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(II) a copy of the plaint; and (III) copies of documents on which the applicant relies, and
(b) to file, on the day on which such injunction is granted or on the day immediately following that day, an affidavit stating that the copies aforesaid have been so delivered or sent."

20. The submission of the respondent that the basis for passing an exparte order under Chapter XX Rule 3 namely "irreparable or serious mischief" and the basis for passing an exparte order under Order 39 Rule 3 namely that "the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay" are different, is unacceptable. The second basis would take within its purview the first. The difference in language between the two provisions is of no legal significance and the phrases in effect mean the same thing. To say, in the circumstances, that the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 will not be applicable to the original side of this court base on this difference in language is to indulge in semantic hair splitting.

25. This view was reiterated in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Karttck Das (supra).

26. if by the use of the word "vitiate" the Supreme Court meant that the order was rendered imperfect, or faulty it would mean that an unreasoned order would be liable to be set aside in appeal. However, if the Supreme Court meant that an unreasoned order would be invalid without legal validity or force it would mean that the court did not have the jurisdiction to have passed such an order at all. We do not read Shiv Kumar Chandha's case as holding that an unreasoned exparte interim order is invalid in the second sense. In any event, because of Chapter XX Rule 3, as far as the original side of this court, is concerned an unreasoned exparte order would be invalid in the first sense, if the requirements or Order 39 Rule 3 are construed as mandatory in the sense that non-compliance would result in the order being void, then it must be held that the conditional power of a court under Order 39 Rule 3 is contrary to and therefore repugnant to the unconditional power of the High Court on its original side under Chapter XX Rule 3 of the OSR.

27. In several of the decisions cited by the appellant 11 is also not clear whether the court's have held that an unreasoned order is invalid in the second sense. In Aparajtt Mukhcrjee v. Anil Kumar Mukherjee (supra) the Division Bench of the Guwahatl High Court set aside the exparte order of a District Judge saying that "it canot be sustained". A learned single Judge of this court in Amiya Prosad v. Bejoy Krishna Chakraborty (supra) said an exparte order passed by a Munsif in vlolatlion of Order 39 Rule 3 was illegal'. The Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Royal Flying Carrier v. The General Eteclrtc Company (supra) held that because the Civil Judge had failed to record reasons for granting the exparle injunction, his order was "not sustainable". Finally, a Division Bench of this court in Banial Tea Warchous v. Falkata industries (supra) set aside an exparte order of a District Judge because there had been a departure from the process prescribed under Order 39 Rule 3.

31. This is the reason why perhaps the Division Bench of this court in Muktakcshi Dawn v. Haripada Mazutrtdar (supra) said :

"II is true that the relevant Proviso to R.3, as inserted by the Amendment Act, 1976, mandates recording of such reasons and that for good reasons. Firstly, such recording of reasons would, to borrow from the old Privy Council decision in Gunga Gobind Mundal (1867) 11 Moo ind. App 345 at 368, operate as a check against a too easy granting of exparte injunction and may inspire confidence and disarm objection. An secondly, since an appeal lies against such exparte order of injunction, such record of reasons would go a very long way to help the appellate court to ascertain as to whether the discretion granted under the Rule to grant exparte injunction has been properly exercised. But even then, we are inclined to think that the mandate in Proviso to R. 3 to record reasons ts not that mandatory to warrant reversal of an order solely on the ground of omission to record reasons. if there are materials on record to show that there were good reasons to pass an exparte injunction order, the order cannot be set at naught solely on the ground that the court, while making the order, did not record thte reasons for proceeding exparte."