Orissa High Court
K. Prutviraj Singh vs Chief General .... Opposite Parties on 5 February, 2026
Author: V. Narasingh
Bench: V. Narasingh
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK
W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
In the matter of an application under Article 226 and 227 of
the Constitution of India.
K. Prutviraj Singh .... Petitioner
Mr. H.M. Dhal, Advocate
-versus-
1. Chief General .... Opposite Parties
Manager, State
Bank of India,
Local Head Office,
IDCO Tower,
Janpath, BBSR,
Khurda
2. General Manager
(Operations) &
Disciplinary
Authority, State
Bank of India
Local Head Office,
IDCO Tower,
Janpath, BBSR,
Khurda
3. Deputy Managing
Director & C.D.O.-
cum-Appellate
Authority, State
Bank of India
Appeals & Review
Department,
Corporate Centre,
8th Floor, State
Page 1 of 27
W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
Bank Bhawan,
Madame Cama
Road, Mumbai-
400021
Mr. A.K. Mishra, Advocate
CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH
DATE OF FINAL HEARING : 27.10.2025
DATE OF JUDGMENT : 05.02.2026
V. Narasingh, J.
1. Heard Mr. Dhal, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Mishra, learned counsel for the Opposite Parties.
2. The Petitioner, who was working as a Field Officer in the State Bank of India, Purusottampur Branch, Dist-Ganjam, has preferred this Writ Petition assailing the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority at Annexure-6 and 12 respectively imposing penalty of removal from service in terms of Rule 67(g) of State Page 2 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 Bank of India Officers Service Rules1. The relief sought for is extracted hereunder;
"Under these circumstances the petitioner most humbly prays that this Hon'ble Court be graciously pleased to issue a Rule NISI calling upon the opposite parties to show cause as to why;
i. the order under Annexure-6 as well as the order under Annexure-12 Series shall not be quashed ii. the opposite parties shall not be directed to grant all consequential service benefits;
If the opposite parties fail to show cause or show insufficient cause the Rule be made absolute.
xxx xxx xxx"
3. Brief facts germane for just adjudication is indicated hereunder;
While the Petitioner was serving as a Field Officer, On the basis of the statement of imputation, the following charges were communicated:1
67. Without prejudice to any other provisions contained in these rules, any one or more of the following penalties may be imposed on an officer, for an act of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing:-
(a) to (f)
(g) reduction to a lower grade or post;Page 3 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
(i) Sri K.P. Singh, OJM, was caught red-handed by the State Vigilance Department during a trap laid by them on 11.08.1989, while accepting Rs.1,000/- as bribe from one Shri Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP borrower, for sanction of a loan of Rs.5,000/- to him, and G.C. notes worth Rs.1,000/- tainted with phenolphthalein powder were recovered from his shirt pocket.
(ii) Shri Singh disbursed Rs.1,000/- on 10.08.1989 from Loan Account No. CIL 6/22 to Sri Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP borrower, unauthorisedly, without the loan being sanctioned by the Branch Manager.
(iii) Sri Singh recommended the loan proposal of Sri Laxmikanta Panda, who was already established in business. As such, Shri Panda was not eligible for finance under the SEPUP Scheme, which was primarily meant for new entrepreneurs.
Page 4 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
(iv) The loan application of Sri Laxmikanta Panda, whose loan was recommended by Sri K.P. Singh, was not properly filled in. The amount of required block capital and working capital were not mentioned separately.
3-B. In response to the memorandum of charges, the Petitioner submitted his explanation denying the same.
3-C. Negating such explanation, the Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the charges extracted hereinabove. And, one Inspector of CBI was appointed as the Presenting Officer. During the enquiry, witnesses were cited on behalf of the Bank as well as the Petitioner-delinquent and several documents were also relied upon.
3-D. On conclusion of the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 22.08.1992, by which he held that Charge No. (iii) was not proved, Charge Nos. (ii) and (iv) were partly proved, and Charge No.
(i) was held to be proved.
Page 5 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
3.E. Copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was given to the Petitioner to submit his representation, and the Petitioner submitted his representation vis-à- vis the enquiry report stating that the same was not based on cogent materials and ought not to be acted upon.
3-F. The Disciplinary Authority, taking into account the enquiry report, proposed to impose punishment of removal from service against the Petitioner, but submitted such recommendation to the Appointing Authority, who concurred with the views of the Disciplinary Authority imposing the punishment of removal. Assailing the same, the Petitioner preferred an appeal.
3-G. Such appeal was rejected by order dated 23.05.1994 (Annexure-9).
4. Assailing such rejection, the Petitioner preferred O.J.C. No. 7895 of 1994, wherein the order of the Appellate Authority was annexed as Annexure-17. This Court, by judgment dated 17.03.2015, remanded the Page 6 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 matter for fresh consideration by the Appellate Authority, inter alia, on the ground that, on the materials available, the acceptance of Final Report by the competent criminal Court on 28.01.1994 inter alia on account of lack of evidence was not brought to the notice of the Appellate Authority.
5. Before adverting to the earlier judgment passed by this Court, it is apposite to note that, in respect of the allegation, CBI, Bhubaneswar had investigated into the matter and after investigation, submitted a Final Report which was accepted by the learned Court.
6. While considering the challenge of the Petitioner to the order of the Appellate Authority in O.J.C. No. 7895 of 1994, this Court, in its earlier judgment, noted that the submission of Final Report and acceptance of the same by the competent criminal Court was evidently not brought to the notice of the Appellate Authority. This Court took note of the sequence of events that, by the time the competent criminal Court passed an order on 28.01.1994 Page 7 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 accepting the Final Report, the penalty of removal had already been imposed by the Disciplinary Authority on 14.03.1993, and while passing the final order dated 24.09.1994 (Annexure-9 in this W.P.(C) and Annexure-17 in O.J.C. No. 7895 of 1994), the Appellate Authority had not considered the effect thereof. In such factual backdrop, this Court set aside the appellate order and remitted the matter back to the Appellate Authority.
Paragraph-16 of the judgment of this Court dated 17.03.2015 in O.J.C. No.7895 of 1994 is extracted hereunder for convenience of reference;
"16. In view of the aforesaid fact and circumstances, the order passed by the appellate authority in Annexure-17 confirming the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the appellate authority to reconsider the same taking into account the factum of closure of criminal case filed against the petitioner Pursuant to order passed on 28.01.1994 in Annexufe-20 and if the appellate authority comes to conclusion that the allegation made against the petitioner in the statement of imputation is same as that of the initiation of criminal case against him in Page 8 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 that case, he may take a decision taking into account law laid down as discussed (supra) and pass an order in accordance with law by affording opportunity of hearing to the parties within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order."
7. On such remand, the Appellate Authority passed the impugned order dated 12.08.2015 (Annexure-12 series), affirming the order of removal. Hence, this writ application.
8. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Dhal, that Charge No. (iii) was not proved and Charge Nos. (ii) and (iv) are mere irregularities. The basis of imposition of penalty is on account of Charge No. (i).
In this context, reliance is also placed on the counter affidavit filed by the Bank authorities.
9. It is the further submission of the learned counsel for the Petitioner, Mr. Dhal, that Charge No.
(i) is absolutely vague and not definite. The said charge relates to the acceptance of alleged bribe of Rs.1,000/- from one Mr. Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP Page 9 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 borrower and in the absence of any allegation of demand of bribe in the said charge, the money allegedly accepted and recovered from the possession of the Petitioner can never be characterized as bribe money.
10. It is also asserted that the imputations qua Charge No. (i) had to be viewed in the light of the submission of Final Report by the CBI, which was duly accepted by the Court in seisin, as already noted. It is stated that, taking into account the nature of charge and the final report as submitted, the Appellate Authority has failed to appreciate the materials on record in their proper perspective, notwithstanding the judgment of remand passed by this Court dated 17.03.2015 in O.J.C. No.7895 of 1994. Hence, the order of removal is liable to be set aside and the Petitioner is entitled to the consequential benefits.
11. To fortify his submission, learned counsel for the Petitioner relied upon the decisions of the Apex Page 10 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 Court in the cases of Union of India and others vs. Gyan Chand Chattar2 and Anil Gilurker vs. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank and another3.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the Bank, Mr. Mishra, submits that there is no illegality in the order passed by the Appellate Authority. Mere submission of Final Report does not absolve the Petitioner and he reiterated the difference of approach in a criminal case and a departmental proceeding. In as much as, it was submitted that in a departmental proceeding the standard of proof is based on preponderance of probabilities, as opposed to proof beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case.
13. He also places reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court defining the contours of this Court in interfering with orders passed in a departmental proceeding and submits that the sum and substance of the submission of the learned counsel for the 2 Union of India and others v. Gyan Chand Chattar, (2009) 12 SCC 78 3 Anil Gilurker v. Bilaspur Raipur Kshetriya Gramin Bank, (2011) 14 SCC 379 Page 11 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 Petitioner is to call upon this Court to act as a super Appellate Authority, which is against the tenet of law.
It is his further submission that it ought not to be forgotten that the allegation against an incumbent like the Petitioner working in a financial institution ought to be viewed with utmost seriousness and the same does not admit of any leniency and thereby sought dismissal of the writ petition.
14. The Petitioner filed rejoinder controverting the assertions made in the counter affidavit.
15. During the course of hearing, in order to arrive at a just conclusion, this Court, by order dated 10.10.2025, granted leave to the Petitioner to place on record the deposition of the complainant examined on behalf of the management as PW/MW-4. Accordingly, the same was submitted by way of additional affidavit vide Annexure-13.
16. The allegation against the present Petitioner, which was at the instance of PW/MW-4, a SEPUP borrower and that for sanction of a loan of Rs.5,000/- Page 12 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 , the Petitioner had demanded bribe of Rs.1,000/-. It is on record that the Petitioner was caught red- handed by the State Vigilance Officials while accepting bribe of Rs.1,000/- from the SEPUP borrower on 11.08.1989. After investigation, the CBI has submitted a Final Report, inter alia stating thus;
"xxx xxx xxx However, it is a true case U/s.13(2) R/W 13(1)(d) and Section 7 of P.C. Act, 1988 against the accused Sri K. Prithiraj Singh, field Officer of S.B.I. Purushottampur Branch. But there is insufficient evidence as discussed above for prosecution of the accused under the said sanctions of law.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasised)
17. In this context, it would be appropriate to refer to the evidence of PW/MW.4 in the Departmental Proceeding.
"DR to PW-4 - From dt.1.11.88 to 27.7.89 how many times you had come to the Bank and whom you were meeting and what was there reply for this delay.
P.W.4 - Nearly ten times I come to the Bank. I met twice to the Branch Manager who directed to me to meet the Field Officer and I Page 13 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 met him. Always the F.O. told that the loan could not be sanctioned.
DR to P.W.4 - When did the F.O indicated that you should given him bribe.
P.W.4 - On dt. 10.08.89 when I went to F.O to meet he told me to pay Rs.1000/- by way of bribe so that my loan could be sanctioned."
It is apt to note that the Petitioner was the F.O.
18. The judgments cited by the learned counsel for the Petitioner have to be evaluated on the basis of materials on record.
In the case of Gyan Chand Chattar(supra)2, in paragraph-21 dealing with Charge No. 6 in the said case of asking for 1% commission for making the payment of allowances, the Apex Court observed that the same is a serious charge and "requires to be proved to the hilt" and, taking into account the consequences, it was stated that it cannot be proved on mere probabilities.
In order to substantiate his submission, learned counsel for the Petitioner has heavily relied on such observation of the Apex Court and states that Page 14 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 "charge should be specific, definite and giving details of the incident which formed the basis of charges"
and it is asserted that the charge more particularly Charge No.1 in the present case is vague.
19. Charge No. (i), which is of seminal importance in the case at hand, being the gravamen of the charges, is extracted hereunder at the cost of repetition:
"(i) Sri K.P. Singh, OJM was caught red handed by the State Vigilance Department, during a trap laid by them on 11.08.1989 while accepting Rs.1,000/- as bribe from one Shri Laxmikanta Panda, a SEPUP borrower for sanction of a loan of Rs.5,000/- to him and G.C. Notes worth Rs.1,000/- tainted with phanolpthale-in power were recovered from his shirt pocket."
20. On a bare perusal of the same, it can be seen that it relates to acceptance of bribe from one SEPUP borrower (PW/MW-4). In its Final Report submitted, extracted hereinabove, the investigating agency has indicated that though it is a true case under Section Page 15 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d)4 and Section 75 of the P.C. Act, 1988 against the Petitioner, Field Officer of SBI, Purusottampur, but because of insufficiency of evidence final report was submitted.
(Emphasized)
21. In the considered view of this Court, non- mentioning of demand of bribe in Charge No. (i), in 4
13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.- (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,(a) to (c)xxx xxx xxx
(d) if he,-
(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or
(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or xxx xxx xxx (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than[four years] but which may extend to [ten years] and shall also be liable to fine. 5
7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.-Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of Section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
(b) "Gratification." The word "gratification" is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money.
(c) "Legal remuneration." The words "legal remuneration" are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept.
(d) "A motive or reward for doing." A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.
(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section. Page 16 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 the present context, cannot absolve the Petitioner of the accusation in the light of the evidence of PW/M.W.4, Mr. Laxmikanta Panda, whose statement has already been adverted to hereinbefore.
So far as interference in a finding in a departmental proceeding is no longer res integra. It is the settled position of law that it is not permissible for this Court to re-examine the evidence unless the approach of the departmental authorities is patently perverse. In this context reference can be respectfully made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the cases of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others vs. Ajai Kumar Srivastava6, Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran7 and State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya8.
The relevant portions of the following judgments are extracted hereunder for reference; 6 Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava, (2021) 2 SCC 612 7 Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 8 State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584 Page 17 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 The Apex Court in the case of Ajai Kumar Srivastava(Supra)6 observed thus;
"xxx xxx xxx
24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent erroron the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.
25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:
Page 18 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;
(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;
(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.
xxx xxx xxx"
In the case of P. Gunasekaran(supra)7, the Apex Court held thus;
"xxx xxx xxx
12............ The High Court, in exercise of its powers Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;
(c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;
(d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;
(e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;
(f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no Page 19 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;
(g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;
(h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;
(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.
13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.
xxx xxx xxx"
Further in the case of Nemi Chand
Nalwaya(Supra)8, the Apex Court held thus;
"xxx xxx xxx
7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is Page 20 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory Regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, Bank of India v.
Degala Suryanarayana and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil.
8. When a court is considering whether the punishment of "termination from service"
imposed upon a bank employee is shockingly excessive or disproportionate to the gravity of the proved misconduct, the loss of confidence in the employee will be an important and relevant factor. When an unknown person comes to the bank and claims to be the account-holder of a long inoperative account, and a bank employee, who does not know Page 21 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 such person, instructs his colleague to transfer the account from "dormant" to "operative"
category (contrary to the instructions regulating dormant accounts) without any kind of verification, and accepts the money withdrawal form from such person, gets a token and collects the amount on behalf of such person for the purpose of handing it over to such person, he in effect enables such unknown person to withdraw the amount contrary to the banking procedures; and ultimately, if it transpires that the person who claimed to be the account-holder was an impostor, the bank cannot be found fault with if it says that it has lost confidence in the employee concerned. A bank is justified in contending that not only the employees who are dishonest, but those who are guilty of gross negligence, are not fit to continue in its service.
xxx xxx xxx"
(Emphasised)
22. Assessing the order of the Disciplinary
Authority as well as the Appellate Authority on remand in terms of the earlier judgment of this Court dated 17.03.2015 in O.J.C No.7895 of 1994, this Court is not persuaded to hold that the Petitioner can be absolved of the accusation. Hence, the finding of guilt of the Petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority Page 22 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 which was accepted by the appointing authority and confirmed by the Appellate Authority does not merit interference.
23. Next question that comes up for consideration is proportionality of the punishment imposed.
24. The principle governing proportionality of punishment has been succinctly stated by the Apex Court in the case of P. Gunasekaran(supra)7, wherein the Apex Court held thus;
"xxx xxx xxx
19. Equally, it was not open to the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, to go into the proportionality of punishment so long as the punishment does not shock the conscience of the court. In the instant case, the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that the Respondent lacked integrity. No doubt, there are no measurable standards as to what is integrity in service jurisprudence but certainly there are indicators for such assessment. Integrity according to Oxford dictionary is "moral uprightness; honesty". It takes in its sweep, probity, innocence, trustfulness, openness, sincerity, blamelessness, immaculacy, rectitude, uprightness, virtuousness, righteousness, goodness, cleanness, decency, Page 23 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015 honour, reputation, nobility, irreproachability, purity, respectability, genuineness, moral excellence etc. In short, it depicts sterling character with firm adherence to a code of moral values.
xxx xxx xxx"
Reliance, in this context, for considering
alteration of the punishment, can be respectfully placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors.9 Relevant portions of the judgment is extracted hereunder for reference;
"xxx xxx xxx
25. No doubt, while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Courts have to bear in mind the restraints inherent in exercising power of judicial review. It is because of this that substitution of High Court's view regarding appropriate punishment is not permissible. But for this constraint, I would have thought that the law makers do desire application of judicial mind to the question of even proportionality of punishment/penalty...
xxx xxx xxx"
9 B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 484 Page 24 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
25. The punishment imposed and the adequacy thereof has to be assessed on the touchstone of the judgments of the Apex Court in this regard referred to hereinabove.
25-A. Admittedly, the Petitioner is governed by the State Bank of India Officers Service Rules, 1992. The punishments that can be imposed are stated in Rule No.67 of the said Rules.
The major Penalties1 which can be imposed run thus;
"xxx xxx xxx
Major penalties
(f) save as provided for in (e) above reduction to a lower stage in the time-scale of pay for a specified period, with further directions as to whether or not the officer will earn increments to pay during the period of such reduction and whether on the expiry of such period the reduction will or will not have the effect of postponing the future increments of his pay:
(g) reduction to a lower grade or post;
(h) compulsory retirement:
(i) removal from service;
(j) dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx"Page 25 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
26. It is not disputed at the Bar that, save and except the allegations in the present case, the Petitioner had an unblemished record. Taking into account the nature of the allegation and in the light of the submission of the Final Report by the CBI, this Court is of the considered view that while the claim of the Petitioner for reinstatement with consequential benefits does not merit consideration, altering/substituting the punishment of removal by compulsory retirement, in the considered view of this Court, would meet the ends of justice.
This Court is conscious of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and that ordinarily it should not effect change in the punishment imposed and should normally relegate the matter to the Disciplinary Authority. However, such course is adopted in the case at hand since the Petitioner has retired since long.
Page 26 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015
Accordingly, W.P.(C) stands disposed of and as discussed above the punishment of removal is altered to one of compulsory retirement.
In view of the disposal of the W.P.(C), pending I.As stand disposed of.
27. Consequential financial benefits to which the Petitioner would be entitled to on alteration of punishment from removal to compulsory retirement, shall be paid to him within a period of four months from the date of receipt of copy of this Judgment.
28. Costs made easy.
(V. NARASINGH) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 5th February, 2026/Santoshi Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANTOSHI LENKA Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 09-Feb-2026 20:18:56 Page 27 of 27 W.P.(C) No.18260 of 2015