Delhi District Court
Hari Chand (Since Deceased) vs Jitender Nath Sharma (Since Deceased) on 18 October, 2025
IN THE COURT OF SH. VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL
PRINCIPAL DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE
& RENT CONTROL TRIBUNAL (CENTRAL)
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
RCT No.09/2021
CNR No. DLCT01-002373-2021
In the matter of:-
HARI CHAND (SINCE DECEASED) THROUG HIS
LEGAL HEIRS
1. Shri Sohan Lal Aggarwal
2. Shri Nathu Ram Aggarwal
Both sons of Late Shri Hari Chand of Shops No. 1630 to 1632,
Chuna Mandi Pahar Ganj, New Delhi
3. Mrs. Baby
D/o Late Shri Hari Chand
4. Mrs. Asha
D/O Late Shri Hari Chand
All of Shops No, 1630 to 1632, Chuna Mandi
Pahar Ganj, New Delhi ..Appellants
Versus
1. Shri Jitender Nath Sharma
S/o Late Shri Nand Lal
(since deceased) through his legal heirs
i. Smt. Vijay Sharma
W/o Late Shri Jitender Nath Sharma
ii. Ms. Pooja Kalra
D/o Late Shri Jitender Nath Sharma
R/o 38/5, East Patel Nagar,
Digitally
signed by
VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
KUMAR BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18
17:30:10
+0530
RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 1 of 43
New Delhi.
iii. Shri Pushkar Sharma
S/o Late Shri Jitender Nath Sharma
R/o 38/5, East Patel Nagar,
New Delhi.
iv. Shri Prashant Sharma
S/o Late Shri Jitender Nath Sharma
R/o 38/5, East Patel Nagar,
New Delhi.
2. Shri Ravinder Nath Sharma
S/o Late Shri Nand Lal
R/o 1634, Main Bazar,
Pahar Ganj,
New Delhi. .....Respondents
Date of filing of appeal : 16.02.2021
Date of arguments : 09.09.2025
Date of Judgment : 18.10.2025
JUDGMENT:
1. The appellate jurisdiction of this court has been invoked under section 38 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in short, the DRC Act impugning the order dated 11.01.2021 whereby the Ld. ARC has allowed the eviction petition and passed the eviction order.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that on 02.02.1978 Sh. Jitender Nath Sharma and Sh. Ravinder Nath Sharma hereinafter referred as petitioners/respondents filed the eviction petition against Sh. Hari Chand hereinafter referred as the respondent/appellant on the ground of sub-letting under Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 2 of 43 17:30:15 +0530 section 14 (1) (b) of DRC Act with respect to premises i.e. Shop No. 1630 to 1632, Chuna Mandi, Pahar Ganj, new Delhi hereinafter referred as tenanted premises as shown red in the site plan.
3. It is alleged that the petitioners are the absolute owners of the premises in dispute. The respondent became the tenant under the petitioners by operation of law, when the petitioners purchased the tenanted premises from the erstwhile owner through registered sale deed.
4. The tenancy of the respondent was oral tenancy and the same has been terminated vide notice dated 08.12.1977. Now the respondent is a statutory tenant.
5. It is alleged that the respondent has sub-let, assigned or parted with possession of the tenanted premises to Sh. Pyare Lal s/o Sh. Laxmi Chand, Sh. Narsingh Dass s/o Sh. Bichha Ram and Sh. Naresh Kumar after 09.06.1952 without the written consent of the petitioners and their predecessors in interest.
6. During the pendency of the petition the subsequent event was brought on record that Sh. Pyare Lal in connivance with the legal heirs of the respondent has further sub-let or parted with possession of shop no. 1630 Chuna Mandi, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi to one Sh. Anoop Bhardwaj, who is running his business in the name and style of Annu Tours and Travels. The petitioners have also obtained the necessary permission under section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956. It is prayed that the eviction order be passed against the respondent.
Digitally
signed by
VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
KUMAR BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18
17:30:20
RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 3 of 43 +0530
7. The notice of eviction petition was served upon the respondent. He filed the written statement. Later on amended written statement was filed taking the defence that the petitioners purchased the tenanted premises in the year 1973. The respondent along with others has been a joint tenant since the year 1930. The other persons are Sh. Pyare Lal, Sh. Narsingh Dass and Late Sh. Kali Ram brother of the respondent.
8. The tenancy was created under the name and style of M/s Hari Chand Kali Ram by the erstwhile owner. Sh. Kali Ram died on 17.06.1972 leaving behind his widow Smt. Kasturi Devi, two sons Sh. Naresh Kumar and Sh. Rakesh and four daughters Smt. Bhagwati Devi, Smt. Santosh, Smt. Kanta and Miss Sunita. It is alleged that the legal heirs of Late Sh. Kali Ram are the necessary party.
9. It is alleged that the permission from the Competent Authority Slum has been obtained only against Sh. Hari Chand and not for the other joint tenants.
10. It is further alleged that assuming but not admitting that there was sub-letting or parting with possession to Sh. Pyare Lal and Sh. Narsingh Dass, but that was within the knowledge of previous landlord. The previous landlord was legally not entitled to raise any objection to the alleged sub-letting by the principle of acquiescence, waiver, abandonment and estoppel as the previous landlord has consented to their presence in the tenanted premises.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date: BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:30:23 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 4 of 43
11. The respondent has further alleged that petitioners themselves were carrying on the business from the adjacent shop for the last more than 40 years and have been in knowledge of the petitioner that Sh. Pyare Lal, Sh. Narsingh Dass and Sh. Kali Ram are in occupation of the tenanted premises along with the respondent since the commencement of tenancy.
12. The rent receipt was issued in the name of M/s Hari Chand Kali Ram, which clearly show that they admitted that besides the respondent, legal heirs of Kali Ram, Sh. Pyare Lal and Sh. Narsingh Dass are the tenants.
13. It is further alleged that petitioners earlier filed an eviction petition No. 293/75 against Sh. Hari Chand, Sh. Narsingh Dass and Sh. Pyare Lal. The said eviction petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 05.01.1976.
14. It is admitted that the present monthly rent is Rs. 37.18 paise. The electricity and water charges are paid by the respondent.
15. It is denied that during the pendency of the eviction petition one of the sub-tenant Sh. Pyare Lal has sub-let or parted with possession of shop no. 1630 Chuna Mandi, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi in connivance with respondent in favour of Sh. Anoop Bhardwaj who is running his business in the name and style of Annu Tours and Travels.
16. It is alleged that on 29.01.1994 the petitioners have illegally taken possession of shop no. 1630. A suit under section 6 of Specific Relief Act has been filed against the petitioners in Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:30:28 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 5 of 43 +0530 this regard. The respondent is now not in possession of shop no. 1630. The petitioners have falsely alleged that shop is in possession of Annu Tours and Travels.
17. The petitioners filed the replication to the written statement denying the averments made in the written statement and re-asserting the facts mentioned in the petition.
18. Thereafter the case was listed for evidence. Ld. ARC recorded the evidence of the parties and after hearing the arguments passed the order of eviction dated 11.01.2021 which is impugned in the present appeal.
19. Notice of appeal was sent to the respondents. They put appearance and also filed reply. The trial court record was also requisitioned.
20. I have heard the Ld. Counsel for the appellant, Ld. Counsel for the respondents and perused the record.
21. Ld. Counsel Sh. P. K. Rawal for the appellant submitted that the respondents earlier filed the eviction petition no.
293/1975 against the present appellant on the ground of sub- letting. That petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 05.01.1976 subject to payment of cost of Rs. 50/-. Ld. Counsel submitted that the respondents have deposited only Rs 30/- and not the entire amount. As they have not complied with the earlier order hence the present eviction petition is not maintainable as the deposit of cost is pre-condition as contemplated by law. It is prayed that on this count itself the Ld. ARC should have dismissed the eviction petition.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date: BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:30:35 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 6 of 43
22. Ld. Counsel for the respondent admitted that due to some miscalculation only Rs. 30/- were deposited and not Rs. 50/- as directed. There was no such intention not to follow the orders. It is neither intentional nor deliberate. It is bonafide mistake. It is prayed that as the respondents have no reason not to comply with the directions of the court and the amount of cost is also only Rs. 20/- which could not be deposited a lenient view be taken and the appeal be not dismissed on this ground.
23. After hearing the arguments and going through the record I found that no doubt earlier eviction petition was filed by the petitioners/respondents against the present appellant. That petition was withdrawn as the tenanted premises were situated in slum area and the petitioners/respondents withdrew that petition. The court while allowing the request of withdrawal imposed a cost of Rs. 50/- on the petitioners/appellants. It is also admitted fact that the petitioners/ appellants have not deposited the entire Rs. 50/- imposed as cost and had deposited only Rs. 30/-. The issue raised is whether on this ground the petitioners/appellants can be denied their right to file the eviction petition against the tenant who allegedly have violated the provisions of DRC Act. In my opinion the answer is no. the procedure has been adopted to further the ends of justice and not to deny the rights of a party who has come knocking on the door seeking justice merely on the ground that out of the cost of Rs. 50/- imposed upon him at the time of withdrawal of the earlier petition he had deposited only Rs. 30/- only. In my opinion it will be very hyper technical view and the Hon'ble Apex Court also has held that the Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:30:40 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 7 of 43 procedural laws are grounded on the principles of natural justice, which does not permit a person to be punished unheard.
24. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the judgment cited as Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 wherein it was held that:
"16. Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is 'procedure', something, designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to 'both' sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.
17. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.
18. The existence of such a principle has been doubled and in any event was condemned as unworkable and impractical by O'Sullivan J. in - 'Hariram Rewachand v. Pribhtas', AIR 1945 Sind 98 at p. 102 . He regarded it as an indeterminate term "liable to cause misconception" and his views were shared by Wanchoo, C. J. and Bapna, J. in Rajasthan: - 'Sewa Ram v. Misrimal ', AIR 952 Raj 12 at p.
14. But that a law of natural justice exists in the sense that a party must be heard in a Court of law, or at any rate be afforded an opportunity to appear and defend himself, unless there is express provision to the contrary, is, we think, beyond dispute. See the observations of the Privy Council in 'Balakrishna Udayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar', AIR 1917 Privy Council 71 at p. 74 , and especially in B. Barrett v. African Products Ltd.', AIR 1928 Privy Council 261 at p. 262 , where Lord Buckmaster said Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:30:44 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 8 of 43 "no forms or procedure should ever he permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigant's defence".
Also - 'Hari Vishnu's case ', which we have just quoted.
In our opinion, Wallace J., was right in 'Venkatasubbiah v. Lakshminarasimham', AIR 1925 Madras 1274 , in holding that "One cardinal principle to be observed in trials by a Court obviously is that a party has a right to appear and plead his cause on all occasions when that cause comes on for hearing", and that-
"It follows that a party should not be deprived of that right and in fact the Court has no option to refuse that right, 'unless the Civil Procedure Code deprives him of it'."
25. Keeping in view the above discussion and the judgment of the Supreme Court in my opinion on this ground no benefit can be given to the appellant herein.
26. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the present petition has been filed by the petitioners/appellants on 02.02.1978 alleging that only Hari Chand is the tenant. It is also alleged that the appellant herein has sub-let the premises to Sh. Pyare Lal, Sh. Narsingh Dass and Naresh Kumar without the written consent of the petitioners/appellants or their predecessor in interest after 09.06.1952. Ld. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the petitioners/appellants have failed to prove their case.
27. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the appellant is joint tenant of the premises since 1930 along with Sh. Pyare Lal, Sh. Narsingh Dass and Sh. Kali Ram. Sh. Kali Ram is brother of the appellant. Since the commencement of the tenancy all the four Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:30:48 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 9 of 43 persons are in possession and occupation of three different, independent shops having separate /independent entry. Ld. Counsel submitted that the erstwhile owner was knowing this fact and also possession of different shops by the different persons. He has by his act has permitted and consented for the said tenancy.
28. Ld. Counsel further submitted that these facts clearly show that the erstwhile owner if had any right, though denied, to evict the appellant on the ground of sub-letting, has waived the same. As the petitioners/ respondents have steeped in to the shoes of the erstwhile owner are not entitled to raise the said plea which has already been waived by the erstwhile owner.
29. Ld. Counsel submitted that it is well within the knowledge of the petitioners/respondents that the appellant along with other tenants are running their business from the suit premises since beginning.
30. Ld. Counsel submitted that in fact the rent receipt was issued in the name of Hari Chand Kali Ram. The rent receipts have been placed on record. These rent receipts clearly show that the tenancy was not in the sole name of Sh. Hari Chand but it was a joint tenancy and Sh. Hari Chand along with Sh. Kali Ram, Sh. Pyare Lal and Sh. Narsingh Dass were inducted as joint tenants. Ld. Counsel submitted that it is settled law that the petitioner/respondents have to stand on their own legs and cannot take benefit of the weaknesses of the defence. Ld. Counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment cited as Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:30:53 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 10 of 43 Ramchandra Sakharam Mahajan v. Damodar Trimbak Tanksale, AIR 2007 SC 2577, wherein it was held that:
"5. In support of his case, the plaintiff produced a number of revenue records and other documents. For reasons not explained, he did not produce the lease deed dated 21.7.1875, the source of the title of his family as set up in the plaint. Belatedly, he tried to introduce a certified copy of the lease deed in evidence. The trial Court took the view that no foundation had been laid for adducing secondary evidence since what was sought to be produced was only a certified copy and not the original and hence discarded the lease deed. Taking the view that the other documents relied upon by the plaintiff including Ext.141 and 142 and the khasra entries for the succeeding years are not enough to establish the title of the plaintiff, the trial Court dismissed the suit. Incidentally, the trial Court also appeared to find that defendants 1 to 9 had not established the title claimed by them. But the trial Court rightly took the view that the burden was on the plaintiff to establish his title and any weakness in the defense would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree for recovery of possession. It may be noticed that defendants 1 to 9 had made a counter claim for relief against the plaintiff in respect of a portion of the property and the trial Court found that the counter claim had not been established. Thus the trial Court dismissed the suit as well as the counter claim."
31. Ld. Counsel further submitted that as the previous owner by his conduct has already consented to the sub-letting and has waived his right to evict the appellant herein, the present petitioners are also bound by the acts of their predecessor in interest and the present petition should have been dismissed by the Ld. ARC on the ground of waiver and acquiesces. Ld. Counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment cited as Martin & Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional Distt. Judge, (1998) 1 SCC 732, wherein it was held that:
"13. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the provision containing the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act was for Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:30:57 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 11 of 43 public benefit and could not be waived. It is, of course, true that it is enacted to cover a class of tenants who are sitting tenants and whose premises are subsequently purchased by landlords who seek to evict the sitting tenants on the ground of bonafide requirement as envisaged by Section 21(1)(a) of the Act, still the protection available to such tenants as found in the proviso would give the tenants concerned a locus (sic) to avail of it or not. It is easy to visualise the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act would be between the landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other. These proceedings are not of any public nature. Nor any public interest is involved therein. Only personal interest of landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other hand get clashed and call for adjudication by the prescribed authority. The ground raised by the landlord under Section 21(1)(a) would be personal to him and similarly the defence taken by the tenant would also be personal to him. Six months' breathing time is given to the tenant after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if the tenant realises that the landlord has a good case. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived. In this connection we may profitably refer to a decision of this Court in the case of Krishan Lal v. State of J & K, 1994(4) SCC 422 wherein Hansaria, J., speaking for a Bench of two learned Judges has made the pertinent observations concerning the question of waiver of a mandatory provision providing for issuance of notice to the parties sought to be proceeded against by the person giving the notice, in paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Report as under : "As to when violation of a mandatory provision makes an order a nullity has been the subject-matter of various decisions of this Court as well as of courts beyond the seven seas. This apart, there are views of reputed text writers. Let us start from our own one time Highest Court, which used to be Privy Council. This question came up for examination by that body in Vellayan Chettiar v. Government of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 Privy Council 197 in which while accepting that Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is mandatory, which was the view taken in Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 54 IA 338 it was held that even if a notice under Section 80 be defective, the same would not per se render the suit requiring issuance of such a notice as a precondition for instituting the same as bad in the eye of Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:31:00 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 12 of 43 law, as such a defect can be waived. This view was taken by pointing out that the protection provided by the Section 80 is a protection given to the person concerned and if in a particular case that person does not require the protection he can lawfully waive his right. A distinction was made in this regard where the benefit conferred was to serve "an important purpose", in which case there would not be waiver (see paragraph 14).
This point had come up for examination by this Court in Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Shudhir Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 Supreme Court 1300 : 1964(6) SCR 1001 and a question was posed in paragraph 7 whether an act done in breach of a mandatory provision is per force a nullity. This Court referred to what was stated in this regard by Mookherjee, J. in Ashutosh Sikdar v. Behari Lal Kirtania, ILR 35 Calcutta 61 at page 72 and some other decisions of the Calcutta High Court along with one of Patna High Court and it was held that if a judgment-debtor, despite having received notice of proclamation of sale, did not object to the non-compliance of the required provision, he must be deemed to have waived his right conferred by that provision. It was observed that a mandatory provision can be waived if the same be aimed to safeguard the interest of an individual and has not been conceived in the public interest."
32. Ld. Counsel has also relied upon the judgment cited as Chiraguddin v. Urmila Rani, 2014 (213) DLT 699, wherein it was held that:
"9. In my opinion, learned counsel for the respondents/landlords is justified in placing reliance upon the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) and which clearly holds that if the provision of a statute gives certain right to a tenant, such a right is available to a tenant and can be waived by him. In my opinion, the right given as per Section 19 of the Slum Act is a right available with the petitioner/tenant in his personal capacity, and once no such objection was taken before the Additional Rent Controller who decided the main case under Section 14 (1) (a) of the Act, such a right has clearly been waived by the petitioner/tenant. The impugned judgment of the Rent Control Tribunal has effectively held the same vide para 13 of the same, and to which reasoning the ratio of the Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:31:05 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 13 of 43 judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Martin and Harris Ltd. (supra) is to be added."
33. Ld. Counsel submitted that in view of the facts of the case and the law as settled by the Apex Court and the High Court of Delhi the erstwhile owner and the petitioners/respondents have already waived their right to file the petition for eviction on the ground of sub-letting and therefore the Ld. ARC should have dismissed the petition instead of decreeing the same. It is prayed that the order of Ld. ARC be set aside and the appeal be allowed.
34. Ld. Counsel for the petitioners/respondent submitted that there is no question of waiver. The tenant was only Hari Chand. The facts itself establish the same. The claim of the appellant is that they were joint tenants but no such document such as the partnership deed or that their accounts were maintained jointly has been placed on record. This evidence can be only in the knowledge of the appellant, which he has never produced. He alleges that his brother Kali Ram was also tenant but according to the evidence Kali Ram use to sell articles by putting a Takahat out side the suit premises and not from the suit premises. This admission of the appellant itself shows that Kali Ram was never a tenant in the suit premises. So far as the other persons Sh. Pyare Lal, Sh. Narsingh Dass and Sh. Naresh Kumar are concerned there is no document placed on record that they were doing business jointly with the appellant from the very beginning. In fact in para 6 of the amended written statement it has specifically mentioned that they are doing their on business from different and independent shops having different and independent entries. Ld. Counsel submitted that this averment in the written statement Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 14 of 43 17:31:09 +0530 it self falsifies the stand of the appellant that they are the joint tenants.
35. Ld. Counsel further submitted that in fact the appellant himself is not certain as to what stand he shall take. On one hand he claims to be the joint tenants and in the same breath he claims them to be sub-tenant inducted with consent. When he is asked to show the consent then he claims that with the long presence in the tenanted premises the consent is presumed. Ld. counsel submitted that there is no such presumption of implied consent under law of landlord to induct the sub-tenant. In fact the law requires the written consent
36. Ld. Counsel submitted that the law also does not provide for waiver of the right in this beneficial legislation which was enacted to protect the tenants against eviction. Ld. Counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment cited as M/s Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma, (1988) 1 SCC 70, wherein the Apex Court has held that:
"11. Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his individual capacity. We are, however, in this case unable to agree. Firstly, in this case there was no case of waiver. Waiver is a question of fact which has to be tested by facts and evidence. There was no conscious relinquishment of the advantage of any statute. No Court has gone into this fact. It does not seem to have been urged before the High Court also. Apart from this, in this requirement of the statute which is in the public interest there cannot be any question of waiver of a right, dealing with the rights of the tenants or the landlord. In Chaplin v. Smith, 1926(1) King's Bench Division 198, it was held that physical possession was not sufficient, there must be legal possession.
Digitally
signed by
VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
KUMAR BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18
17:31:14
+0530
RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 15 of 43
15. There is no dispute in the legal proposition that there must be parting of the legal possession. Parting of the legal possession means possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. That is, in our opinion, is the matter of fact. In this case, it has been found that there was a right of possession in favour of the sub-lessee R.C. Abrol & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and right to exclude indeed as it appears from the narration of the fact that the company has gone into liquidation and the official liquidator has taken possession of the premises on behalf of the liquidator and that must be on the basis that it was the asset belonging to the company. In that aforesaid view of the matter we are unable to accept this proposition that there was no sub-letting."
37. Ld. Counsel has also relied upon the judgment cited as Duli Chand (Dead) By Lrs. v. Jagmender Dass, (1990) 1 SCC 169 wherein the Supreme Court has held that:
"11. In the aforesaid view it was held that it was necessary for the tenant to obtain the consent in writing to sub-letting the premises. The mere permission or acquiescence will not do. The consent shall also be to the specific sub-letting or parting with possession. This Court further observed that the requirement of consent to be in writing was to serve a public purpose, i.e., to avoid dispute as to whether there was consent or not and that, therefore, mere permission or acquiescence will not do. While noting that everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his individual capacity, in the context of the statutory provision of the Delhi Rent Control Act, this Court further held that the requirement as to the consent being in writing was in the public interest and that, therefore, there cannot be any question of waiver of a right, dealing with the rights of the tenants or landlord. The words used in the section are "without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord". If the words were "without consent of the landlord" it might mean without consent, express or implied and in that sense question of waiver may arise. The question of implied consent will not arise, if the consent is to be in writing."
38. Ld. Counsel submitted that in view of the facts of the case and the law as established by the Apex court of law that there Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:31:18 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 16 of 43 +0530 cannot be waiver of the right to evict the arguments raised by the appellant has no merit.
39. After hearing the arguments and going through the record I found that the plea raised by the appellant is that due to long presence of the sub-tenants in the premises in dispute and no action being taken by the erstwhile owner he has waived his right to evict the tenant on the ground of sub-letting. It is important to note here that before a sub-tenant is inducted a written consent of the landlord that also to the sub-tenant specific is required. It is not available in this case. The appellant claims the implied consent but there is no such concept of implied consent recognised by law. Even otherwise when the law specifically provides that consent has to be in writing then there is no question of any other way of having the consent. Even otherwise there has to be some evidence to show that the erstwhile owner or the present petitioners/respondents have consciously waived their right to evict the appellant herein on the ground of sub- letting, a ground provided to them under statute, but there is no such evidence on record. The issue now is whether due to long presence the landlord has waived the right of eviction? The supreme Court in the case of Duli Chand (supra) and Shalimar Tar (supra) has specifically held that there is no question of waiver of right to evict. The Supreme Court in the case titled Vaishakhi Ram v. Sanjeev Kumar Bhatiani, AIR 2008 SC 1585 considered the question of waiver on the ground of long exclusive possession of the sub-tenant and held as follows:
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:31:28 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 17 of 43 "12. Let us now revert to the question whether long exclusive possession of the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 in the suit shop would invite the court to hold that the respondent or the erstwhile owner of the suit shop had waived the right to evict the tenant on the ground of subletting. As noted herein earlier, an order of eviction can be passed under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act only if the ingredients enumerated herein earlier are satisfied. In order to prove subletting, it must be shown that the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were inducted without the consent in writing of the landlord. In this case, admittedly, no consent in writing, either of the erstwhile owner of the suit shop or of the respondent, who was the subsequent purchaser of the same, was taken in writing. It is now well settled that to constitute waiver of benefit conferred by provisions of the Act, conscious relinquishment of such benefit must be proved. In the case of Duli Chand (Dead) by Lrs. v.
Jagminder Dass [(1990)1 SCC 169], this Court while dealing with a case of subletting and waiver on the part of the landlord, emphasised that the consent in writing of the landlord for subletting or parting with possession was essential under Section 14(1)(b) of the Act. The view expressed in the aforesaid decision was also the view of this Court in the case of Pulin Behari Lal v. Mahadeb Dutta & Ors., 1993(1) RCR (Rent) 357 : [(1993)1 SCC 629] in which this Court reiterated the principle that in the absence of conscious relinquishment of right to eviction, the question of waiver on the ground of subletting for eviction by the landlord did not arise at all. It is not in dispute in the present case that the respondent had purchased the suit shop from the erstwhile owner of the same. The sale deed dated 20th of October, 2000 evidencing the purchase of the suit shop by the respondent from the erstwhile owner of the same was exhibited. A perusal of the sale deed would show that the appellant No. 1 was a tenant in respect of the suit shop and there was no mention that the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were also in possession of the suit shop, either in its entirety or in a part of it. That being the position and in the absence of any evidence on record to show that there was any conscious relinquishment of the benefit conferred by the provisions of the statute, we do not find any reason to hold otherwise to the extent that the subletting made in favour of the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 by the appellant No. 1 was proved and the right to eviction was not waived, either by the erstwhile landlord or by the respondent.
Digitally
signed by
VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
KUMAR BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18
17:31:32
+0530
RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 18 of 43
13. Mr. Aggarwal, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants had strongly relied on a decision of this Court in the case of United Bank of India v. Cooks and Kelvey Properties (P) Limited, 1995(1) RCR (Rent) 8 :
[(1994)5 SCC 9] and submitted that since the appellant No. 1 was in exclusive possession and legal control of the suit shop, the case of subletting could not be proved. In our view, that decision of this Court has no manner of application in the facts and circumstances of the present case. In that case, although the tenant appellant bank had inducted the trade union in the tenanted premises for carrying on the trade union activities, the bank had not received any monetary consideration from the trade union which was permitted to use and enjoy the same for its trade union activities. The bank had retained its power to call upon the trade union to vacate the premises at any time and the Union had also given an undertaking to vacate the same when required. In that decision, the bank was maintaining the premises at its own expense and also paying the electricity charges consumed by the trade union for using the demised premises. Basing on the aforesaid facts, it was held in that case that the bank had retained its control over the trade union whose membership was only confined to the employees of the bank and, therefore, the court held that the inference that could only be drawn was that the appellant had retained the legal control and possession of the suit premises in that case. As noted herein earlier, this is not the situation in the present case. The findings of the three courts were that the appellant No. 1 had no legal control over the suit shop and also that the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were in exclusive possession of the suit shop or at least, in a portion of the same and were carrying on a different independent business in the suit shop. Such being the position and in view of the fact that the appellant Nos. 2 to 4 were conducting their independent business in the suit shop and had exclusive possession of the same and that the appellant No. 1 had no legal control or possession over the suit shop, the aforesaid decision of this Court, as relied on by Mr. Aggarwal, could not be taken to be of any help to the appellants. Accordingly, these submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants have no legs to stand upon and thus rejected."
40. Keeping in view the judgment of the Apex Court in the aboe mentioned matter and in the cases of Shalimar Tar (supra) Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:31:36 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 19 of 43 and Duli Chand (supra) in my opinion this argument of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant has no merit.
41. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the present petition is barred by limitation. Ld. counsel submitted that limitation for seeking eviction on the ground of sub-letting is twelve years from the date of sub-letting or that sub-letting was within 12 years prior to the date of filing of the eviction petition.
In the present case as per the stand of the appellant the sub tenants are in possession since 1930. The eviction petition has been filed on 02.02.1978. the same is therefore barred by limitation hence liable to be dismissed. The Ld. ARC has not considered this fact and has held that it is continuing cause of action but the Supreme Court of India has not held so. The limitation would start running from the day the sub-letting was done and the time expires after 12 years. Ld. Counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment cited as Ganpat Rai Sharma v Gayatri Devi, (1987) 3 SCC 576, wherein it was held that:
"4. In 1958 Ganpat Ram was allotted a D.D.A. Quarter No. 3 7 at Village Seelampur, Shahdara. By a notification dated 28th of May, 1966. Village Seelampur, Shahdara was declared to be an urban area. By Notification dated 27th March, 1979 issued under section 1(2) of the Delhi Rent Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') this village was subjected to the provisions of the said Act. During 1967- 68 one Mrs. Sushila Devi was inducted into the quarter at Seelampur, consisting of a room, a kitchen and a bath room. This lady had applied for the allotment of the said quarter in her name sometime in 1974. On 20th of July. 1980. the authorities, in fact, allotted the said quarter to her. In 1965-70 Ms. Dev Karan and Kul Bhushan being the sons of Pearey Lal had been occupying the portion of the house at Krishna Nagar together with their family Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:31:43 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 20 of 43 members and grand-father, Nathu Ram. Nathu Ram died in 1969. The other portion was occupied by one Kalu Ram and his family members being brother of Jai Bhagwan. There are 18 people residing at the relevant time in the said house. The present landlord, the respondent herein, purchased the suit premises from the erstwhile landlord, Dina Nath on or about 9th April, 1973. On or about 28th of September, 1973, the present landlord applied to the competent authority under the Slum Act for permission to evict the appellants from the said premises. On 12th of December, 1974 the competent authority under the Slum Act granted permission to the landlord to proceed in eviction against the three appellants. On or about the 16th of April, 1975, the respondent herein filed three eviction suits against the appellants on the grounds contained in section 14 (1)(a),(h) & (j) of the Act. On 31st of January, 1977, it was held by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi that the ground under section 14 (1)(h) was made out against all the three appellants. The ground under section
14 (1)(a) was also upheld but the appellants were asked to deposit arrears of rent within a month from the date of the order so as to avail the benefit of section 15(1) of the Rent Act which the appellants availed of. On or about 24th April, 1979, the Rent Control Tribunal confirmed the decree in ejectment on appeal under section 14 (1)(h) of the Act against the three appellants. On further appeal the High Court construed section 14 (1)(h) of the Act to mean that a Building constructed by the tenant which is outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Act on the date of the application for ejectment, was yet within section 14 (1)(h) and the tenant was liable to be ejected.
21. Before we discuss the other aspect the result of the several decisions to which reference has been made above, indicate that the position in law is that the landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant has built, or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts. The other aspect is that apart from the question of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:31:48 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 21 of 43 quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant. In the light of these, we have now to examine whether the suit in the instant case was barred by the lapse of time. But quite apart from the suit being barred by lapse of time, this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limited rights to the landlord to recover-possession on stated contingencies.
22. The next aspect of the matter is which article of the Limitation Act would be applicable. Reference was made to Article 66 and Article 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the Limitation Act) which stipulates that for possession of immovable property the cause of action arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition. Article 67 stipulates a period of twelve years when the tenancy is determined. Article 113 deals with suit for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Schedule. On the facts of this case it is clear that Article 66 would apply because no determination in this case is necessary and that is well-settled now. Determination by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary.
23. It is well-settled that time begins to run from the date of the knowledge. See in this connection the decision of Harbans Singh and another v. Custodian of Evacuee Property 'P' Block and others, AIR 1970 Delhi 82 though that was a case under a different statute and dealt with a different article. See also Ujagar Singh v. Likha Singh and another, AIR 1941 Allahabad 28 at page 30. The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Somdass (deceased). v Rikhu Dev Chela Bawa Har Jagdass Narokari, Punjab Law Reporter Vol. 85., 184 held that in a suit for possession under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, material date is one on which the right to sue for possession arises.
24. In K.V. Ayyaswami Pathar and another v. M.R. Ry. Manavikrama Zamorin Rajah and others, AIR 1930 Madras 430, it was held that where a claim is based upon a forfeiture of a lease by reason of alienation of the demised land and nothing else, the article applicable for the purpose of limitation was clearly Article 143 and the limitation commences to run from the date of the Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 22 of 43 17:31:53 +0530 alienation. Here accrual of the right of the landlord is not challenged. The knowledge is indisputably in 1973 looked at from any point of view. There is no question of limitation in this case."
42. Ld. Counsel has further placed reliance upon the judgment cited as Maheshwar Dayal (Deced) v Shanti Devi, 2012 (3) AD (Delhi) 123, wherein the High Court of Delhi has held as follows:
"The order impugned before this Court is the judgment and decree dated 31.05.1989 passed by the Additional Rent Control Tribunal (ARCT) endorsing the finding of the Additional Rent Controller (ARC) dated 15.02.1986 whereby the eviction petition filed by the landlord Maheshwar Dayal (through legal representatives) seeking eviction of the tenant Shanti Devi (legal heirs of the original tenant) under Section 14 (1)(b) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) had been dismissed. The reasoning of the ARCT was however a reasoning different from that adopted by the ARC. Both the two Courts below had dismissed the eviction petition filed by the landlord.
11. Per contra, the respondent submits that the evidence recorded in the court below both oral and documentary has in fact established that a case of sub-letting was not made out and the findings of the ARC on this ground which was the first fact finding returned on reasoned grounds could not be interfered with by the RCT which has to hear an appeal under Section 38 of the DRCA only on a substantial question of law. The submission of the respondent being that ground under Section 14 (1)(b) was not established; further submission being that the present petition has even otherwise been filed in the year 1973 when admittedly even as per the case of the petitioner, the sub-tenancy was created in the year 1950; bar of limitation is also applicable. To support this submission reliance has been placed upon AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2016 Ganpat Ram Sharma and Others v. Smt. Gayatri Devi, AIR 1987 Supreme Court 2230 Kashi Ram v. Rakesh Arora and JT 1995 (5) S.C. 296 Mukri Gopalan v. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker; submission being that Article 66 of the Limitation Act, 1963 contemplates a period of 12 years for filing of a suit for possession by a landlord against his tenant which period has long since expired; subletting as per the case of the landlord is of the year Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:31:57 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 23 of 43 1950 and the present petition having been filed on 03.04.1973 i.e. 23 years later suffers from delay and latches as well. The judgment of the RCT on no count calls for no interference."
43. Ld. Counsel has also relied upon the judgment cited as Dharamvir Kataria v Shyam Sunder Talwar, D.O.D. 08.02.2012 wherein the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has held that:
"22. The next aspect of the matter is which article of the Limitation Act would be applicable. Reference was made to Art.66 and Art. 67 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter called the Limitation Act) which stipulates that for possession of immovable property the cause arises or accrues when the plaintiff has become entitled to possession by reason of any forfeiture or breach of condition. Article 67 stipulates a period of twelve years when the tenancy is determined. Article 113 deals with suit for which no limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule. On the facts of this case it is clear that Article 66 would apply because no determination in this case is necessary and that is well settled now. Determination by notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act is no longer necessary"
44. Ld. Counsel submitted that in this case the alleged sub- letting took place in 1930. The eviction petition has been filed on 02.02.1978 that is after 48 (forty-eight) year. The limitation had expired way back in 1942. Ld. Counsel submitted that Ld. ARC has not considered all these facts and prayed that the order of the Ld. ARC be set-aside and the appeal be allowed.
45. Ld. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the Ld. ARC has rightly dealt with the issue in the light of the judgments and held that the cause of action being continuing one hence the petition is with in limitation. It is submitted that there is no merit in the submissions on the issue of limitation. Ld. Counsel in Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:02 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 24 of 43 support of his arguments relied upon the judgments cited as Ld. Counsel for respondent in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment cited as Subhash Chand Goel v. Hans Raj Gupta and Co Pvt. Ltd, 2019 (2) RCR (Rent) 545 wherein Delhi High Court has held that:
"19. Mr. Aggarwal cited the Kerala High Court decision in Sadanandan (supra) to support his submission that a case of sub-letting is one of a recurring cause of action. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as follows: "7. We are also of the view that where a subletting is involved, the landlord gets a cause of action, which can only be described as a recurring cause of action. Every moment the objectionable sub-tenancy continues, the landlord gets, a right to apply for eviction under the Act after complying with the requirement of the proviso to Section (14)(1) of the Act. There is nothing in the Act which provides for the extinguishment of the right, once a notice under the proviso is issued, but it is not followed up by a petition for eviction. The objectionable subletting does not become an authorised subletting by that process. The right to apply for eviction will continue so long as the objectionable subletting subsists...."
20. The Gujarat High Court has also come to a similar conclusion in Amrutlal Jagjivandas Shah and Anr. v. Ramniklal Jagjivandas Shah (2005) 2 RCR 388, in the context of Section 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Paragraph 10 of the judgment reads as follows:
"10. Even otherwise, it is to be seen that in case of raising pakka construction, the moment construction is completed, a cause of action generates or accrues in favour of the landlord. In case of a sub-tenancy, which is continuing since after its creation, would give continuous cause of action to the landlord. A tenant cannot be allowed to say that though sub-tenancy was created, but after 12 years, it would ripen into a valid sub-tenancy. The judgment in the matter of Shakuntala (supra) was on different facts and cannot be applied to the facts of the present case."
21. The reasons given by the Kerala and Gujarat High Courts in the aforesaid judgments are applicable to Section 14 (1)(b) of the Act as well. In the present case, the factual Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:06 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 25 of 43 +0530 narration noted by the Trial Court also shows that the fact of the amalgamation was not made known to the petitioners. In the Kerala High Court decision, the fact of sub-letting was in fact known to the landlord who had also issued a notice of eviction. Even in those circumstances, a belated Eviction Petition was held not to be barred by limitation. The defence of limitation raised by the respondent is therefore rejected."
46. Ld. Counsel has also relied upon the judgment cited as M/s Rai & Sons v. M/s Phelps and Co., 1989 (38) DLT 94 wherein it was held that:
"13. It was contended by Mr. Verma that the petition for eviction was barred by limitation and also on account of laches and acquiescence. Provisions of proviso (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 14 of the Act are to be read with Section 16 thereof. In the present case subletting is alleged after the commencement of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 16 provides that in such a case, no tenant shall, without the previous consent in writing of the landlord, sublet the whole or any part of the premises held by him as a tenant. Sub-section (2) of this Section provides that no premises which have been sublet either in whole or in part on or after the 9th day of June, 1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord, shall be deemed to have been lawfully sublet. Proviso to sub-section (1) of Section
15 provides that the Controller may, on an application made to him by the landlord, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified therein. As noted above, in the present case, we are concerned with ground (b). The question that arises for consideration is if an application (petition) for eviction on the ground given in clause (b) could be filed at any time or within the period prescribed under the law relating to limitation under the Limitation Act 1963. Reference may be made to clause (h) of the proviso which contains another ground for seeking eviction of the tenant. This clause becomes applicable where the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of the Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of limitation in a case where an application for eviction had been filed on the ground contained in clause (h). This was in Ganpat Ram Sharma & ors. v. Gayatri Devi, 1987(2) RCR 162 : (1987)3 SCC 576). The Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:10 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 26 of 43 +0530 court observed that the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and that on the facts of the case article 66 of the Limitation Act, which prescribed a period of 12 years and not article 113 thereof, would apply because determination of the lease by notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was no longer necessary and that time would begin to run from the date of the knowledge of the fact that "the tenant had ......... built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a residence" (see paras 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the judgment). This judgment was delivered on 17.7.1987. Earlier on 6.5.1987, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in Smt. Shakuntala S. Tiwari v. Hem Chand M. Singhannia, 1988(1) RCR 9 : (1987) 3 SCC 211) in a case which had been filed under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses Rates Control Act, 1947. This Act contemplates filing of a suit. Section 13 of the Act provided that a landlord could sue for eviction provided he established any one of the circumstances set out in that section. The grounds on which the landlord in that case filed a suit for possession against the tenant were that the tenant had (1) made alterations of permanent nature in respect of the demised premises; (2) committed acts of waste and damage; and (3) changed the user of the premises. The Supreme Court held that article 67 of the Limitation Act would be applicable which provided for a period of 12 years or, in any case, it was article 66 which again provided for a period of 12 years, the cause of action, arising under article 67 from the date when the tenancy was determined and under article 66 when the forfeiture was incurred or the condition was broken. Earlier to filing of the suit, the landlord had given a notice to quit to the tenant. The court held that article 113, which dealt with the period of limitation for suits for which no period of limitation was provided elsewhere in the Schedule to the Limitation Act and provided the period of limitation as three years from the date when the right to sue accrued, would not be applicable. There is, however, a vital difference between the Bombay Act and the Delhi Rent Control Act. While the Bombay Act contemplates filing of suit, under the Delhi Act an application for eviction in the form prescribed is to be filed. In such a case, the period of limitation would be three years from the time when the right to apply accrues as provided under article 137 of the Limitation Act, which is applicable to applications for which no period of limitation is provided Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:15 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 27 of 43 elsewhere in the Schedule. But, then in the Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, (AIR 1977 Supreme Court 282), the Supreme Court held that article 137 of the Limitation Act would apply to any petitions or application filed under any Act to a civil court. In this case, a petition had been filed under Sections 10 and 16(5) of the Indian Telegraph Act 1885 read with Section 51 of the Indian Electricity Act 1910 claiming compensation against the Kerala State Electricity Board. The petition was filed before the District Judge. An argument was raised that the petition was barred by time under article 137 of the Limitation Act. The court held that the words "any other application" appearing under article 137 would be petition or any application under any Act but that had to be an application to a court for the reason that Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act spoke of expiry of prescribed period when court was closed and extension of prescribed period of applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application during such period. 'Application' under Section 2(b) of the Limitation Act includes a petition. This judgment, therefore, clearly lays down that article 137 of the Limitation Act would not apply to an application or petition filed before the Rent Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act and for that matter Limitation Act would be inapplicable to proceedings under the Act. This judgment is by a 3-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court. It would appear, therefore, that the view taken therein has not been followed in Ganpat Ram Sharma's case (supra) which has been rendered by a 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court. Rent Controller is not a civil court (e.g. see Section 50 of the Act which bars jurisdiction the civil courts). If I apply the law as laid by the Supreme Court in the Kerala State Electricity Board's case (supra), it may have to be held that there is no period of limitation prescribed for a petition for eviction on the ground prescribed in clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act. In the present case, however, the issue of limitation is not a pure question of law."
47. Ld. Counsel submitted that in view of these judgments it is clear that the law of limitation is not attracted to the petitions under section 14 (1) (b) of the DRC Act and hence the argument forwarded by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant is not tenable.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:23 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 28 of 43
48. After hearing the arguments and going through the law of limitation I found that the Article 137 of the Limitation Act only contemplates application to Courts. In the Third Division of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, all other applications mentioned in the various articles are applications filed in a Court.
Further Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, provides for the contingency when the prescribed period for any application expires on a holiday and the only contingency contemplated is "when the court is closed". It is clear that the scheme of the Indian Limitation Act is to deal with applications to be filed in courts, the Controller and the Tribunal under the Act are not Courts hence the Limitation Act is not applicable to proceedings under the Act. A Division Bench of Delhi High Court in the case Subhash Chander v Rehmat Ullah, 1972 RCR 977 held that though the Controller under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 may have some of the trappings of a Court, he is not a Court in strict sense and so not within the meaning of the Limitation Act. The full bench of Delhi High Court approved this view of Division Bench in the case Kedar Nath v Mohini Devi, 1974 RCR 118 and held that the Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings before the Controller. The Supreme Court in the case titled Sakuru v Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279 also held that the Rent Controller not being a Court the law of limitation does not apply to the proceedings before the Rent Controller. In view of these pronouncements itself it is clear that the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under this Act. However, the Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:28 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 29 of 43 Act itself provides certain limitations for moving certain applications, those have to be followed.
49. Even otherwise it has been held in the case titled as Subhash Chand Goel v. Hans Raj Gupta and Co Pvt. Ltd (supra) that the cause of action for eviction on the ground of sub-letting is a recurring cause of action. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in this contention of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the eviction petition is barred by limitation.
50. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that though there is no sub-letting but for the sake of arguments if it is presumed that there is sub-letting the same was created in the year 1930 under the old Act and hence was governed by the old Act. In the old Act it was not required to serve the notice as required under the new Act. If the tenancy of the tenant is terminated the sub-tenant becomes tenant directly under the landlord. Ld. Counsel submitted that in view of the facts of the case on this ground also no eviction order can be passed on this ground.
51. The Supreme Court of India has already considered this argument and put the controversy at rest in the case Manphul Singh Sharma v. Smt. Ahmedi Begum (died through her LRs), (1994) 5 SCC 465 and held as follows:
"8. The only submission of Mr. B.B. Sawhney, learned counsel for the appellant, which in our view merits acceptance, is the rights of the parties are governed by 1952 Act. Under the said Act, Section 25 enables a sub- tenant to become a tenant on determination of the tenancy. It matters very little whether the sub-letting took place Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:33 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 30 of 43 before or after the commencement of the 1952 Act. As a matter of fact, the claim of the appellant was only based on this Section. No doubt, pending these proceedings, the 1958 Act came into force but the provisions thereunder, namely, Sections 17 or 18 would not apply. The reason is : no doubt, the 1952 Act has been repealed by Section 57 of the 1958 Act, however, notwithstanding such repeal, the proceedings under the 1952 Act could be continued, as if the 1958 Act had not been enacted. Therefore, the High Court went wrong in holding, consequent to the failure of the appellant to issue notice under Section 17, the benefit of Section 18 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 would be unavailable. Thus, it is prayed, the appeal may be allowed. Besides, it is somewhat strange the High Court should have impleaded both M.A. Khan as well as the Delhi Wakf Board as legal representatives of the deceased Ahmedi Begum.
9. In opposing these arguments, Mr. M.C. Dhingra, learned counsel for the respondent, would take the stand, if on the date of the decree, namely, 31st August, 1959, the 1952 Act stood repealed, it is only the provision of 1958 Act which should apply.
10. After the commencement of the said Act on 9th February, 1959, the tenant was prohibited to sub-let the premises. However, if there had been written consent of the landlord, they would become lawful sub-tenants. In view of Section 17 of the said Act a notice ought to have been served on the landlord regarding the creation of sub- tenancy. Only by reason of such notice the benefit of Section 18(1) of the said Act could be claimed. In the absence of notice the High Court is right in its conclusion."
52. The Supreme Court in another case titled Mrs. Kapil Bhargava v. Subhash Chand Aggarwal, (2001) 6 SCC 645 has held as follows:
"17. Submission for the appellant is once a sub-tenant is a lawful sub-tenant by virtue of Section 16(1), the notice under sub-section (2) of Section 17 would be a mere formality which is procedural. Thus, its non-compliance cannot take away his substantive right created under Section 16(1). This submission misses the purpose for which this sub-section (2) of Section 17 is enacted. On performance of this obligation a right is conferred on a Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:32:37 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 31 of 43 sub-tenant to become a tenant under Section 18. This service of notice saves a sub-tenant from eviction even if a decree of eviction is passed against a tenant under Section 14 and further confers on such sub-tenant an independent right as that of a tenant. Thus, notice under Section 17(2) cannot be construed as a mere procedural, in fact it confers substantive right on such a sub-tenant. So, a conjoint reading of Sections 16, 17 and 18 makes it clear that a sub-tenant falling under Section 16(1) is deemed to be lawful sub-tenant even without written consent of the landlord. But Section 17(2) casts an obligation on such sub-tenant to give notice to the landlord under sub-clause (2), within six months of the commencement of the Act.
The legislature has used in sub-section (2) the words "lawfully sub-let." So even if the appellant is a lawful sub- tenant by virtue of Section 16(1), still an obligation is cast on such lawful sub-tenant to serve a notice on the landlord for gaining a right under Section 18. This as we have said is as a protective measure in favour of a sub- tenant. So, the submission that by mere declaration as lawful tenant under Section 16(1), no decree for eviction is enforceable against the sub-tenant has no merit and is hereby rejected. Hence, we hold, unless notice under sub-section (2) of Section 17 is served by the sub-tenant, he cannot take the benefit of Section 18 and any decree passed under Section 14 against a tenant is executable against a sub-tenant.
18. The next and the last submission is that the landlord was not only aware of the fact that it is not the tenant but the sub-tenant is residing exclusively in whole of the premises, since before 9th June, 1952 and landlord was accepting the rent from this sub-tenant, hence compliance of Section 17(2) could be best be said to be a mere formality. This submission has also no merit. Neither there is any such finding by any courts nor any evidence pointed out that after the tenant left, the rent was paid by the sub- tenant on his own behalf and not on behalf of the tenant. A person in possession may continue to live and continue to pay rent which would be payment on behalf of the tenant, unless specific evidence led that the incumbent in possession started paying rent as sub-tenant, receipt issued as sub-tenant or there exist any document of this nature. We have not been shown any such plea, evidence or any finding by any of the courts below in this regard."
53. In view of these judgments, it is clear that even if the sub- letting was done while the earlier Act was in force but to claim Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 32 of 43 17:32:43 +0530 the benefit of section 18 of DRC Act the service of notice under Section 17 of DRC Act. Therefore, I do not find any force in the arguments of Ld. Counsel for the appellant on this count.
54. Ld. Counsel for appellant has also raised the issue that permission from Competent Authority Slum is taken only with respect to Sh. Hari Chand, whereas the permission should have been taken with respect to all the joint tenants. Keeping in view the above discussion and finding that the appellant has not been able to establish Joint Tenancy and that only the appellant is the tenant, therefore, I do not find any force in this argument.
55. Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that for proving the sub-letting initial onus was upon the landlord to prove and establish the presence of the third party in the tenanted premises, which the respondent has failed to prove. In fact, it was a joint tenancy The appellant along with Sh. Pyare Lal, Sh. Narsingh Dass and Late Sh. Kali Ram brother of the respondent has been joint tenants since the year 1930. The other persons are. The tenancy was created under the name and style of M/s Hari Chand Kali Ram by the erstwhile owner. The rent receipts were also issued in the name of M/s Hari Chand Kali Ram. Ld. Counsel submitted that all these facts were also in the knowledge of the landlord/respondent and also the erstwhile owner. No evidence has been brought on record that they are the sub- tenants. No date and month is mentioned when the tenancy was created. In fact, no sub-tenancy has been created. They all are the joint tenants. The fact that they are joint tenants have been established by the appellant by proving on record the rent Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:32:50 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 33 of 43 receipts issued by the landlord/respondent himself. Now he cannot be permitted to say that they are the sub-tenants. Ld. Counsel further submitted that the actual possession of the premises is still with the tenant and hence no sub-letting is made out. It is submitted that the Ld. ARC has not considered these facts and passed the eviction order without considering the evidence resulting in to miscarriage of justice. It is prayed that the order of the Ld. ARC be set-aside and the appeal be allowed.
56. Ld. Counsel for the respondent submitted that every fact is proved and established on record that the appellant has sub-let the premises in dispute. In fact, he himself has admitted the factum of sub-letting. Ld. Counsel submitted that the defence of the appellant is that they are joint tenants from the very beginning. If that is true then why the rent receipt was issued in the name of M/s Hari Chand Kali Ram only and the names of the other so called joint tenants were not mentioned.
57. Ld. Counsel further submitted that it was in the exclusive knowledge of the appellant only as to what joint business was being carried out by them, but no such document or accounts have proved on record to show that they are doing the joint business. It is settled law that once the landlord is able to show that the possession has been delivered to third party, the onus shifts on the tenant to explain as to in what capacity that third party is in possession. The appellant in fact has alleged that all the four persons are in possession and occupation of three different, independent shops having separate /independent entry. It is also the stand of the appellant that Kali Ram use to sell Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 34 of 43 17:32:54 +0530 articles by putting a Takahat outside the suit premises and not from the suit premises. Ld. Counsel submitted that these admissions of the appellant itself shows that Kali Ram was not tenant in the suit premises. If kali Ram would have been the tenant he would have been doing business from the shop jointly with the appellant as also now contended by the appellant instead of running his business from a Takhat from outside the tenanted premises. Ld. Counsel submitted that admittedly no document of doing joint business has been placed on record to prove the same. It is submitted that under the circumstances it is established that the premises has been sublet by the appellant to the sub-tenants. They are doing independent business having independent possession and control. The onus which was on the respondent has fully been discharged. Ld. ARC has rightly passed the eviction order. There is not merit in the appeal it be dismissed.
58. Ld. Counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment cited as Bhairon Sahai (D) v. Bishamber Dayal (D), (2017) 8 SCC 492 wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that:
"8. In the present case, it is clear from the evidence on record and the judgments of the courts below that there has been parting of possession by Respondent No.1 of a portion of the premises in favour of Respondent No.2 without taking the consent of the Appellant. The Rent Controller found that from 1964 onwards, there were two shops being run in the premises. One portion of the premises was being used for a fair price shop, the licence of which was in the name of Respondent No.2. The other portion was being used as a provision store which was being run by Respondent No.1. The averments in the Eviction Petition would disclose that the Appellant alleged parting of possession by Respondent No.1 in favour of Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:33:00 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 35 of 43 Respondent No.2 between the years 1964 and 1976. The other allegation is that Respondent No.1 entered into a partnership with Respondent No.2 in 1977. No consent was taken from the Appellant for either parting with possession of a portion of the premises or for entering into a partnership.
9. Eviction can be sought by a landlord if the tenant sublets, assigns or otherwise parts with possession without his consent. We are of the opinion that the Rent Controller was right in finding that Respondent No.2 was carrying on the business as Authorised Ration Distributor in a portion of the premises from 1964 as he was the licensee. Parting with the possession of the premises without consent of the landlord was sufficient for eviction of the tenant without getting into the question of sub-letting or assignment."
59. Ld. Counsel has also relied upon the judgment cited as Munshi Lal v. Santosh, 2017 INSC 94 wherein the Supreme Court has held as follows:
"Section 14 (4) reads as follows:-
"(14)(4)For the purposes of clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (1), any premises which have been let for being used for the purposes of business or profession shall be deemed to have been sub-let by the tenant, if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord has, after the 16th day of August, 1958, allowed any person to occupy the whole or any part of the premises ostensibly on the ground that such person is a partner of the tenant in the business or profession but really for the purpose of sub-letting such premises to that person."
This sub-section provides that if a person is allowed to occupy the premises ostensibly as a partner of the tenant but really for the purpose of sub-letting it, such an arrangement would be deemed to be sub-letting. Therefore, if the tenant has allowed any person to occupy the whole or any part of the premises, actually for the purpose of sub-letting but speciously by entering into a partnership with him, such an arrangement shall be deemed to be subletting. In other words, subletting is not permitted by camouflaging it as a partnership. The combined reading of clause (b) of the proviso to Section 14(1) read with Section 14(4) makes it clear that before a Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:33:06 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 36 of 43 tenant can sub-let, assign or part with the possession of any part of the premises or the whole, it must be preceded by the consent in writing from the landlord. In other words, the requirement of obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord is retained as a pre-requisite even for the purposes of sub-section (4). What is of importance is, in either case whether a person has been inducted genuinely as a partner and therefore allowed to occupy the premises or whether the partnership is a ruse, the requirement of consent in writing as in sub-section (1) is retained. In the present case, there is no evidence that the tenant obtained the consent in writing from the landlord before allowing the son-in-law to occupy the premises in pursuance of the Partnership deed.
12. We are satisfied that the respondents-tenants have been found to have inducted the son-in-law as a sub-tenant for the purpose of doing business under a partnership agreement. The arrangement between Hakim Rai and his son-in-law Raj Kumar was not a casual arrangement wherein the latter was requested to conduct business at the shop because the former was old and infirm. There was no need of entering into a partnership agreement in that case."
60. Ld. Counsel has further relid upon the judgment cited as Mrs. Bhawna Manchandani v. Mr. Swaran Dhawan, 2005 (119) DLT 183 wherein the High Court of Delhi held as follows:
"7. In the present case question regarding nature of possession of Mohan Manchandani over suit premises was subject matter of controversy in the pleadings. In the written statement appellant has pleaded joint tenancy which was repudiated by the landlady. The husband of landlady has stated on oath about the subletting to Mohand Manchandani. Thus, parties were aware of the nature of controversy and they led evidence about it. Appellant first tried to set up the case of joint tenancy as well as partnership and led evidence about it but the Tribunal found it to be untenable. From the material on record and evidence led by the parties learned Tribunal concluded that after the divorce, Bhawna Manchandani has no interest in the suit premises whatsoever and she has parted with the possession to her ex-husband Mohan Manchandani. It is a finding of fact and having considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and material on record, I find no reason to take a different view in the matter.
Digitally
signed by
VIRENDER
VIRENDER KUMAR
KUMAR BANSAL
BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18
RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 37 of 43 17:33:11
+0530
8. Learned counsel for the appellant next contended with reference to Ayyappally Mohd. Haji and Ors. v. M.M. Abdulsalam & Ors, II (2001) CLT 222 (SC) : (2001) 2 SCC 428, wherein it was held that once an application for amendment of plaint is finally disallowed, no deviation from original pleadings can be permitted. In that case application for amendment of plaint, filed along with appeal against dismissal of suit was ultimately dismissed by Supreme Court and appeal was directed to be heard on the basis of pleadings as they existed. High Court allowed second appeal, permitting plaintiff-respondents to rely on a plan annexed to a sale deed just because the said sale deed had been mentioned in the plaint. In the present case the application for amendment was rejected the learned ARC and landlord challenged that order in appeal before the Tribunal. Ground No. 8 of the memo of appeal before Tribunal relates to the landlady's objections against rejection of amendment application and learned Tribunal in para 8 of the impugned order has taken note thereof and has clearly observed that " " Unfortunately the application was declined merely on the ground that a new case was being set up whereas the fact remained that it was the subsequent event which was in continuity with the allegation of subletting that was being brought on record. As a matter of fact mere application under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code for bringing this event to the notice of the court was sufficient instead of application under Order 6 Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code.". The aforesaid observation of learned Tribunal clearly shows that the Tribunal did not agree with the learned ARC's order, rejecting amendment application filed under Order 6 Rule 17 Civil Procedure Code and proceeded to take into consideration subsequent events which were sought to be introduced by the amendment. Obviously, under the circumstances, learned Tribunal must be deemed to have allowed the amendment and then proceeded to examine the material on record in the light of subsequent developments. The order of learned ARC rejecting amendment application could be challenged in appeal and had, thus not attained finality. Therefore, the observations made in 2001 2 SCC page 428 will not apply to the facts of present case. Factum of divorce was admitted by Mohan Manchandani himself in his statement. His plea of joint tenancy and partnership business have also been taken into consideration by the learned Tribunal. Under the circumstances it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the appellant or that they had no opportunity to meet the question of alleged subletting, Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18
17:33:38
RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 38 of 43 +0530
assignment or parting with possession in favour of Mohan Manchandani. It is settled law that the subsequent events can be/ must be taken note of even at the stage of appeal. The appellant Bhawna Manchandani never appeared in the witness box. Obviously, it indicates that she has no interest whatsoever in the suit premises after her divorce with Mohan Manchandani. The statement of Mohan Manchandani regarding joint tenancy or alleged partnership has been rightly found to be unbelievable. Under the circumstances, the learned Tribunal was justified in arriving at obvious conclusion that Bhawna Manchandani has parted with possession of the demised premises in favour of her ex-husband Mohan Manchandani."
61. Ld. Counsel has further relied upon the judgment cited as M/s. Gobind Parshad Jagdish Parshad v. Shri Hari Shanker, 2007 (136) DLT 259, wherein the High Court of Delhi has held as follows:
"26. I am unable to accept the plea of learned counsel for respondent No. 1/tenant that no adverse inference can be drawn in the circumstances in view of the aforesaid judgments of the Apex Court. Those were matters where the issue was of proving the accounts and no adverse inference being drawn on account of non-production of the accounts. Oral testimony had been led. These judgments have no application to the facts of the present case. The dispute in the present case relates to the issue whether there is sub-tenancy or not or parting with possession or not. There is presence of third parties. It was for the tenant to explain the presence of such third parties and to produce any material in support thereof. No material whatsoever was produced in that behalf. A reference to the account books and the salary register in the order of the ARC arose on account of the testimony of the tenant that such registers/accounts were being maintained. Despite this, the same were not produced. It was for the tenant to have produced the best material in support of the plea that original respondents No. 4 and 5 were employees and respondent No. 1 failed to discharge this onus and, thus, adverse inference must be drawn against respondent No.
1."
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:33:42 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 39 of 43
62. Ld. Counsel has also relied upon the judgment cited as Flora Elias Nahoum v. Idrish Ali Laskar, (2018) 2 SCC 485, wherein it was held by the Supreme Court that:
"41. In other words, if Joynal Mullick was the respondent's employee then, in our view, he should have proved it by filling a declaration form, which he had submitted under the Shops and Establishment Act to the authorities. But it was not done. Rather he admitted that he did not disclose the name of Joynal Mullick in the declaration form. That apart, the respondent could have proved this fact by filing payment voucher, or any other relevant evidence to show that Joynal Mullick was his employee and that he used to sit in the suit shop in that capacity only. It was, however, not done.
42. Second, if Joynal Mullick was a partner of the respondent in the tailoring business then the respondent could have proved this fact by filing a copy of the partnership deed. However, he again failed to produce the copy of partnership deed. In this way, he failed to prove even this fact.
43. Now so far as the appellants are concerned, they appear to have discharged their initial burden by pleading the necessary facts in Para 4 and then by proving it by evidence that firstly, they let out the suit shop to the respondent and secondly, the respondent has sub-let the suit shop to Joynal Mullick, who was in its exclusive possession without their consent.
44. In a case of sub-letting, if the tenant is able to prove that he continues to retain the exclusive possession over the tenanted premises notwithstanding any third party's induction in the tenanted premises, no case of sub-letting is made out against such tenant.
45. In other words, the sin qua non for proving the case of the sub-letting is that the tenant has either whole or in part transferred or/and parted with the possession of the tenanted premises in favour of any third person without landlord's consent."
63. Ld. Counsel has further relied upon the judgment cited as Pooran Chand v Motilal & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 461, wherein the Supreme Court has held that: Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL BANSAL Date:
2025.10.18 17:33:47 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 40 of 43 "6. Even so it is contended that the appellant had not sublet the premises within the meaning of Section 13(1)(b)
(i) of the Act. It is said that the sub-section applies only to a case of sub-tenancy created for the first time after the lease was taken and does not cover a case whether there was already a sub-tenant and a new sub-tenant was inducted when the previous sub-tenant vacated it. This conclusion is sought to be drawn from the words "sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession" and it is argued if possession had already been parted with by way of sub-lease and what was done was only to substitute another in the place of the earlier sub-tenant, this sub-
clause is not attracted. There are no merits in this contention Section 13(1)(b)(i) clearly says that if a tenant, without obtaining the consent of the landlord in writing has, after the commencement of this Act, sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises, he is liable to be evicted. Here, admittedly after the lease deed of 1952 the appellant has sublet some of the rooms of the building to others without obtaining the written consent of the landlord. The fact that there were sub-tenants in the said portions could not conceivably be of any help to the appellant, because the new sub-tenants were not holding under the earlier sub- tenants, but were inducted by the appellant after the earlier sub-tenancies were terminated. The appellant, having sublet part of the premises without the consent of the landlord in writing, cannot invoke the protection given to him under Section 13 of the Act."
64. After hearing the arguments and going through the record I found that Sh. N. R. Aggarwal during his cross-examination conducted on 09.06.2017 has admitted that premises no. 1627 to 1633 is one property. Admittedly as on date there are three shops in occupation of the appellant and the sub-tenants. Admittedly the subtenants are doing their own business from those shops. The shops are separate and independent having separate and independent entries. There is a defence taken that they are the joint tenants. The onus was upon the appellant to prove that they are the joint tenants. No such document has been placed on record as to what joint business is being run by them from the premises. It is Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date:
BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:34:05 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 41 of 43 also alleged that the tenancy was in joint name and that is why the receipt was issued in the name of M/s Hari Chand Kali Ram. This fact though lends some credence to the argument of the appellant but when asked as to what business was being done by M/s Hari Chand Kali Ram, whether it is a partnership firm the appellant remained silent. In fact, no such document, as rightly pointed out by the Ld. Counsel for the respondent, has been placed on record that they were doing any business jointly. The appellant on the other hand has taken the stand that Sh. Kali during his life time use to do business by placing a Takaht out side the premises in dispute. This fact itself demolishes the stand that it was a joint tenancy between the appellant herein and Sh. Kali Ram. The sub-tenants are admittedly in possession of independent/separate shops in the tenanted premises. It was for the appellant to prove that they are joint tenants but again no document in this regard has been proved or even placed on record. It is settled law that once the landlord is able to prove the presence of the third party in the tenanted premises, the onus shifts on the tenant to explain the same. In the present case the respondent has been able to prove the presence of third party in the tenanted premises. It is also admitted by the appellant. There is no evidence that the tenant is still having possession of the portion of the tenanted premises, which has been sub-let. In view of the above discussion in my opinion the Ld. ARC has rightly passed the eviction order against the appellant under section 14 (1) (b) of DRC Act. There is no merit in the appeal, same is dismissed.
65. Copy of order along with record Ld. ARC be sent back.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR BANSAL KUMAR Date: BANSAL 2025.10.18 17:34:10 +0530 RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 42 of 43
66. Appeal file be consigned to record room.
Digitally signed by VIRENDER VIRENDER KUMAR KUMAR BANSAL Announced in the open Court BANSAL Date: 2025.10.18 on 18th day of October, 2025 17:34:16 +0530 (Virender Kumar Bansal) Principal District & Sessions Judge
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi(ak) RCT No.09/2021 Hari Chand v. Jitender Nath Sharma page 43 of 43