Madras High Court
Sri Varadaraja Textiles Pvt. Ltd vs State Of Tamil Nadu
Author: P.N.Prakash
Bench: P.N.Prakash
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
RESERVED ON : 13.02.2017
DELIVERED ON: 03.03.2017
CORAM:
THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE P.N.PRAKASH
W.P. No.15520 of 2003
Sri Varadaraja Textiles Pvt. Ltd.
Rep. by its Director
Mr.G.V.Doraiswami Naidu
Peelamedu
Coimbatore . Petitioner
vs.
1.State of Tamil Nadu
Rep. by its Secretary to Government
Housing and Urban Development
Chennai 600 009
2. The Special Tahsildar (L.A)
Housing Scheme
Coimbatore 641 018
3. Tamil Nadu State Housing Board
Rep. by its Executive Engineer &
Administrative Officer
Hudco Colony, Tatabad
Coimbatore 641 012. .. Respondents
Prayer: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue a Writ of Certiorari to call for the notification made under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act I/1894 in G.O.Ms. 649 Housing and Urban Development (L.A.3(2) dated 22.9.1992 and the declaration made under Section 6 of Act in G.O.Ms.(Per) No.312 dated 12.7.2001 and the consequential notices under Section 9(3) and 10 of the L.A. Act I of 1894 made on 7.5.2003 for quashing the proceedings of the first respondent in G.O.Ms.649 Housing and Urban Development (L.A.3(2) dated 22.9.1992 and the declaration made under Section 6 of Act in G.O.Ms.(Per) No. 312 dated 12.7.2001 and the consequential notices under Section 9(3) and 10 of the L.A.Act I of 1894 on 7.5.2003 issued by the 2nd Respondent.
For petitioner Mr. M. Venkatachalapathy
Senior Counsel
for Mr. M.Sriram
For RR 1 & 2 Mr. V.Jayaprakash Narayan
Special Government Pleader
For R3 Mr.B.Vivekavanan
ORDER
Heard Mr. M. Venkatachalapathy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr.V.Jayaprakash Narayanan, learned Special Government Pleader appearing for respondents 1 and 2 and Mr.B. Vivekavanan, learned counsel for the third respondent.
2 This matter arises under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity the LA Act). The petitioner is a textile mill at Coimbatore. In this writ petition, they have challenged the notice issued by the 1st respondent under Section 9(3) r/w 10 of the LA Act by the 2nd respondent as well as the notices issued under Section 4 dated 22.9.1992 and Section 6 dated 12.7.2001 of the LA Act. The petitioner textile mill was aggrieved by the acquisition of the land of the company situated in Vilankurichi Village, Coimbatore North Taluk to the extent of 2.84.5 hectares in survey no.361 and 0.49.0 hectares in survey no.362/1 classified as dry land.
3 This writ petition was admitted on 27.5.2003 and interim stay of the impugned notice was granted in W.P.M.P.No. 19492 of 2003. Subsequently, on 11.11.2003, the stay granted was made absolute. When the matter came up on 6.2.2017, this court recorded the statement made by the learned Additional Government Pleader that after conducting an enquiry, a final award was also passed on 15.11.1995. On that day, the presence of the 2nd respondent (Mrs.T.S.Indra, who was present in the Court) was dispensed with for future hearings. She had filed her counter affidavit dated 1.2.2017 and it was stated that the counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the 1st respondent also.
4 The learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent- Housing Board made an issue before the court and this court had recorded the same as follows:-
When the matter came up for hearing, Mr.Vivekavanan, learned counsel appearing for the Tamil Nadu Housing Board submitted that there is a discrepancy with regard to ownership of the property under acquisition, in as much as in 4(1) Notification, land in Survey Nos. 361 and 362-1 stands in the name of Doraiswamy Naidu, son of Venkitaswami Naidu and Chandrakanthi and the land in Survey No. 363-1 stands in the name of Doraiswamy Naidu, son of V.Sri Rangammal and Velappa Naicker, whereas the petitioner before this court is Sri Varadaraja Textiles Private Limited, whose name does not figure in the revenue records and that their entitlement to maintain the writ petition is under cloud. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he would produce the necessary records to convince this court and that the land under acquisition belongs to Sri Varadaraja Textiles Private Limited. A copy of the sale deed made in favour of the petitioner textile mill dated 6.11.1964 was also produced to show their ownership of the land in question.
5 The facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are as follows. The Executive Engineer and the Administrative Officer of the 3rd respondent requested for acquisition of the lands found in survey no. 361/1, 362/1 and 363/1 in Vilankurichi Village, Coimbatore North Taluk to the extent of 12.05.0 hectares for the construction of houses under the Ganapathy Neighbourhood Housing Scheme Phase II. A draft notification under section 4(1) of the LA Act was approved by the 1st respondent in G.O.Ms. No.649, (Housing & Urban Development Department) dated 22.9.1992. The said notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 21.10.1992 as well as two daily newspapers (Namadhu MGR and Viduthalai) dated 22.10.1992. A publication was made in the local area on 25.11.1992.
6 An enquiry under section 5A of the LA Act was conducted by the 2nd respondent. Individual notices were said to have been served on all the land owners and interested persons. In the enquiry held on 24.2.1993, opportunities were given to the aggrieved persons to submit their objections to the proposal. Even before that day, the land owners submitted written objections and gave statements, which were recorded by the Acquisition Officer. The objections raised by the land owners were sent to the 3rd respondent, being the requisitioning body. The 3rd respondent, after due inspection, gave his remarks stating that the notified lands were situated in a vantage point in the housing scheme and any exclusion of those lands will adversely affect the comprehensive nature of the lay out. He also recommended the overruling of all the objections made by the land owners.
7 The records which were sent to the 1st respondent were considered and the objections raised were overruled. A draft declaration under section 6 of the LA Act was approved by the 1st respondent vide G.O.Ms.No.937 (H & UD Department) dated 15.11.1993. The said declaration was published in the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette on 18.11.1993 as well as in two Tamil dailies on 20.11.1993. A publication in the locality was also made on 23.11.1993.
8 The draft declaration under Section 6 was approved by the Government vide their letter no.4671/L.A/3(2)/94-1 dated 19.3.1994. It was also published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette on 11.5.1994. Subsequently, the notices issued under Section 9(3) r/w 10 of the LA Act by the 2nd respondent was served on the land owners and acknowledgements were obtained. Thereafter, an award enquiry was conducted as per Section 11 of the LA Act and a final award was passed in Award No.2/95 dated 15.11.1995.
9 Even before the final award was passed, the petitioner filed a writ petition being W.P.No.17359 of 1994 and obtained an interim order of stay of dispossession alone in W.M.P.No. 26377 of 1994 on 6.10.1994. Subsequently, the same petitioner filed W.P.No.16218 of 2000. Both writ petitions were disposed of by a common order dated 14.7.2000. The learned Judge set aside the enquiry proceedings under section 5A. In that order, it was stated as follows:-
It is stated that the requisitioning body namely, the Housing Board offered their remarks on 12.5.93, it is seen from the records that 5-A proceedings were issued on 1.5.93 i.e. even prior to the receipt of the remarks of the requisitioning body. It is settled law that whenever the land owner filed objections within the time prescribed, it is the duty of the land acquisition officer to forward the said objection to the requisitioning body and after obtaining the remarks, the same has to be communicated to the land owner and further enquiry has to be conducted thereafter as laid down in the case of N.D.Ramanujam Vs.Collector of Madras & 2 others 1994 W.L.R.326. The said recourse has not been followed by the respondents. On this ground, namely, non-compliance of mandatory provisions under Section 5-A read with Rule 3(b) of the Rules, the acquisition proceedings from the state of 5-A enquiry is quashed. Writ petition is allowed to the extent mentioned above. 10 Subsequent to the order passed by this court, the 2nd respondent issued a notice dated 19.2.2001 under section 5-A of the LA Act. The petitioner sent their objections dated 7.3.2001 once again contending that the land is required and the proposal to acquire may be dropped. They also informed that apart from a school by name Vidya Niketan, there were two other schools in the same campus and also an Industrial Training Institute (I.T.I) run by them in that land. The 3rd respondent sent their remarks dated 24.4.2001 stating that since subsequent to Section 4(1) notification, the land owners have constructed buildings and are conducting schools and using the other land as playground and if the acquisition proceedings were proceeded with, then, it may result in demolition of the school building and then only the scheme can be executed. Even if the acquisition is completed, it may result in protracted litigation without any use for the Board due to impossibility of taking possession, in view of the existence of buildings. Further, executing the project by demolishing the building may not be feasible. Hence, withdrawal from the acquisition may be considered. He also stated that apart from the existing school premises and excluding the land buildings having been constructed, there are remaining 9 acres of land lying vacant, for which, acquisition proceedings may be continued.
11 On examining these records, the 2nd respondent made a recommendation vide his proceeding dated 31.5.2001 to the Government to drop the acquisition proceeding in respect of the entire land. In his recommendation, he made the following remarks:-
nfhit tPl;L trjp jpllr; braw;bghwpahsh; f/r/ 361 kw;Wk; 363-1 be/fhiyfspy; 8/50 Vf;fh; (3/44/0 bcwf;nlh;) epyj;jpy; gs;spf;fl;ol';fs; cs;sjhy; epy vLg;gpy; ,Ue;J tpyf;fspf;f nfhhpa[s;shh;/ f/r/ 361 gFjp. 362-1 kw;Wk; 363-1 be/ fhiyfspy; fl;Lkhd';fs; ,d;wp fhypahf cs;s 8/56 Vf;fh; (3/46/5 bcwf;nlh;) epyj;ij epyvLg;g[ bra;a nfhhpa[s;shh;/ ,t;tYtyf rhh; Ma;thshpd; mwpf;ifgo f/r/361 be/fhiyapy; fhypaplkhf cs;s 2/85 Vf;fh; (1/15/5 bcwf;nlh;) epyj;jpy; Tilg;ge;J ikjhdk;. ifg;ge;J ikjhdk; kw;Wk; fhy;ge;J ikjhdk; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ/ f/r/ 362-1 be/fhiyapy; fhypahf cs;s 1/21 Vf;fh; (0/49/0 bcwf;nlh;) epyj;jpy; cwhf;fp ikjhdk; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ/ f/r/ 363-1 be/ fhiyapy; fhypahf cs;s 4/50 Vf;fh; (1/82/0 bcwf;nlh;) epyj;jpy; fphpf;bfl; ikjhdk; mikf;fg;gl;Ls;sJ/ nkYk; fiyau';fk; mikf;f jpl;lkplg;gl;L mjw;fhf ntiyfs; eilbgw;W tUfpwJ/ ou!;l;lhy; eph;tfpf;fg;gl;LtUk; jpUkjp gj;khtjp mk;khs; cah;epiy gs;spf;F 5 Vf;fh; tpisahl;olk; Vw;gLj;jg;gl;L guhkhpf;fg;gl ntz;Lk; vd;W gs;spf; fy;tp ,iz ,af;Feh; (,ilepiy fy;tp) bjhptpj;Js;shh;/ fl;Lkhd';fs; ,d;wp fhypahf cs;s 8/56 Vf;fh; (3/46/5 bcwf;nlh;) epyj;ij tPl;Ltrjp thhpaj;jpw;F epyvLg;g[ bra;a[k; gl;rj;jpy; jpUkjp gj;khtjpak;khs; cah;epiyg; gs;spf;F 5 Vf;fh; epyk; tpisahl;olk; Vw;gLj;jg;gl ,ayhj epiy Vw;gLk;/ jpUkjp gj;khtjp mk;khs; cah;epiyg; gs;spf;F tpisahl;olk; Vw;gLj;jg;glhtpl;lhy; mg;gs;spf;F tH';fg;gl;l jw;fhypf m';fPfhuk; ,uj;J bra;ag;gl ntz;oa epiy Vw;gLk;/ Mifahy; epy clikahsUf;F ghj;jpag;gl;l f/r/ 361. 362-1 kw;Wk; 363-1 be/ fhiyfspy; 6/90/5 bcwf;nlh; epyk; KGtija[k; epy vLg;gpy; ,Ue;J tpyf;fspf;f ghpe;Jiuf;fg;gLfpwJ/" (emphasis added) 12 However the 1st respondent rejecting their proposal, issued a draft declaration under section 6 of the LA Act vide G.O.Ms.No.312 (H& UD Department) dated 12.7.2001. The said notification was published in the Tamil Nadu Gazette dated 13.7.2001. Besides a publication in the locality on 13.7.2001, it was also advertised in two Tamil dailies of the same date. The reasons for rejection of the objections of the land owner of the petitioner as well as the remarks of the requisitioning authority and the recommendation of the acquisition officer were not disclosed and the counter affidavit is silent on this aspect.
13 A draft declaration made under section 7 of the LA Act was approved by the District Collector, Coimbatore, vide his proceedings in reference no. 169081/91/F6 dated 10.01.2002. Thereafter, the 2nd respondent issued notices under Section 9(3) r/w 10 of the LA Act dated 7.5.2003 asking the petitioner to appear for an enquiry under section 11 of the Act. It was at this stage the petitioner moved this Court with the above writ petition and obtained an interim order, as noted already.
14 Conscious of the fact that the construction of the buildings was made in the lands proposed to be acquired only after Section 4(1) notification and so, on that ground no equity can be claimed, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the declaration made under section 6 of LA Act dated 12.7.2001 is barred by limitation. According to them, the original notification under Section 4(1) was made on 22.9.1992 and that notification was not disturbed by this Court by its order dated 14.7.2000 and it had set aside the Section 5A enquiry report alone. For this purpose, reliance was placed upon a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) & Ors. Vs. State of T.N.&Ors. [(2002) 3 SCC 533] as well as the earlier order of the Supreme Court in A.S.Naidu & Ors.Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (though was delivered in 1990) reported in (2010) 2 SCC 801.
15 As reliance was placed upon section 6(1) of the LA Act, for the purpose of computing the limitation, it is necessary to extract the said provision which is as follows:-
"Section 6:Declaration that land is required for a public purpose:- (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the Appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5 sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under section 5, sub-section (2):
Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under section 4, sub- section (1)-
(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.
[Explanation 1.- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded."
16 Since there were differences of opinion on the question of calculation of limitation between Section 4(1) notification and Section 6 declaration, the matter was referred to a decision by a Constitution Bench and the same was answered in Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) (supra) and in para 11, the Court observed as follows:-
It may be pointed out that the stipulation regarding the urgency in terms of Section 5of the Act has no role to play when the period of limitation under Section 6 is reckoned. The purpose for providing the period of limitation seems to be avoidance of inconvenience to a person whose land is sought to be acquired. Compensation gets pegged from the date of Notification under Section 4. Section 11 provides that the valuation of the land has to be done on the date of publication of Notification under Section 4. Section 23 deals with matters to be considered in determining the compensation. It provides that the market value of the land is to be fixed with reference to the date of publication of the Notification under Section 4 of the Act. The prescription of time limit in that background is, therefore, peremptory in nature. In Ram Chand and Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (1994 (1) SCC 44), it was held by this Court that though no period was prescribed, action within a reasonable time was warranted. The said case related to a dispute which arose before prescription of specific periods. After the quashing of declaration, the same became non-est and was effaced. It is fairly conceded by learned counsel for the respondents that there is no bar on issuing a fresh declaration after following the due procedure. It is, however, contended that in case a fresh notification is to be issued, the market value has to be determined on the basis of the fresh Notification under Section 4 of the Act and it may be a costly affair for the State. Even if it is so, the interest of the person whose land is sought to be acquired, cannot be lost sight of. He is to be compensated for acquisition of his land. If the acquisition sought to be made is done in an illogical, illegal or irregular manner, he cannot be made to suffer on that count. 17 Again, in the very same judgment, the court over ruled some of its earlier decisions and upheld some other decision. In para 16,17 &18, it was ordered as follows:-
The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K Chinnathambi Gounder (supra) was rendered on 22.6.1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the Legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay or injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim 'actus curia neminem gravibit' highlghted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.
The view expressed in Narasimhaiah's case (supra) and Nanjudaiah's case (supra), is not correct and is over-ruled while that expressed in A.S. Naidu's case (supra) and Oxford's case (supra) is affirmed.
There is, however, substance in the plea that those matters which have obtained finality should not be re-opened. The present judgment shall operate prospectively to the extent that cases where awards have been made and the compensations have been paid, shall not be reopened, by applying the ratio of the present judgment. The appeals are accordingly disposed of and the subsequent Notifications containing declaration under Section 6 of the Act are quashed. 18 Since in the present case no compensation has been paid and no Award has been passed, the decision in Padma Sundara Raos case (cited supra) will apply to the case of the petitioner. As noted already, the Padma Sundara Raos case upheld its earlier decision in A.S.Naidus case (supra).
19 Further, the decision in Padma Sundara Raos case also came to be considered subsequently in several other rulings of the Supreme Court. In R. Indira Saratchandra Vs. State of Tamil Nadu reported in [(2011)10 SCC 344], it was held as follows:
6. In the opinion of the Division Bench, the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (supra) cannot be applied to the cases in which the acquisition proceedings had become final. The Division Bench was also of the view that the writ petition filed by the appellant herein and the proforma respondents was highly belated.
14.In our view, the last paragraph of the aforesaid judgment has no bearing on this case because at the time of pronouncement of Constitution Bench judgment, the writ petition filed by the appellant and the proforma respondents for grant of a declaration that the acquisition will be deemed to have lapsed due to non-making of award for two years was pending before the High Court.
15. Although, the Division Bench has referred to a large number of judgments which lay down the proposition that the High Court would not entertain belated challenge to the land acquisition proceedings but the impugned judgment does not contain any discussion on this issue. That apart, we find that the appellant and the proforma respondent had moved the High Court without any delay. Rather, they had filed writ petition immediately after pronouncement of the award. Therefore, they could not have been non-suited by the Division Bench of the High Court by invoking the rule of laches. 20 Once again, in Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. Vs. Vemuganti Ramakrishan Rao [(2013) 8 SCC 789], while considering a similar limitation found under section 11A of the LA Act, the Supreme Court applied the principle laid down in Padma Sundara Raos case and held as follows:-
It is evident from the above that in order to be valid, the Award must be made within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The declaration in the instant case was published on 2nd March, 1994 while the Award was made on 5th November, 1999. The same was, therefore, clearly beyond two years period stipulated under the above provisions. Even so the Award could be held to be valid if the same was within two years of the declaration after excluding the period during which the High Court had stayed the proceedings in the writ petition filed by the respondent-landowners. That is because Explanation to Section 11 (supra) permits exclusion of the period during which the Court had stayed the acquisition proceedings for the purpose of reckoning the period of two years prescribed for making the Award. In the case at hand the interim order of stay was issued by the High Court on 6th December, 1995 which order was finally vacated on 28th July, 1999 with the dismissal of the writ petition. This means that the restraint order remained in force for a period of 3 years, 7 months and 22 days. That period shall have to be added to the period of two years prescribed for making the Award in the light of Explanation to Section 11. The difficulty is that even if the said period is added to the time allowed for making an Award, the Award stands beyond the period prescribed. Confronted with this proposition Mr. Altaf Ahmad argued that the period taken to obtain a copy of the order by which the High Court vacated the stay earlier granted by it ought also to be excluded from consideration and when so excluded the Award would fall within the outer limit of two years stipulated under Section 11. Reliance in support of that submission was placed by Mr. Altaf Ahmad on the decision of this Court in N. Narasimhaiah and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors. Union of India and Ors. (1996) 3 SCC 88. It was contended that although the said decision was reversed by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and Ors. v. State of T.N. and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533, the law declared by this Court was made applicable prospectively. This would, according to Mr. Altaf Ahmad, imply that on the date the Award in question was made, the legal position stated in Narasimhaiahs case (supra) would hold the field. It would also, according to the learned counsel, mean that the time taken for obtaining a copy of the order of the High Court would have to be excluded in the light of the judgment in Narasimhaiahs case (supra).
On behalf of the respondents, on the contrary, learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of this Court in R. Indira Saratchandra v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (2011) 10 SCC 344 to contend that this Court having noticed the previous decisions on the subject had clearly repelled the contention that a stay order vacated by the Court should all the same remain operative till delivery or receipt of a copy of such order by the Collector/LAO. It was submitted that the view expressed in N. Narasimhaiahs case (supra) which was followed in State of Karnataka v. D.C. Nanjudaiah (1996) 10 SCC 619 having been overruled by this Court in case of Padma Sundara Raos case, there was no question of placing reliance upon the ratio of the said two decisions. The contrary view expressed in A.S. Naidu and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (2010) 2 SCC 801 having been found to be the correct view, not only by the Constitution Bench in Padma Sundara Raos case (supra) but also in R. Indira Sartchandras case (supra), the ratio of the said decisions alone stated the correct legal position, which was squarely applicable to the case at hand. 21 Though the plea of limitation for passing the award was raised in para 6(a) of the affidavit, in the counter affidavit filed by the 2nd respondent on behalf of 1st and 2nd respondents, there is no specific denial. The factual situation was only set down in para 17 of the counter affidavit. In view of the same, to examine whether the Award dated 12.7.2001 is hit by limitation provided under section 6(1) of the LA Act, the following dates are relevant for the purpose of computing the limitation.
22.9.1992 : Section 4(1) Notification 24.2.1993 : Section 5A enquiry 15.11.1993 : Section 6 declaration 6.10.1994 : Interim stay granted of dispossession alone in W.M.P.26377of 1994 in W.P.17359 of 1994.
14.7.2000 : W.P.No.17359 of 1994 allowed Section 5A enquiryquashed 7.3.2001 : Fresh 5A enquiry 12.7.2001 : Section 6 declaration.
22 It must be noted that under section 6(1)(ii), a declaration cannot be published after one year after the notification under section 4(1) of the LA Act. As per Explanation (1) to the said section, the action or proceeding taken pursuant to notification under Section 4(1), if it is stayed by the court, can be excluded. In this case, there is no interim stay of further proceedings granted by this Court. Even otherwise, the final orders in the earlier writ petition challenging the section 5A enquiry was made on 14.7.2000.
23 Therefore, in this case, it cannot be held that the impugned Section 6 declaration dated 12.7.2001 was made within one year from the date of the notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act. In view of the same, this Court is constrained to quash the impugned Section 6 declaration dated 12.7.2001 as well as the notification under Section 4(1) dated 22.9.1992 and also the consequential proceedings under Section 9(3) r/w 10 dated 7.5.2003. Accordingly, the writ petition stands allowed. No costs.
03.03.2017 cad Index : Yes/No To 1 The Secretary to Government Housing and Urban Development State of Tamil Nadu Chennai 600 009
2. The Special Tahsildar (L.A) Housing Scheme Coimbatore 641 018 3 The Executive Engineer & Administrative Officer Tamil Nadu State Housing Board Hudco Colony, Tatabad Coimbatore 641 012 P.N.PRAKASH, J.
cad W.P.No.15520 of 2003 03.03.2017