Subhash Rai vs State Of U.P. And Another on 25 July, 2024

[Cites 27, Cited by 0]

Allahabad High Court

Subhash Rai vs State Of U.P. And Another on 25 July, 2024

Bench: Samit Gopal





HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
 
 


Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:119236
 
Court No. - 77
 

 
Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 4146 of 2022
 

 
Applicant :- Subhash Rai
 
Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another
 
Counsel for Applicant :- Rakesh Dubey
 
Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.
 

 
Hon'ble Samit Gopal,J.

1. Heard Sri Rakesh Dubey, learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Syed Iqbal Ahmad, Advocate holding brief of Sri Sharique Ahmad, learned counsel for the opposite party no. 2, Sri Devendra Nath Singh, learned counsel for State.

2. The present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the applicant Subhash Rai the prayer to quash the charge sheet No. 09-A of 2007 dated 10.08.2007 as well as cognizance and summoning order dated 20.08.2007 passed by Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad in Case No. 2870 of 1996 (State vs. Subhash Chandra Rai) related to Case Crime No. 229 of 1996, under Section 307/34 I.P.C., Police Station Cant., District Allahabad, pending in the Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad.

3. The facts of the case are that a first information was lodged on 19.05.1996 at 23:45 hours as Case Crime No. 229 of 1996, under Section 307 I.P.C., P.S. Cantt., District Allahabad by Rajesh Kumar Rai, opposite party no. 2 against Utpal Rai, Ravindra Pratap Singh @ Guddu Singh and the driver of Car No. U.P.70 H 5055 with the allegation that he is the proprietor of Ankita Travels, Civil Lines, Allahabad and also at Church Lane, Police Station Colonelganj, Allahaabd. Utpal Rai used to illegally take his income which was done from the firm and was asking further for it for which he regularly tried to stop him but he got angry and at about 9:45 P.M. on 19.05.1996 when he after discussions with regards to his business came out from the Hindustan Cables Guest House, Circular Road then Utpal Rai with a .38 bore pistol along with Ravindra Pratap Singh @ Guddu Singh, Ex-Precedent Student's Union, C.M.P. Degree College and the applicant Subhash Rai came together and asked him as to why he has kept the keys of the shop and on intention to murder him fired opened him which hit his abdomen and right thigh. The accused persons then ran away in Maruti Car No. U.P.70H5055. The incident was seen by the guard of the guest house, he then informed the police of Civil Lines from telephone of the guest house. He was taken by the Inspector Civil Lines to the hospital, where he has been admitted. His report be lodged and action be taken.

4. The investigation of the present matter was transferred to the C.B.C.I.D. vide order dated 23.05.1996 of the State Government. A charge sheet against Utpal Rai and Ravindra Pratap Singh @ Guddu was filed under Section 307 / 34 I.P.C. They were tried for the said offence in S.T. No. 341 of 2000 (State of U.P. vs. Utpal Rai and others), wherein they were acquitted of the charges levelled against them vide judgement and order dated 13.11.2002 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 22, Allahabad.

5. Insofar as the applicant is concerned, a charge sheet bearing Charge Sheet No. 09-A of 2007 dated 10.08.2007 was filed against him for offences under Section 307 / 34 I.P.C. The said charge sheet reached the court concerned on 20.08.2007 and court concerned directed the same to be registered and copies to be prepared. Subsequently, vide order dated 25.06.2010, the accused was summoned by the court concerned. The accused did not appear before the court concerned in response to the summons and thus vide order dated 01.02.2011 bailable warrants of Rs.5000/- were issued against him. The applicant accused continued to abscond and as such bailable warrants of Rs.5000/- were directed to be issued against him on 01.04.2011, 01.07.2011, 03.09.2011, 16.09.2011, 04.11.2011, 10.01.2012, 12.03.2012, 01.05.2012, 02.07.2012, 03.09.2012, 28.09.2012, 26.10.2012, 20.12.2012, 12.02.2013, 15.04.2013, 07.06.2013 and then on 07.08.2013, non bailable warrants were issued against him. He again did not appear before the court concerned and thus non-bailable warrants were directed to be issued on 07.10.2013, 07.02.2014, 07.04.2014, 12.06.2014, 12.08.2014, 12.11.2014, 05.01.2015, 06.04.2015, 15.06.2015, 15.03.2016, 15.06.2016, 15.09.2016, 15.12.2016, 15.06.2017, 02.06.2018, 06.09.2018, 01.03.2019, 07.01.2020 and 14.10.2021.

6. Subsequently, it appears that a compromise dated 26.08.2022 was entered into between the parties for which an application dated 26.07.2022 was moved by Rajesh Rai co-accused before the court of Special C.J.M., Allahabad titled as "compromise" with the averments in Paragraph 3 on behalf of the opposite party no. 3 stating that the applicant accused Subhash Rai did not fire upon him and he had got a report lodged on the saying of the others. The said application of Rajesh Rai in which signature of one Sumit Puri as a witness is there has been filed as Annexure-2 to the supplementary affidavit dated 04.08.2023.

7. Paragraph nos. 10, 11 and 12 of the affidavit in support of the present 482 Cr.P.C. refers to the facts that the informant and the accused applicant have settled the dispute and the informant does not wish to prosecute the applicant and wishes to withdraw the prosecution. The said paragraphs read as under :-

10. That during the pendency of the proceeding the good sense are prevail between the applicant and informant because they are not committed any offence with the informant / injured and has not attempt to commit his murder. The FIR was registered on the basis of overhearing by the informant and the said fact is deposed and admitted by the informant before the Court. Relying upon the said testimony the other co-accused has been acquitted by the trial court. The applicant and informant are reside peacefully and separately and leading their life peacefully and the informant is not wishes to prosecute the applicant and pursue his remedy against him

11. That the informant is not wishes to prosecute the applicant and has agreed to withdraw the prosecution in terms of compromise and not wishes to further prosecute the applicant. They further agreed to undertake that they may not pursue his remedy for prosecution of the applicant in future.

12. That under the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the informant does not want to pursue his remedy against the applicant and wanted to decide the present case in terms of compromise arrived between. As such present application seeking quashing of the proceeding in terms of compromise is file before the Hon'ble Court with a prayer to quash the proceeding in terms of compromise arrived between them.

8. The another bench of this court vide order dated 12.07.2022 directed for filing of an application before the court concerned and verification of the compromise documents. The said order reads as under :-

"Sri Sharique Ahmad and Sri Gaurav Pandey, Advocates have filed his Vakalatnama on behalf of the opposite party no.2, the same is taken on record.

Heard learned counsel for the applicant, Sri Sharique Ahmad and Sri Gaurav Pandey, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2, learned A.G.A. for the State and perused the record.

This Criminal Misc. Application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has been filed to quash the Charge Sheet No.09A/2007 dated 10.08.2007 based upon cognizance and summoning order dated 20.08.2007, passed by Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad in Case No. 2870 of 1996 (State vs. Subhash Chandra Rai), related to Case Crime No. 229 of 1996, under Section 307/34, Police Station - Cantt., District - Allahabad, pending in the court of Special C.J.M., whereby the applicant is summon to face trial, in terms of compromise arrived between the parties.

Learned counsel for the applicant submits that applicant and opposite party no. 2 have settled their dispute. However, the physical verification of the same is required to be made by the court concerned.

Sri Sharique Ahmad and Sri Gaurav Pandey, learned counsel for the opposite party no.2 and learned A.G.A. do not dispute the submission made by learned counsel for the applicant and he has no objection to it.

Accordingly, it is provided that both the parties shall appear before the court below on 26.07.2022 and shall file an application along with a certified copy of this order for verification of the original compromise document. It is expected that the court below may verify the compromise entered into between the parties and pass an appropriate order with respect to the verification. Upon due verification, the court below may pass appropriate order in that regard and send verification report to this Court before the next date of listing of the case.

List this case on 11.08.2022 in the additional cause list along with the verification report.

Till then, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant."

9. In compliance of the order dated 12.07.2022, an application was moved before the court concerned and an order dated 26.07.2022 was passed by the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad. The said order reads as under :-

न्यायालय विशेष मुख्य न्यायिक मजिस्ट्रेट, इलाहाबाद।

मुकदमा संख्या 2870/96 अपराध संख्या 229/96 सरकार बनाम सुभाष चन्द्र राय धारा 307,34 भा०द०सं० थाना सी०बी०सी०आई०डी०/कैण्ट जिला इलाहाबाद दिनांक 26.07.2022 पत्रावली पेश हुयी।

पत्रावली के अवलोकन से विदित है कि प्रस्तुत मुकदमा अपराध संख्या 229/96 अन्तर्गत धारा 307,34 भा०द०सं० के तहत पक्षकारों के मध्य माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के प्रार्थना पत्र संख्या 482 नम्बर 4146/2022 में पारित आदेश दिनांक 12.07.2022 के अनुसार समझौता हो चुका है। अभियुक्त सुभाष चन्द्र राय मय विद्वान अधिवक्ता उपस्थित आये तथा वादी मुकदमा पक्ष की ओर से राजेश कुमार राय मय विद्वान अधिवक्ता उपस्थित आये। मूल समझौता पत्रावली पर मौजूद है। पत्रावली पर मौजूद माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के आदेश दिनांक 12.07.2022 के माध्यम से माननीय उच्च न्यायालय के आदेशानुसार मात्र सुलहनामा तसदीक किया जाना है तो ऐसे मे पक्षकारो की पहचान सुनिश्चित करने और उनके द्वारा स्वेच्छा बिना किसी दबाव के सुलह करने की बात कहते हुए सुलहनामा तसदीक किया जाता है। पत्रावली दिनांक 23.08.2022 को पेश हो।

ह० अप० विशेष मुख्य न्यायिक मजिस्ट्रेट इलाहाबाद।

The same is annexed at page no. 15 to the supplementary affidavit dated 04.08.2023 filed on behalf of the applicant.

10. The present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is thus being pressed by learned counsel for the applicant on the basis of compromise and settlement between the parties and it is argued that the matter be allowed and quashed since the parties have entered into a compromise and the said compromise has been verified before the court concerned.

11. Learned counsel for State vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing. Learned counsel for opposite party no. 2 does not raise any objection for opposing the argument of compromise.

12. After having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the records it transpires that the applicant is a named accused in the present matter along with two other co-accused, namely, Utpal Rai and Ravindra Pratap Singh @ Guddu Singh. The case is of firing upon the first informant with a fire arm resulting in injuries in his abdomen and thigh. The first informant, who is an injured, namely, Rajesh Rai was medically examined on 19.05.1996 at 10:30 p.m. by the Emergency Medical Officer, Swaroop Rani Nehru Hospital, Allahabad. He received the following injuries on his person : -

1. Firearm wound of entry 1.5 cm x 1 cm being 2 cm below ingunial line on front of right thigh. Bleeding present . Communicating with injury no. 2. No B/T/S. Directing outwards and backwards.

2. Firearm wound of exit 1 cm x 1 cm on outer aspect of right thigh 18 cm. from injury no. 1, depth up to muscle. Bleeding present.

3. Firearm wound of entry 1.5 cm x 1 cm x cavity deep directing outwards & backwards & slightly up side. No. B/T/S. Bleeding present.

4. Abrasion 1 cm x 1 cm just above and left to umbilicus .

5. Abrasion 1.5 cm x 1 cm just below umbilicus .

13. Although, the trial of the applicant was separated and two named co-accused persons were acquitted of the charges levelled against them vide judgment and order dated 13.11.2002 but a perusal of the same goes to show that the same was on the ground that two witnesses, namely, P.W.-1 Rajesh Rai and P.W. 2 Mohd. Mumtaz Hashimi, who were the only witnesses produced, did not support the prosecution case and were declared hostile. The charge sheet against the applicant was submitted under Section 307 / 34 I.P.C. which is dated 10.08.2007 and had reached the court on 20.08.2007 which is after the acquittal of the two other co-accused persons.

14. After the cognizance and summoning of the applicant on the basis of the charges he continued to abscond from 25.06.2010, on call of summons, after which the court concerned issued bailable warrants against him of Rs.5000/- vide order dated 01.02.2011. The applicant accused then again continued to abscond even on the call through bailable warrants and thus the court concerned vide its order dated 07.08.2013 issued non-bailable warrants against him which continued till the filing of a compromise allegedly dated 26.07.2022, thus, the order sheet shows that since 25.06.2010, the applicant has been absconding and only appeared before the court concerned on 26.07.2022 for verification of the alleged compromise that too under the directions of this court in its order dated 12.07.2022.

15. The present case is the case in which there has been firing from a firearm having corresponding injuries on the first informant / injured.

16. The law with regards to such a situation where there has been a use of firearm, the accused had been absconding and did not make himself available before the trial court, despite summons, bailable warrants and then non-bailable warrants and continued to abscond for a good period of about 12 years till the date, he appeared before the court concerned for verification of the compromise under orders of this court, has been considered and detailed directions with regards to such matters have been given by the Apex Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan : (2019) 5 SCC 688. Reference is made to paragraph 1, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 18 of the same, which read as under :-

"1. A two-Judge Bench of this Court vide its order dated 8-9-2017 [State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1799], in view of the apparent conflict between the two decisions of this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat [State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 781], has referred the matter to a Bench of three Judges, and that is how the matter is placed before a Bench of three Judges.

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11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present appeals, the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC solely on the basis of a compromise between the complainant and the accused. That in view of the compromise and the stand taken by the complainant, considering the decision of this Court in Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101], the High Court has observed that there is no chance of recording conviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of a trial would be exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the FIR.

11.1. However, the High Court has not at all considered the fact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section 320 CrPC. From the impugned judgment and order, it appears that the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between a personal or private wrong and a social wrong and the social impact. As observed by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi [State of Maharashtra v. Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 : (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 563], the Court's principal duty, while exercising the powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegations and the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case at hand, the High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminal proceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by the High Court in the present case for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions.

11.2. In Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988], in para 61, this Court has observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 342-43) "61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding."

11.3. In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], after considering the decision in Gian Singh [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988], in para 29, this Court summed up as under: (Narinder Singh case [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], SCC pp. 482-84) "29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."

11.4. In Parbatbhai Aahir [Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1], again this Court has had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash the FIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. Considering a catena of decisions of this Court on the point, this Court summarised the following propositions: (SCC pp. 653-54, para 16) "16.1. Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.

16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.

16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned.

16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and 16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions 16.8 and 16.9 above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance."

11.5. In Manish [State of M.P. v. Manish, (2015) 8 SCC 307 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 510], this Court has specifically observed and held that, when it comes to the question of compounding an offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch of imagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private parties simpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have a serious impact on the society at large. It is further observed that where the accused are facing trial under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC, as the offences are definitely against the society, the accused will have to necessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating their innocence.

11.6. In Deepak [State of M.P. v. Deepak, (2014) 10 SCC 285 : (2015) 1 SCC (Cri) 89], this Court has specifically observed that as the offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable and as the offence under Section 307 is not a private dispute between the parties inter se, but is a crime against the society, quashing of the proceedings on the basis of a compromise is not permissible. Similar is the view taken by this Court in a recent decision of this Court in Kalyan Singh [State of M.P. v. Kalyan Singh, (2019) 4 SCC 268 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 57] and Dhruv Gurjar [State of M.P. v. Dhruv Gurjar, (2019) 5 SCC 570].

12. Now so far as the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] is concerned, this Court in para 29.6 admitted that the offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, this Court further observed that the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed. Its further corroboration with the medical evidence or other evidence is to be seen, which will be possible during the trial only. Hence, the decision in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] shall be of no assistance to the accused in the present case.

13. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101], while quashing the FIR by observing that as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is no possibility of recording a conviction, and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the High Court has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid ground. It appears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the said decision to the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to have appreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant has entered into a compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction. Such observations are presumptive and many a time too early to opine. In a given case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the dispute is not a commercial transaction and/or of a civil nature and/or is not a private wrong. In Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101], this Court found that the case had its origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute was resolved by them and therefore this Court observed that: (SCC p. 713, para 19) "19. ... that being so, continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready to support the allegations ... will be a futile exercise that will serve no purpose."

(emphasis supplied) In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed "that even the alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the complainant, were not supporting the prosecution version", and to that this Court observed and held that the continuance of the proceedings is nothing but an empty formality and Section 482 CrPC can, in such circumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of law and thereby preventing a wasteful exercise by the courts below. Even in the said decision, in para 18, it is observed as under: (Shiji case [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101], SCC p. 713) "18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude of the power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatory for the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care and caution. The width and the nature of the power itself demands that its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Court is, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuance of the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate the situations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 may be justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of power must be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases where refusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of the process of law. The High Court may be justified in declining interference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannot assume the role of an appellate court while dealing with a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to the above, the High Court will have to consider the facts and circumstances of each case to determine whether it is a fit case in which the inherent powers may be invoked."

Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in a case which has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties have resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society at large and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is a family/matrimonial dispute, etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicable in a case where the offences alleged are very serious and grave offences, having a social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC. Therefore, without proper application of mind to the relevant facts and circumstances, in our view, the High Court has materially erred in mechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that in view of the compromise, there are no chances of recording conviction and/or the further trial would be an exercise in futility. The High Court has mechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101], without considering the relevant facts and circumstances of the case.

14. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] and Shambhu Kewat [State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 781] is concerned, in Shambhu Kewat [State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 : (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 781], this Court has noted the difference between the power of compounding of offences conferred on a court under Section 320 CrPC and the powers conferred under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that in compounding the offences, the power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 CrPC and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing criminal proceedings or criminal complaint under Section 482 CrPC is guided by the material on record as to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. However, in the subsequent decision in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54], the very Bench ultimately concluded in para 29 as under: (SCC pp. 482-84) "29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.

15. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions of this Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:

15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves;

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society;

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;

15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have a serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

15.5 [Ed.: Para 15.5 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./22/2019 dated 3-4-2019.]. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and why he was absconding, how he had managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc. (emphasis supplied) ******************** Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 2019

18. So far as criminal appeal arising out of SLP No. 10324 of 2018 is concerned, by the impugned judgment and order [Narendra Singh Rajput v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1150], the High Court has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 294, 308 and 34 IPC, solely on the ground that the accused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of the decision of this Court in Shiji [Shiji v. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101], there may not be any possibility of recording a conviction against the accused. Offence under Section 308 IPC is a non-compoundable offence. While committing the offence, the accused has used the firearm. They are also absconding, and in the meantime, they have managed to enter into a compromise with the complainant. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this appeal is also allowed, the impugned judgment and order dated 28-5-2018 passed by the High Court in Narendra Singh Rajput v. State of M.P. [Narendra Singh Rajput v. State of M.P., 2018 SCC OnLine MP 1150] is hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the accused, and they shall be dealt with, in accordance with law."

17. The Apex Court has held that merely stating that the complainant has compromised with the accused and there is no possibility of recording conviction and further the trial would be an exercise in futility cannot only be a ground for quashing of the case. Further, it has been held that the conduct of the accused whether he absconded and why he was absconding and how he has managed with the complainant to enter into the compromise is required to be seen by the High Court while considering the quashing on the basis of compromise.

18. In the present case, the case is of firing by fire arm resulting in a corresponding injury to the complainant. The same cannot be said to be a personal or private dispute but is a social wrong having social impact. The conduct of the applicant accused is that after filing of charge sheet against him, he absconded despite summons, bailable and non-bailable warrants against him and continued to abscond for about 12 years for which there is no justification at all and then managed a compromise dated 26.07.2022 with the informant / injured and then under orders of this court dated 12.07.2024 appeared before the court concerned for verification of the compromise. His abscondance is without any explanation and / or justifiable reason.

19. In view of the facts of the matter and the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Laxmi Narayan (supra), this court is not inclined to extend the benefit of compromise between the parties and as such is not inclined to interfere in the present application.

20. The present application, thus, lacks merits and is dismissed.

21. Office to communicate this order to the trial court concerned which shall proceed with the trial expeditiously.

(Samit Gopal,J.) Order Date :- 25.7.2024 Manoj

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