Gujarat High Court
Heirs Of Decd. Mandan Kanabhai vs State Of Gujarat on 8 October, 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO. 2464 of
2024
In F/FIRST APPEAL NO. 6539 of 2024
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HEIRS OF DECD. MANDAN KANABHAI & ORS.
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR KRUSHNAKANT D PATEL(10632) for the Applicant(s) No.
1,1.1,1.2,1.2.1,1.2.2,1.2.3,1.3,1.4,1.5,1.6,2,2.1,2.2,2.3,2.4,3,4,4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4,
4.5,4.6,5,6
MR TEJAS P SATTA(3149) for the Applicant(s) No.
1,1.1,1.2,1.2.1,1.2.2,1.2.3,1.3,1.4,1.5,1.6,2,2.1,2.2,2.3,2.4,3,4,4.1,4.2,4.3,4.4,
4.5,4.6,5,6
MR GH VIRK, GP with MS DHARITRI PANCHOLI, AGP for Respondent No.1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP N. BHATT
Date : 08/10/2024
ORAL ORDER
1. There are a bunch of civil applications today on board for condonation of delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, caused in filing the respective first appeals, which are filed under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act (`LAQ' Act for short).
2. The first appeals are filed by the claimants who have lost their lands in the acquisition proceedings for exercising the remedy of appeal under Section 54 of the Land Page 1 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined Acquisition Act, however, as there is a huge delay of approximately 12 to 17 years in filing the first appeals, civil applications are filed for condonation of delay.
3. The core issue in all the matters is the same. Therefore, all the matters are heard together but this matter is considered as a lead matter as agreed by all the advocates for the parties and is heard at length and disposed of by this detailed order. Rest of the civil applications filed in different first appeals are disposed of by separate short orders, where the discussion of this order will be considered as part of those separate orders also.
4. The matter was heard at length on 8.10.2024. However, time was sought by learned advocates in all the civil applications for the respective parties to submit the written arguments, due to which the Court had to wait for dictation of the order. The written arguments were submitted in piecemeal by some of the learned advocates and the same are not submitted by some of the learned advocates. However, without waiting for much time for the same, the Court proceeded to dictate the order, considering the submissions made by learned advocates at the time of hearing of the applications.
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NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined
5. Learned Government Pleader had raised the preliminary objection at the initial stage as to whether the amount deposited before the Reference Court was withdrawn by the farmers with objection or without objection. Considering the same, the coordinate Bench had granted time to the learned advocate for the claimants to file affidavit to this effect. The affidavits are filed in most of the matters.
6. Learned Government Pleader has raised several contentions that when the amount is withdrawn by the claimants without any objection/protest pursuant to the order passed by the Reference Court, the appeal against the said order cannot be entertained and the delay caused in filing the said appeal cannot be condoned. He submitted that the Court may consider this as preliminary objection.
7. Learned advocate for the claimants have made their submissions and assisted the Court by pointing out the relevant provisions of the Land Acquisition Act.
8. The bone of contention of the learned advocate for the claimants is that there is no specific provision in the LAQ Act that before filing of the appeal and after the award is passed by the Reference Court under Section 18 of the LAQ Act that if the claimants want to challenge the said Page 3 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined award of Reference Court by filing appeal under Section 54 of the LAQ Act, the amount has to be withdrawn by filing objection or by registered protest. The relevant provisions of Sections 11, 12, 18, 31, 53 and 54 of the LAQ Act are referred by the learned advocate for the claimants in support of the submissions.
9. A reliance is placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas V/s Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and Another reported in (1988)3 SCC 751, wherein it is held that when the reference is determined by way of adjudication of protest, there is no requirement to register the protest thereafter. That such protest could have been registered at the time of passing of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the LAQ Act if the claimants are aggrieved by the said award. That even the reference under Section 18 of the LAQ Act could have been converted into objections and therefore no separate petitions are not required to be filed.
10. By referring to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhanu Kumar Jain V/s Archana Kumar and Another reported in (2005)1 SCC 787 and a judgment of this Court in the case of Patel Natvarbhai Prabhudas V/s Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in 1999(1) GLR Page 4 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined 437, the learned advocate for the claimants has submitted that the statutory right of appeal cannot be curtailed; and that no written protest is required as making application under Section 18 itself is a protest and that the non- mentioning of protest at the time of withdrawal of amount of compensation enhanced under Section 18 cannot disentitle the claimants to prefer appeal under Section 54 of the LAQ Act.
11. In support of the submissions, learned advocate for the claimants has relied on the following judgments:
(1) Ningappa Thotappa Angadi (supra) V/s Special Land Acquisition Officer and Another, reported in (2020)19 SCC 599. (2) Huchanagouda V/s Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer and another repoted in 2020(19) SCC 236. (3) K.Subbarayudu and others V/s Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition) reported in 2017(12) SCC 840. (4) Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.R.s and others V/s Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 513.
(5) Basawaraj and Another V/s Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013(14) SCC 81.
12. As regards the length of delay caused, he Page 5 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined submitted that though there is huge delay in filing the appeal, the delay is not to be seen but the cause of delay is to be seen and considering the reasons given for the delay caused, it cannot be said that the delay is caused due to some inaction on the part of the claimants. Therefore, the delay is required to be condoned.
13. Learned advocate for the claimants submitted that in many cases where there was huge delay, the Court ordered that the claimants will not be entitled to claim the interest for the delayed period and this application for condonation of delay may be allowed with the same direction that the claimants will not be entitled to interest for the delayed period. He submitted that the interest of justice will be served if this application is allowed with such direction.
14. Learned Government Pleader has vehemently opposed this application by raising mainly two contentions; firstly-the preliminary contention of raising protest at the time of withdrawal of the amount before the Reference Court and secondly-the period of huge delay caused in filing the appeals. He submitted that the affidavits filed pursuant to the preliminary objection raised by him show that the amount was withdrawn without protest and when it is so, then the claimants have accepted the award and therefore Page 6 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined they are not entitled to file the appeal against the said award. He submitted that as per the doctrine of election, by accepting the compensation without protest, the litigants have forgone their right to challenge the award passed under Section 18 of the LAQ Act. That the claimants are not allowed to approbate and reprobate on their stand, having once acquiesced and the doctrines of waiver and estoppel are unambiguous in its term that the parties to the proceedings are estopped from raising the issue further, once they have waived their rights. He, submitted that on all these grounds, this application is required to be dismissed.
15. In support of his submissions, learned Government Pleader has relied on the following decisions:
1. Nathu V/s State of H.P. reported in AIR 1984 HP 63
2. Ramendra Kr.Battercharjee and Ors. V/s Land Acquisition Collector and Anr. Reported in 2004 SCC Online Gau 85.
3. V.Chandrasekaran and Another V.Administrative officer and Others reported in 2012(12) SCC 133.
4. K.S.Parippornan V/s State of Kerala and others reported in 1994(5) SCC 593.
5. Union of India and Others V.N.Murugesan and others reported in 2022(2) SCC 25.
6. Cauvery Coffee Traders, Manglore V/s Hornor Resources Page 7 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined International Company Limited, reported in 2011(10) SCC 420.
7. Waman Shrinivas Kini V/s Ratilal Bhagwandas and Co., reported in AIR 1959 SC 689.
8. Krishna Bahadur V/s Purna Theatre and others reported in 2004(8) SCC 229.
9. Garikapati Veeraya V.N.Subbiah Choudry & Others reported in AIR 1957 SC 540.
10. Bihari (Dead) through Lrs. And others V/s State of U.P. and another reported in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.27879 of 2018 decided on 23.9.2021.
16. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the material on record.
17. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads as under:
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Explanation.--The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Page 8 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
18. Relevant provisions of the LAQ Act read as under:
4. Publication of preliminary notification and powers of officers thereupon.--
(1) Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] that land in any locality [is needed or] 10 is likely to be needed for any public purpose [or for a company] a notification to that effect shall be published in the Official Gazette [and in 9 two daily newspapers circulating in that locality of which at least one shall be in the regional language] and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the said 9 locality [(the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of die notification)]. (2) Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally or specially authorized by such Government in this behalf, and for his servants and workmen,-- to enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in such locality;
to dig or bore in the sub-soil;
to do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land is adapted for such purpose;
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NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined to set out the boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any) proposed to be made thereon;
to mark such levels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and, where otherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crop, fence or jungle:
Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed court or garden attached to a dwelling-house (unless with the consent of the occupier thereof) without previously giving such occupier at least seven days' notice in writing of his intention to do so.
6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose.--
(1) Subject to the provisions of' Part VII of this Act, 15 [when the 16 [appropriate Government] is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Section 5-A, sub-section (2)], that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorized to certify its orders 17 [, and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Section 4, sub section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been Page 10 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined made (wherever required) under Section 5-A, sub-section (2)]: 18
[Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1),--
(i) 19 published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 20 (1 of 1967), but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall he made after the expiry of three years front the date of the publication of the notification; or
(ii) ** published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification]:
Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.
[Explanation 1.--In computing any of the periods referred to 21 in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded.
Explanation 2.--Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to he paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or Page 11 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.] 22 (2) [Every declaration] shall be published in the Official 17 Gazette, [and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situate of which at least one, shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall state] the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area, and, where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected.
(3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be; and, after making such declaration, the 23 [appropriate Government may acquire the land in a manner hereinafter appearing.
11. Enquiry and award by Collector.-- [1] On the day so fixed, or 26 any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections (if any) which any person interested has stated pursuant to a notice given under Section 9 to the measurements made under Section 8, and into the value of the land and 27 [at the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1)], and into the Page 12 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined respective interests of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of--
(i) the true area of the land;
(ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and
(iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him:
28
[Provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf:
Provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf.
29
[(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), if at any stage of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government, he may, without making further enquiry, Page 13 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined make an award according to the terms of such agreement.
(3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-
section (2) shall not in anyway affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), no agreement made under sub-section (2) shall be liable to registration under that Act.]
12. Award of Collector when to be final.--(1) Such award shall be filed in the Collector's office and shall, except as hereinafter provided, be final and conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested, whether they have respectively appeared before the Collector or not, of the true area and value of the land, and apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made.
13. Adjournment of enquiry.--The Collector may, for any cause he thinks fit, from time to time, adjourn the enquiry to a day to be fixed by him.
18. Reference to Court.--(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the Page 14 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken:
Provided that every such application shall be made,--
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2);
or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.
31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.--(1) On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub-section.
(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the Page 15 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined compensation in the court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted:
Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:
Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18:
Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this Act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector may, with the sanction of 56 [appropriate Government], instead of awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land-revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interests of the parties concerned.
(4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof.
53. Code of Civil Procedure to apply to proceedings before Court.-- Page 16 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined Save in so far as they may be inconsistent with anything 92 contained in this Act, the provision of the [Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, shall apply to all proceedings before the Court under this Act.
[54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.--Subject to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as 94 aforesaid an appeal shall lie to [the Supreme Court] subject to the provisions contained in Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLV thereof.]"
19. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the Land Acquisition Act is a benevolent legislation, which is formulated to provide compensation to the persons who have lost their lands in acquisition proceedings. In many cases, the persons lose their only source of livelihood. The compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer is often too meager and therefore the provision is made that the claimants can raise protest/objection against the amount awarded. On such objection being recorded, the Land Acquisition Officer refers the same to the Court under Section 18 of the LAQ Act, Page 17 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined which is then decided by the Reference Court concerned. Thereafter, when the claimants are not satisfied with the awarded amount in reference, there is a provision for preferring appeal before the High Court, however, there is no provision in the entire Act to record any objection at the time of withdrawing the said enhanced amount before the Reference Court. The appeal is a statutory right for any claimant/applicant to challenge the award/order, if it is not satisfactory in their view. Therefore, prima facie, the preliminary objection raised by the learned Government Pleader of recording a protest at the time of withdrawing of the enhanced amount in reference cannot be entertained.
20. As regards the huge delay caused in filing the appeal, there cannot be any second thought that the delay is really very huge to condone. However, the reasons mentioned in the civil application for such a huge delay are to be seen. In the land acquisition proceedings, generally, the claimants are illiterate and poor farmers, with very limited resources at their disposal to have the knowledge to challenge the award before the higher forum. When the appeal is sought to be filed in such a benevolent legislation, the delay caused in filing the appeal cannot be straightaway rejected to be condoned, as the claimants have lost their lands and have been awarded a very meagre amount towards compensation. Page 18 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined At the same time, if a person is sleeping for many years and suddenly waking up and walking to file an appeal being dissatisfied with the award, the burden of interest for all the said period should not be saddled on the government, for no fault of the government. Therefore, the ends of justice would be met if the civil application for condonation of delay is allowed and the first appeal be permitted to be registered to be decided on merits would serve the purpose of the claimants in pursuing their statutory right to appeal and at the same time, not allowing the claimants to claim interest for the delayed period which would serve the purpose of not saddling the government with huge burden on exchequer.
21. With the above observation and the provisions of law, now, a reference deserves to be made to the judgments referred and relied on by learned advocates for the parties.
22. Learned Government Pleader has relied on the decisions, wherein, in the case of Nathu(supra), it is held in paragraphs 5,6 and 7 as under:
"5. A combined reading of these two provisions would show that a reference petition under S. 18 of the Act can be made only by such of the interested persons who have not accepted the award. Section 31 then indicates as to what is Page 19 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined meant by 'a person interested who has not accepted the award'. Proviso (1) to sub-sec. (1) of S. 31 lays down that any person admitted to be interested may receive the payment of compensation under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount. The next proviso then clearly enjoins that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under S. 18 of the Act. It is thus clear that before a person can be held entitled to make an application under S. 18 of the Act, it must be shown that he received the amount of compensation under protest. The law does give an option to receive the amount of compensation with or without protest and in case a person chooses the latter course, he will lose his right to apply for a reference under S. 18 of the Act. The Act is silent with respect to the manner in which the protest should be registered by a person interested to show that he does not accept the award. In the absence of any provision in the Act with respect to the manner and the procedure for registering such a protest, it looks reasonable to say that such a protest must be registered either before the payment is received or latest at the time of receiving the payment of the amount of compensation and that the registration of such a protest must appear on the record itself. Since the payment is made against receipt in writing, it is legitimate to conclude that the protest should also be registered in writing.
6. An application under S. 18 of the Act is required to be Page 20 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined made before the Collector for onward transmission to the Court. Since in terms of S. 31(2) of the Act no reference petition under S. 18 of the Act lies at the instance of a person who has received the amount of compensation without protest, it would be the duty of the Collector to ensure before forwarding an application under S. 18 of the Act to the Court that the applicant had not received the amount of compensation without protest. The Collector can do so only after scrutinsing his own record since the protest, if any, is supposed to have been registered there. I do not think that it is necessary on the part of the Collector to hold an inquiry into the matter after giving a notice to the applicant when his own record shows that the amount of compensation had been received by the applicant without protest. In any case when there is no allegation in the reference petition itself that the amount of compensation had been received by the applicant under protest or that the applicant had not accepted the award before receiving the payment, there would arise no occasion for such an inquiry. I have perused the original reference petition filed by the petitioner under S. 18 of the Act and I find no allegation therein to the effect that the petitioner had received the amount of compensation under protest. It might have been a different matter in case the petitioner had alleged in his reference petition under S. 18 of the Act that he had received the amount of compensation under protest or that he had already registered his protest before receiving such payment. Page 21 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined On the facts of the present case I find no infirmity, much less illegality, in the order of the Land Acquisition Collector refusing to forward the reference petition of the petitioner.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in support of his contention that the Collector is bound to hold an inquiry into the matter after notice to the petitioner and only then can take a decision whether the amount was received under protest. That was a decision given in the facts of a particular case. An inquiry is called for when there is controversy between the parties. In the instant case, as already observed, there was no allegation before the Collector if the petitioner had registered his protest at the time of receiving the payment of the amount of compensation or at any earlier occasion and as such there arose no question to hold any inquiry. On the facts of this case I find that the petitioner had received the amount of compensation without registering any protest and in the absence of any allegation to the contrary, there was no occasion to hold an inquiry into the matter. In these circumstances I find no merit in this revision petition which is accordingly dismissed."
22.1 In the case of Ramendra Kr.Battacharjee (supra), it is held in paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 as under: Page 22 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined
10. It may also be mentioned that Section 31 of the L.A. Act reads as follows:--
"31. Payment of compensation or deposit of same in Court.
-- (1) On making an award under Section 11, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested entitled thereto according to the award, and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the next sub- section.
(2) If they shall not consent to receive it, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there be any dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or as to the apportionment of it, the Collector shall deposit the amount of the compensation in the Court to which a reference under Section 18 would be submitted:
Provided that any person admitted to be interested may receive such payment under protest as to the sufficiency of the amount:
Provided also that no person who has received the amount otherwise than under protest shall be entitled to make any application under Section 18:
Provided also that nothing herein contained shall affect the liability of any person, who may receive the whole or any part of any compensation awarded under this act, to pay the same to the person lawfully entitled thereto. (3) Notwithstanding anything in this section, the Collector may, with the sanction of appropriate Government instead of Page 23 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined awarding a money compensation in respect of any land, make any arrangement with a person having a limited interest in such land, either by the grant of other lands in exchange, the remission of land revenue on other lands held under the same title, or in such other way as may be equitable having regard to the interest of the parties concerned.
(4) Nothing in the last foregoing sub-section shall be construed to interfere with or limit the power of the Collector to enter into any arrangement with any person interested in the land and competent to contract in respect thereof."
11. From a combined reading of the provisions of Section 18 and Section 31 of the L.A. Act read with Section 12 thereof, what transpires is that the Collector shall, according to Section 12, issue a notice of the award to the person interested in the land, which is acquired, to receive the amount awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector. The persons, who is interested in the land so acquired and who has not accepted the award so made, may, by an application addressed to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector to a Court of competent jurisdiction for determination of, inter alia, the amount of compensation. The application, so made, shall contain the grounds on which the objection to the award has been taken. If the Collector makes the reference, the Court to which the reference is made has to decide the reference.
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12. The question, now, is as to what is the object and scope of Section 31, which is the subject of controversy in this appeal. A careful reading of Section 31 shows that the Collector had to tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons entitled to receive compensation. The first proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 shows that the person to whom the payment of compensation is made may receive the payment under protest as regards the sufficiency of the amount. But the second proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 shows that a person, who has received the amount, otherwise than under protest, would not be entitled to make any application under Section 18. The logical conclusion from a careful reading of the second proviso to Sub-section (2) of Section 31 is that the person to whom the payment of the awarded amount is tendered by the Collector has the liberty to receive the amount, but if he receives the amount without any protest, then, he shall not be entitled to make any application seeking a reference to the Court. Both the proviso to sub- section (2) of Section 31 have to be given realistic and meaningful interpretation. The realistic interpretation will be that the awardee of the amount must raise his protest before he receives the payment. There is nothing in the language of the two proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 31 to indicate that the protest must be made, in writing, simultaneously and/or along with the receipt of the payment and/or at the very moment of receipt of the payment. What Page 25 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined the two proviso indicate is that the protest must be raised after the payment of the amount awarded is tendered by the Collector and must continue to exist at the time, when the payment is received, meaning thereby that there is no impediment on the part of the person to raise a protest on any day after the amount awarded is tendered to him and before he actually receives the payment of the awarded amount. Such a person will forfeit or lose his right to seek a reference under Section 18 only if he either waives the protest, which he had already raised, or withdraws the protest he had raised before actually receiving the awarded amount. In the absence of waiver or withdrawal of protest, the real and logical conclusion will be that the protest raised by such a person has continued to exist at the time, when he received the payment.
22.2 In the case of V.Chandrasekaran (supra), it is held in paragraphs 33 and 34 as under:
33. This Court has earlier taken the view that, in case the award is not accepted under protest, the persons interested cannot make an application to make a reference under Section 18 (vide Wardington Lyngdoh v. Collector [(1995) 4 SCC 428] ) wherein this Court held that, a person who has received the amount of award made under Section 11 of the Act, without protest, will not be entitled to make an application under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, receipt of Page 26 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined the said amount under protest, is a condition precedent for making an application under Section 18, within the limitation prescribed under the Act.
34. The aforesaid view however, has not been consistently reiterated, as is evident from the judgment in Ajit Singh v.
State of Punjab [(1994) 4 SCC 67] wherein it was held that, merely an application under Section 18 of the Act would make it clear that the person interested has not accepted the award made by the authority.
22.3 In the case of K.S.Paripoornan (supra), it is held in paragraphs 52 and 54 as under:
52. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Bhag Singh v.
Union Territory of Chandigarh [(1985) 3 SCC 737] disapproved the view taken in Kamalajammanniavaru [(1985) 1 SCC 582] and held that under sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act the provisions of the amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 are made applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30-4-1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even if they have finally terminated before the enactment of the amending Act. The Court first considered what would be the position if Section 30(2) were not enacted and the amendments in sub-section (2) of Section 23 and Section 28 Page 27 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined were effective only from the date on which they were made, namely, 24-9-1984, when the amending Act received the assent of the President and was brought into force. After observing that "if at the date of the amending Act, any proceedings for determination of compensation were pending before the Collector under Section 11 of the Act or before the Court on a reference under Section 18 of the Act, the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would admittedly be applicable to such proceedings", the Court posed the question: (SCC p. 743, para 5) "But if an award were made by the Court on a reference under Section 18 prior to the commencement of the amending Act and an appeal against such award was pending before the High Court under Section 54 at the date of the commencement of the amending Act, which provisions would the High Court have to apply in deciding the appeal and determining the amount of compensation : the amended provisions in Section 23 sub- section (2) and Section 28 or the unamended provisions." The said question was thus answered: (SCR pp. 958-59 :
SCC pp. 743-44, para 5) "The answer can only be that the High Court would have to apply the provisions in the amended Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28. The appeal against the award would be a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18 and when the High Court hears the appeal, it would in Page 28 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined effect and substance be hearing the reference and while determining the amount of compensation, it would have to give effect to Sections 23 and 28 as it finds them at the date of decision of the appeal. When Section 23 sub- section (1) provides that in determining the amount of compensation the Court shall take into consideration matters specified in the various sub-clauses of that sub- section and sub-section (2) of Section 23 directs that in addition to the market value of the land the Court shall in every case award a sum of 15 per centum of such market value in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition, the mandate of these two sub-sections must apply equally whether the Court is hearing a reference or the High Court is hearing an appeal against an award made by the Court. The amended provisions in Section 23 sub-section (2) and Section 28 would therefore have to be applied by the High Court in determining the amount of compensation. The same position would obtain where an appeal against an award has been decided by the High Court prior to the commencement of the amending Act and an appeal against the order of the High Court is pending before the Supreme Court at the date of commencement of the amending Act or is filed after such date."
Thereafter the Court examined sub-section (2) of Section 30 of the amending Act and observed that by virtue of the said provision the amended provisions of sub-section (2) of Section Page 29 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined 23 and Section 28 were made applicable also where the proceedings were pending on 30-4-1982, the date when the original Bill (which ultimately became the amending Act) was introduced in Parliament, but were commenced after that date even though they might have finally come to an end before the enactment of the amending Act. The expression "such award" in Section 30(2) was construed to mean only the award made by the Collector or by the Court and it was held that it does not import the time element which finds place only at the end of the sentence and not immediately followed by the words "any award made by the Collector or Court". It was, therefore, held that under Section 30(2) the provisions of amended Section 23(2) and Section 28 are applicable to all proceedings relating to compensation pending on 30-4-1982 or filed subsequent to that date, whether before the Collector or before the Court or the High Court or the Supreme Court, even though they have finally terminated before the enactment of the Amendment Act.
54. Referring to the principle that an appeal is a continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court by way of reference under Section 18, the learned Chief Justice observed that "the application of a general principle must yield to the limiting terms of the statutory provision itself".
(SCR p. 340 : SCC p. 782, para 34) While construing the provisions of Section 30(2) of the amending Act, it was held that the words "any such award" in the context in which Page 30 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined they appear in Section 30(2), are intended to refer to awards made by the Collector or by the Court between 30-4-1982 and 24-9-1984 and they could not have the expanded meaning given to them in Bhag Singh [(1985) 3 SCC 737]. 22.4 In the case of N.Murugesan (supra), it is held in paragraphs 25 and 26 as under:
25. Acquiescence would mean a tacit or passive acceptance.
It is implied and reluctant consent to an act. In other words, such an action would qualify a passive assent. Thus, when acquiescence takes place, it presupposes knowledge against a particular act. From the knowledge comes passive acceptance, therefore instead of taking any action against any alleged refusal to perform the original contract, despite adequate knowledge of its terms, and instead being allowed to continue by consciously ignoring it and thereafter proceeding further, acquiescence does take place. As a consequence, it reintroduces a new implied agreement between the parties. Once such a situation arises, it is not open to the party that acquiesced itself to insist upon the compliance of the original terms. Hence, what is essential, is the conduct of the parties. We only dealt with the distinction involving a mere acquiescence. When acquiescence is followed by delay, it may become laches. Here again, we are inclined to hold that the concept of acquiescence is to be Page 31 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined seen on a case-to-case basis
26. These phrases are borrowed from the Scots law. They would only mean that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing, and thus one cannot blow hot and cold. The principle behind the doctrine of election is inbuilt in the concept of approbate and reprobate. Once again, it is a principle of equity coming under the contours of common law. Therefore, he who knows that if he objects to an instrument, he will not get the benefit he wants cannot be allowed to do so while enjoying the fruits. One cannot take advantage of one part while rejecting the rest. A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same. Such a party either has to affirm or disaffirm the transaction. This principle has to be applied with more vigour as a common law principle, if such a party actually enjoys the one part fully and on near completion of the said enjoyment, thereafter questions the other part. An element of fair play is inbuilt in this principle. It is also a species of estoppel dealing with the conduct of a party. We have already dealt with the provisions of the Contract Act concerning the conduct of a party, and his presumption of knowledge while confirming an offer through his acceptance unconditionally. 22.5 In the case of Cauvery Coffee Traders (supra), it is held in paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 as under: Page 32 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
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33. In R.N. Gosain v. Yashpal Dhir [(1992) 4 SCC 683 :
AIR 1993 SC 352] this Court has observed as under : (SCC pp. 687-88, para 10) "10. Law does not permit a person to both approbate and reprobate. This principle is based on the doctrine of election which postulates that no party can accept and reject the same instrument and that 'a person cannot say at one time that a transaction is valid and thereby obtain some advantage, to which he could only be entitled on the footing that it is valid, and then turn round and say it is void for the purpose of securing some other advantage'."
34. A party cannot be permitted to "blow hot and cold", "fast and loose" or "approbate and reprobate". Where one knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right and good conscience. (Vide Nagubai Ammal v. B. Shama Rao [AIR 1956 SC 593] , CIT v. V.MR.P. Firm Muar [AIR 1965 SC 1216] , Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service [AIR 1969 SC 329] , P.R. Deshpande v. Maruti Balaram Haibatti [(1998) 6 SCC 507 : AIR 1998 SC 2979] , Babu Ram v. Indra Pal Singh [(1998) 6 SCC 358 : AIR 1998 SC 3021] , NTPC Ltd. v. Reshmi Constructions, Page 33 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined Builders & Contractors [(2004) 2 SCC 663 : AIR 2004 SC 1330] , Ramesh Chandra Sankla v. Vikram Cement [(2008) 14 SCC 58 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 706 : AIR 2009 SC 713] and Pradeep Oil Corpn. v. MCD [(2011) 5 SCC 270 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 712] .)
35. Thus, it is evident that the doctrine of election is based on the rule of estoppel--the principle that one cannot approbate and reprobate inheres in it. The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have had.
22.6 In the case of Waman Shriniwaskini (supra), it is held in paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 as under:
13. The plea of waiver was taken for the first time in this Court in arguments. Waiver is not a pure question of law but it is a mixed question of law and fact. This plea was neither raised nor considered by the courts below and therefore ought not to be allowed to be taken at this stage of the proceedings. But it was argued on behalf of the appellant that according to the law of India the duty of a pleader is to set up the facts upon which he relied and not any legal inference to be drawn from them and as he had set up all the circumstances from which the plea of waiver Page 34 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined could be inferred he should be allowed to raise and argue it at this stage even though it had not been raised at any previous stage not even in the statement of case filed in this Court and he relied upon Gouri Dutt Ganesh Lal Firm v. Madho Prasad [AIR (1943) PC 147] . Assuming that to be so and proceeding on the facts found in this case the plea of waiver cannot be raised because as a result of giving effect to that plea the Court would be enforcing an illegal agreement and thus contravene the statutory provisions of Section 15 based on public policy and produce the very result which the statute prohibits and makes illegal. In Surajmull Nargoremull v. Triton Insurance Co. [(1924) LR 52 IA 126 128] Lord Sumner said:
"No Court can enforce as valid that which competent enactments have declared shall not be valid, nor is obedience to such an enactment a thing from which a Court can be dispensed by the consent of the parties, or by a failure to plead or to argue the point at the outset : Nixon v. Albion Marine Insurance Co. [(1867) LR 2 Ex 338] . The enactment is prohibitory. It is not confined to affording a party a protection of which he may avail himself or not as he pleases. It is not framed solely for the protection of the revenue and to be enforced solely at the instance of the revenue officials, nor is the prohibition limited to cases for which a penalty is exigible."
In the instant case the question is not merely of waiver of statutory rights enacted for the benefit of an individual but Page 35 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined whether the Court would aid the appellant in enforcing a term of the agreement which Section 15 of the Act declares to be illegal by enforcing the contract the consequence will be the enforcement of an illegality and infraction of a statutory provision which cannot be condoned by any conduct or agreement of parties. Dhanukudhari Singh v. Nathima Sahu [(1907) II CWN 848, 852] . In Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 92 at p. 1068 the law as to waiver is stated as follows:
"... a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favoured, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals...."
In Bowmakers Ltd. v. Barnet Instruments Ltd. [(1945) I KB 65, 72] the same rule was laid down. Mulla in his Contract Act at p. 198 has stated the law as to waiver of an illegality as follows:--
"Agreements which seek to waive an illegality are void on grounds of public policy. Whenever an illegality appears, whether from the evidence given by one side or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. A stipulation of the strongest form to waive the objection would be tainted with the vice of the original contract and void for the same reasons. Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys."
This, in our opinion, is a correct statement of the law and is supported by high authority. Field, J. in Oscanyan v. Winchester Arms Company [(1881) 103 US 261, 268 : 26 LEd 539] quoted with approval the observation of Swayne, J. Page 36 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined in Hall v. Coppell [ Wallace 542] :
"The principle is indispensable to the purity of its administration. It will not enforce what it has forbidden and denounced. The maxim Ex dolo malo non oritur actio , is limited by no such qualification. The proposition to the contrary strikes us as hardly worthy of serious refutation. Wherever the illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one side or the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. No consent of the defendant can neutralise its effect. A stipulation in the most solemn form, to waive the objection, would be tainted with the vice of the original contract, and void for the same reasons. Wherever the contamination reaches, it destroys."
Waiver is the abandonment of a right which normally everybody is at liberty to waive. A waiver is nothing unless it amounts to a release. It signifies nothing more than an intention not to insist upon the right. It may be deduced from acquiescence or may be implied. Chitty on Contract 21st Ed. p. 381 : Stackhouse v. Barnston [(1805) 10 Ves 453, 466 : 32 ER 921] . But an agreement to waive an illegality is void on grounds of public policy and would be unenforceable.
14. In Mytton v. Gilbert [(1787) 2 TR 171 : 100 ER 91] Ashurst, J., said:
"Besides, there is still further reason why the trustees should not be estopped; for this is a public Act of Page 37 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined Parliament, and the Courts are bound to take notice that the trustees under this Act had no power to mortgage the toll-houses. This deed therefore cannot operate in direct opposition to an Act of Parliament, which negatives the estoppel".
15. Vaughan Williams, L.J., in Norwich Corporation v. Norwich Electric Tramways Company [(1906) 2 KB 119, 124] said:
"The case is not like that of a provision in an agreement which is for the benefit of one of the parties and which he may waive. This is a provision in an Act of Parliament, which, though to some extent it may be for the benefit of the parties to the difference, must be regarded as inserted in the interest of the public also."
In that case there was a provision made by the legislature that disputes mentioned in the section of the Act were to be determined by an Expert nominated by the Board of Trade and it was contended that though not in the strict technical sense estoppel, it was a waiver of the provisions introduced into the Statute for the benefit of private rights. No doubt that was a case which proceeded on a question of jurisdiction but the judgment proceeded on the principle of waiver of a statutory provision inserted in public interest. Thus the plea of waiver is unsustainable. Page 38 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined 22.7 In the case of Garikapati Veeraya (supra), it is held in paragraph 23 as under:
23. From the decisions cited above the following principles clearly emerge:
(i) That the legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal and second appeal are really but steps in a series of proceedings all connected by an intrinsic unity and are to be regarded as one legal proceeding.
(ii) The right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but is a substantive right.
(iii) The institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force are preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit.
(iv) The right of appeal is a vested right and such a right to enter the superior court accrues to the litigant and exists as on and from the date the lis commences and although it may be actually exercised when the adverse judgment is pronounced such right is to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevails at the date of its decision or at the date of the filing of the appeal.
(v) This vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment, if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise. Page 39 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined 22.8 In the case of Bihari (Dead) through Lrs. And others (supra), it is held in paragraph 4 as under:
4. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that after the impugned judgment and order has been passed by the High Court enhancing the compensation to Rs. 28.12 Per Square Yard, in fact, the respondents accepted the judgment and order passed by the High Court and deposited the entire amount as awarded by the High Court and even the landowners received the same in the year 2013 accepting the judgment and order passed by the High court awarding compensation at the rate of Rs. 28.12 per square yard.
Therefore, even the cause shown explaining the delay is not acceptable.
22.9 In the case of Chimanlal Hargovinddas (supra), it is held in paragraph 4 as under:
4. The following factors must be etched on the mental screen:
(1) A reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not an appeal against the award and the court cannot take into account the material relied upon by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award unless the same material is produced and proved before the court.
(2) So also the award of the Land Acquisition Officer is not Page 40 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined to be treated as a judgment of the trial court open or exposed to challenge before the court hearing the reference.
It is merely an offer made by the Land Acquisition Officer and the material utilised by him for making his valuation cannot be utilised by the court unless produced and proved before it. It is not the function of the court to sit in appeal against the award, approve or disapprove its reasoning, or correct its error or affirm, modify or reverse the conclusion reached by the Land Acquisition Officer, as if it were an appellate court.
(3) The court has to treat the reference as an original proceeding before it and determine the market value afresh on the basis of the material produced before it. (4) The claimant is in the position of a plaintiff who has to show that the price offered for his land in the award is inadequate on the basis of the materials produced in the court. Of course the materials placed and proved by the other side can also be taken into account for this purpose. (5) The market value of land under acquisition has to be determined as on the crucial date of publication of the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (dates of notifications under Sections 6 and 9 are irrelevant). (6) The determination has to be made standing on the date line of valuation (date of publication of notification under Section 4) as if the valuer is a hypothetical purchaser willing to purchase land from the open market and is prepared to pay a reasonable price as on that day. It has Page 41 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined also to be assumed that the vendor is willing to sell the land at a reasonable price.
(7) In doing so by the instances method, the court has to correlate the market value reflected in the most comparable instance which provides the index of market value. (8) Only genuine instances have to be taken into account. (Sometimes instances are rigged up in anticipation of acquisition of land.) (9) Even post-notification instances can be taken into account (1) if they are very proximate, (2) genuine and (3) the acquisition itself has not motivated the purchaser to pay a higher price on account of the resultant improvement in development prospects.
(10) The most comparable instances out of the genuine instances have to be identified on the following considerations:
(i) proximity from time angle,
(ii) proximity from situation angle.
(11) Having identified the instances which provide the index of market value the price reflected therein may be taken as the norm and the market value of the land under acquisition may be deduced by making suitable adjustments for the plus and minus factors vis-à-vis land under acquisition by placing the two in juxtaposition. (12) A balance-sheet of plus and minus factors may be drawn for this purpose and the relevant factors may be Page 42 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined evaluated in terms of price variation as a prudent purchaser would do.
(13) The market value of the land under acquisition has thereafter to be deduced by loading the price reflected in the instance taken as norm for plus factors and unloading it for minus factors.
(14) The exercise indicated in clauses (11) to (13) has to be undertaken in a common sense manner as a prudent man of the world of business would do. We may illustrate some such illustrative (not exhaustive) factors:' Plus factors Minus factors
1. smallness of size 1. largeness of area
2. proximity to a road 2. situation in the interior at a distance from the road.
3. frontage on a road 3. narrow strip of land with very small frontage compared to depth
4. nearness to developed area 4. lower level requiring the depressed portion to be filled up
5. regular shape 5. remoteness from developed locality
6. level vis-a-vis land under 6. some special disadvantageous acquisition factor which would deter a purchaser
7. special value for an owner of an adjoining property to whom it may have some very special advantage (15) The evaluation of these factors of course depends on the facts of each case. There cannot be any hard and fast or rigid rule. Common sense is the best and most reliable guide. For instance, take the factor regarding the size. A Page 43 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined building plot of land say 500 to 1000 sq. yds. cannot be compared with a large tract or block of land of say 10,000 sq. yds. or more. Firstly while a smaller plot is within the reach of many, a large block of land will have to be developed by preparing a lay out, carving out roads, leaving open space, plotting out smaller plots, waiting for purchasers (meanwhile the invested money will be blocked up) and the hazards of an entrepreneur. The factor can be discounted by making a deduction by way of an allowance at an appropriate rate ranging approximately between 20 per cent to 50 per cent to account for land required to be set apart for carving out lands and plotting out small plots. The discounting will to some extent also depend on whether it is a rural area or urban area, whether building activity is picking up, and whether waiting period during which the capital of the entrepreneur would be locked up, will be longer or shorter and the attendant hazards.
(16) Every case must be dealt with on its own fact pattern bearing in mind all these factors as a prudent purchaser of land in which position the judge must place himself. (17) These are general guidelines to be applied with understanding informed with common sense. 22.10 In the case of Bhanu Kumar Jain (supra), it is held in paragraph 36 as under:
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36. However, it appears that in none of the aforementioned cases, the question as regards the right of the defendant to assail the judgment and decree on merits of the suit did not (sic) fall for consideration. A right to question the correctness of the decree in a first appeal is a statutory right. Such a right shall not be curtailed nor shall any embargo be fixed thereupon unless the statute expressly or by necessary implication says so. (See Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2004) 5 SCC 385 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1623] and Chandravathi P.K. v. C.K. Saji [(2004) 3 SCC 734 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 544] .) 22.11 In the case of Garikapati Veeraya (supra), it is held in paragraph 28 as under:
28. In exercise of the powers conferred on him by Article 372(2), the President promulgated the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, which came into force simultaneously with the Constitution on January 26, 1950. In the first schedule dealing with the Central Acts are set out the adaptations made in the Code of Civil Procedure. It is to be noted that Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not deleted altogether but were modified only. The sections as adapted run as follows:
"109. Subject to the provisions in Chapter IV of Part V of the-Constitution and such rules as may, from time to time, Page 45 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined be made by the Supreme Court regarding appeals from the Courts of India, and to the provisions hereinafter contained, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court--
(a) from any judgment, decree or final order passed on appeal by a High Court or by any other Court of final appellate jurisdiction;
(b) from any judgment, decree or final order passed by a High Court in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction; and
(c) from any judgment, decree or order, when the case, as hereinafter provided, is certified to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court.
110. In each of the cases mentioned in clauses ( a) and (b) of Section 109, the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of first instance must be twenty thousand Rs or upwards, and the amount or value of the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to the Supreme Court must be the same sum or upwards, or the judgment, decree or final order must involve, directly or indirectly, some claim or question to or respecting property of like amount or value, and where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such judgment, decree or final order, the appeal must involve some substantial question of law." This adaptation, however, was subject to the provisions of clause 20 of the Order itself, which runs as follows: Page 46 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined "20. Nothing in this Order shall affect the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under, any existing law, or any right, privilege, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred under any such law, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence already committed against any such law." 22.12 In the case of Patel Natvarbhai Prabhudas (supra), it is held in paragraph 4 as under:
4. On 25.5.1993, according to the petitioners, they filed reference application seeking enhancement of compensation on 11.6.1993. The case of the petitioners is that the respondent-
Land Acquisition Officer rejected the reference application on the ground that these petitioners had accepted award and, therefore, under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act there cannot be any reference to the District Court for enhancement of compensation. The petitioners challenge the order passed by the respondent on 4.8.1993.
23. At this stage, it will also be appropriate and fruitful to refer to the judgments which are most relevant in view of the above mentioned provisions of law, which are as under:
23.1 In the case of Ningappa Thotappa Angadi (supra), wherein it is held in paragraphs 6 and 7 as under: Page 47 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
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6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
7. We find that the issue raised in this appeal is no longer res integra. This Court in Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana [Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana, (2014) 14 SCC 127 : (2015) 1 SCC (Civ) 236] held that : (SCC p. 131, paras 14-15) "14. The appellants are identically situated and there is no reason to meet out a different treatment to them. We also note that, while in these cases, the High Court had refused to condone the delay and dismissed the LPAs of the appellants, other LPAs were allowed by the High Court itself by condoning the delay of the same magnitude in the same circumstances.
15. Equities can be balanced by denying the appellants' interest for the period for which they did not approach the court. The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hypertechnical view of self-imposed limitations. In the matter of compensation for land acquisition, we are of the view that approach of the court has to be pragmatic and not pedantic."
23.2 In the case of K.Subbarayudu and others (supra), it is held in paragraphs 8 to 11, 13 and 18 as under: Page 48 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
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8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length.
Perused the impugned judgment and considered the documents and other materials placed on record.
9. The High Court dismissed the claimants' appeal mainly on the ground of delay of 3671 days in filing the appeal. On perusal of records, it is seen that the appellants have explained the reason for the delay in filing the appeal stating that they have entrusted the relevant papers to their co-villager, namely, Pullaiah who is well-conversant with the court proceedings and the said Pullaiah has also taken steps to engage an advocate at Hyderabad and the said Pullaiah informed that the appeal was filed and left for Kuwait to eke out his livelihood. Thus the appellant claimants were under the impression that the appeal has been filed. The claimants have further stated that when they inquired the said Pullaiah, he informed them that he went to the house of Shri Jaganmohan Raju, Advocate and he learnt that the said advocate is no more and expired in 2012 itself and on enquiry with the clerk of the said advocate, he learnt that no appeal has been filed and this has caused a delay of 3671 days in filing the appeal. The High Court rejected the explanation given by the appellants on the ground that there are contradictions between the affidavit filed by the said Pullaiah and the stand of the claimants and being not satisfied with the reason for the delay of 3671 days in preferring the appeal, the High Court dismissed the appeal. Page 49 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
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10. Before the High Court, the appellants relied upon Yellasiri Sarojanamma case [ LASS No. 46 of 2015] , in which the High Court condoned the delay of 3386 days in filing the land acquisition appeal suit subject to the condition that in the event, the appellant claimant thereon succeed in appeal, she is not entitled to any interest in respect of the period of delay. The appellants contended that the same approach ought to have been adopted in the case of the appellants also. Insofar as, the reliance placed upon by the claimants in LASS No. 46 of 2015, the High Court seems to have brushed aside the contention of the appellants on the puerile ground that the relevant fact situation in the said case is not forthcoming in the said order. In our view, the High Court was not right in adopting a different yardstick in the case of the appellants in not condoning the delay.
11. The term "sufficient cause" is to receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides is attributable to the appellants, the Court should adopt a justice-oriented approach in condoning the delay. In State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao [State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] , it was held as under : (SCC p. 757, para 8) "8. ... Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates Page 50 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient."
13. When the court concerned has exercised its discretion either condoning or declining to condone the delay, normally the superior court will not interfere in exercise of such discretion. The true guide is whether the litigant has acted with due diligence. Since the appellant claimants are the agriculturists whose lands were acquired and when similarly situated agriculturists were given a higher rate of compensation, there is no reason to decline the same to the appellants. Merely on the ground of delay such benefit cannot be denied to the appellants. The interest of justice would be served by declining the interest on the enhanced compensation and also on the solatium and other statutory benefits for the period of delay.
18. Compensation awarded to the appellants is enhanced to Rs 1500 for each pomegranate tree and Rs 250 for each lime tree. The appellants are also entitled to all statutory benefits like solatium and other benefits and interest on the same. It is further directed that the appellants shall not be entitled to any interest during the period of delay of 3671 days. The appeal is partly allowed in the above terms. Parties are to bear their respective costs. Page 51 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024
NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined 23.3 In the case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. And others (supra), it is held in paragraphs 13 to 17, 25 and 29 as under:
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux v.
Munshi (Dead) by LRs.1, it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may require different construction, as for example, the court exercises its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It, therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section 3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of Page 52 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase 'sufficient cause' used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji , 2 this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for 'sufficient cause' held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of 'sufficient cause' for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice-oriented approach' and cause for the advancement of 'substantial justice' cannot be Page 53 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing 'sufficient cause' in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters Page 54 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
29. The other decision relied upon in this regard is the case of Imrat Lal v. Land Acquisition Collector . In this case also 10 the matter was regarding determination of compensation for the acquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days in filing the appeal for enhancement of compensation. Despite findings that no sufficient cause was shown in the application for condoning the delay, this Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal as a large number of similarly situate persons have been granted relief by this Court.
23.4 In the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Another v. Mst. Katiji and Others reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353, which still holds the field, it has been observed as under :-
"3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression Page 55 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaning- ful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is con- doned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made.
Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
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4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
24. In over all view of the matter, the protest/objection is required to be registered at the time of the award passed by the Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11 of the LAQ Act as per the statute and the submission of the learned Government Pleader that the protest/objection is required to be registered/filed after the Reference Court passes the award under Section 18 of the LAQ Act as it is a prerequisition for the claimants to file an appeal under Section 54 of the LAQ Act before this Court, is ill-founded, as there is no such Page 57 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined requirement under the statute and the right to file an appeal is a statutory right available to the claimant/s. Therefore, the said submission of the learned Government Pleader is required to be rejected.
25. As regards the aspect of condonation of such huge delay, as recorded hereinabove, considering the fact that the claimants have lost their valuable lands in acquisition process and are not having sufficient knowledge of various aspects about market price and/or entitlement of amount of compensation and in view of the various judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court and this Court, it is consistent view to order to the effect that the claimants will not be entitled to claim interest for the delayed period for filing the first appeal. On perusal of the averments of the present applicant, it can be held that sufficient cause is made out for condonation of delay, which can be considered by imposing some condition on applicant/s to waive the interest for the period of delay, in the interest of justice.
26. In view of the above, as sufficient cause is made out, this application is required to be allowed by condoning the delay caused in filing the first appeal.
27. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The delay Page 58 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024 NEUTRAL CITATION C/CA/2464/2024 ORDER DATED: 08/10/2024 undefined caused in filing the first appeal is condoned on condition that the claimants will not be entitled to claim the interest for the delayed period from the date of judgment of reference Court to the date of filing of first appeals.
28. Registry to register the first appeal and place on board for admission.
(SANDEEP N. BHATT,J) SRILATHA Page 59 of 59 Uploaded by U. SRILATHA(HC00185) on Wed Oct 23 2024 Downloaded on : Sat Oct 26 22:11:27 IST 2024