. We shall now turn to the affidavit filed by the appellant in this Court. He has sworn an affidavit stating that the annexures of the criminal appeal are the true copies of the originals and the facts stated in the criminal appeal are true to his knowledge. As already noted by us, the appellant has tampered with the original impugned order. He stated that he had filed a bail application in the High Court. The copy of the said bail application filed in this Court is unsigned and supported by unsigned affidavit bearing no name of the lawyer. The appellant has not made the Registrar of the Patna High Court party to the appeal. The Registrar could have clarified whether any bail application was, in fact, filed by the appellant. In any case, we have perused the record and we find that there is no such bail application in the record. Thus, in this Court the appellant has filed a false affidavit. This amounts to contempt of this Court."
4(b)(vi) AIR 2022 SC 5711 (In Re: Perry Kansagra), was a case where the contemnor had falsely represented before the foreign jurisdiction about the orders passed by the Indian Courts. Hon'ble ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 19 Apex Court held that the acts lowered the authority of the Supreme Court. The contemnor had interfered with the due course of judicial .
proceedings and obstructed the administration of justice which is a clear case of criminal contempt.
4(b)(vii) In the instant case, the dates figuring in the certified copy of the judgment & decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court of have been tampered by the respondents. In their application seeking condonation of delay, the fabricated dates in the judicial document rt were passed on as the actual dates and made the basis for the prayer.
These acts amount to interference in the administration of justice.
Respondents attempted to deceive the Court in order to obtain favourable order in their application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The acts fall within the definition of criminal contempt in Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act and attract the liability of contempt.
4(c) The second contention of learned counsel for the respondents is that this contempt proceeding was initiated beyond the period of one year from the date of commission of contemptuous act, therefore, cannot proceed in view of limitation ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 20 imposed in Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The section is as follows:-
.
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt. No Court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
Article 215 of the Constitution of India empowers the of High Court to punish for its contempt, it would be appropriate to reproduce hereinafter Article 215 of the Constitution of India:-
rt "Every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
We may now refer to legal position in reference to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act read with Article 215 of the Constitution of India.
4(c)(i) 1993 Suppl. (1) SCC 529 (Pritam Pal Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh), laid down that the power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court, being Courts of record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively, is an inherent power and as the jurisdiction vested in these Courts is a special one not derived from any other statute, but from the aforesaid Articles of ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 21 the Constitution of India. Such power cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down.
.
4(c)(ii) In 1998 (7) SCC 379 (Dr. L.P.Misra Vs. State of U.P.), it was held that the High Court can invoke powers and jurisdiction vested in it under Article 215 of the Constitution of India but such a jurisdiction has to be exercised in accordance with the procedure of prescribed by law.
4(c)(iii) rt In 2001 (7) SCC 549 (Pallav Sheth Vs. Custodian & Others), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that 'there is no doubt that the Supreme Court & the High Courts are the Courts of Record and the Constitution has given them the powers to punish for contempt.
Previous decisions of the Supreme Court clearly show that this power cannot be abrogated or stultified. But if the power under Article 129 and Article 215 is absolute can there be any legislation indicating the manner and the extent to which that power can be exercised? If there is any provision of the law which stultifies or abrogates the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 there can be little doubt that such law would not be regarded as having been validly enacted. It, however, appears to us that providing for the quantum of punishment or what may or may not be regarded ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 22 as acts of contempt or even providing for a period of limitation for initiating proceedings for contempt cannot be taken to be a .
provision which abrogates or stultifies the contempt jurisdiction under Article 129 or Article 215 of the Constitution.
Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that it has always frowned upon the grant or existence of absolute or unbridled power.
of Just as power or jurisdiction under Article 226 has to be exercised in accordance with law, if any, enacted by the legislature it would stand rt to reason that the power under Article 129 and/or Article 215 should be exercised in consonance with the provisions of a validly enacted law. In case of apparent or likelihood of conflict, the provisions should be construed harmoniously. Some previous judgments on the issue were noticed by the Apex Court in the following para:-
"32 The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 inter alia provides for what is not to be regarded as contempt; it specifies in Section 12 the maximum punishment which can be imposed; procedure to be followed where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or in the High Court or cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases is provided by Sections 14 and 15; the procedure to be followed after taking cognizance is provided by Section 17; Section 18 provides that in every case of criminal contempt under Section 15 the same shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges; Section 19 gives the right of appeal from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. There is no challenge to the validity of any of the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act as being violative ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 23 or in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution. Barring observations of this Court in the Supreme Court Bar Association's case (supra), where it did not express any opinion on the question whether .
maximum punishment fixed by the 1971 Act was binding on the Court, no doubt has been expressed about the validity of any provision of the 1971 Act. In exercise of its constitutional power this Court has, on the other hand, applied the provisions of the Act while exercising jurisdiction under Article 129 or 125 of the Constitution. In Sukhdev Singh Sodhi's case (supra) it recognised that the 1926 Act placed a limitation on the amount of punishment which could be imposed. Baradakanta Mishra's of case was decided on the interpretation of Section 19 of the 1971 Act, namely, there was no right of appeal if the Court did not take action or initiate contempt proceedings. In the case of Firm Ganpat Ram rt Rajkumar's case (supra) the Court did not hold that Section 20 of the 1971 Act was inapplicable. It came to the conclusion that the application for initiating contempt proceedings (was within time and limitation had to be calculated) as for the purpose of limitation date of filing was relevant and furthermore that was a case of continuing wrong. In Kartick Chandra Das case (supra) the provisions of the Limitation Act were held to be applicable in dealing with application under Section 5 in connection with an appeal filed under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. A three-Judge Bench in Dr L. P. Misra's case (supra) observed that the procedure provided by the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 had to be followed even in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 215 of the Constitution. It would, therefore, follow that if Section 20 is so interpreted that it does not stultify the powers under Article 129 or Article 215 then, like other provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act relating to the extent of punishment which can be imposed, a reasonable period of limitation can also be provided."
4(c)(iv) In (2016) 14 SCC 251 (Maheshwar Peri & Ors. Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad), the Apex Court reiterated that in an action initiated for contempt under Article 129 of the ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 24 Constitution by the Supreme Court or under Article 215 thereof by the High Court, the prosecution proceeding has to be in consonance with .
the Contempt of Courts Act. The suo motu contempt initiated by the High Court was held to be hit by the limitation of one year prescribed under the Act. Relevant paragraphs from the judgment are extracted hereinafter:-
of "1. Leave granted. What is the period of limitation for suo motu initiation of contempt proceedings, is the short question for consideration in this case.
rt 2-6.....................
7. The main contention advanced by the learned Counsel for the appellants is that the High Court, having initiated action only after four years of the alleged contempt, the whole proceedings are barred by Section 20 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') which has prescribed the period of limitation of one year for initiating any proceedings of contempt, be it suo motu or otherwise. Section 20 of the Act reads as follows:
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt.--No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. "
8-12 ..................
13. Criminal Contempt of court subordinate to High Court can be initiated either suo motu or on a motion made by the Advocate General. The suo motu action is set in motion on a Reference made to it by the subordinate court. In view of the process involved in making the Reference by the subordinate court, in Pallav Sheth case (supra), it has been held that the Reference is the starting point of the process of ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 25 initiation of the action for contempt. That is why in paragraph-39, which we have extracted above, it has been clearly held that:
"39.... unless a court was to take suo motu action, the proceeding .
under The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an application drawing the attention of the court to the contempt having been committed."
The application is the motion provided under Section 15 of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Such a motion, by any person other than Advocate General, can be made only with the consent in writing of the of Advocate General. In other words, any other application made by a person without the consent of the Advocate General, is not an application in the eyes of law."
rt
14. This aspect has been succinctly discussed and subtly distinguished in paragraph-44 of the Pallav Sheth case.
"44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
15. Coming to the factual matrix of the present case, the High Court is clear in its mind that the action under Section 15 of the Act is initiated suo motu by the High Court. To make it abundantly clear in the impugned order, it is said that the name of the petitioner is not to be shown in the cause list. Apparently, it can only be suo motu because the application filed by the advocates, and which is referred to in the impugned order, is without the consent in writing of the Advocate General. The only application other than by the Advocate General, ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 26 contemplated under Section 15 of the Act, is the motion made by any person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General. Being a jurisdiction which, when exercised, is fraught with serious .
consequences, the Parliament has thought it justifiably fit to provide for such safeguards. Thus, the impugned article, having been published on 10.11.2008 and the High Court having initiated the suo motu action only on 28.04.2015, the same is hit by the limitation of one year prescribed under the Act."
4(c)(v) In the backdrop of above legal position, the plea of of limitation taken by learned counsel for the respondents is to be examined in the facts of the instant case. The regular second appeal rt alongwith the interpolated & tampered certified copy of the judgment and decree of the learned Appellate Court was filed by the respondents in this Court on 17.07.2017. Notice was issued in the accompanying application CMP(M) No.971/2017 seeking condonation of delay on 01.08.2017. The non-applicants filed their reply to the application on 09.08.2017 expressing doubts over the date of attestation, preparation & delivery impressed in the endorsement seal on the certified copy of judgment and decree. The Court called for the comments of the learned First Appellate Court on 30.08.2017. The matter was ordered to be listed on 04.10.2017. Learned First Appellate Court furnished its comments. Thereafter at the request of the present respondents (appellants in RSA) the matter was adjourned on 18.10.2017, ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 27 13.11.2017 & 15.11.2017. On 06.12.2017, following order was passed in the matter:-
.
"Despite repeated opportunities having been afforded to the applicants to file rejoinder w.e.f. 30.08.2017, they have failed to do so. As a matter of sheer indulgence and by way of last opportunity, two weeks' further time is granted to do the needful, failing which the application shall be considered on the basis of the pleadings as existing in the case file."
of Another application was moved by the present respondents for withdrawing the application seeking condonation of rt delay. The matter proceeded further and was repeatedly adjourned at the behest of present respondents (appellants in the RSA). Following orders were passed in the matter on 07.03.2018 and 04.04.2018, respectively:-
"Mr. Abhay Kaushal, learned vice counsel appearing for the applicants/appellants prays for and is granted three weeks time to file rejoinder."
& "Learned counsel for the applicants prays for further three weeks' time to file rejoinder. As a matter of sheer indulgence and by way of last opportunity further three weeks' time is granted to do the needful."
In the meanwhile, in the application moved by the present respondents seeking to withdraw the application for condonation of delay, adjournments were sought for filing the rejoinder. Such adjournments were granted to them on 25.04.2018, 16.05.2018, ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 28 23.05.2018 and 19.06.2018. The rejoinder was eventually filed on 10.07.2018.
.
On 24.07.2018, learned counsel representing the present respondents (appellants in RSA) sought permission to withdraw from the case. Permission was granted. The present respondents prayed for and were allowed time to engage another counsel. The matter was of thereafter adjourned time and again at the request of the appellants/present respondents, who attended the hearing in person.
rt Finally, vide order dated 21.08.2018, the Secretary H.P. Legal Services Authority was directed to provide legal aid to applicant No.2. The matter was adjourned thereafter at the request of learned legal aid counsel. It was finally heard on 02.04.2019 & the order was passed on 10.04.2019 dismissing the application & inter alia directing the Registry to initiate this contempt proceeding.
In light of orders passed in the regular second appeal, it is evident that the cause of action to initiate the contempt proceedings arose not on 05.01.2016 or 07.01.2016 as is contended by learned counsel for the respondents, rather the cause of action arose only on 10.04.2019 when prima facie the Court concluded after hearing learned counsel on both sides that there was tampering in the Court record.
::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 29Therefore, the contention put-forth by learned counsel for the respondents that contempt action cannot be initiated against the .
respondents, being barred by limitation provided under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act is devoid of merit. In Pallav Sheth v.
Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549, at page 571 the Supreme Court held that where fraud is committed by a party, time for computing the period of of limitation commences from the date of knowledge of act of fraud and that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation rt Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted. It declared:
"44. Action for contempt is divisible into two categories, namely, that initiated suo motu by the court and that instituted otherwise than on the court's own motion. The mode of initiation in each case would necessarily be different. While in the case of suo motu proceedings, it is the court itself which must initiate by issuing a notice, in the other cases initiation can only be by a party filing an application. In our opinion, therefore, the proper construction to be placed on Section 20 must be that action must be initiated, either by filing of an application or by the court issuing notice suo motu, within a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
45. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that even if the provisions of Section 20 do not bar the High Court from taking action if proceedings are initiated by the filing of an application within a period of one year of the contempt having been committed, in the present case the ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 30 period of limitation must be regarded as having expired long before the filing of the application by the Custodian and, therefore, no action on such an application could be taken by the Court.
.
46. The record discloses that the Custodian received information of the appellant having committed contempt by taking over benami concerns, transferring funds to these concerns and operating their accounts clandestinely only from a letter dated 5-5-1998 from the Income Tax Authorities. It is soon thereafter that on 18-6-1998, a petition was filed for initiating action in contempt and notice issued by the Special Court on 9-4-1999. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that of where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period rt were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. This Court in the case of Kartick Chandra Das has held that by virtue of Section 29(2) read with Section 3 of the Limitation Act, limitation stands prescribed as a special law under Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in consequence thereof the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act stand attracted.
47. Section 17 of the Limitation Act, inter alia, provides that where, in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation is prescribed by the Act, the knowledge of the right or title on which a suit or application is founded is concealed by the fraud of the defendant or his agent [Section 17(1)(b)] or where any document necessary to establish the right of the plaintiff or the applicant has been fraudulently concealed from him [Section 17(1)(d)], the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff or the applicant has discovered the fraud or the mistake or could, with reasonable diligence, have discovered it; or in the case of a concealed document, until the plaintiff or the applicant first had the means of producing the concealed document or compelling ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 31 its production. These provisions embody fundamental principles of justice and equity viz. that a party should not be penalised for failing to adopt legal proceedings when the facts or material necessary for him to do so .
have been wilfully concealed from him and also that a party who has acted fraudulently should not gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour by virtue of such fraud.
48. The provisions of Section 17 of the Limitation Act are applicable in the present case. The fraud perpetuated by the appellant was unearthed only on the Custodian receiving information from the Income Tax Department, vide their letter of 5-5-1998. On becoming aware of the of fraud, application for initiating contempt proceedings was filed on 18-6- 1998, well within the period of limitation prescribed by Section 20. It is on this application that the Special Court by its order of 9-4-1999 rt directed the application to be treated as a show-cause notice to the appellant to punish him for contempt. In view of the abovestated facts and in the light of the discussion regarding the correct interpretation of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, it follows that the action taken by the Special Court to punish the appellant for contempt was valid. The Special Court has only faulted in being unduly lenient in awarding the sentence. We do not think it is necessary, under the circumstances, to examine the finding of the Special Court that this was a continuing wrong or contempt and, therefore, action for contempt was not barred by Section 20."( emphasis supplied) This was reiterated in Bank of Baroda vs. Sadruddin Hasan Daya...(2004) 1 SCC 360 as under:
"11. One of the pleas taken in the reply filed by the respondents is that they had given the undertaking before the Bombay High Court on 5-10- 1999 but the present petition for initiating contempt proceedings against them was filed after more than one year in May 2001 and consequently, the same was barred by limitation by virtue of Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act. In this connection it may be noticed that the petitioners are not party to Summary Suit No. 4571 of 1996 which was ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 32 instituted by Oman International Bank, SAOD in the Bombay High Court wherein the respondents entered into a settlement and gave an undertaking in the consent terms on 5-10-1999. Normally, a person who .
is not a party to the suit or proceedings can get no knowledge of the affidavits or documents filed therein. It is categorically stated in para 14 of the present petition that in January 2001 the petitioners learnt about the consent decree passed in the case of Oman International Bank during the course of execution proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, when steps were taken to attach the aforesaid three properties. The respondents have neither controverted the said fact nor have they of placed any material to show that the petitioners had got knowledge of the consent terms filed by the respondents in the Bombay High Court at any time prior thereto. The petitioners filed the present application rt within five months of getting knowledge of the undertaking given by the respondents in the aforesaid case. In such a situation, the proceedings initiated against the respondents cannot be held to be barred by limitation in view of the law laid down by this Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian3, SCC paras 44 and 47, wherein it has been held that the period of limitation in a case like the present one has to be counted from the date of knowledge."
(emphasis supplied) In our opinion, the instant case being one initiated suo motu by the High Court, this court can be said to have knowledge of the tampering of the record only when it applied it's mind to the said issue at the time it heard the matter on 2.4.2019 and only when it got convinced that there was tampering of record by the respondents after considering the material on record and pronounced the order on 10.4.2019. All intermediate stages before the same were stages where the matter was under verification of said allegation made by original ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 33 plaintiffs, and steps taken by the Court in compliance with following of due process preliminary to hearing of the matter. The respondents .
cannot be allowed to take advantage of the time taken by them by seeking repeated adjournments before the learned Single Judge, so that decision in the matter gets delayed and then plead that the suo motu contempt is time barred. This principle is stated in maxim nullus of commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria.
In Union of India v. Maj. Gen. Madan Lal Yadav ... rt (1996) 4 SCC 127 the Supreme Court held :
"28. Even if narrow interpretation is plausible, on the facts in this case, we have no hesitation to conclude that the trial began on 25-2-1987 on which date the court martial assembled, considered the charge and the prosecution undertook to produce the respondent who was found escaped from the open detention, before the Court. It is an admitted position that GCM assembled on 25-2-1987. On consideration of the charge, the proceedings were adjourned from day to day till the respondent appeared on 2-3-1987. It is obvious that the respondent had avoided trial to see that the trial would not get commenced. Under the scheme of the Act and the Rules, presence of the accused is a precondition for commencement of trial. In his absence and until his presence was secured, it became difficult, nay impossible, to proceed with the trial of the respondent- accused. In this behalf, the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria -- meaning no man can take advantage of his own wrong -- squarely stands in the way of avoidance by the respondent and he is estopped to plead bar of limitation contained in Section 123(2). In Broom's Legal Maxim (10th Edn.) at p. 191 it is stated:
"... it is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong; and this maxim, which is ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 34 based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure."
.
The reasonableness of the rule being manifest, we proceed at once to show its application by reference to decided cases. It was noted therein that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong to gain the favourable interpretation of the law. In support thereof, the author has placed reliance on another maxim frustra legis auxilium invocat quaerit qui in legem committit. He relies on Perry v. Fitzhowe. At p. 192, it is stated that if a man be bound to appear on a certain day, and before that of day the obligee puts him in prison, the bond is void. At p. 193, it is stated that "it is moreover a sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has rt occasioned". At p. 195, it is further stated that "a wrong doer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong". At p. 199 it is observed that "the rule applies to the extent of undoing the advantage gained where that can be done and not to the extent of taking away a right previously possessed".
29. The Division Bench of the High Court has recorded the finding that the respondent has absconded from open military detention. From the narration of the facts it is clear that the respondent was bent upon protracting preliminary investigation. Ultimately, when the GCM was constituted, he had challenged his detention order. When he was unsuccessful and the trial was to begin he escaped the detention to frustrate the commencement of the trial and pleaded bar of limitation on and from 1-3-1987. The respondent having escaped from lawful military custody and prevented the trial from being proceeded with in accordance with law, the maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria squarely applies to the case and he having done the wrong, cannot take advantage of his own wrong and plead bar of limitation to frustrate the lawful trial by a competent GCM. Therefore, even on the narrow interpretation, we hold that continuation of trial from 2-3-1987 which commenced on 25-2-1987 is not a bar and it is a valid trial." ( emphasis supplied) ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 35 This principle has been reiterated in several cases such as Swarnalata Sarkar v. State of West Bengal ... (1996) 4 SCC 733;
.
Kanhaiya Kumar v Union of India ... (2018) 14 SCC 279 etc. Therefore the plea of respondents that the instant Criminal Contempt matter is barred by limitation, is rejected. We hold this proceeding to be within the limitation period. We may also of profitably extract observations of Hon'ble Apex Court from Dhananjay Sharma's case (supra) that "the stream of administration of rt justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the ad-
ministration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice".
::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 36It would also be pertinent to observe that Pallav Sheth's decision as followed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in AIR 2020 SC .
3927 (In Re: Vijay Kurle & Others) was noticed in AIR 2022 SC 5711 (In Re: Perry Kansagra) as under with reference to the constitutional power of the Court to consider contumacious acts of a contemnor & to punish him for the same:-
of " 13. The above said principle is followed in Re: Vijay Kurle and Ors., where this Court reiterated the above referred principle and held as under: -
rt "38. The aforesaid finding clearly indicates that the Court held that any law which stultifies or abrogates the power of the Supreme Court under Article 129 of the Constitution or of the High Courts under Article 215 of the Constitution, could not be said to be validly enacted. It however, went on to hold that providing the quantum of punishment or a period of limitation would not mean that the powers of the Court under Article 129 have been stultified or abrogated. We are not going into the correctness or otherwise of this judgment but it is clear that this judgment only dealt with the issue whether the Parliament could fix a period of limitation to initiate the proceedings under the Act. Without commenting one way or the other on Pallav Seth's case (supra) it is clear that the same has not dealt with the powers of this Court to issue suo motu notice of contempt.
39. In view of the above discussion we are clearly of the view that the powers of the Supreme Court to initiate contempt are not in any manner limited by the provisions of the Act. This Court is vested with the constitutional powers to deal with the contempt. Section 15 is not the source of the power to issue notice for contempt. It only provides the procedure in which such contempt is to be initiated and this ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 37 procedure provides that there are three ways of initiating a contempt - (i) suo motu (ii) on the motion by the Advocate General/Attorney General/Solicitor General and (iii) on the .
basis of a petition filed by any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General/Attorney General/Solicitor General. As far as suo motu petitions are concerned, there is no requirement for taking consent of anybody because the Court is exercising its inherent powers to issue notice for contempt. This is not only clear from the provisions of the Act but also clear from the Rules laid down by this Court."
of
14. It is within the constitutional power of this Court to consider the contumacious acts of a contemnor and to punish him/her for the same. It is in exercise of such a power, unrestricted by the Contempt of rt Court Act that this Court had imposed a sentence of more than six months and also directed in some cases that the contemnor shall undergo rigorous imprisonment.
15-16..........
17. This Court in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India and ors.6 while articulating the powers under Article 129 held as follows: -
"19. ...It is therefore that Article 142 of the Constitution of India mandates that this Court "... in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India ...".
And it is also inter alia for the above enforcement, that Article 129 of the Constitution of India, vests in the Supreme Court the power, amongst other things, to enforce compliance with the Court directions. The Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and power to punish for its contempt. It is this dispensation which authorises the Supreme Court to enforce compliance with its orders. For, the power to punish would serve no purpose if the power to enforce compliance was ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 38 lacking. It was, therefore, that this Court in Maninderjit Singh Bitta v. Union of India [(2012) 1 SCC 273 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 88 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 528 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 83] with .
reference to its contempt jurisdiction observed, thus : (SCC pp.
28285, paras 26-27 & 34).
"26. It is also of some relevance to note that disobedience of court orders by positive or active contribution or non-
obedience by a passive and dormant conduct leads to the same result. Disobedience of orders of the court strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which the judicial system rests. The of rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. Judiciary is the guardian of the rule of law. If the judiciary is rt to perform its duties and functions effectively and remain true to the spirit with which they are sacredly entrusted, the dignity and authority of the courts have to be respected and protected at all costs (refer T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad (102) v. Ashok Khot [(2006) 5 SCC 1] , SCC p. 6, para 5).
130. ...The scope of the instant contempt jurisdiction extends to punishing contemnors for violating the Court's orders;
punishing contemnors for disobeying the Court's orders; punishing contemnors for breach of undertakings given to the Courts. It also extends to enforcement of the Court's orders. The contempt jurisdiction even extends to punishing those who scandalise (or lower the authority of) any court; punishing those who interfere in due course of judicial proceedings; and punishing those who obstruct the administration of justice..."
18...............
19. In the circumstances and in order to mention the majesty of law, we must impose upon adequate punishment on the contemnor. We have also noted that the contemnor never showed any remorse or tender any apology for his conduct."
The Court would be failing in its duties, if the matter in question is not dealt with in a proper and effective manner for ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 39 maintenance of majesty of Courts as otherwise the Law Courts would lose their efficacy to the litigant public. [Re. 2000 (2) SCC 367 .
(Murray And Co vs Ashok Kr. Newatia)]. We may also gainfully quote from the judgment in Dhananjay Sharma's case that the law of contempt is deterrent in nature and is concerned essentially with prevention of scandalization or prejudice or interference with course of of judicial proceedings or administration of justice. The Criminal contempt offends public and consists of conduct that offends majesty rt of law undermines the dignity of Court.
5. Conclusion 5(i) We hold that respondents no.2-4 are guilty of criminal contempt under Section 2(c)(ii) & 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 for wilfully tampering the judicial record by making interpolations in the copying agency details contained in the certified copy of the judgment & decree dated 23.12.2015 passed by learned Additional District Judge-I Una in C.A. No.1938/2014.
5(ii) We also hold that respondents no.2-4 made false averments in CMP(M) No.971/2017 regarding dates of attestation & supply of aforementioned certified copy, which act prejudiced the due course of judicial proceedings and also interfered with & obstructed ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 40 the administration of justice. Thereby respondents no.2-4 have committed an offence punishable under Section 12 of the Contempt of .
Courts Act 1971.
5(iii) Considering the nature of offence committed by respondents no.2-4 & the factual matrix of the case, we impose following punishment upon them:-
of 5(iii)(a) Respondents no.2-4 shall render community service for a period of two weeks in a span of two months and for this purpose shall rt forthwith make themselves available to the Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Haroli, District Una. The concerned Gram Panchayat shall extract suitable & appropriate work from them for the benefit of the villagers/Gram Panchayat Haroli District Una.
5(iii)(b) After completion of the work under Clause 5(iii)(a) above to the satisfaction of the concerned Gram Panchayat, respondents no.2-4 shall report to the Secretary District Legal Services Authority Una, who shall in turn depute them for appropriate & suitable work for a total period of four weeks in span of six months, in the Village Legal Care and Sports Center, Haroli District Una.::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS 41
5(iii)(c) We impose a fine of Rs.2,000/- upon each of respondents no.2-4. In default, respondent no.2-4 shall be liable to undergo simple .
imprisonment for a period of one week.
5(iii)(d) We impose exemplary costs of Rs.10,000/- upon each of respondents no.2-4 to be deposited by them within a period of two weeks with District Legal Services Authority District Una.
of This contemt petition is disposed of in terms of above directions. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand rt disposed of.
( M.S. Ramachandra Rao ) Chief Justice (Jyotsna Rewal Dua) Judge 24th November, 2023 (rohit) ::: Downloaded on - 24/11/2023 20:33:44 :::CIS