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Jharkhand High Court

G.M.,Sijua Area Of M/S Bharat Coking ... vs Regional Labour Commissioner Central ... on 17 July, 2017

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                   1

     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                     W.P.(L) No. 872 of 2011
                                  ­­­­­
General Manager, Sijua Area of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, 
P.O.­Sijua,   P.S.­Jogta,   District­Dhanbad,   through   Sri   Soumen 
Chatterjee,   son   of   Late   Govindo   Chatterjee,   General   Manager, 
residing   at   G.M.   Bunglow   of   Sijua   Area,   P.O.­Sijua,   P.S.­Jogta, 
District­Dhanbad                               ...  ...         Petitioner
                                    Versus
1. Regional Labour Commissioner (C), Dhanbad, Shram Bhawan, 
New Colony, Jagjiwan Nagar, P.O.­Jagjiwan Nagar, P.S.­Saraidhella, 
District­Dhanbad
2. Bihar Colliery Kamgar Union, through its Secretary, Jai Prakash 
Srivastava, having its office at Refugee Market, Temple Road, P.O., 
P.S. & District­Dhanbad                        ...      ... Respondents
                                  ­­­­­
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                           ­­­­­
For the Petitioner   : Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta,  Advocate 
                       Mr. Amit Kumar Sinha, Advocate       
For Respondent No.1  : Mr. Rajiv Sinha, ASGI
                       Mr. B.K. Prasad, JC to ASGI
                           ­­­­­
Order No. 03                                 Dated: 17.07.2017

             Heard the learned counsels for the parties. 

2.           The present writ petition has been filed for quashing 
the   letter   bearing   Reference   No.   1/250/2003/B­2   dated 
30.10.2009

  (Annexure­4   to   the   writ   petition)   issued   by   the  respondent   no.   1,   whereby   the   petitioner   has   been   directed   to  implement   the   settlement   award   dated   16.07.1981   passed   in  Reference No. 60 of 1975 in so far as the remaining 6 workmen  out   of   47   workmen   are   concerned,   who   have   not   yet   been  provided   employment   although   the   terms   and   conditions  mentioned in the settlement award dated 16.07.1981 passed in  Reference No. 60 of 1975 does not stand satisfied. 

3. The factual matrix of the case is that a dispute relating  to the action of the management of Loyabad Colliery, Dhanbad,  whereby   they   stopped   the   workmen   concerned   to   work,   was  2 referred to the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad.  The reference was registered as Reference No. 60 of 1975 and was  decided   by   order   dated   16.07.1981   in   terms   of   the   settlement  filed by the parties whereby it was agreed to provide employment  to the workmen subject to their medical fitness without any back  wages.   In   compliance   of   the   terms   of   the   Award,   documents  submitted   by   the   Awardees   were   considered   and   during   the  period   1982­83,   9   awardees   were   provided   employment   and  again   during   the   year   1990­96,   38   awardees   were   given  appointment.   The   respondent   no.   2   filed   writ   petition   being W.P.(L) No. 3686 of 2003 seeking direction for implementation of  the   Award   dated   16.07.1981   which   was   finally   disposed   of   by  directing the respondent No. 1 to look into the matter and decide  as to why the Award has not yet been implemented and if there is  any   difficulty,   it   would   communicate   the   grounds   within   3  months.   The   respondent   No.   1,   thereafter,   issued   notice   to   the  petitioner  which was replied on 25.11.2003 by stating that the  Union   had   failed   to   submit   requisite   papers   and   documents  relating  to  Sri   Shyamal  Kumar  Manjhi and 5  others  before   the  Management and as such the Award has become inoperative on  account   of   expiry   of  a  long  period.  Thereafter,  the   respondent­ Union filed another writ petition being W.P. (L) No. 2834 of 2005,  wherein   the   petitioner   filed   counter­affidavit   stating   that   the  management had been punctual for implementation of the award,  but the Union did not submit necessary documents within time for  which the petitioner cannot be blamed. The said writ petition was  disposed of vide order dated 18.08.2009 directing the respondent  No. 1 to take appropriate decision in the matter within a period of  two months. Thereafter, the respondent no. 1 again called upon  the petitioner to attend for discussing the matter whereupon the  representative   of   the   petitioner   appeared   and   filed   necessary  documents by stating that in terms of the settlement, the Union  had   to   file   the   documents   and   particulars   of   the   concerned  3 workman within 45 days of the Settlement to which it failed and  as such, the Award was not implemented due to the laches on the  part   of   the   Union.   However,   the   respondent   No.   1   vide   order  dated 30.10.2009 directed the petitioner to implement the Award  in toto and submit implementation report, failing which suitable  action   for   non­implementation   of   the   Award   under   section   29  read with section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would be  initiated.  

4. The   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   primarily  submits   that   although   sufficient   reason   and   relevant   factual  details for non­implementation of the Award with regard to 12  persons were given by the petitioner to the respondent no. 1, the  impugned   Award   dated  30.10.2009   has   been   passed   in   a   most  mechanical manner without considering the reasons explained by  the   petitioner.   The   impugned   Award   being   cryptic   and  unreasoned, is liable to be set­aside on that score only. 

5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent  no.   1   submits   that   the   impugned   letter   dated   30.10.2009   is  completely   legal   and   justified   and   the   same   has   been   issued  directing the petitioner to implement the Award dated 16.07.1981  as out of 59 workmen of Loyabad Colliery of M/s BCCL, only 47  workmen were given employment in different years i.e., 1994­96.  Moreover, the respondent no. 1 being the competent authority to  issue   the   said   letter   directing   the   petitioner   to   implement   the  Award, the impugned letter dated 30.10.2009 does not warrant  interference by this Court. 

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and  considering the documents placed on record, it appears that the  settlement Award dated 16.07.1981 in Reference No. 60 of 1975  was published in the Gazette of India on 08.08.1981, a copy of  which has been annexed as Annexure­1 to the writ petition. On  perusal of Clause (iii)(h) of the settlement Award, it appears that  4 there   is  a  condition that  the  workmen  who were  to be offered  employment   of   their   sons   in   case   of   death   of   the   workmen  concerned or he has not been found fit for employment or he is  crossing  the   age   of  60  years  should  report   to the  management  with   details   as   required   for   dealing   with   their   cases   for  employment as per the said agreement within a period of 45 days  of the settlement. It has also been mentioned in Clause (iii)(h) of  the settlement Award that if any workman or the son, as the case  may be, fails to report within the prescribed period, he shall have  no claim for employment. The case of the petitioner is that so far  as 6 workmen are concerned, all the details regarding the date of  death   of   their   dependants   were   submitted   as   late   as   on  14.01.2004   and,   therefore,   in   view   of   Clause   (iii)(h)   of   the  settlement   Award,   no   claim   for   employment   could   have   been  entertained by the petitioner. The said fact has been completely  overlooked   by   the   respondent   no.   1,   despite   the   fact   that   due  deliberations   were   made   between   the   petitioner   and   the  respondent   no.   1   and   the   said   factual   stand   was   taken   by   the  petitioner before the respondent no. 1. It is a settled law that any  administrative/quasi­judicial   authority   must   pass  order   so   as  to  demonstrate   that   the   relevant   issue   has   been   objectively  considered. 

7. In the case of "Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. Vs. Masood   Ahmed   Khan"  reported   in  (2010)   9   SCC   496,  the   Hon'ble  Supreme Court has held as under: 

47.  Summarising the above discussion, this Court  holds:
(a)   In   India   the   judicial   trend   has   always  been   to   record   reasons,   even   in   administrative  decisions,   if   such   decisions   affect   anyone  prejudicially.
(b)   A   quasi­judicial   authority   must   record  reasons in support of its conclusions.
(c)   Insistence   on   recording   of   reasons   is  meant to serve the wider principle of justice that  5 justice must not only be done it must also appear  to be done as well.
(d) Recording of reasons also operates as a  valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of  judicial   and   quasi­judicial   or   even   administrative  power.
(e)   Reasons   reassure   that   discretion   has  been exercised by the decision­maker on relevant  grounds   and   by   disregarding   extraneous  considerations.
(f)   Reasons   have   virtually   become   as  indispensable   a   component   of   a   decision­making  process as observing principles of natural justice by  judicial, quasi­judicial and even by administrative  bodies.
(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial  review by superior courts.
(h)   The   ongoing   judicial   trend   in   all  countries   committed   to   rule   of   law   and  constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned  decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually  the lifeblood of judicial decision­making justifying  the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(i)   Judicial   or   even   quasi­judicial   opinions  these days can be as different as the judges and  authorities  who  deliver   them.  All   these   decisions  serve   one   common   purpose   which   is   to  demonstrate   by   reason   that   the   relevant   factors  have been objectively considered. This is important  for   sustaining   the   litigants'   faith   in   the   justice  delivery system.
(j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for  both judicial accountability and transparency.
(k) If a judge or a quasi­judicial authority is  not candid enough about his/her decision­making  process then it is impossible to know whether the  person   deciding   is   faithful   to   the   doctrine   of  precedent or to principles of incrementalism.
(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be  cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or  "rubber­stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a  valid decision­making process.
(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency  is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial  powers. Transparency in decision­making not only  makes the judges and decision­makers less prone  to errors but also makes them subject to broader  scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial  6 Candor32.)
(n) Since the requirement to record reasons  emanates   from   the   broad   doctrine   of   fairness   in  decision­making,   the   said   requirement   is   now  virtually   a   component   of   human   rights   and   was  considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See  Ruiz Torija v. Spain33 EHRR, at 562 para 29 and  Anya v. University of Oxford34, wherein the Court  referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of  Human Rights which requires, "adequate   and   intelligent   reasons   must   be   given  for judicial decisions".
(o)   In   all   common   law   jurisdictions  judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents  for the future. Therefore, for development of law,  requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of  the essence and is virtually a part of "due process".

8. On perusal of the impugned letter dated 30.10.2009, it  appears   that   the   same   does   not   disclose   any   reason   and   in   a  mechanical manner, the petitioner has been directed to implement  the Award in toto. Thus, in my considered opinion, the impugned  letter   dated   30.10.2009   suffers   from   non­application   of   mind.  Consequently,   the   impugned   letter   dated  30.10.2009   cannot  be  sustained   in   law   and   thus,   the   same   is   quashed   and   set­aside.  However,   considering   the   nature   of   dispute,   the   petitioner   is  directed   to   file   a   fresh   representation   within   a   period   of   two  months   from   the   date   of   the   order   incorporating   all   relevant  factual  details   regarding  its  stand  before  the   respondent   no. 1,  who shall consider the said representation and shall pass reasoned  order within a period of three months thereafter. 

9. In view of aforesaid observations/directions, the writ  petition is accordingly disposed of. 

(Rajesh Shankar, J.) Manish/A.F.R.