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10. At the beginning Mr. Rele, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 - company, took us through the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "I.D. Act") and the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act and contended that a very limited jurisdiction is invested in the Courts functioning under the MRTU & PULP Act. Referring to several provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act, Mr. Rele contended that before a Labour Court can entertain a complaint under the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act, the employer and employee relationship has to be an admitted one and only when such a relationship is admitted that the Courts under the MRTU & PULP Act will get jurisdiction. Mr. Rele contended that the moment the basic relationship of employer and employee is disputed, the Court will not have jurisdiction to decide the issue of existence of such a relationship. Mr. Rele further submitted that in view of the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act and the provisions of the I.D. Act and especially the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, the issue regarding the genuineness or otherwise of a contract when pleaded cannot be gone into by the Courts functioning under the MRTU & PULP Act. Mr. Rele, in that behalf, very heavily relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Gujarat Electricity Board, Ukai v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. reported in (1995-II-LLJ-790) and the judgment of the Apex Court in General Labour Union v. Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co. Ltd. reported in 1995 S.C.C. (L&S) 372. According to Mr. Rele, the judgment in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co.'s case decides the issue and no further argument is needed. Mr. Rele, therefore, contended that the Court functioning under the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act will have no jurisdiction to go into the issue of genuineness or otherwise of the contract pleaded and the only way such issue could be raised was by raising an industrial dispute as laid down in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co.'s case (supra). Mr. Rele, therefore contended that the complaint ought to have been dismissed and rejected on this ground alone. Coming to the merits of the case, Mr. Rele contended that on proper reading of the complaint it is clear that it does not disclose any unfair labour practices under items 1(a), (b), (d) and (f) of Schedule IV. Mr. Rele referred to the reliefs claimed in the complaint and contended that, in fact, what is sought is abolition of the contract labour system. Mr. Rele, thereafter, referred to the evidence of the workmen and of the employer as also of the contractor and contended that the Labour Court was more than justified in coming to the conclusion that there is a voluminous record conclusively showing that there was a genuine contract between the company and respondent No. 2 - contractor and further that all the workmen were employed by respondent No. 2 and that they could not be considered as workmen of respondent No. 1 - company. Mr. Rele also contended that Schedule 'M' to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are merely guidelines and by no stretch of imagination it could be said that maintenance of cleanliness and the work of cleaning and sweeping was any statutory obligation upon respondent No. 1 - company. Mr. Rele contended that the Labour Court and the revisional Court on the basis of material on record have recorded a pure finding of fact which cannot be labelled as per verse and, as such, in its extraordinary jurisdiction, this Court should not disturb the said concurrent finding of fact. On the aspects of employer - employee relationship as also the principles to be applied, Mr. Rele relied upon the decisions reported in (1996-II-LLJ-42) (SC) and (1963-I-LLJ-126) (SC).

12. Mr. Gonsalves for the petitioner took us through the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act and contended that the Labour Court has extremely wide jurisdiction and power and, in fact, the Labour Court under the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act is having wider powers than those under the provisions of the I.D. Act. Mr. Gonsalves contended that it will be a travesty of justice if the Labour Court was to be divested of its jurisdiction merely on the plea of the employer that relationship of an employer and employee is denied or not admitted. Mr. Gonsalves contended that even if such plea is raised, the Labour Court under the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act would have wide jurisdiction to determine such an issue. Mr. Gonsalves further contended that even when some fake contract is pleaded, the Court will have jurisdiction to go into the issue as to the genuineness of the contract and find out whether it is a mere facade and camouflage to hide the real relationship. Mr. Gonsalves contended that Schedule 'M' of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act casts a statutory duty of maintaining a particular degree of hygiene and cleanliness and, therefore, if the work done by the workmen is required to be statutorily done, such workmen have to be held to be direct workmen under the company. Mr. Gonsalves contended that both so the Courts below have not addressed themselves to the settled principles to determine whether the relationship of employer and employee exists between the parties. Both the Courts were overwhelmed by the paper work and by the voluminous record produced by the contractor and the company but failed to remove the smoke - screen or veil to find the real relationship between the workmen and the company. Mr. Gonsalves, thereafter, took us through the various terms of the agreement as also the oral evidence adduced by the parties and submitted that the terms of agreement and evidence on record clinchingly point out that respondent No. 2 was a mere name lender and, in fact, the entire control over the service conditions of these workmen and the supervision was exercised by respondent No. 1 - company and respondent No. 2 - contractor had no role to play. Mr. Gonsalves, in this behalf, relied on several decisions in support of his different submissions. The decisions are : and (1955-I-LLJ-688) (SC).

14. Mr. Singhvi for the intervenor took us through the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act and especially through the definition of 'employee' and' employer' thereunder. Mr. Singhvi submitted that the arguments of Mr. Rele that the judgments of the Apex Court in Gujarat Electricity Board and the Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Printing Co.'s case lay down that the issue of genuineness of a contract can be raised only by way of raising an industrial dispute under the I.D. Act is misconceived. He contended that every judgment has to be read in the context of the facts and no ratio could be derived out of the context. Mr. Singhvi submitted that on proper reading of the provisions of the MRTU & PULP Act and the judgment of the Apex Court in Gujarat Electricity Board's case, it has to be held that the Labour Court under the revisions of the MRTU & PULP Act has ample jurisdiction to go into the issue as to whether the alleged contract is genuine or otherwise and decide the issue regarding employer-employee relationship between the parties. Mr. Singhvi, in support of his various contentions, relied upon the judgments , 1991 Appeal Cases 495 and .

Section 60 of the MRTU and PULP Act is as under :-

"60. Bar of suits :- No civil Court, shall entertain any suit subject matter of a complaint or application to the Industrial Court or Labour Court under this Act; or which has formed the subject of an interim or final order of the Industrial Court or Labour Court under this Act".

In our opinion, all these provisions clearly show that not only the Labour and Industrial Courts established under the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act have wide jurisdiction, they are also having the jurisdiction to decide any question that may be incidental or necessary to be decided. As such, it is difficult to appreciate the submission that the moment the employer raises a plea that he is not the employer, the Labour Court will not have any jurisdiction. In complaints filed if the question is raised, if employer and employee relationship is disputed or the question regarding genuineness or otherwise of the contract arises, the Labour Court or the Industrial Court under the provisions of the MRTU and PULP Act, in our opinion, will have ample jurisdiction to adjudicate upon and decide such a question. Otherwise, the simplest way to defeat any proceedings would be for the employer merely to deny the existence of relationship. Of course, in such proceedings, the existence of such relationship obviously will have to be proved before the complaint could be entertained and in the absence of establishing such a relationship, the Labour Court would not have the jurisdiction. But that does not mean that the fact of such relationship has to be established in some other earlier proceedings. When disputed, the relationship can be established before the Labour Court or Industrial Court under the MRTU and PULP Act itself. The provisions of Section 30, in our opinion, clearly support this proposition. In this behalf, reference to the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in Vishwanth Tukaram, General Manager, Central Railway, reported in 59 Bom. L.R. 892 may be useful. In fact, there the Full Bench was concerned with the jurisdiction of the authority under the Payment of Wages Act, which jurisdiction as is well known is quite a limited jurisdiction. It was pointed out that in Sarin v. Patil, 53 Bom. L.R. 674, it was held that it may also be necessary to decide whether the employee was employed by the employer or not, because the question of a contract can only arise provided there was employment. Therefore, in order to determine what the contract was, what the terms of the contract were, what were the wages due under the contract, it might become necessary for the authority to determine whether in the first place there was an employment or not. Then referring to the decision in Mushran v. Patil 53 Bom. L.R. 1009, it was pointed out that in the said case the emphasis was that it was competent to the authority to determine whether during the relevant period the employee was, in fact, employed by the employer. Thereafter, reference was made to the decision in C. S. Lal v. Shaikh Badshah 56 Bom. L.R. 859 and the Full Bench held that the said decision correctly enunciates the principle emerging from the authorities, viz. :-