Allahabad High Court
Hridaya Shanker Mishra Son Of Sri Kalp ... vs State Of U.P. Through Its ... on 21 March, 2005
Author: Shishir Kumar
Bench: Shishir Kumar
ORDER Shishir Kumar, J.
1. By means of the present writ petition, petitioner has approached this Court for quashing the order dated 8.6.1995 (Annexure 5 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No. 4 terminating the service of the petitioner and treating the petitioner as untrained and further prayer in the writ petition is to regularize the services of the petitioner and treat and petitioner as a trained Lekhpal.
2. The facts arising out the present writ petition are that the petitioner has obtained training from the Consolidation Department, Gorakhpur where he was serving as Lekhpal and after having training the petitioner was appointed as Lekhpal on 1.2.1979 at Maharajganj, Tehsil, District Gorakhpur. From the date of his appointment the petitioner has been continuously working to the satisfaction of the higher authorities. The Government has issued an order dated 13th April, 1977 and the notification directing to treat those persons to be trained Lakhpals those who have completed training from the Consolidation Department. Thereafter again a scheme of the Government was issued known as Job Million Yojna' under which the Lakhpals, who have obtained training from the Consolidation Department, were asked to be regularized in the Revenue Department, Respondent No. 1 issued a latter dated 24.7.1984 asking the names of the Consolidation trained Lekhpals, who had worked for a period of more than three years under which the name of the petitioner and others were sent for regularization. A copy of the same has been filed by the petitioner as Annexure 2 to the writ petition. Another order was issued by the Government on 9.12.1982 under the direction to the effect that those untrained Lekhpals, who were appointed prior to 8.5.1980, their services may not be terminated. Though the petitioner is continuously working as Lekhpal from the date of his appointment, even then while preparing the seniority list of the Lekhpals, who were working, the name of the petitioner was not mentioned and numbers of junior Lekhpals were mentioned in the list. Petitioner made a representation before respondent No. 1 on 30.10.1994 and prior to that the petitioner has also submitted the representations on 18.5.1992 and 1.2.1994 with a prayer to treat the petitioner as trained Lekhpal as the petitioner has already obtained the training from the Consolidation Department under the scheme of 'Half Million Job Yojna'. On the representation of the petitioner and others, the respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have not passed any order although under the same and similar circumstances, the Lekhpal, who have obtained training from the Consolidation Department and were working in district Gorakhpur, the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur has recommended to the respondent No. 1 to allow them and to treat the petitioner as well as other Lekhpals to be the trained Lekhpals. A copy of the recommendation of the District Magistrate Gorakhpur has been filed as Annexure 3 to the writ petition. Since the petitioner and other Lekhpals who were trained from the Consolidation Department repeatedly asked for regularization and also for petitioner, the petitioner to be trained Lekhpal and with request for including the name in their seniority list maintained by the department, but instead of regularizing the services of the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 passed an order on 11.4.1995 asking the respondent No. 3 to terminate the services of the petitioner and others under the U.P. Temporary Employees Service Rules, 1975, giving one months' notice or salary in lieu thereof, in spite of the fact that in view of the government orders, the petitioner has become permanent and trained Lekhpal. In pursuance of the order dated 11.4.1995, passed by the respondent No. 2, the respondent No. 4 has issued an order of termination dated 8.6.1995 purported to be issued under U.P. Temporary Employees Service Rules, 1975 treating the petitioner as a temporary employee. A copy of the said order has been filed as Annexure 5 to the writ petition. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner has filed a Writ petition No. 14871 of 1985 which was admitted and the interim order was granted and the same is still pending. The order is being quoted below-
"Learned Standing Counsel prays for and is granted three weeks time for filing counter affidavit. List the petitioner for admission along with the stay application immediately on the expiry of three weeks meanwhile the respondent shall not send the petitioner on training as directed under order dated 19th June, 1984 and 16th July, 1984 Annexure-A1 and 1 to the petitioner respectively unless the petitioner is paid his regular emoluments which he is at present drawing during the period of training."
3. On 14.7.1988 the Hon'ble Court further pleased to pass the following order, which is quoted, below-
"Issue Notice.
Until further order the interim order dated 17.10.1984 shall continue."
4. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Lekhpal on 1.2.1979 and since the initial date of appointment, the petitioner is working continuously and the petitioner being a trained and experienced Lekhpal, working in the department from 1977, is not required for any further training as during consolidation, the petitioner has obtained the training. The services of the petitioner cannot be terminated treating the petitioner to be a temporary employee as the petitioner is working from 1979 and in view of the well settled principle of law, the petitioner cannot be treated to be temporary employee as the petitioner has completed about 16 years of service continuously. It has further been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner was neither asked for training at any point of time not it was required under the law in view of the Government orders dated 13.4.1977 and 9.12.1988. The provisions of U.P. Temporary Employees Service Rules will not apply in the case of the petitioner as in view of the judgment reported in AIR 1990 Page 371 Smt. Bhagwati Devi and Ors. v. Delhi State Mineral Corporation. It has been submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgment, the practical experience is always in aid to the person to discharge his duties effectively and is a sure guide to assess suitability, once the appointment of the petitioner was made treating to be a trained Lekhpal then subsequently after a period of 17 years his duties cannot be terminated treating the petitioner as a temporary employee. Against the order of termination, the petitioner has approached this Court.
5. Notice were issued and a counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the State stating that as the petitioner was not a trained Lekhpal as such, he has go, no right to post.
6. In the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has denied the allegations made in the counter affidavit and has stated that as the petitioner has got training, as such, no further training is required for the petitioner to remain on the post of Lekhpal and more so, if the respondents wanted to send the petitioner on training, the petitioner has never refused to go unless his regular emoluments, which the petitioner was drawing were paid. This Hon'ble Court has also said in the order date 17.10.1984 in Writ Petition No. 17481 of 1984.
7. The petitioner has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court reported in (1990) 1 UPLBEC 351 Riksh Pal Singh v. Secretary, U.P. Basic Education Board, Allahabad and Ors. The Hon'ble Court has taken a view that the services of the petitioner have been terminated as the petitioner was not having certificate of teachers training course at the time when the petitioner was appointed in the year 1968. Then the Court has held that even if it is presumed that the petitioner has been appointed and confirmed as Assistant Teacher in the School on 1.7.1972, and the petitioner has been working in the School for more than 13 years if his services are now terminated on the ground that he is not having the certificate of teaching, the petitioner will suffer great injustice and hardship, as he has become over-age for any respective employment. A job experience of about 13 years cannot be said to be less meritorious than one or two years training course. The petitioner has further placed reliance upon a judgment of this Apex Court in A.I.R. 1990 Supreme Court 371 Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation. The Apex Court has held that the "practical experience would always aid the person to effectively discharge the duties and is a sure guide to assess the suitability. The initial minimum education qualification prescribed for the different posts in undoubtedly a factor to be reckoned with, but it is so at the time of the initial entry into the service. Once the appointments of the petitioners were made as daily rated workers and they were allowed to work for considerable length of time, it would be hard and harsh to deny them the confirmation in the respective posts on the ground that they lack the prescribed educational qualifications. It can be said that three years' experience ignoring artificial break in service for short period/periods created by the management, in the circumstances, would be sufficient for confirmation. If there is a gap of more than three months between the period of termination and re-appointment that period may be excluded in the computation of the three years training."
8. The Supreme Court has further observed that-
"The main controversy centres round the question whether some petitioners are possessed of the requisite qualification to hold the posts so as to entitle them to be confirmed in the respective posts held by them. The indisputable facts are that the petitioners were appointed between the period 1983 and 1986 and ever since, they have been working and have gained sufficient experience in the actual discharge of duties attached to the posts held by them. Practical experience would always aid the person to effectively discharge the duties and is a sure guide to assess the suitability. The initial minimum educational qualification prescribed for the different posts is undoubtedly a factor to be reckoned with, but it is so at the time of the initial entry into the service. Once the appointments were made as daily rate workers and they were allowed to work for a considerable length of time, it would be hard and harsh to deny them the confirmation in the respective posts on the ground that they lack the prescribed educational qualifications.
All the petitioners are entitled to equal pay at par with the persons appointed on regular basis to the similar post or discharge similar duties, and are entitled to the scale of pay and allowances revised from time to time for the said posts. We further direct that 16 of the petitioners who are ousted from the service pending the writ petition should be reinstated immediately."
9. The further reliance has been placed by the petitioner in the case of Division Bench of this Court reported in (2000) 1 UPLBEC 622 State of U.P. v. Dr. R.P. Goel and Ors. The Division Bench of this Court while considering the termination of the employee after completing 19 years of service treating that employee as a temporary employee, has held that the services after 10 to 20 years can be treated to be arbitrary. The Division Bench has observed as under:-
"In the present case the petitioner had worked from 1956 to 1975 i.e. for 19 years in U.P. Government service. In our opinion, even if he was a temporary employee, a person who has worked for such a long period cannot be suddenly asked to go for no rhyme or reasons. The position may have been different if the service of a temporary employee is terminated only after two or three years of appointment, and in that case the termination order may not be arbitrary. However, where a person has worked in a temporary capacity for say, 10 to 20 years, in our opinion, the termination of his service without opportunity of hearing would certainly be arbitrary because such an employee would ordinarily have got married and have had children, and is overage for other employment, and has settled down in life with reasonable expectation, that ordinarily he will be continued in service till the age of retirement."
10. Further reliance has been placed by the petitioner in a judgment reported in Judgment Today 2001 (4) Supreme Court, 382, Agra District Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Prescribed Authority Labour Court, U.P. and Ors. and the Apex Court has observed as follows-
"Though the services were terminated the parties concerned invoked the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and the Labour court directed their reinstatement and they were reinstated from the date of the termination itself. In these circumstances they must be deemed to be in service for more than 20 years now and to disturb their services at this stage would be harsh and inhuman.
Even though there may be irregularity in the recruitment but the reasons of respondents being in employment for more than 20 years the same stood cured by their long service and they are deemed to have been regularly appointed."
11. On behalf of the respondents, it has been stated that as the petitioner has deliberately refused to go for training and in view of the service rules as the petitioner was untrained Lekhpal, therefore, the services of the petitioner have been terminated under the U.P. Lekhpal Service Rules, 1958 and has placed reliance upon Rules 5, 6 and 7 of the Lekhpal Service Rules, 1958 which deal with the sources of recruitment and procedure for recruitment and appointment. It has been submitted that in the present case, the appointment is of 1979 whereas Rule 78 was published in the Gazette on 29.7.1978. In any case the training is requisite and essential qualification for the appointment of Lekhpal and has placed reliance of the judgment of the Apex Court in A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court 1336 U.P. Shiksha Education Board v. Rajendra Prasad Gupta, 1991 (1) Judgment Today 108, State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, A.I.R. 1986, S.C. 737 Union of India v. Arun Kumar Roy, 1992 (1) Judgment Today, 37, Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 696 Harbansh Mishra v. Railway Board, 2005 (1) Supreme Court, 639 Mahendra L. Jain v. Indore Development Authority, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1638 Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Melhotra, 2004 (2) UPLBEC, 1630 F.B. Allahabad, Lal Mohd. v. Indian Railway Casual, 2004 (1) UPLBEC 77, State of U.P. v. U.P. Madhyamic Shiksha Parishad, 2004 (1) UPLBEC State of U.P. v. Rajendra Prasad, 2003 (3) A.W.C. 1875 Dr. Mala Arora v. Director of Education, 2004 (3) UPLBEC 2470, Suresh Chandra v. Vice Chairman G.D.A., 1998, Judgment Today, Volume (IV) Supreme Court, 363, State of M.P. v. Dharam Veer and 1997 (6) S.C.C. 574, State of Rajasthan v. Hetendra Kumar Bhatt, and has submitted that in view of the aforesaid judgments, the petitioner has got no right to post and the services has rightly been terminated.
12. It has also been pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that one Shree Niwas Mishra has also approached this Court against the same show cause notice terminating the services of the petitioner by way of Writ Petition No. 10682 of 1995 and the said writ petition was dismissed by this Court on the ground of alternative remedy before the U.P. Service Tribunal Lucknow. Shree Niwas Mishra has approached the Service Tribunal by way of Claim Petition No. 4084 of 1988 and his Claim Petition has been allowed vide order dated 7.1.2000 and the order has been quashed and it has been directed that petitioner be treated in service and is entitled to be regularized as trained Lekhpal. It has been stated that such judgment passed by the Tribunal has become final and appeal has been filed against the aforesaid judgment.
13. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel at length and have considered the judgments cited on behalf of the parties.
14. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed in the year 1979 and from the perusal of the record, it is also clear that the petitioner has worked during the consolidation period and has obtained the training. The Secretary Rajashwa Parishad had issued an order dated 24.7.1994, which has been filed as Annexure 2 to the writ petition shows that during the consolidation there was "Half a Job Million Yojna", various persons have worked during the consolidation period and subsequently after consideration they have been ousted from service and has directed to submit a list of those persons who have completed three years to accommodate them in the Revenue Department.
15. In view of the aforesaid fact, and direction issued by the Secretary, Rajaswa Parishad, to the District Magistrate, Gorakhpur in the month of January, 1995, it has been submitted that certain Lekhpals, who have worked and obtained training during 1975-74 in consolidation Department as Lekhpal and after the appointment in the Revenue Department they should be treated as trained Lekhpal and has stated that in view of the Government Orders dated 13th April, 1977 and 18th April, 1977, those Lekhpals, who have obtained training during consolidation period they should be treated as trained Lekhpal. The said letter has been sent by the District Magistrate to the Commissioner/Secretary in the month of January, 1995 and the District Magistrate without waiting the guidance, which was to be given by the Board of Revenue has issued a letter dated 11th April, 1995 to terminate the service of the petitioner on the ground that they were directed to obtain the training but have obtained interim order by the High Court, therefore, their services should be dispensed with as they are untrained Lekhpals and in view of the aforesaid fact, the Additional District Magistrate by order dated 8.6.1995 has issued a notice terminating the services of the petitioner. The petitioner has brought on record by way of supplementary affidavit that the petitioner went for training but has completed six months and he was not permitted to appear in the examination due to the interim order of this Court in Writ Petition No. 14871 of 1985 and has submitted that in the said writ petition, the petitioner has claimed that he be paid salary during the training period and this Court was pleased to direct that he should not send for training unless the regular emoluments are paid. In view of the aforesaid fact, the petitioner submits that the services of the petitioner cannot be terminated on the ground that petitioner is an untrained Lekhpal. In view of the fact that the petitioner has completed about 16 years of service, therefore, the services of the petitioner in spite of the fact that no order of confirmation has specifically been passed in favour of the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be treated to be a temporary employee and has got the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution.
16. Admittedly, the services of the petitioner have been terminated treating the petitioner as temporary employee in spite of the fact that the petitioner was appointed in the year 1979 and no notice or opportunity prior to the order of termination has been given to the petitioner and in view of the Apex Court judgment reported in 1991 Volume II UPLBEC 967, and 1991 (5) Judgment Today, 525, it has been held that the temporary employee has got the protection of Article 311 of the Constitution. In N.S.K. Nair's case the Apex Court has taken into consideration the fact that if a person has completed 15 years of service in spite of the fact that no order of confirmation has been passed but it will be deemed to be confirmed employee and the services of the person concerned cannot be terminated treating the petitioner as a temporary employee. In State of U.P. v. Dr. R.P. Goel, this Court has taken a view that if a person has completed 19 years of services even if he was a temporary employee and a person who has worked for such a long time cannot be suddenly asked to go without any reason. The position is different if the service of the temporary employee is terminated only after two or three years of appointment and in that case, the termination order may not be arbitrary. However, where a person has worked in a temporary capacity for 10 to 20 years, the services of the person concerned cannot be terminated without opportunity of hearing and if such order has been passed that it treated to be arbitrary.
17. Regarding the contention raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner was an untrained Lekhpal therefore, in view of the service rules, he is not entitled to hold the post. the similar controversy was before the Apex Court in case of Bhagwati Prasad (Supra) , the Apex Court has held that in initial minimum qualification prescribed for the post is undoubtedly a factor to be considered. It is so at the time of initial entry into the services, once appointments were made and they were permitted to allow to work for considerable length of time, it will be hard and harsh to terminate the service.
18. The judgment cited on behalf of the respondents after consideration is not applicable and can be distinguished in view of the fact that the petitioners had worked for certain period during consolidation and has obtained training and subsequently on that basis they have been appointed in the Revenue Department and from 1979 they have continuously been working, as such, the services of the petitioner cannot be terminated on the ground that their services are temporary in nature. There is no dispute to this effect that prior to the order of terminating the services of the petitioner, no opportunity or show cause have been given and in view of the Apex Court judgment as the petitioner has served considerably for a period of 15 years of service then legally they are entitled for notice or opportunity of hearing and the services of the petitioner cannot be terminated treating the petitioner to be a temporary employee.
19. In view of the aforesaid fact, I am of the view that the orders dated 11.4.1995 and 8.6.1995 (Annexures 4 and 5 to the writ petition are liable to be quashed and the petitioner be reinstated in service forthwith along with continuity in service including the seniority. It will however be open to the respondents to pay the salary from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement if the petitioner is able to satisfy the authorities that during this period petitioner was not financially benefited anywhere or the petitioner was not in employment during this period.
20. In view of the aforesaid fact, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs.